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Court of Appeals of Maryland
I. ATToRNEY MALPRACTICE
A. Facilitating Claims for Legal Malpractice in Maryland
In Thomas v. Bethea,1 the Court of Appeals held that the ordinary
standard of negligence applies to legal malpractice actions based on
wrongful settlement recommendations.2 The court further con-
cluded that the measure of damages should be the difference between
the actual settlement and the likely recovery if the case had gone to
trial.3 The majority determined that trial courts should measure dam-
ages by using the "trial within a trial" method, in which the jury in the
malpractice trial is asked to determine what a jury would have
awarded had the underlying case been tried.4 In so ruling, the Court
of Appeals made it substantially easier for potential plaintiffs to sue
their attorneys successfully for negligently recommending settlement.5
This decision contravenes the public policy in favor of settlement as a
preferred means of resolving disputes by dissuading attorneys from
settling cases.
1. The Case.-In August 1981, the petitioner, attorney David
Thomas (Thomas), agreed to represent minor Marsharina Bethea
(Bethea) and her mother, Gerrine Bethea.6 Bethea's mother alleged
that her daughter had suffered lead paint poisoning from three Balti-
more City residences.7 Thomas filed suit on behalf of Bethea and her
mother in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the three land-
lords.8 Although Thomas served the owners of two of the properties,9
1. 351 Md. 513, 718 A.2d 1187 (1998).
2. Id. at 530, 718 A.2d at 1195.
3. Id. at 533, 718 A.2d at 1197.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 541, 718 A.2d at 1201 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
infra text accompanying notes 137-140.
6. See 351 Md. at 515, 718 A.2d at 1188.
7. See id. at 515-16, 718 A.2d at 1188. The residences were, respectively: 209 East
Lafayette Avenue, 1322 Myrtle Avenue, and 1217 East Preston Street. See id. at 515, 718
A.2d at 1188.
8. See id. at 516, 718 A.2d at 1188-89.
9. See id., 718 A.2d at 1188. Thomas served the owners of the respective properties at
209 East Lafayette Avenue and 1322 Myrtle Avenue. See id.
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he was unable to serve W.H. Groscup and Sons, Inc. (Groscup), the
owner of the third property (the Preston Street property).t0
In December 1983, the two served defendants offered to settle in
the amount of $2500, but conditioned the offer on a general release
of all three defendants.'" Allegedly relying upon Thomas's recom-
mendation, Bethea's mother accepted the settlement offer in ex-
change for her execution of a general release of liability.12
In March 1995, almost twelve years after her mother accepted the
settlement, Bethea filed suit against Thomas in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City.' 3 She alleged that Thomas had failed to "properly in-
vestigate, prosecute, and litigate her claim," 4 and asserted that
Thomas's settlement recommendation to her mother was "grossly in-
adequate to cover the damages."' 5 After the Court of Special Ap-
peals's decision in Prande v. Bell, 6 Bethea amended her complaint to
further allege that Thomas's 1983 settlement "was one that no reason-
able attorney, having undertaken a reasonable investigation of the
facts and law as would be appropriate under the circumstances, and
with the knowledge of the same facts, would have made."' 7 Bethea
later stipulated that Thomas's violation of the standard of care con-
cerned only his handling of the case as it pertained to Groscup, the




13. See id. Bethea was presumably able to overcome any statute of limitations objection
because she was a minor at the time her injury occurred. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD.
PROC. § 5-201(a) (1984) (allowing a minor to file an action that has already passed the
statute of limitations deadline within three years of reaching age of majority).
14. Thomas, 351 Md. at 516, 718 A.2d at 1189.
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
16. 105 Md. App. 636, 660 A.2d 1055 (1995). In Prande, the Court of Special Appeals
held that
to state a cause of action for legal malpractice based on a recommendation that a
case be, or not be, settled, the plaintiff must specifically allege that the attorney's
recommendation in regard to settlement was one that no reasonable attorney,
having undertaken a reasonable investigation into the facts and law as would be
appropriate under the circumstances, and with knowledge of the same facts,
would have made.
Id. at 656, 660 A.2d at 1065.
17. Thomas, 351 Md. at 516, 718 A.2d at 1189 (internal quotation marks omitted) (cita-
tion omitted).
18. See id. ("[H]er contention was not that $2500 was an unreasonable consideration
for releasing the owners of the other two properties, but rather that a valuable case against
Groscup was surrendered for no compensation at all."). Bethea was presumably contend-
ing that Thomas's failure to serve Groscup when he had $300,000 of insurance on his
property was the essence of Thomas's negligence. See id. at 516-17, 718 A.2d at 1189.
2000]
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At trial, Bethea presented evidence that her mother had put
Groscup on notice of her special vulnerability prior to leasing the
Preston Street property by informing him of Bethea's already elevated
lead level, and that Groscup had responded by assuring Bethea's
mother that the apartment contained no lead-based paint.1 9 Bethea
also offered evidence that there had been flaking or peeling lead
paint at the Preston Street property and that there had been $300,000
of insurance on the property. 20 Bethea's expert witness, C. Christo-
pher Brown, Esquire, testified that the settlement amount to which
Thomas had agreed was inadequate, and that Thomas had behaved
unreasonably in recommending that Bethea's mother accept such a
settlement.21 Mr. Brown conceded that some mitigating factors might
make such a small settlement amount reasonable,22 but that Bethea's
case was a "strong" one that "should not merely [have been] settled
for $2,500, but ... which should [have been] off to a trial for however
much the jury determines is an appropriate sum. 2 3
Thomas responded that the case against Groscup had been a
weak one, due partly to conflicting evidence, and that Bethea's
mother herself wanted a settlement.24 In support of Thomas's asser-
tion that he "got the best settlement possible," his expert witness,
George Russell, Esquire, stated that "the settlement made by Mr.
Thomas was not only reasonable but because of the problems he had
in the case was ultimately a gift because had the case gone to trial he
could not have won the case." 25
In response to the court's request that it resolve a number of spe-
cific issues, the jury determined that Groscup had been negligent con-
cerning the hazard posed by the lead paint, that the presence of that
hazard was a substantial factor in causing Bethea's injury, and that
Thomas's settlement recommendation was one that no reasonable at-
19. See id. at 516-17, 718 A.2d at 1189.
20. See id. at 517, 718 A.2d at 1189.
21. See id. Mr. Brown asserted that:
the settlement that was entered into by Mr. Thomas was woefully inadequate in
terms of what the... reasonable amount would have been in light of the facts of
the case and the law applicable to the case; and that as a consequence no reasona-
ble attorney should have entered into such a settlement.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. See id. According to Mr. Brown, a small settlement amount might be reasonable "if
the landlord had no assets or threatened bankruptcy, or if the client herself were in some
way irresponsible." Id. Mr. Brown asserted that those circumstances were not present in
Bethea's case. See id.
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. See id. at 517 n.2, 718 A.2d at 1189 n.2.
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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torney would have made.26 Moreover, the jury found that a reasona-
ble settlement amount would have been $25,000, and that Bethea had
sustained $125,000 in damages resulting from her exposure to lead
paint at the Preston Street property.27 Pursuant to these special ver-
dicts, the court entered judgment in Bethea's favor in the amount of
$125,000.28 Shortly thereafter, the trial court vacated this judgment,
granted Thomas's motion for judgment N.O.V. and entered judgment
in his favor.29 The court found that the proper measure of damages
"would have been the amount of a reasonable settlement with Gros-
cup in 1983, not the value" of Bethea's claim against the landlord, and
determined that Bethea had presented no evidence at trial as to what
a reasonable settlement would have been at that time.3 °
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed
the judgment N.O.V., and reinstated the jury's verdict, awarding
Bethea $125,000 in damages. 3 1 The Court of Special Appeals relied
on its prior decision in Prande v. Bell, and concluded that evidence of
the fair settlement value was unnecessary.32 The Court of Appeals
subsequently granted certiorari to review the Court of Special Ap-
peals's decision.33
2. Legal Background.-
a. Attorney Malpractice and Settlements in Maryland.-In the
1995 case of Prande v. Bell,34 the Court of Special Appeals considered
for the first time in Maryland "whether an attorney may be held liable
for malpractice because of allegedly inadequate settlements of per-
sonal injury claims. '35 The plaintiff in Prande had been involved in
two separate motor vehicle accidents and claimed that the other driv-
ers had been at fault in each of them.36 The plaintiff retained an
attorney to represent her in suits against both drivers.37 Prior to the
first case, the plaintiff, relying on her attorney's advice, settled for
$7500.38 Subsequently, and again relying on her attorney's recom-
26. See id. at 517, 718 A.2d at 1189.
27. See id. at 517-18, 718 A.2d at 1189.
28. See id. at 518, 718 A.2d at 1189.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 518, 718 A.2d at 1189-90.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 515, 718 A.2d at 1188.
34. 105 Md. App. 636, 660 A.2d at 1055 (1995).
35. Id. at 639, 660 A.2d at 1056.
36. See id. at 641, 660 A.2d at 1057.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 643, 660 A.2d at 1058.
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mendation, the plaintiff settled her suit against the second driver for
$3000.3' The plaintiff subsequently reneged on the settlement with
the second driver, but the trial court nonetheless enforced it.4" The
plaintiff then sued her attorney for malpractice for recommending
the two settlements.41 The circuit court granted all of the defendants'
summary judgment motions on the basis of nonmutual collateral es-
42toppel,4 reasoning that the plaintiff had agreed to the settlements
with the tort defendants, and therefore was precluded from relitigat-
ing those claims against her attorneys.43
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the cir-
cuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings.44 In its
opinion, the court recognized that no other jurisdictions have applied
collateral estoppel to a legal malpractice action against an attorney in
the context of an earlier settlement. 45 The court concluded that
[w] hen a client sues a lawyer for malpractice resulting from
the settlement of an earlier claim and the issue of the attor-
ney's negligence was not decided in the earlier adjudication,
the party claiming the malpractice has not been given a fair
opportunity to be heard on the issue of the attorney's
negligence.46
The court determined that it would violate public policy to allow attor-
neys to rely on collateral estoppel in this context, explaining that "[i] t
would be patently unfair to allow attorneys who may have committed
malpractice in handling a case to turn around and rely on a defense
that effectively says that, because the client knowingly settled his or
39. See id. at 644, 660 A.2d at 1059.
40. See id. at 644-45, 660 A.2d at 1059.
41. See id. at 645, 660 A.2d at 1059.
42. Traditional collateral estoppel principles dictate that a party may be estopped from
relitigating an issue that has been determined by a valid finaljudgment. See CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A, at 724 (5th ed. 1994). Nonmutual collateral
estoppel allows a new party to invoke collateral estoppel against a party who had previously
litigated and lost on a particular issue in a prior action. See id. § 100A, at 726-29. For many
years, the general rule was that mutuality was required, i.e., that the only parties who could
invoke collateral estoppel were those involved in the action in which the issue was initially
decided. See id. § 100A, at 728. A number of jurisdictions, however, abandoned the
nonmutuality principle following the landmark California decision of Bernhard v. Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Ass', 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942). See WRIGHT, supra,
§ 100A, at 729.
43. Prande, 105 Md. App. at 646, 660 A.2d at 1060.
44. Id. at 661-62, 660 A.2d at 1067.
45. See id. at 648-52, 660 A.2d at 1061-63 (discussing cases from New York, New Jersey,
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, and citing cases from Oregon, Alabama, Con-
necticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Missouri).
46. Id. at 652, 660 A.2d at 1063.
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her case, the issue of whether the attorney was negligent was also set-
tled."47 Noting, however, that "there will, of necessity, be a range for
honest differences of opinion in making settlement recommenda-
tions," the court concluded that "[a] recommendation to settle or not
to settle on particular terms is not malpractice simply because another
lawyer, or even many other lawyers, would not have made the same
recommendation under the alleged circumstances. '"48
Because of the concern about lawyers being afraid to settle for
fear of possible malpractice suits, the court adopted a heightened
standard for finding malpractice in the context of allegedly negligent
settlement.49 The court held that "the plaintiff must specifically allege
that the attorney's recommendation in regard to settlement was one
that no reasonable attorney, having undertaken a reasonable investi-
gation into the facts and law as would be appropriate under the cir-
cumstances, and with knowledge of the same facts, would have
made."50
b. Attorney Malpractice in the Context of Settlement in OtherJuris-
dictions.-A number of courts from other states have considered the
issue of whether a client may sue his or her attorney for recom-
mending a settlement that is later determined to be disadvantageous.
Most courts have concluded that a client may sue his or her attorney
in malpractice for negligently recommending settlement but have de-
clined to adopt the heightened negligence standard enumerated in
Prande.5' Also, the defense of nonmutual collateral estoppel has been
47. Id. at 654, 660 A.2d at 1064.
48. Id. at 656, 660 A.2d at 1065.
49. See id.
50. Id.; see also supra notes 133-134.
51. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brennan, 625 N.E.2d 1188, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that a plaintiff who has settled his or her underlying case may file a malpractice action
"where it can be shown that the plaintiff had to settle for a lesser amount than she could
reasonably expect without the malpractice"); Cook v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287, 291-92
(Minn. 1985) (concluding that "[the] plaintiffs malpractice action is not limited to in-
stances where the results in the minor's personal injury action were the result of fraud on
the part of the minor's attorney" and that a prior court approved settlement did "not make
this malpractice suit different from any other malpractice action on the standard of con-
duct required of the defendant attorney"); Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo.
App. 1994) (declining to adopt a "bright line" rule in cases where plaintiffs present "sub-
missible case [s] of negligence" involving a settlement); Schaefer v. Manfredi, 549 N.Y.S.2d
59, 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (deciding that "[a] cause of action for legal malpractice is
viable despite the plaintiffs settlement of the underlying action where such settlement was
compelled because of the mistakes of the defendant, the plaintiff s former counsel" (inter-




rejected by nearly all the courts in which that defense has been
raised.52
Pennsylvania is the only jurisdiction that has not permitted a mal-
practice action against an attorney based on negligence in recom-
mending settlement. 53 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that
rejected this type of suit, Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer,
Shilobod and Gutnick,54 involved plaintiffs who retained a law firm in a
medical malpractice action for the death of their infant son following
surgery.5 5  After agreeing to a $26,500 settlement, the plaintiffs
changed their minds, but the trial court upheld the settlement.56 The
plaintiffs then filed suit against their lawyers, alleging fraudulent mis-
representation, fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, breach of
contract, negligence, and outrageous conduct." In the opinion, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted that nonmutual collateral estop-
pel did not bar the suit, but found that public policy dictated against
it.58 The court determined that only a settlement procured by fraud
could serve as the basis for attorney malpractice in settlement. 59 The
52. See, e.g., Cook, 366 N.W.2d at 290-91 (concluding that collateral estoppel does not
apply, as the issues before the court were not adjudicated in the underlying claim);
Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Mo. App. 1994) (reasoning that because specific
issues had not been litigated in the underlying action, "defendants' argument of collateral
estoppel does not satisfy the threshold requirement that the issues be identical");
Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1305 (N.J. 1992) (determining that collateral estop-
pel should not preclude a legal malpractice action from proceeding because "[t]he fact
that a party received a settlement that was 'fair and equitable' does not necessarily mean
that the party's attorney was competent or that the party would not have received a more
favorable settlement had the party's incompetent attorney been competent"); Muhammad
v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa. 1991)
(finding that "it is ... evident that the matter is not barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel," because the issues in the subsequent legal malpractice action have not been
previously litigated in the underlying action). Other courts have rejected the defense of
nonmutual collateral estoppel for the same reason the Prande court rejected it. The mal-
practice suit is based upon the attorney's alleged negligence, which usually is not an issue
at all in the underlying case that was settled. See, e.g., Lowman v. Karp, 476 N.W.2d 428,
429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); King v. Jones, 483 P.2d 815, 818 (Or. 1971); Titsworth v.
Mondo, 407 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797-98 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
53. See Lynn A. Epstein, Post-Settlement Malpractice: Undoing the Done Dea4 46 CATH. U. L.
REv. 453, 453-54 (1997) (observing that "[iln every state except Pennsylvania, a client is
permitted to proceed with the theory that his attorney negligently negotiated an agree-
ment despite the fact that his client consented to settlement").
54. 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1991).
55. Id. at 1347.
56. See id. at 1347-48.
57. See id. at 1348.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court stated:
[W] e will not permit a suit to be filed by a dissatisfied plaintiff against his attorney
following a settlement to which that plaintiff agreed, unless that plaintiff can show
[VOL. 59:743
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court reasoned that this conclusion was necessary in light of the
"strong and historical public policy of encouraging settlements. "60
The court explained that allowing such suits would "create chaos in
[the] civil litigation system" because lawyers would be reluctant to set-
tle cases for fear of being sued.6"
As noted, the Muhammad decision is only followed in Penn-
sylvania;62 other jurisdictions have rejected the Muhammad ap-
proach.6 3  For example, in Ziegelheim v. Apollo,64 the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that
[a]lthough we encourage settlements, we recognize that liti-
gants rely heavily on the professional advice of counsel when
they decide whether to accept or reject offers of settlement,
and we insist that the lawyers of our state advise clients with
respect to settlements with the same skill, knowledge, and
diligence with which they pursue all other legal tasks.6
The New Jersey court determined that frivolous claims made by dis-
gruntled clients did not present a compelling concern, because any
potential plaintiffs "must allege particular facts in support of their
claims of attorney incompetence and may not litigate complaints con-
taining mere generalized assertions of malpractice."66
The Connecticut Supreme Court similarly rejected Muhammad in
Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky.6 7 Grayson involved a
he was fraudulently induced to settle the original action. An action should not lie
against an attorney for malpractice based on negligence and/or contract princi-
ples when that client has agreed to a settlement. Rather, only cases of fraud
should be actionable.
Id.
60. Id. at 1349.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
63. See Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the
language in Muhammad transcends "the proposition that settled cases should not be readily
revisited. In essence, defendants ask us to grant attorneys immunity from civil liability in
cases where their clients have settled, absent some affirmative misrepresentation or fraud
by the attorney."); McWhirt v. Heavey, 550 N.W.2d 327, 334-35 (Neb. 1996) (stating that
the court's decision to decline adopting a rule that would insulate attorneys from negli-
gence arising from their settled cases "is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions that
have addressed this issue"); Malfabon v. Garcia, 898 P.2d 107, 109 (Nev. 1995) (rejecting
the rationale espoused in Muhammad, and asserting that "the standard of proof should be
simple negligence when an attorney is sued by a client, even if the client has approved and
consummated a settlement"); Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1304 (N.J. 1992) (re-
jecting the "severe rule" espoused by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Muhammad).
64. 607 A.2d 1298 (N.J. 1992).
65. Id. at 1304.
66. Id. at 1306.
67. 646 A.2d 195, 199 (Conn. 1994).
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plaintiff who sued the attorneys who had represented her in a di-
vorce.68 She alleged that her attorneys had failed to prepare properly
her case, which resulted in her agreeing to a settlement that did not
reflect her legal entitlement.69 The Connecticut Supreme Court af-
firmed a jury award of $1,500,000 in her malpractice action against
her attorneys.7v In so doing, the court refused to "adopt a rule that
promotes the finality of settlements and judgments at the expense of a
client who, in reasonable reliance on the advice of his or her attorney,
agrees to a settlement only to discover that the attorney had failed to
exercise the degree of skill and learning required of attorneys in the
circumstances. ''7 ' The court explained that although settlements
were to be encouraged, lawyers must be held to the same standard of
care with respect to settlements as with other legal tasks.72 The court
noted that because settlements are often in the best interest of clients,
it was doubtful that attorneys would be unwilling to recommend them
simply because of the possibility of future litigation.73 The court also
rejected the defendant attorneys' "prediction of a dramatic increase
in legal malpractice claims by parties . . .who, after judgments, have
become disenchanted with settlement agreements negotiated by their
attorneys," reasoning that its decision had not created any "new claim
or theory of recovery," but had simply refused "to narrow the existing
common law remedy for attorney malpractice."74
c. Measure of Proof and Damages.-In evaluating Bethea's
claim against Thomas, the Thomas majority analyzed the measure and
proof of damages that flowed from Thomas's negligence in recom-
mending settlement. In Thomas, Bethea based her case against
Thomas upon Thomas's wrongful settlement recommendation-
"that, upon his recommendation, a valuable case against Groscup was
given away for no recompense."75 Consequently, Thomas only sought
as damages "the amount she likely would have recovered from Gros-
cup had the case proceeded to trial-the difference between that
amount and zero."76 As the Thomas court noted, practical difficulties
necessitate plaintiffs like Bethea to frame their cases in precisely this
68. Id. at 198.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 209.
71. Id. at 199.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 200.
74. Id.
75. Thomas, 351 Md. at 531, 718 A.2d at 1196.
76. Id.
[VOL. 59:743
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fashion-"to assert that, given the inadequacy of the settlement offer,
the lawyer should have recommended that the offer be rejected and
that the litigation be pursued to adjudication.""7 In fact, the court
observed that this approach is the one that courts most commonly
take.7 Furthermore, that approach is often implemented "through
what has become known as a trial within a trial, or a suit within a suit,
i.e., litigating before the malpractice jury the underlying case that was
never tried."79
When a plaintiff uses the trial with a trial approach, he or she
must recreate the underlying action.8" Thus, as the Fourth Circuit has
noted, with the trial within a trial method, "a plaintiff in a legal mal-
practice action is given the opportunity to litigate before the malprac-
tice jury the underlying case as it would have been tried in the absence
of the attorney's negligence."81 When courts use this approach,
" It] he malpractice jury decides what the client should receive from
adjudication of the underlying claim, and the client's damages are the
difference between that amount and the amount accepted at settle-
ment." 2 Numerous commentators have criticized the trial within a




80. Polly A. Lord, Comment, Loss of Chance in Legal Malpractice, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 1479,
1480-81 (1986) (stating that "[m]ost courts determine whether a claim is actionable by the
trial-within-a-trial method whenever the client's claim is based on an attorney's negligence
regarding litigation"). With the trial-within-a-trial method, "the client's cause of action
depends on the resolution of the underlying action for which the attorney-client relation-
ship was formed. The reasoning is that if the result of the action would have been the
same, the client suffered no injury due to the attorney's negligence." Id
81. Briggs v. Cochran, No. 98-2439, 1999 WL 1208420, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 1999).
82. Id. at *4.
83. See Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Layers' Responses, 107 HARv.
L. REv. 1557, 1568-69 (1994) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (observing that the trial
within a trial approach's inherent complexity "may discourage clients from suing their
lawyers," and also that this approach potentially allows "an attorney's negligence to shield
him from malpractice liability"); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsi-
bility, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 101, 148-50 (1995) (questioning the merits of the trial within a
trial approach because "aside from its expense, the doctrine gives a client the task of litigat-
ing a former case against the client's own former lawyer, who knows the strengths and
weaknesses of the case, perhaps from the client's own confidences"); Lord, supra note 80,
at 1480-85 (describing how the trial within a trial approach works and asserting that "dissat-
isfied courts have struggled with [this] method, partly because of the impossibility of accu-
rate reconstruction, and partly because of the client's difficult burden of proof"); Melissa
A. Thomas, When is an Attorney's Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Missouri Not Legal Malpractice?, 63
Mo. L. REv. 595, 600-01 (1998) (noting that a client's recovery may be denied, irrespective
of how egregious the attorney's wrong may have been, "if the attorney can establish that
the claimant would not have been successful on the underlying claim").
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In affirming the Court of Special Ap-
peals's decision, the Court of Appeals held that it would 'join the cho-
rus of States that have rejected Muhammad' and allow a cause of
action against lawyers for negligently recommending settlement.
8 4
The Thomas court held that a traditional standard of negligence
should apply in actions based on professional negligence, 85 and that
the measure of damages should be assessed by using the trial within a
trial method, "i.e., litigating before the malpractice jury the underly-
ing case that was never tried.
86
a. Attorneys' Liability for Negligently Recommending Settlement.-
The Thomas majority then noted that the Prande decision was not
unique, as most courts that had considered the issue have also con-
cluded that a client may sue their attorney for negligently recom-
mending settlement.8 7 Furthermore, according to the majority, these
courts also decided two important sub-issues.8 8 First, that nonmutual
collateral estoppel did not constitute a defense to these types of
suits. 8 9 Also, that concern over the effect such suits would have on the
willingness of attorneys to settle, although legitimate, could not "over-
ride the application of well-established principles of tort law."9 The
Thomas court also noted that other issues such as the proper measure
of damages, the nature of proof required, and need for expert testi-
mony "are doubting, but have not proved insurmountable."'"
The Thomas court next pointed out that of all of the jurisdictions
that had considered the issue only a few declined to permit an action
against an attorney based on a negligent settlement recommenda-
tion.92 Of these, the most notable was Pennsylvania.9" The court
84. Thomas, 351 Md. at 529, 718 A.2d at 1195.
85. Id. The court asserted that "we see no reason to adopt any heightened standard of
negligence." Id.
86. Id. at 533, 718 A.2d at 1197.
87. Id. at 520, 718 A.2d at 1191.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 521, 718 A.2d at 1191 (explaining that a "malpractice suit does not consti-
tute a collateral attack on the settlement itself ... which remains unaffected by a verdict for
or against the attorney").
90. Id. at 521-22, 718 A.2d at 1191 (noting that other courts have used reasoning simi-
lar to that of the Prande court in that "they have treated the negotiation and recommenda-
tion of settlements much the same as other legal work done by an attorney and have
concluded that a lawyer may be held liable, at least under some circumstances, if the rec-
ommendation is the product of professional negligence and the client can prove harm").
91. Id. at 523, 718 A.2d at 1192.
92. See id at 524, 718 A.2d at 1192.
93. See id. (citing Muhammed v. Strassburger, McKenna, Shilobod, and Gutnik, 587
A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1991)); see also supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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noted, however, that not only was Pennsylvania in the minority, but
many courts had expressly rejected the Pennsylvania approach.94
Looking to the elements of attorney malpractice in Maryland, 95
the court concluded that "[t]here is nothing extraordinary about ap-
plying... [these principles] to an attorney's recommendation regard-
ing the settlement of a dispute in, or susceptible to, litigation."96 The
court reasoned that because of the statistical likelihood of settlement
in any particular case, clients "rely heavily on their lawyer's recom-
mendation regarding settlement, expecting that the lawyer has a suffi-
cient understanding of the relevant facts, law, and prospects to make
an intelligent recommendation."97 The court, however, refused to
adopt the heightened standard of negligence expressed in Prande, ex-
plaining that a traditional negligence standard, requiring "ordinary
care and diligence.., to a fair average degree of professional skill and
knowledge" would be sufficient.98
b. Measure and Proof of Damages.-In deciding the proper
measure of damages to be awarded, the court first considered and
rejected Thomas's argument that damages should have been limited
to the difference between a reasonable value and the actual settle-
ment obtained.9 The court stated that his formulation would be ap-
propriate in cases where the plaintiff client alleges that had the
defendant attorney performed with "reasonable skill, judgment, and
diligence," that the "defendant in the underlying case would and
could have settled for substantially more. 100 In this case, however, the
court noted that the plaintiff had alleged, instead, that "given the in-
adequacy of the settlement offer, the [defendant] lawyer should have
recommended that the offer be rejected and that the litigation be
94. See Thomas, 351 Md. at 525, 718 A.2d at 1193.
95. The Thomas court observed that "a former client may have an action against a law-
yer if the client can prove (1) the attorney's employment, (2) the attorney's neglect of a
reasonable duty, and (3) loss to the client proximately caused by that neglect of duty." Id.
at 528-29, 718 A.2d at 1195 (citing Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 128, 492 A.2d 618,
624 (1985)).
96. Id. at 529, 718 A.2d at 1195.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 529-30, 718 A.2d at 1195 (quoting Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 611, 31
A.2d 312, 314 (1943)). In support of this determination, the Thomas majority pointed to
similar conclusions reached by courts in other states and noted that it was "aware of no
indication that [the application of a traditional negligence standard to these types of suits]
has caused any significant problem." Id.
99. See id. at 531-33, 718 A.2d at 1196-97.
100. Id. at 531-32, 718 A.2d at 1196.
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pursued to adjudication."101 Thus, "when so framed, the measure of
damages necessarily becomes the difference between what was ac-
cepted in settlement and what likely would have been received from
the adjudication.' 2
The court further determined that the ordinary way to imple-
ment this approach is to have a trial within a trial-"litigating before
the malpractice jury the underlying case that was never tried." °3 Al-
though the court recognized that the trial within a trial method has
been widely criticized on a variety of grounds, the court nonetheless
observed that "[t] he courts have not seemed eager to adopt any of the
alternatives . . . so the trial within a trial approach continues to be
used," and concluded that "it was not an inappropriate method in this
case.''
1 04
The court determined that prevailing under this method re-
quired Bethea to prove five elements. 05 They were the following:
(1) that Thomas was negligent in recommending acceptance
of the settlement; (2) that Groscup could have been served
within a reasonable time in order to permit the action to
proceed against it; (3) that Groscup was liable to Marsharina
under a theory pled in the complaint against it and had no
exculpating defense to the action; (4) that Marsharina suf-
fered compensable injury; and (5) the amount of damages
that (i) would have been award by the jury had the case
against Groscup proceeded to trial, and (ii) would have been
collectible with reasonable effort. 106
Although Thomas indicated that there was no evidence suggesting
what a reasonable settlement with Groscup would have been, or even
any evidence that a reasonable settlement could have been reached,
the court found that the testimony of Bethea's expert witness "sufficed
to support the jury's determination that no reasonable attorney would
101. Id. at 532-33, 718 A.2d at 1197. The court recognized that this position was a more
common approach for plaintiffs in these types of suits, because of the "practical difficulties
in establishing the reasonable prospect of a better settlement." Id. at 532, 718 A.2d at
1197.
102. Id. at 533, 718 A.2d at 1197.
103. Id.
104. 351 Md. at 534, 718 A.2d at 1197; see also Briggs v. Cochran, No. 92-2439, 1999 WL
1208420, at *4 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 1999) (discussing the use of the trial within a trial ap-
proach in Thomas, and finding that "[a] 'trial within a trial' is arguably appropriate in cases
like Thomas in which the attorney's negligence completely forecloses the client's claim
from proceeding to adjudication").
105. 351 Md. at 534-35, 718 A.2d at 1197-98.
106. Id.
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have recommended acceptance of the settlement... and that the case
should have proceeded to trial."10 7
e. Judges Chasanow's and Cathell's Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.-In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Chasanow,
joined by Judge Cathell, agreed with the majority holding that the
negligent recommendation of a settlement can serve as the basis for a
legal malpractice suit.1 °8 Judge Chasanow, however, disagreed with
the majority on the appropriateness of the trial within a trial method
for determining the amount of damages.10 9 Judge Chasanow indi-
cated that he would have affirmed the $25,000 verdict for reasonable
settlement value.110 Judge Chasanow pointed out that it was far from
certain that Bethea would prevail in a trial against her former land-
lord and "[t]hus, the most the plaintiff lost by settling was not the full
trial recovery against the landlord but the less than 100% probability
of prevailing multiplied by the likely damages." '111 Judge Chasanow
noted that any award must take into account the chance that the
plaintiff would not have won and the concomitant costs saved by not
going to trial.1 1
2
Judge Chasanow also asserted that the trial within a trial method
"permits irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence to serve as a basis
for the jury's findings."11 3 In other words, to prevail in such an action,
the plaintiff must call other attorneys to testify both about the
probability of winning the underlying case as well as the inadequacy of
the settlement.1 14 Judge Chasanow pointed out that such testimony
would certainly influence the jury in a highly prejudicial way, for such
testimony is intrinsically speculative.115
Judge Chasanow further criticized the trial within a trial ap-
proach because it allows any statements that the attorney previously
107. Id. at 535, 718 A.2d at 1198 (stating "that determination, especially when based on
the heightened standard of liability enunciated in Prande v. Bell amounted to a determina-
tion of negligence on the part of Mr. Thomas").
108. See id. at 536, 718 A.2d at 1198 (Chasanow, J., dissenting and concurring).
109. See id. ("Lawyers too are entitled to justice when they are parties to litigation and I
cannot think of a more unjust and unfair procedure than the 'trial within a trial' proce-
dure . . . ." (internal footnote omitted)).
110. Id. at 537, 718 A.2d at 1199.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 538, 718 A.2d at 1199.
114. See id. (explaining that calling other attorneys to testify about the plaintiff's likeli-
hood of prevailing in the underlying case "will obviously influence the jury in their 'trial




made to his or her client to be introduced into evidence as admissions
by a party opponent. 16 Judge Chasanow concluded:
It seems absurd to have a trial within a trial where a plaintiffs
declaration and ad damnum clause can be used to prove the
plaintiffs liability and damages, and this is in addition to al-
lowing expert attorney witnesses to tell the jury their assess-
ment of liability and their opinion as to what a reasonable
damage award should be.1 17
Moreover, Judge Chasanow disagreed with the use of an ordinary,
rather than a heightened, standard in malpractice actions for negli-
gent settlement recommendations.118 He implied that using the ordi-
nary negligence standard, combined with the trial within a trial
approach, to prove an attorney's negligence "seems absurd .... This
Court would not permit any other class of tort defendants to be
judged as unfairly as it permits attorneys to be judged in legal mal-
practice cases."119
Finally, Judge Chasanow lamented that the majority's decision al-
lows disgruntled plaintiffs two bites at the apple. Judge Chasanow
opined that a plaintiff who has followed his or her attorney's advice to
settle a claim can simply find another attorney willing to state that
such an inadequate settlement should not have been recom-
mended.1 20 At that point, the plaintiff can file a claim against the
former attorney, seeking the verdict value of the underlying case while
avoiding the risks and costs inevitably associated with a trial.12 ' Rather
than characterizing this approach as a trial within a trial, Judge Chasa-
now conceded that it should appropriately be called "a debacle within
a trial."1 2
2
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals in Thomas v. Bethea deter-
mined that the traditional negligence standard applicable to profes-
116. See id., 718 A.2d at 1199-1200 (noting that under the trial within a trial method,
"since the plaintiffs former attorney is now a party defendant, the pleadings filed by the
attorney on behalf of the plaintiff and the prior optimistic statements and high damage
estimates made by the attorney on behalf of the plaintiff are now admissions by a party-
opponent").
117. Id. at 538-39, 718 A.2d at 1200.
118. See id. at 538-39, 542, 718 A.2d at 1200, 1201.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 541, 718 A.2d at 1201.
121. Id. In the action against his or her former attorney, the plaintiff "can use the decla-
ration filed by the attorney, the letters written to the insurance adjuster, the initial settle-
ment demands and all the positive things the attorney told the client about the case as
admissions to prove liability and damages." Id.
122. Id. at 542.
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sional negligence actions, rather than the heightened standard
enunciated in Prande, is the appropriate one for actions alleging that
an attorney negligently recommended an inadequate settlement.1 23
The court also found that the controversial trial within a trial ap-
proach should be used to determine liability and damages.1 24 In so
ruling, the Thomas majority may have unwittingly ushered in a flood of
frivolous litigation.
a. The Proper Measure of Damages.--Courts have stated that
"[t] he fundamental goal of tort recovery is compensation of the vic-
tim, i.e., to put the victim, insofar as money damages may do so, in the
position he would have been absent the tort," yet have cautioned that
"on the other hand, the law will not put an injured party in a better
position than he would have been in had the wrong not been
done."1 25 At trial, the jury determined that a reasonable settlement
amount would have been $25,000.126 Accordingly, Bethea should not
have been awarded more than this amount. 127  Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals has long held that a plaintiff may not recover for
damages "which are speculative or conjectural." 12 The jury's verdict
finding that the reasonable settlement amount would have been
$25,000 seemed to be based more upon speculation than upon evi-
dence.1 29 Indeed, the trial court noted that the verdict was "a verdict
based on speculation and conjecture concerning values thirteen years
123. Id. at 529, 718 A.2d at 1195.
124. See id. at 534, 718 A.2d at 1197.
125. E.g., Tucker v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973); see also
Tidewater Oil Co. v. Spoerer, 125 A. 601, 602 (Md. 1924) (stating that a tort victim is
entitled to compensatory damages, but that "in no case should the injured party be placed
in a better position than he would be had the wrong not been done"); Weishaar v. Canes-
trale, 241 Md. 676, 685, 217 A.2d 525, 530 (1966) (asserting the general principle that
"[d]amages are supposed to compensate the injured person for the wrong which has been
done him" (citation omitted)).
126. See Thomas, 351 Md. at 518, 718 A.2d at 1189.
127. See Petitioner's Brief at 14, Thomas v. Bethea, 351 Md. 513, 718 A.2d 1187 (1998)
(No. 7) (arguing that to award Bethea more than $25,000 would put her in a better posi-
tion than "[s]he would have been in had the wrong not been done" (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tucker, 356 F. Supp. at 711)).
128. Pickett v. Halslip, 73 Md. App. 89, 104 (1987); see also McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md.
446, 455, 197 A.2d 140, 145 (1964) (considering compensatory damages in the context of
loss of enjoyment, and conceding that there are "numerous cases in which the court has
held that purely speculative damages are not recoverable"); Weishaar, 241 Md. at 685, 217
A.2d at 531 (agreeing with the principle that compensation should not be provided where
it is "so speculative as to create danger of injustice to defendant").
129. See Petitioner's Brief at 32, Thomas (No. 7) (contending that the jury's verdict was
based on speculation and conjecture, thus flying in the face of Maryland law).
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after the trial of the underlying action. '1 3 ° As such, the court's deci-
sion appears to be a countenance damage awards contrary to estab-
lished Maryland law.
b. The Thomas Ruling and its Potential for Discouraging Settle-
ment.-The Court of Special Appeals first recognized a cause of action
in Maryland for negligent settlement in Prande v. Bell.13 1 In Prande,
the court conceded that malpractice actions involving negligent settle-
ment are fundamentally different than other actions for legal mal-
practice because settlement recommendations depend upon a
lawyer's overall judgment and experience, which differs from lawyer
to lawyer. 132 The court therefore realized that there would be a neces-
sary range for honest differences of opinion in settlement recommen-
dations. 133 Due to these concerns, the court established a heightened
standard for plaintiffs who base their malpractice actions on an alleg-
edly negligent recommendation to settle.'33 The Prande court ostensi-
bly set this higher standard for plaintiffs in an attempt to protect
attorneys' legitimate judgment calls as well as to prevent the courts
from being overwhelmed by new cases against attorneys. The Prande
court's concern was well taken. In his dissent in Thomas, Judge Chasa-
now added his own cautionary note about the method used in such
actions when he chose to characterize the "trial within a trial" ap-
proach as "a debacle within a trial."'3 5 The Thomas majority's decision
has the potential to result in chaos in the courts.
As indicated above, the Court of Special Appeals indicated, in
Prande v. Bell, that permitting legal malpractice claims following a
plaintiff's acceptance of a settlement could be problematic, for law-
yers might be increasingly hesitant to settle claims when doing so
would expose them to malpractice suits.' 36 The decision of the
Thomas majority unwisely allows plaintiffs to seek the verdict values of
claims in actions for negligent settlement. In so ruling, the Thomas
130. Bethea v. Thomas, No. 95079017/CL194080, at 6 (1997) (Circuit Court for Balti-
more City).
131. Prande v. Bell, 105 Md. App. 636, 656, 660 A.2d 1055, 1065 (1995).
132. See id. (observing that the process of negotiating settlements is inherently subjective
and inevitably requires an attorney to make judgment calls).
133. See id. at 656, 660 A.2d at 1065.
134. Id.
135. Thomas, 351 Md. at 542, 718 A.2d at 1201. Judge Chasanow stated that "this Court
would not permit any other class of tort defendants to be judged as unfairly as it permits
attorneys to be judged in legal malpractice cases." Id.
136. Prande, 105 Md. App. at 655, 660 A.2d at 1064 (acknowledging the concerns of the
Muhammad court).
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court's ruling is likely to have the chilling effect that the Court of
Special Appeals forecasted in Prande.
As Judge Chasanow indicated in his separate concurrence and
dissent, "[a] ny attorney who has ever settled a plaintiffs case or con-
templates settling a plaintiffs case should carefully read the majority's
opinion. '  Judge Chasanow's warning is both sobering and well
taken, for the Thomas ruling allows plaintiffs two bites at the apple.
After Thomas, any plaintiff who has settled his or her claim would sub-
sequently be able to sue his or her attorney by alleging that such a
settlement recommendation was unreasonable. A plaintiff could thus
avoid the risks and costs associated with trial, obtain payment via set-
tlement, then sue his or her attorney and seek the verdict value of the
underlying case. As the petitioner in Thomas noted, "[s] uch a system
would essentially entitle every plaintiff to settle his case and recover a
sum certain and then, without risk, seek to recover that which may
have been awarded had the underlying matter been tried."13 The
Thomas decision thus allows plaintiffs not only to have two bites at the
apple; it allows plaintiffs to have the second bite without risk and at
the expense of their former attorney. As Judge Chasanow stated, the
Thomas decision means that "[a] ny plaintiff who has accepted an attor-
ney's advice to settle a claim merely has to find another attorney to
opine that the settlement was inadequate and should not have been
recommended."1"9 The client will be able to take these actions at the
expense of his former attorney because he or she "can use the declara-
tion filed by the attorney, the letters written to the insurance adjuster,
the initial settlement demands and all the positive things the attorney
told the client about the case as admissions to prove liability and dam-
ages." 4° The Thomas majority has therefore provided lawyers with a
greater incentive not to settle suits.
While it is true that the Thomas decision seems to bring Maryland
in line with the majority of other states that have considered legal mal-
practice in this context, adoption of legal principles ought not to be a
popularity contest. Various commentators have criticized the trial
within a trial method for reasons other than those suggested by Judges
Chasanow and Cathell.' 4 ' While the Thomas majority acknowledged
137. Thomas, 351 Md. at 541, 718 A.2d at 1201 (Chasanow, J., concurring and
dissenting).
138. Petitioner's Brief at 15, Thomas (No. 7).
139. Thomas, 351 Md. at 541, 718 A.2d at 1201 (Chasanow, J., concurring and
dissenting).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1569 (criticizing the trial within a
trial approach because "[a]s an initial matter, the complexity of the trial-within-a-trial may
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the widespread criticism of the trial within a trial method, even stating
the specific grounds that its detractors have offered as weaknesses, the
Thomas court fails to address any of these criticisms, instead summarily
concluding that "l[t] he courts have not seemed eager to adopt any of
the alternatives that have been suggested ... so the trial within a trial
approach continues to be used." '42 The majority's reasoning is not
persuasive. Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the trial within a
trial method,143 the court ought to have considered the feasibility of
other alternatives, such as loss of a chance.1 44
c. Suggestions for Practice.-Approximately twenty percent of
civil settlements will eventually "be resurrected in the form of mal-
practice actions initiated by dissatisfied clients. 1 45 Courts typically
view performing any sort of post mortem on the negotiation process
as antithetical to the American judicial system, and therefore avoid
scrutinizing the negotiation process. 146 Attorneys would do well to
consider taking some preventative measure in order to minimize the
discourage clients from suing their lawyers. Moreover, the trial-within-a-trial method may
allow an attorney's negligence to shield him from malpractice liability"); Leubsdorf, supra
note 83, at 145 (decrying the trial within a trial approach for the following reasons: "Aside
from its expense, the doctrine gives a client the task of litigating a former case against the
client's own former lawyer, who knows the strengths and weaknesses of the case, perhaps
from the client's own confidences. Furthermore, the doctrine puts a lawyer in the un-
seemly position of contending that a case he or she agreed to bring was hopeless"); Ep-
stein, supra note 53, at 463, 468-69 (positing that "numerous problems of proof arise in the
post-settlement legal malpractice claim," and advocating that courts permits attorneys to
assert client contributory/comparative negligence as a defense, by presenting evidence of
the client's subjective reasons for settling the case); Lord, supra note 80, at 1482-83 (observ-
ing that courts are dissatisfied with the trial within a trial method).
142. Thomas, 351 Md. at 533, 718 A.2d at 1197.
143. See supra notes 83 & 141 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Lord, supra note 80, at 1486-99. Loss of change "has arisen where al-
leged mistreatment exacerbates a preexisting condition, and both contribute to some end
result that does not appear readily divisible. Loss of chance operates as a device to com-
pensate for the chance to avoid or decrease the harm that results." Id. at 1485. Causation
and injury are isolated under loss of change, with the issue of whether negligence exists
being separate from the nature and extent of the loss. See id. at 1498. Lord posited that
[t]o establish an injury under the loss of change doctrine, the client must prove
that, but for the attorney's negligence, the diminished opportunity to recover was
lost. In order to prove cause, the client must show that the claim or defense was
meritorious by a but for standard. The trial-within-a-trial method of proof would
not be necessary. The pleadings should suffice to meet this causal burden, analo-
gous to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Id. at 1499.
145. Epstein, supra note 53, at 453.
146. See id. at 463-64 (stating that "[t]he American judicial system harbors a long-stand-
ing policy that encourages settlement by keeping the negotiation process confidential and
promoting the effective and efficient settlement of cases").
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chances of their being confronted with a malpractice suit concerning
former settlement recommendations.
147
When settling cases, an attorney may be able to avoid potential
misunderstandings by writing a letter to his or her client(s) in which
he or she summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of settlement
for the client(s).48 Such correspondence would indicate that the at-
torney's recommendation was based on a thorough and, even more
important, a contemporaneous understanding of the case. Further-
more, clearly communicating with a client in this manner would obvi-
ate the malpractice plaintiff's trial argument that the lawyer-
defendant's reasons for settling were offered only as a post-hoc ex-
cuse. By documenting such reasons in a letter to his or her client(s),
the attorney would more thoroughly inform the client, who must ulti-
mately decide whether or not settlement is acceptable. Moreover,
such communication would not place a client at risk in the underlying
litigation, as the attorney-client privilege would protect such commu-
nication. 149 The attorney, however, would be allowed to introduce
such communication at the client's potential subsequent malpractice
trial, as suing one's attorney for malpractice waives the privilege as it
pertains to relevant communications."' 0 Consultation with another at-
torney (or attorneys) concerning settlement ranges is another
suggestion.
147. See Prande v. Bell, 105 Md. App. 636, 656, 660 A.2d 1055, 1065 (1995). The Court
of Special Appeals stated:
Before recommending that a client settle, or not settle, a claim, either before or
after the suit is filed, the lawyer must have, at a minimum, an adequate apprecia-
tion of: (1) the relevant facts, (2) the potential strengths and weaknesses of the
client's case as it then stands and as it might possibly be developed, (3) the likely
costs, both monetary and psychological, of proceeding further with litigation, and
(4) what the outcome is likely to be if the case proceeds further, based not only
on the relevant law but also on what triers of fact in the community are doing in
similar kinds of cases.
Id.
148. See Epstein, supra note 53, at 472 ("[A]n attorney should be required to provide a
client with a statement of the case before settlement. This statement would precisely artic-
ulate the ramifications of settlement and act as written confirmation of the attorney's work
on the case.").
149. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAwyEas, §§ 118, 119, Attorney-Client
Privilege Provisions (1998), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF
LAwYEIs: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2000) (indicating when the attorney-client privilege
may properly be invoked, and defining a "communication" in the context of the attorney-
client privilege).
150. Id. § 133 (pointing out that the attorney-client privilege does not apply when a
lawyer needs to protect himself or herself in certain disputes with a client, or against a
charge that the lawyer acted wrongfully).
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5. Conclusion.-In holding attorneys to an ordinary, rather than
a heightened, standard of care for malpractice in negligent recom-
mending settlement, and in determining that damages should be
measured by the "trial within a trial" approach, the Court of Appeals
has enabled any client dissatisfied with the settlement secured by his
or her attorney to sue that attorney for the full verdict amount without
incurring any of the risks or costs that a plaintiff would ordinarily in-
cur in proceeding to trial. The majority's decision contravenes public
policy; its potential effects include attorneys' increased hesitancy in
making settlements as well as encouraging plaintiffs to initiate cavalier
claims against their attorneys. To borrow from the Muhammad dis-
sent, the Thomas majority has, perhaps unwittingly, created a "client's
holiday." '51
ANN J. LEWis
151. The Muhammad dissent sharply criticized that court's majority opinion for being
too lenient on attorneys, opining that "[t ] he majority has just declared a 'lawyer's holiday.'
It's Christmastime for Pennsylvania lawyers." Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Mes-
ser, Shilobod, and Gutnik, 587 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Pa. 1991) (Lassen, J., dissenting).
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II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The Common Law Writ of Error Coram Nobis Remains Available as a
Civil Procedure to Challenge Collaterally a Criminal Judgment
In Ruby v. State,' the Court of Appeals contemplated whether a
petition for the writ of error coram nobis is a civil or criminal pro-
ceeding.2 The Court of Appeals held that a proceeding on a writ of
error coram nobis is a civil matter, independent of the underlying
judgment being contested.3 The court concluded that the lower court
erred by addressing the propriety of the grant of the civil writ in the
underlying criminal case, rather than in a separate proceeding.4 The
court reached its unanimous holding after reviewing Maryland, fed-
eral, and out-of-state case law as well as the specific factual and proce-
dural circumstances of the case.5
For over 200 years, Maryland has recognized the availability of the
common law writ of error coram nobis to defendants in both civil and
criminal cases. 6 Although a majority of jurisdictions have either par-
tially or totally abrogated the writ,7 the Ruby decision is reflective of
Maryland's steadfast commitment to the continued viability of com-
mon law remedies with their common law attributes.8 Most impor-
tandy, the Ruby decision demonstrates Maryland's recognition of the
common law rule that a petition for the writ of error coram nobis is a
civil proceeding,9 and therefore, the Maryland Rules of Civil Proce-
dure apply.10 While the federal courts have broadened the writ be-
yond its traditional common law purpose,1 the court's adherence to
1. 353 Md. 100, 724 A.2d 673 (1999).
2. Id. at 104. The writ of error coram nobis is a common law tool primarily used to
correct factual errors not appearing on the record that would have precluded the court's
judgment had the court known of the error when it rendered judgment. See id. at 104-05,
724 A.2d at 675-76.
3. Id. at 111, 724 A.2d at 678-79.
4. Id, at 112-13, 724 A.2d at 679.
5. Id at 104-13, 724 A.2d at 675-79.
6. See id. at 105, 724 A.2d at 676 (noting that the writ has been available in Maryland
since Maryland adopted English common law as it stood on July 4, 1776).
7. See, e.g., Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 689, 166 A. 410, 411 (1933) (noting that "the
efficacy and usefulness" of the writ "[has] in some states been destroyed by statute," and in
all states has "to some extent [been] modified by statute or practice").
8. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 111,724 A.2d at 678 ("The original common law remedies with
their common law attributes continue to be viable.").
9. See id., 724 A.2d at 678-79.
10. See id at 113, 724 A.2d at 679 (applying Rule 8-202(a) of the Maryland Rules of
Civil Procedure).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Wickham, 474 F. Supp. 113, 116 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (recog-
nizing that although the writ of error coram nobis was limited to the correction of errors of
fact at common law, the federal courts permit the writ to correct constitutional or other
20001
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common law principles in Ruby foreshadows the dim prospects in
Maryland for future expansions of the writ beyond its traditional com-
mon law confines.
1. The Case.--On November 25, 1993, the petitioner, Carl
Walter Ruby, was involved in an automobile accident in Cumberland,
Maryland. 12 According to the other driver, Mary O'Neal, a car occu-
pied by Ruby and his mother struck her car.13 O'Neal testified that
Ruby was the driver and that his mother urged her not to call the
police.14 Nevertheless, the police were called, and when they re-
sponded, they learned that Ruby's driver's license was suspended. 15
At the scene, Ruby told the police that his mother had been driving,' 6
and at trial, both Ruby and his mother testified that she was driving
the car when the accident occurred.17
Ruby was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Allegany
County of driving with a suspended out-of-state license, knowingly giv-
ing false accident report information, and failing to yield the right of
way."' The court sentenced Ruby to consecutive terms of sixty days
and one year in the Allegany County Detention Center, plus a fine of
fifty dollars and two years of unsupervised probation following his re-
lease from custody.' 9 Ruby's conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Special Appeals on April 25, 1995, in an unreported per curiam
opinion.2 °
On June 22, 1995, Ruby filed a motion for a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence. 2' Following a hearing on September
20, 1995, at which Ruby appeared without counsel, the motion was
denied by order, filed September 26, 1995.22 Ruby again appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the decision of the cir-
fundamental errors as well as traditional errors of fact); see also infra notes 71-72 and ac-
companying text (discussing the expansion of the common law purpose of the writ in the
federal courts).




16. See id. at 102-03, 724 A.2d at 674.




21. See id. The newly discovered evidence was an insurance report which stated that
Ruby's mother was the driver of the car when the accident occurred. See id. at 103 n.1, 724
A-2d at 674 n.1.
22. See id. at 103, 724 A.2d at 674-75.
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cuit court and remanded the matter for a new hearing due to the
inadequacy of the court's inquiry into Ruby's waiver of counsel.23
Pursuant to the remand by the Court of Special Appeals, the cir-
cuit court heard Ruby's motion for new a trial on December 5, 1996,
and denied the motion by memorandum opinion and order dated
December 6, 1996.24 Notice of this order was not sent to either Ruby
or the State's Attorney.25 Ruby became aware of the court's action
after the thirty-day period for filing a timely appeal had expired.26
On March 18, 1997, Ruby filed a motion for a belated appeal,
which was denied by the circuit court on March 25, 1997.27 On April
1, 1997, Ruby pursued a motion for reconsideration of the order de-
nying his motion for a belated appeal and a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the denial of his motion for a new trial, both of which were
denied.28
On May 2, 1997, Ruby filed a petition for writ of error coram
nobis in the circuit court, "requesting as relief a belated appeal of the
December 6, 1996, denial of his motion for a new trial. '29 On May 30,
1997, the circuit court, sitting as a civil court, issued the writ, granting
Ruby a belated appeal of the denial of his motion for a new trial in his
original criminal case. 3' The State failed to appeal from the circuit
court's grant of the writ of error coram nobis.31
On June 4, 1997, Ruby pursued his belated appeal in the criminal
case, "pursuant to the leave granted by the writ."' 32 Upon a motion by
the State, the Court of Special Appeals dismissed Ruby's appeal, rea-
soning that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the
circuit court had improperly issued the writ of error coram nobis.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review the intermediate
appellate court's dismissal of Ruby's belated appeal in the criminal
case.
34




27. See id. at 103-04, 724 A.2d at 675.
28. See id.
29. Id. Ruby's petition for writ of error coram nobis was assigned a civil case number,








2. Legal Background.-The writ of error coram nobis is "a com-
mon law tool primarily used to correct factual errors" not appearing
on the record that would have precluded the court's judgment had
the court known of the error when it rendered judgment.35 In the
United States, the writ's efficacy and usefulness have to some extent
been modified by statute or by practice.36 In fact, several jurisdictions
have statutorily destroyed the common law writ of error coram
nobis.37 In those jurisdictions where the writ of error coram nobis is
still available, most agree that a proceeding on the writ is a civil matter
procedurally independent of the underlying judgment being con-
tested. 8 Some courts, however, have held that although a coram
nobis proceeding is civil in nature, it is properly part of the original
criminal case, and not of an independent civil action.39 The federal
circuits are divided as to whether a petition for coram nobis is gener-
35. See id. at 104-05, 724 A.2d at 675-76.
36. See Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 689, 166 A. 410, 411 (1933) (stating that some
states have eliminated the writ by statute, while other states have modified the writ); see also
Hackett v. People, 406 P.2d 331, 332 (Colo. 1965) (observing that the purpose of ancient
writ of error coram nobis is now attained by the filing of 2i motion to set aside the judg-
ment); Crews v. State, 333 S.E.2d 176, 177 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the writ of
error coram nobis has fallen into disuse due to the modem practice of applying to the
court by motion for the relief sought); Kemp v. State, 506 S.E.2d 38, 39 n.4 (W. Va. 1997)
(per curiam) (recognizing that although the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure abol-
ished the writ of coram nobis in civil cases, the writ remains available in criminal cases).
37. Land v. State, 1999 WL 588215, *12 n.4 (Ala. Aug. 6, 1999) (Maddox, J., concur-
ring) (recognizing that "the common law writ of coram nobis in criminal cases has been
incorporated into Rule 32 [of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure]" (citing 2 HUGH
MADDOX, ALABAMA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 32.0, at 971 (2d ed. 1994))); In re
Duffy, 709 A.2d 707, No. 169, 1998, 1998 WL 231159, at *1 (Del. Apr. 29, 1998) (unpub-
lished disposition) (observing that Delaware has abolished the writ of error coram nobis);
Wood v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S240 (Fla. May 27, 1999) (recognizing that the writ of
error coram nobis has been eliminated by statute for both custodial and noncustodial mov-
ants); People v. Sturgeon, 649 N.E.2d 1385 (Ill. 1995) (noting that the Illinois legislature
has explicitly abolished the writ of error coram nobis, but has incorporated the relief avail-
able under the writ into the Illinois Code (citing 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/2-401 (a) (West
1992))); Commonwealth v. Spalding, 991 S.W.2d. 651, 655 (Ken. 1999) (announcing that
the writ of error coram nobis has been abolished by statute in both criminal and civil
proceedings).
38. See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 41 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ind. 1941) (observing that the peti-
tion for the writ of error coram nobis is considered civil in nature); State v. Smith, 324
S.W.2d 707, 711-12 (Mo. 1959) (recognizing that a writ of error coram nobis is civil in
nature rather than criminal in nature); Dobie v. Commonwealth, 96 S.E.2d 747, 752 (Va.
1957) (noting that a writ of error coram nobis "is in the nature of a civil action").
39. See Dwyer v. State, 120 A.2d 276, 283 (Me. 1956) (holding that a proceeding on a
writ of error coram nobis is part of the underlying criminal matter); State v. Endsley, 331
P.2d 338, 340 (Or. 1958) (recognizing that a writ of error coram nobis "is not.., a new
case, civil in nature, but simply a part of the original criminal proceeding").
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ally a civil or a criminal proceeding.4" Nevertheless, in Maryland, it is
clear that the writ of error coram nobis remains viable as a civil matter
independent of the underlying action from which it arose.4'
a. Common Law Origins of the Writ of Error Coram Nobis.--The
English common law writ of error coram nobis evolved in England
during the sixteenth century.4 2 Applied in both criminal and civil
cases,4 3 the writ was one of two common law writs available to correct
errors of fact that could not have been ascertained through ordinary
diligence at the time of the trial and that, in all probability, would
have affected its outcome.4' Coram nobis, along with the writ of error
coram vobis, directed a particular court of law to examine its own judg-
ment.45 The term "coram nobis," which means "before us," is a writ
40. Compare United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that
the time limits for civil, rather than criminal, appeals apply to a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis), United States v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(noting that a coram nobis motion is a civil proceeding), abrogated on other grounds by Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992), United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 220-21 (7th Cir.
1979) (recognizing that a coram nobis motion is civil in nature), Neely v. United States,
546 F.2d 1059, 1965-66 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that a petition for the writ of error coram
nobis is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil
suit), United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying the civil rules of
procedure to a petition for the writ of error coram nobis), and United States v. Tyler, 413
F. Supp. 1403, 1404-05 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (noting that coram nobis proceedings are civil in
nature), with Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that
"a petition for the writ of error coram nobis is a step in the original criminal proceedings,
not the beginning of a separate civil action" (citing Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496,
1499 (9th Cir. 1985)), United States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1970) (recogniz-
ing that a petition for the writ of error coram nobis is a part of the original criminal
proceeding (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954))), Booker v.
Arkansas, 380 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1967) (observing that procedurally coram nobis is a
step in the original criminal proceeding itself), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), and United States v. Hanks, 340 F. Supp.
625, 626 (D. Kan. 1972) (stating that "[c]oram nobis is not an independent civil action,"
but a step in the criminal case).
41. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 111, 734 A.2d at 678-79.
42. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 9, at 36-37 (1981).
43. See Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954) (stating that the writ
of error coram nobis "has been used in both civil and criminal cases").
44. See id. (recognizing that "[t]he purpose of the writ is to bring before the court facts
which were not brought into issue at the trial of the case, and which were material to the
validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which, if known by the court, would have
prevented the judgment"); Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 689, 116 A. 410, 411 (1933) (rec-
ognizing that the purpose of the writ of error coram nobis was "to determine whether facts
existed which were not known to the court at the trial and not in issue under the plead-
ings, but which, if known, would have prevented the judgment which actually was entered
from being entered").
45. See Keane, 164 Md. at 691, 166 A. at 412 (stating that "error coram vobis, but more
correctly coram nobis, . . .is addressed to the court which rendered judgment" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted)); Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1, 3, 65
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that lay in the King's Bench, and the term "coram vobis," which means
"before you," is a writ that lay in the Court of Common Pleas.4 6 In the
United States, the common law distinction between "coram nobis"
and "coram vobis" lost its significance, and "coram nobis" has survived
as the predominant term. 47
b. The Nature of the Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Federal
Court.-Before 1954, the availability of any post-conviction remedy in
the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to challenge criminal convic-
tions in federal district courts was unsettled.4' Although the Supreme
Court had intimated that such a remedy did not exist,49 the circuit
courts were divided. 5' During the 1940s, a number of developments
in federal law made unclear the availability of any post-conviction rem-
edy in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to those convicted of
federal crimes. In 1944, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing a district court to
correct "an illegal sentence at any time."51 Furthermore, a 1946
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) abolished the
A.2d 297, 298 (1949) (stating that "the purpose of the writ of error coram nobis ... is to bring
before the court a judgment previously rendered by it").
46. See YACKLE, supra note 42, § 9, at 37.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67-69 (1914) (recognizing the writ of
coram nobis as the modern substitute of coram vobis).
48. See DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RE-
LIEF § 3-3, at 27 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that "[u] ntil 1954, the Supreme Court never decided
whether ... there existed a federal coram nobis remedy extending to persons convicted in
federal court"); YACKLE, supra note 42, § 37, at 168-69 (recognizing that lower court deci-
sions were "divided on the availability of the common law remedy [of coram nobis] in
criminal cases" until the Supreme Court decided Morgan in 1954).
49. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475-76 n.4 (1947) (finding it "difficult to
conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [coram nobis] would be
necessary or appropriate").
50. Compare Allen v. United States, 12 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1947) (per curiam) (de-
ciding that coram nobis was a proper remedy where petitioner claimed relief on a basis of
insanity at the time of his plea, because if that fact had been known at the time of judg-
ment it might have led to a different result), Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150, 150-51
(4th Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (granting coram nobis relief to determine whether petitioner
had intelligently entered plea of guilty and competently waived counsel where the record
did not show whether the petitioner had been informed of his right to counsel and there
was evidence of his mental disability), Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir.
1946) (per curiam) (granting coram nobis relief for violation of petitioner's due process
rights where petitioner claimed that United States officers had forced material witnesses to
commit perjury), and United States v. Monjar, 64 F. Supp. 746, 747 (D. Del. 1946) (ruling
that coram nobis still existed as a valid remedy despite the government's insistence to the
contrary), with United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1953) (concluding
that writs of error coram nobis had been abolished by Rule 60(b)).
51. FED. R. CRM. P. 35.
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writ of coram nobis in civil cases.52 In 1948, Congress enacted 28
U.S.C. § 2255, 5 authorizing motions to attack sentences "in the na-
ture of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. 5 4
In 1954, in the landmark case of United States v. Morgan,55 the
Supreme Court finally resolved the issue of whether coram nobis con-
tinued to exist as a criminal post-conviction remedy.56 The Morgan
Court held that the common-law writ of error coram nobis was avail-
able as an independent post-conviction remedy in federal district
courts.5 7 The Court rejected the government's arguments that Rule
60(b) abolished coram nobis in criminal as well as civil cases,58 that
Rule 35 rendered it unnecessary,59 or that § 2255 replaced coram
nobis with an exclusive statutory remedy.60 Instead, the Court held
that the federal district court's power to grant the writ of error coram
nobis was authorized by the all-writs section of the Judicial Code. 1
Although Morgan revitalized the writ in the federal courts,62 the
decision also caused confusion in the federal circuits regarding the
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) provides that "[w]rits of coram nobis .... are
abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." Id.
53. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1994)).
54. H.R. REP. No. 80-808, at A180 (1947), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1692, 1908.
55. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
56. Id. Morgan filed a petition for the writ of error coram nobis in the District Court
for the Northern District of New York to challenge a federal conviction. See id. at 504. The
district court treated the petition as a § 2255 motion and denied relief on the ground that
Morgan was no longer in custody and § 2255 has a custody requirement. See id
57. Id. at 511. The Morgan Court concluded that a motion in the nature of coram
nobis was available in the district court.
58. Id. at 505 n.4. The Morgan Court held that a motion in the nature of coram nobis
challenging a criminal conviction was a "step in the criminal case" and was, therefore,
unaffected by Rule 60(b). Id. (citing Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885)).
59. See id. at 505-06. The Court argued that coram nobis was still necessary because
Rule 35 applied only to illegal sentences, which are sentences "the judgment of conviction
did not authorize." Id. at 506.
60. See id at 510-11. The government argued that § 2255 codified the remedy in the
nature of the writ of error coram nobis and restricted it to cases in which the petitioner was
still in custody. See id. at 510. The Morgan Court held that § 2255 had been enacted to
meet the difficulties associated with the administration of federal habeas corpus, and thus,
§ 2255 did not occupy the entire field of remedies in the nature of coram nobis. See id at
511.
61. Id. at 506-07, 512-13 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1952)).
62. Commenting on the Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh Circuit stated: "the
ancient writ of error coram nobis rose phoenix-like from the ashes of American jurispru-
dence through the benign intervention of the supreme court in United States v. Morgan."
United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 219 (7th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 917 (1980).
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nature of the proceeding on a writ of error coram nobis.63 At com-
mon law, a petition for writ of coram nobis was an independent civil
proceeding governed by civil rules,64 but footnote four in the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Morgan6 5 has rendered uncertain its mod-
ern status as a civil or criminal proceeding in the federal courts.6 6
According to some courts, the Supreme Court's statement that Rule
60(b) did not abolish coram nobis in criminal cases because it is "a
step in the criminal case and not ... the beginning of a separate civil
proceeding"" meant that a petition for the writ of error coram nobis
was a criminal proceeding governed by criminal rules.6' According to
other courts, however, the Supreme Court's subsequent statement in
the footnote that a coram nobis proceeding "is of the same general
character as [a motion] under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 "69 indicated that the
petition for the writ of coram nobis was civil in nature, because at the
time, courts viewed § 2255 motions as civil proceedings governed by
civil rules.7 °
In federal district courts today, the scope of the writ of error
coram nobis as a post-conviction remedy is much broader than its
traditional common law scope.71 Coram nobis may now be used to
63. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the split among the federal
circuits on the nature of the proceeding on the petition for the writ of error coram nobis).
64. See YACKLE, supra note 42, § 36, at 164.
65. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4. Footnote four reads:
Such a motion is a step in the criminal case and not, like habeas corpus where
relief is sought in a separate case and record, the beginning of a separate civil
proceeding. While at common law the writ of error coram nobis was issued out of
chancery like other writs, the procedure by motion in the case is now the ac-
cepted American practice. As it is such a step, we do not think that Rule 60(b),
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., expressly abolishing the writ of error coram nobis in civil
cases, applies. This motion is of the same general character as one under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
66. See YACKLE, supra note 42, § 36, at 165.
67. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506 n.4.
68. See, e.g., Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting
the language in footnote four of Morgan as "suggesting that criminal time limits [for ap-
peal] should apply" to writs of error corarn nobis); United States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528
(8th Cir. 1970) (citing to footnote four in Morgan for the proposition that coram nobis "is
deemed a step in a criminal case").
69. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506 n.4.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968) (relying on the
language in Morgan "characterizing a motion coram nobis as of the same general character
as one under" § 2255 to support civil time limits for coram nobis motions).
71. See United States v. Wickman, 474 F. Supp. 113, 116 (1979) (finding that "[tihe
Court concludes that the present-day scope of coram nobis is broad enough to encompass
not only errors of fact that affect the validity or regularity of legal proceedings, but in
addition, legal errors of a constitutional or fundamental proportion"); CHARLEs A.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 592, at 429 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1989) (stat-
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correct constitutional or other fundamental errors as well as tradi-
tional errors of fact.72 Despite the Morgan Court's assertion that
courts should allow the review of judgments through "this extraordi-
nary remedy only under circumstances compelling such action to
achieve justice" and to correct errors "of the most fundamental char-
acter,"73 several circuit courts have held that the scope of coram nobis
as a post-conviction remedy is as broad as the scope of § 2255. TM
Coram nobis, however, is available only when § 2255 motions and
other forms of relief, such as common law habeas corpus, are not.
75
This situation typically occurs when the petitioner is not in custody,
because unlike § 2255 and habeas corpus, the writ of error coram
ing that "[t]he present-day scope of coram nobis is broad enough to encompass not only
errors of fact that affect the validity or regularity of legal proceedings, but also, legal errors
of a constitutional or fundamental proportion").
72. See Farnsworth v. United States, 232 F.2d 59, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (permitting a
petition for writ of error coram nobis to set aside a judgment of conviction, because the
petitioner had been deprived of his constitutional right to counsel); Garrison v. United
States, 154 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (permitting a motion of coram
nobis to set aside a sentence on the ground that two of the material witnesses against the
movants were forced by threats to commit willful perjury in testifying as they did); Roberts
v. United States, 158 F.2d 150, 151 (4th Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (permitting a writ of error
coram nobis to review the defendant's mental competency, in connection with whether he
could or did competently waive counsel); United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442 (3d
Cir. 1944) (allowing a writ of error coram nobis where the record failed to reveal the
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel or that the defendant was expressly advised of
such a right because it appeared that an injustice had been committed to the extent of
depriving the defendant of his constitutional rights); see also Martha A. Mills & Sue A.
Herrmann, Collateral Attacks on Convictions: A Survey of Federal Remedies, 12 J. MARSHAtL J.
PRc. & PROC. 27, 62-63 (1978) (listing a variety of circumstances in which coram nobis has
been made available).
73. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511, 512 (1954) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)).
74. See United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1173 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that the
standards applied to a federal coram nobis claim are similar to those applied to a § 2255
motion); Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sanctioning the
district court's consideration of a writ of error coram nobis, although the issues raised were
those covered under § 2255). But see United States v. Darnell, 716 F.2d 479, 481 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1983) (concluding, based on Morgan, that the scope of coram nobis is more limited
than the scope of § 2255).
Based on the first paragraph of § 2255, the Supreme Court has stated the grounds for
relief under the statute as the following: "(1) 'that the sentence was imposed in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States;' (2) 'that the court was without jurisdic-
tion to impose such sentence;' (3) 'that the sentence was in excess of the maximum au-
thorized by law;' and (4) that the sentence 'is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'" Hill
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988)).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 413 F.2d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1969) (refusing to allow
writ of coram nobis where the appellant was still in federal custody); Adam v. United
States, 274 F.2d 880, 882 (10th Cir. 1960) (same); see alsoYACKLE, supra note 42, § 36, at 165
(noting that a writ of coram nobis "is available only where the motion remedy under
§ 2255 is not").
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nobis does not have a custody requirement. 76 The writ of error coram
nobis is an essential element of the federal array of post-conviction
remedies because the consequences of a federal conviction can be ex-
ceptionally harsh.77
c. Maryland's Approach to the Writ of Error Coram Nobis.-In
Maryland, the writ of error coram nobis has been available to defend-
ants in both civil and criminal cases for over 200 years.78
The Maryland Court of Appeals appears to have considered the
scope and purpose of the writ of error coram nobis for the first time
in Hawkins v. Bowie.79 In this case, Hawkins obtained a civil judgment
against Bowie.8" Bowie then petitioned the court for a writ of error
coram nobis, and the court granted the writ to correct the record of
judgment, and reversed the judgment it had rendered.8' The Haw-
kins court recognized:
A writ of coram nobis, lies to correct an error in fact, in the
same court where the record is; as if there be error in the
process, or through default of the clerk, it shall be reversed
in the same court, by writ of error sued thereon before the
same justices. But of an error in law, which is the default of
the justices, the same court cannot reverse the judgment by
writ of error, nor without a writ of error, but this error ought
to be redressed in another court, before other justices, by
writ of error.8
2
Several years later, the Court of Appeals denied petitions for a
writ of error coram nobis in Hawks v. State3 and Keane v. State.84 In
76. SeeYACKLE, supra note 42, § 36, at 165; see also Byrnes v. United States, 408 F.2d 599,
602 (9th Cir.) (noting that writs of error coram nobis are "used to attack convictions involv-
ing collateral legal disadvantages which survive the satisfaction of a sentence"); Azzone v.
United States, 341 F.2d 417, 418 (8th Cir. 1965) (recognizing that "by a proceeding in the
nature of coram nobis, the convicted party may proceed in a federal district court to have
set aside his conviction and sentence.., though he had served full time for which he had
been sentenced").
77. See Note, The Need for Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts, 59 YALE L.J. 786, 786-87
(1950) (recognizing that former convicts "may be ineligible for naturalization, military ser-
vice, and certain civil rights such as voting or holding offices" (footnotes omitted)).
78. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 105, 724 A.2d at 676 (recognizing that "[blecause Maryland
adopted the Common Law of England as it existed on July 4, 1776 subject to constitutional
conflict, legislative amendment, or modification by this Court.... the common law writ of
error coram nobis is a procedure still available in this State" (internal citation omitted)).
79. G. &J. 428 (1983).
80. See id. at 428.
81. See id. at 437.
82. Id. (internal citations omitted).
83. 162 Md. 30, 32, 157 A. 900, 901 (1932).
84. 164 Md. 685, 695, 166 A. 410, 414 (1933).
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Hawks, the appellant alleged, in his petition, that his sentence to in-
dustrial school, and subsequent sentence to confinement in the house
of correction warranted the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis8 5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the peti-
tion," reasoning that "the petition of the appellant allege [d] no facts
of any kind unknown to the court at the time the appellant was sen-
tenced to confinement .... which would have prevented or prohib-
ited the rendition of that judgment."87
In Keane, the Court of Appeals considered whether a petition for
a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the prosecuting witness mis-
takenly identified the petitioner and that the prosecution failed to
present to the jury the fact that other eyewitnesses of the crime failed
to identify the petitioner, was properly dismissed. 8 The court held
that the dismissal of the petition was proper,8 9 reasoning that the pur-
pose of the writ of error coram nobis is "not to permit a review of the
evidence given in connection with the issues actually tried, but to de-
termine whether witnesses who actually testified before a jury sworn
on those issues testified falsely." ° According to the court, the pur-
pose of the writ, in its original as well as in modern practice is "to
determine whether facts existed which were not known to the court at
the trial and not in issue under the pleadings, but which, if known,
would have prevented the judgment which actually was entered from
being entered."9 1 The court recognized that although "[i] t is unfortu-
nate that there is no complete and adequate remedy for such a wrong
as that of which the petitioner complains"92 the writ of error coram
nobis "is not broad enough to reach every case in which there has
been an erroneous or unjust judgment on the sole ground that no
other remedy exists."93
85. Hawks, 162 Md. at 31, 157 A. at 901.
86. Id at 32, 157 A. at 901.
87. Id.
88. Keane, 164 Md. at 686-87, 166 A. at 410-11.
89. Id. at 694-95, 166 A. at 414.
90. Id. at 689, 166 A. at 411. The court also held that the State's mere failure to call
two witnesses, present when the robbery was committed, did not warrant the issuance of a
writ of error coram nobis. Id. at 693, 166 A. at 413.
91. Id. at 689, 166 A. at 411. The Keane court also explained that if the purpose of the
writ "was to permit the court in which the judgment was entered to decide whether the
witnesses in the case had testified falsely, and, if it decided that they had, to reverse it,
instead of being the end of the litigation, thejudgment might well be but the beginning of
it." Id., 166 A. at 411-12.
92. Id. at 694, 166 A. at 413.
93. Id. at 692, 166 A. at 412-13.
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Years later, the Court of Appeals again discussed the unavailabil-
ity of the writ of error coram nobis for allegations of false testimony in
Bernard v. State94 and Tyson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiay.95 Follow-
ing Keane, the Bernard court recognized that "[t]he writ will not lie to
correct an issue of fact which has been adjudicated even though
wrongly determined; nor for alleged false testimony at the trial; nor
for newly discovered evidence."96 The Bernard court also observed
that the "writ will not lie where the accused has another adequate
remedy at law, as by motion for a new trial, an appeal to a higher
court, or other existing statutory proceeding.
9 7
In Tyson v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary,98 the court denied the
petition for the writ of error coram nobis for the same reasons that it
denied the petitions for the writ of error coram nobis in Keane and
Bernard.99 The petition in Tyson alleged that a mistake in identity was
made, and that the applicant was wrongfully convicted of a crime."' °
The Tyson court observed that the "appropriate remedy in such a case
is an application to the executive department."' '
After Bernard and Tyson, Maryland began to treat a motion to
strike out the verdict, judgment and sentence entered, based on a wit-
ness repudiating an affidavit, as if the remedy of the writ of error
coram nobis had been invoked. In Madison v State,10 2 the appellant
filed a motion to strike out his judgment and sentence on the grounds
of newly discovered evidence, alleging that a principal witness had tes-
tified falsely and had recanted her testimony.1°  Although Madison
did not in terms seek a writ of error coram nobis, the court dealt with
the application as if it were for the writ and reviewed the instances in
which the writ was and was not available. 0 4 The court ultimately con-
94. 193 Md. 1, 65 A.2d 297 (1949).
95. 198 Md. 652, 80 A.2d 613 (1951).
96. Bernard, 193 Md. at 4, 65 A.2d at 298.
97. Id. (citing Hawks v. State, 162 Md. 30, 157 A. 900 (1932); Keane v. State, 164 Md.
685, 166 A. 410 (1933)).
98. 198 Md. 652, 653, 80 A.2d 613, 613 (1951).
99. Id. at 653, 80 A.2d at 613-14.
100. Id. at 653, 80 A.2d at 613.
101. Id., 80 A.2d at 614 (citing Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 166 A. 410 (1933)).
102. 205 Md. 425, 109 A.2d 96 (1954).
103. Id. at 430, 109 A.2d at 98.
104. Id. at 432, 109 A.2d at 99. Following Keane and Bernard, the court recognized that:
coram nobis will not lie (1) to correct an issue of fact which has been adjudicated,
even though wrongly determined, or (2) to determine whether any witnesses testi-
fied falsely at the trial, or (3) to present newly discovered evidence, or (4) to
strike out a conviction on the ground that the prosecuting witness was mistaken
in his identification of the accused as the person who committed the crime.
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cluded that relief could not be granted on the claim that a witness had
testified falsely at the trial.1°5  Following Bernard and Keane, the
Madison court observed that
if the writ were available to allow the court in which the judg-
ment was entered to decide subsequently whether the wit-
nesses who testified at the trial had testified falsely, and, if it
should decide that they had, to strike out the judgment, then
the judgment might be the beginning rather than the end,
of litigation. 0 6
The Maryland Court of Appeals's decision in Madison occurred
several months after the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan,107
where the court expanded the scope of the writ to cover all "errors of
the most fundamental character."1 ' Although several federal circuits
followed the Court by expanding the writ beyond its traditional com-
mon law confines, 0 9 Maryland chose not to follow this course, and in
Skok v. State" ° the Court of Special Appeals explained the rationale
for this position."'
In Skok, the appellant filed two petitions for a writ of error coram
nobis based on facts not known to the trial judges when his pleas were
accepted. 12 After thoroughly reviewing the relevant authorities, 1
105. Id. at 435, 109 A.2d at 100-01.
106. Id. at 432, 109 A.2d 99 (citing Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 698, 166 A. 410 (1933);
Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1, 65 A.2d 297 (1949)). The Court of Appeals continued to treat
a motion to strike out or modify a sentence after conviction, based on false testimony, as if
the remedy of the writ of error coram nobis had been invoked. See Johnson v. State, 215
Md. 333, 336, 138 A.2d 372, 373 (1958) (recognizing that the motion in the present case
"purports to be a motion to strike out or modify the sentence," but analyzing the motion as
if it were "a motion in the nature of a writ of coram nobis"); Carrv. State, 218 Md. 318, 321,
146 A.2d 182, 193 (1958) (recognizing that if the motion to strike out the verdict, judg-
ment, and sentence "in this case were treated as what it does not purport to be, a petition
for a writ of error coram nobis, the alleged perjury of the prosecuting witness would not
sustain it" (citation omitted)).
107. Morgan was decided on January 4, 1954, United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 502
(1954), and Madison was decided on November 12, 1954, Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425,
425, 109 A.2d 96, 96 (1954).
108. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512 (concluding that the allegation of an involuntary waiver
of counsel was sufficient to sustain a writ of error coram nobis).
109. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing the modem scope of the
writ in federal courts).
110. 124 Md. App. 226, 721 A.2d 259 (1998).
111. Id. at 236-42, 721 A.2d at 264-68.
112. See Skok, 124 Md. App. at 236-42, 721 A.2d at 264-68. In February 1994, the appel-
lant plead guilty to the possession of cocaine in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County. See id. at 228, 721 A.2d at 260. Later in 1994, the appellant plead nolo contendere
in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to another charge of possession of co-
caine. See id. The Court of Special Appeals noted that both of Skok's petitions "were based
on careless procedural errors committed by the trial judge, not upon facts unknown to the
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the court explained that the writ of error coram nobis may be granted
only in situations where the "supposed error inheres in facts not actu-
ally in issue under the pleadings at trial, and unknown to the court
when the judgment was entered, but which, if known, would have pre-
vented the judgment."114 Skok argued that the court's explanation
was in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court's holding in Morgan
that a writ of coram nobis could be issued even if the writ was not
based on a fact unknown to the court when the judgment was
entered.'1 1 5
The Court of Special Appeals found Skok's reading of the hold-
ing in Morgan too expansive."1 6 The Skok court recognized that Mary-
land law is in direct conflict with Morgan "insofar as Morgan allows the
court to entertain a petition for a writ of coram nobis to consider facts
known to the trial judge when the original judgment was entered."1'1 7
The court pointed out, however, that the conflict between Maryland
law and Morgan did not mean that the Maryland courts were required
to follow Morgan or that prior Maryland decisions should be disre-
garded. 1 ' The Skok court explained that although Maryland courts
are obligated to follow Supreme Court decisions that speak to federal
constitutional principles,11 9 in Morgan, the Supreme Court decided an
issue of federal jurisdiction as opposed to an issue of federal constitu-
tional principle. 2 ' Specifically, the Morgan court decided that the
"All Writs" section of 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) was broad enough to allow
federal courts to issue writs of coram nobis in appropriate
circumstances. 12
1
trial judge." Id. at 234, 721 A.2d at 263. The court explicitly stated that "[t]his is fatal to
appellant's claim." Id
113. See id. at 234-42, 721 A.2d at 263-67.
114. Id. at 234, 721 A.2d at 263 (quoting Jackson v. State, 218 Md. 25, 145 A.2d 234
(1958)).
115. See id. at 235, 721 A.2d at 264; see also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 508
(1954) (stating that the writ may be used to correct an error "of fact not apparent on the
face of the record" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
116. Skok, 124 Md. App. at 236, 721 A.2d at 264.
117. Id, at 240, 721 A.2d at 266.
118. Id
119. See id. at 266-67, 721 A.2d at 240-41 (citing State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 490, 682
A.2d 694, 705 (1996)).
120. Id
121. Id. (recognizing that the Morgan court "decided only an issue of federal jurisdic-
tion, i.e., whether the (all writs) section of 28 U.S.C. 1651 (a) was broad enough to allow
federal courts to issue writs of coram nobis under certain circumstances and, if so, under
what circumstances").
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d. Legislative Effects on Post-Conviction Remedies Including the
Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Mayland. -In 1958, the Maryland General
Assembly enacted the Post Conviction Procedure Act, 1 22 as an attempt
to limit the ever-increasing caseload of the Court of Appeals by reduc-
ing the number of appeals arising from repeated collateral attacks on
criminal convictions.'12  At the same time, the Act attempted to pre-
serve, within clearly defined limits, appellate review for persons who
are legally imprisoned. 124 The purpose of the Act was "to create a
simple statutory procedure, in place of the common law habeas
corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal
convictions and sentences."'125 Furthermore, the Act was seen as pro-
viding for the first time "a statutory remedy under which a prisoner
could collaterally challenge the conviction and sentence, or defective
delinquency determination, which led to his incarceration."'
26
Under the Maryland Act,1 27 all post-conviction proceedings, in-
cluding petitions based on grounds heretofore only available under
122. MD. ANN. CODE § 645A (1957 & Supp. 1963)).
123. See Tillet v. Warden of the Maryland House of Correction, 220 Md. 677, 679, 154
A.2d 808, 810 (1959) (recognizing that the enactment "manifest[s] an intention to put a
stop to the endless repetition of the same grounds of collateral attack upon conviction").
124. See Carter v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction, 219 Md. 692, 693, 150 A.2d
242, 243 (1959) (stating that "the purpose of the Act is to provide only for those who have
been 'convicted of a crime' and are 'incarcerated under sentence of death or imprison-
ment,' not those who have been released from confinement" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE § 645A)).
125. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658, 574 A.2d 898, 909-10 (1990) (citing Brady
v. State, 222 Md. 442, 446-47, 160 A.2d 912 (1960); State v. D'Onofrio, 221 Md. 20, 28-29,
155 A.2d 643 (1959)).
126. Id. at 658, 574 A.2d at 909.
127. As originally enacted, the statute read, in relevant part:
(a) Appeal in lieu offormer remedies; when denied.-Any person convicted of a crime
and incarcerated under sentence of death or imprisonment,... who claims...
that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of
alleged error heretofore available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram
nobis, or other common law or statutory remedy, may institute a proceeding
under this subtitle to set aside or correct the sentence, provided the alleged error
has not been previously and finally litigated or waived in the proceedings result-
ing in the conviction, or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to
secure relief from his conviction.
(b) Time offiling; not substitute for remedies of trial proceedings; other common law statu-
tory remedies superseded.-The remedy herein provided is not a substitute for, nor
does it affect any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial
court or before the trial magistrate .... or any remedy of direct review of the
sentence or conviction. A petition for relief under this subtitle may be filed at any
time. Hereafter no appeals to the Court of Appeals of Maryland in habeas corpus
or coram nobis cases, or from other common law or statutory remedies which
have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of incarceration under
sentence of death or imprisonment shall be permitted or entertained, except ap-
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the writs of error coram nobis, may be brought in the lower court and
are subject to appeal.128 The writ of coram nobis may also be brought,
however, outside the provisions of the Act, although if this is done, the
question still remains as to whether there is a right of appeal.
1 29
Thus, the Maryland Act does not abolish the common law peti-
tion for the writ of error coram nobis.131 Instead, it sets up an alterna-
tive procedure under which applications for writs of error coram
nobis may be treated either as they were prior to June 1, 1958, the
date the Act was enacted, or as a proceeding under the Act. 3 ' If the
applicant proceeds originally under the Act, the case will be heard in
the court where the conviction took place,3 2 and any person ag-
grieved by the order of a judge may apply to the Court of Appeals for
leave to prosecute an appeal. 1 3 On the other hand, if the petition is
heard as a coram nobis application, and if heard and denied, the
question still remains whether there is any right to request leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeals from such denial.' 34
The most recent cases in Maryland addressing the writ of error
coram nobis have focused on this question. The uncertainty stems
peals in such cases pending in the Court of Appeals in June 1, 1958, shall be
processed in due course.
MD. ANN. CODE § 645A (1957 & Supp. 1959).
128. Art. 27, § 6451 (recognizing that "[a]ny person ... aggrieved by the order of the
court or judge passed in accordance with this subtitle, may ... apply to the Court of Special
Appeals for leave to prosecute an appeal therefrom").
129. See Art. 27, § 645A(b) (stating that "[h]ereafter no appeals to the Court of Appeals
in ... coram nobis cases... shall be permitted or entertained, except appeals in such cases
pending in the Court of Appeals on June 1, 1958"). But see infra notes 149-157 (discussing
the question of whether there is a right of appeal in coram nobis cases).
130. See Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447, 160 A.2d 912, 915-16 (1960) (stating that "the
... [Post Conviction Procedure Act] did not abrogate the remedies formerly available
under writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis and other common-law statutory
remedies").
131. Id.; see also Skok v. State, 124 Md. App. 226, 721 A.2d 259 (1998) (treating the
application for the writ of error coram nobis as it was treated prior toJune 1, 1958); Hamil-
ton v. Warden, 220 Md. 657, 152 A.2d 125 (1959) (treating the petition for the writ of error
coram nobis as a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act).
132. See Rule 4-401 (stating that "[a] proceeding under the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act is commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court of the county
where the conviction took place").
133. See Art. 27, § 6451 (providing that any party aggrieved by the final trial court order
in a proceeding under the Act could file an application for leave to appeal).
134. See infra notes 148-157 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of whether the
right to appeal in coram nobis cases survived the adoption of the Post Conviction Proce-
dure Act).
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from a 1965 amendment to the original Act.'1 5 Originally, Section
645A(b) of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act provided:
Hereafter no appeals to the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
habeas corpus or coram nobis cases, or from other common
law or statutory remedies which have heretofore been availa-
ble for challenging the validity of incarceration under sen-
tence of death or imprisonment shall be permitted or
entertained, except appeals in such cases pending in the
Court of Appeals on June 1, 1958, shall be processed in due
course. 
136
In Brady v. State, 3 7 the Court of Appeals construed the aforemen-
tioned language as abolishing all appeals from coram nobis and
habeas corpus decisions.' 38 The court held that "[w] hile the ... [Post
Conviction Procedure Act] did not abrogate the remedies formerly
available under writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis and other
common law statutory remedies, it clearly took away the right of ap-
peal from an order denying any of them. ' 13 9 Similarly, in Cumberland
v. Warden,'4 ° the Court of Appeals announced that "[t]his court may
no longer entertain an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus."' 41
However, in 1965, the Maryland General Assembly added new
language to the portion of the Act relating to appeals in habeas
corpus cases. 14 2 This new language provided that
nothing in this subtitle shall operate to bar an appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals (1) in a habeas corpus proceeding
instituted under § 2-210 of Article 41 of this Code or (2) in
any other proceeding in which a writ of habeas corpus is
sought for any purpose other than to challenge the legality
of a conviction of crime or sentence of death or imprison-
ment therefore, including confinement as a result of a pro-
ceeding under article 31B of this Code. 143
According to the Court of Appeals, the amendment as outlined above
was intended to authorize appeals in habeas corpus proceedings relat-
135. See infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment to the
Act and the Court of Appeals interpretation of the amendment).
136. MD. ANN. CODE § 645A(b) (1957 & Supp. 1963).
137. 222 Md. 442, 160 A.2d 912 (1960).
138. Id. at 447, 160 A.2d at 915-16.
139. Id.
140. 225 Md. 636, 171 A.2d 709 (1961).
141. Id. at 638, 171 A.2d at 709 (citation omitted).




ing to cases "other than" those challenging criminal convictions. 144
The Court of Appeals also recognized that the Act does not provide a
remedy to a defendant who is no longer in custody, or is subject to
conditions of probation or parole. 14 5 Specifically, a proceeding under
the Post Conviction Procedure Act can only be brought by a "person
convicted of a crime and incarcerated under sentence of death or im-
prisonment [or on parole or probation] ."146 Therefore, as the Court
of Appeals recognized in Fairbanks v. State, common law remedies, in-
cluding coram nobis, may be available for collateral attacks on prior
convictions that no longer impose restraints on defendants.'4 7
Although the Court of Appeals has not specifically addressed the
validity of appeals from coram nobis decisions in light of the Act and
its 1965 amendment, 4 ' the Court of Special Appeals, in Jones v.
State,'49 concluded that the right of appeal in coram nobis cases sur-
vived the enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act. 150 The
Jones court reached this conclusion by first recognizing that the Post
Conviction Procedure Act was "intended to replace habeas corpus and
coram nobis as a statutory remedy for collateral challenges to criminal
judgments.' 15 ' Next, the Jones court noted that in cases where the
Post Conviction Procedure Act does not provide a remedy, such as
habeas corpus cases "other than" those challenging criminal convic-
tions, the Act as amended provided no reason for restricting appeals
in these cases. 152 The Jones court determined that the same reasoning
that was applied in Gluckstern to habeas corpus cases should also be
applied to coram nobis cases. 15' Therefore, an appeal could be taken
144. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662, 574 A.2d 898, 911 (1990). The court
stated: "In situations where the Post Conviction Procedure Act did not provide a remedy,
and thus was not a substitute for habeas corpus, the enactment of the new statute provided
no reason for restricting appeals in habeas corpus cases." Id. at 662, 574 A.2d at 912.
145. See Fairbanks v. State, 331 Md. 482, 493 n.3 629 A.2d 63, 68 n.3 (1993) (citing
McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534, 539-47, 536 A.2d 652 (1998)).
146. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS, Art. 27, § 645A (1957).
147. Fairbanks, 331 Md. at 486, 724 A.2d at 65.
148. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 106 n.4, 724 A.2d at 676 n.4 (stating that the Court of Appeals
"has yet to address the correctness of the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Jones,"
which held that the right to appeal in coram nobis cases survived the adoption of the Post
Conviction Procedure Act).
149. 114 Md. App. 471, 691 A.2d 229 (1997).
150. Id. at 478-79, 691 A.2d at 232.
151. Id. at 478, 691 A.2d at 232.
152. Id. (citing Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662, 574 A.2d 898, 912 (1990)).
153. Id. ("We see no justifiable reason for denying a right of appeal to a coram nobis
petition when a right of appeal is avoidable to those seeking redress under habeas
corpus.").
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from a coram nobis decision notwithstanding the Post Conviction Pro-
cedure Act.'54
In 1998, one year after Jones, the Court of Special Appeals again
considered the issue of whether the right to appeal in coram nobis
cases survived the adoption of the Post Conviction Procedure Act in
Skok v. State.'55 In Skok, the Court of Special Appeals reiterated its
holding in Jones that the right to appeal in coram nobis cases survived
the enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act.' 56 Thus, Jones
and Skok set the stage for the court's decision in Ruby.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ruby, the Court of Appeals held
that the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to deter-
mine the propriety of the trial court's grant of the petition for a writ
of error coram nobis.157 Specifically, the court determined that the
State's failure to file an appeal of the trial court's grant of a petition
for writ of error coram nobis in the separate civil proceeding termi-
nated its right of appeal and that the appellate court acquired no ju-
risdiction to hear that final civil order in that civil case.158 The court
further observed that the Court of Special Appeals had no jurisdiction
to consider the propriety of the grant of the civil writ in the criminal
case.
1 59
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with a historical survey of
the writ of error coram nobis. 6 ° The court acknowledged previous
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals
involving the writ of error coram nobis.1 6' The Ruby court also traced
the Madison court's decision of the use and the application of the writ
of error coram nobis, 62 and then highlighted the main theme of the
Maryland cases that have considered the writ-that the "writ of error
154. See id. ("The question remains whether the right of appeal in coram nobis actions
survived the adoption of Art. 27, § 645A(e), as amended in 1965. We hold that it does.").
155. 124 Md. App. 226, 721 A.2d 259 (1998).
156. Id. at 233, 721 A.2d at 263 ("To the extent that coram nobis relief may be available in
certain instances, appellant has the right to appeal the denial of his request that the [trial]
court issue a writ of coram nobis.").
157. Ruby, 353 Md. at 113, 724 A.2d at 680.
158. Id., 724 A.2d at 679.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 104-06, 724 A.2d at 675-76.
161. See id. at 105, 724 A.2d at 676 (citingJohnson v. State, 215 Md. 333, 336, 138 A.2d
372, 373 (1958); Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1, 3-4, 65 A.2d 297, 298 (1949); Keane v. State,
164 Md. 685, 689-93, 166 A. 410, 411-13 (1933); Hawks v. State, 163 Md. 30, 31-32, 157 A.
900, 901 (1932);Jones v. State, 114 Md. App. 471, 475, 691 A.2d 229, 230-31 (1996)). The
court also recognized the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502
(1954). Id.
162. Id. (citing Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954)).
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coram nobis is a common law tool primarily used to correct factual er-
rors by a court.
1 63
The court continued its discussion of the writ of error coram
nobis by recognizing that Maryland's enactment of the Post Convic-
tion Procedure Act has diminished the usefulness of the writ of error
coram nobis to some extent. 164 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that "like a habeas corpus proceeding and a proceeding under the
Act, [a writ of error coram nobis] still may be used to collaterally chal-
lenge a criminal judgment. 165
The Ruby court next discussed the nature of a collateral challenge
to demonstrate that a writ of error coram nobis is a civil matter proce-
durally independent of the underlying judgment being contested. 166
The court observed that "[a] collateral challenge, by its very nature, is
a separate and distinct civil procedure by which a defendant may chal-
lenge his or her conviction, sentence, or imprisonment."16 7 The court
also recognized that "at common law, a proceeding on a writ of error
coram nobis was a civil matter procedurally independent of the underly-
ing judgment being contested."168 The court cited, as additional sup-
port for this proposition, a number of decisions from other
jurisdictions that have concluded that a proceeding on a writ of error
coram nobis remains a civil matter independent of the underlying
case even though its resolution may affect the underlying case. 1 6 9
The court then acknowledged that the federal circuits are split on
the issue of whether a proceeding on a writ of error coram nobis is
163. Id. at 104, 724 A.2d at 675.
164. Id. at 105-06, 724 A.2d at 676. The court explained that although the Post Convic-
tion Procedure Act was enacted "to create a single statutory procedure, in place of com-
mon law habeas corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal
convictions and sentences," the Court of Special Appeals had, in Jones v. State, determined
that "the right of appeal in coram nobis actions survived the adoption of [the Act]" be-
cause the Act did not provide for a remedy "when the defendant is not incarcerated or
subject to parole or probation." Id. at 106 n.4, 724 A.2d at 676 n.4 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658, 574 A.2d 898, 909
(1990)) (citingJones v. State, 114 Md. App. 471, 478, 691 A.2d 229, 232 (1996)). The Ruby
court also noted that the correctness of the Jones decision has never been addressed by the
Court of Appeals, and declined to do so in the present case because the issue was not
properly before the Court of Special Appeals. Id.
165. Id. at 106, 724 A.2d at 676.
166. Id. at 107, 724 A.2d at 677.
167. Id. (citing State Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90, 326 A.2d 180, 181
(1974)).
168. Id. (citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221 n.36 (1952); State v. King,
380 P.2d 325, 326 (1963); State v. Turner, 231 N.W.2d 345, 349 (1975); People v. Holland,
209 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (1960)).
169. Id. at 108, 724 A.2d at 677; see also supra note 38 (discussing several of the cases
cited by the Ruby court).
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civil in nature. 170 The court hinted that the confusion in the federal
circuits has been caused by footnote four of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Morgan.1 71 The court observed that "[t]he paradox in the
footnote is that the Supreme Court first contrasted a writ of error
coram nobis with a habeas corpus proceeding, which is historically a
separate civil procedure, but then in the same footnote likened the
writ to a civil post conviction action under section 2255. " 172 The court
concluded that despite the disagreements among the federal circuits,
"no confusion as to the nature of a writ of error coram nobis exists in
this jurisdiction.' 7 ' According to the court, the writ of error coram
nobis in Maryland remains a civil matter procedurally independent of
the action from which it arose.'7 4
The court then reexamined the effect of the Post Conviction Pro-
cedure Act on the availability of the common law writ of error coram
nobis. 175 In recognizing that Maryland adopted England's common
law, subject to a constitutional conflict, legislative change, or judicial
modification, the court noted that the General Assembly's enactment
of the Act limited the right to appeal in common law habeas corpus
and coram nobis proceedings to defendants who are in custody or on
probation. 176 The court reasoned, however, that "the Act is not a sub-
stitute for common law remedies when, ... the defendant is not in
custody or on probation or parole."' 77 The court thus concluded that
"It]he original common law remedies with their common law attrib-
utes continue to be viable."'
78
The court addressed the facts of the case before it and concluded
that because the state failed to file any appeal of the grant of the writ
of error coram nobis in the civil case, that decision was final. 179 The
court recognized that during the petitioner's belated criminal appeal,
the State filed a motion to dismiss.' 0 The court criticized the State's
170. Ruby, 353 Md. at 109-10, 724 A.2d at 677-78; see also supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text (discussing this split within the federal circuits).
171. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 109-10, 724 A.2d at 678 ("Commentators note that the split
among the federal circuits, to some extent, has been caused by footnote four in Morgan
.... " (internal citation omitted)); see also supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's opinion in Morgan).
172. Ruby, 353 Md. at 110, 724 A.2d at 678.
173. Id. at 111, 724 A.2d at 678.
174. Id., 724 A.2d at 678-79.
175. Id., 724 A.2d at 678.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Fairbanks v. State, 331 Md. 482, 492 n.3, 629 A.2d 63, 68 n.3 (1993)).
178. Id.
179. Id., 724 A.2d at 679 ("The correctness of the trial court's grant of the writ of error
coram nobis, after the time for appeal has passed, is no longer appealable.").
180. Id. at 112, 724 A.2d at 679.
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motion as an attempt to challenge the grant of the writ of error coram
nobis."'8 The court reasoned that by claiming that the trial court
erred in granting the writ of error coram nobis, the State was using a
motion to dismiss a criminal appeal to attack a judgment rendered in
a civil case.1
8 2
Finally, the court addressed the procedural grounds for vacating
the intermediate appellate court's judgment.18 ' The court observed
that "[t]he State's motion to dismiss ... [Ruby's] appeal is where the
confusion began.""8 4 The court cited Maryland Rule 8-202(a)"1 as
controlling and stated that:
there is no record in the docket entries noting an appeal of
the trial court's grant of the petition for writ of error coram
nobis in the civil proceeding. Maryland Rule 8-202(a) man-
dates that a "notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days
after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal
is taken." Failure of an aggrieved party to so file terminates
its right of appeal and the appellate court acquires no juris-
diction to hear that matter.1 8 6
Considering the State's failure to appeal the final order of the
circuit court's issuance of the writ of error coram nobis, the court held
that the intermediate appellate court "did not have jurisdiction to ad-
dress the propriety of that final civil order even in that civil case."'81 7
Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction "to
consider the propriety of the grant of the civil writ in . . . [Ruby's]
belated appeal of the denial of his motion for a new trial in the crimi-
nal case."' 88
4. Analysis.-In Ruby, the Court of Appeals considered whether
the intermediate appellate court acquired jurisdiction to consider the
correctness of a circuit court's final order when the aggrieved party
failed to file an appeal from that order.1"9 The Court of Appeals de-
termined that the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction
to address the propriety of the circuit court's grant of the petition for
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 113, 724 A.2d at 679.
184. Id.
185. MD. RULE 8-202(a).
186. Ruby, 353 Md. at 113, 724 A.2d at 679 (quoting MD. RULE 8-202(a)) (citing Hough-
ton v. County Comm'rs, 305 Md. 407, 413, 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 104, 724 A.2d at 675; see also supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
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writ of error coram nobis when the State did not note an appeal of the
grant of that petition in the civil case.19°
This result is an intuitive response to the issue presented; the fail-
ure of an aggrieved party to file a timely appeal terminates its right of
appeal and the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to hear that
matter.' 91 Several significant tasks, however, were accomplished
through the process of reaching this procedural conclusion. First, the
court reaffirmed the existence of the common law writ of error coram
nobis. Also, it refused to expand the writ beyond its common law pur-
pose, thus adopting a narrower interpretation than the federal courts
and foreshadowing dim prospects for its expansion in Maryland. Fi-
nally, it clarified that the writ of error coram nobis in Maryland is in
the nature of a civil matter, and as such is consistent with Maryland's
steadfast commitment to the continued viability of common law reme-
dies with their common law attributes. In accomplishing these tasks,
the Ruby decision confirmed that, in Maryland, the common law writ
of error coram nobis remains available as a separate and distinct civil
procedure to challenge collaterally a criminal judgment, and contin-
ues to be interpreted within its traditional common law confines.
a. Procedural Grounds for Reversal.-The Court of Appeals's
decision to overturn the ruling of the Court of Special Appeals was
based on solid procedural grounds, and the court applied the proper
standard of appellate review. 92 Ruby filed a petition for writ of error
coram nobis, requesting as relief a belated appeal of the denial of his
motion for a new trial in his original criminal case.19 The petition
was assigned a civil case number, and was dealt with as a civil mat-
190. Ruby, 353 Md. at 113, 724 A.2d at 680; see also supra notes 158-160 and accompany-
ing text.
191. Ruly, 353 Md. at 113, 724 A.2d at 679; see alsoJones v. Warden, 210 Md. 666, 667,
124 A.2d 283, 283 (1956) (finding that "[a] Ithough the petitioner could have appealed...
from the denial of the writ of error coram nobis ... the record shows that no appeal was
taken as to either, and the correctness of the Court's action in denying [it] [ ] is not before
us" (internal citations omitted) (citing Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1, 65 A.2d 297 (1949))).
192. The court's procedural determination is also consistent with its decision in Johns v.
Warden, 210 Md. 666, 124 A.2d 283 (1956). In Johns, the court considered whether the
circuit court's denial of a tri writ-a petition for habeas corpus, a petition for a writ of
error coram nobis, and a motion to strike out the judgment and sentence-was proper. Id.
at 667, 124 A.2d at 283. Relying on its decisions in Madison and Bernard, the Johns court
affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that "[a]lthough the petitioner could have
appealed from the refusal to strike the judgment ... and from the denial of the writ of
error coram nobis . . . the record shows that no appeal was taken as to either, and the
correctness of the Court's action in denying them is not before us." Id. at 667, 124 A.2d
283 (citations omitted).
193. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 111, 724 A.2d at 679.
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ter.' 94 The circuit court granted Ruby the writ in the civil case, which
directed the criminal court to afford him permission to file a belated
appeal in the criminal case. 95 The State failed to file an appeal of the
circuit court's grant of the writ of error coram nobis in the civil
case.196 Therefore, the circuit court's decisions were final, and the
correctness of the circuit court's grant of the writ of error coram nobis
was, after the time for appeal had passed, no longer appealable. 19 7
Instead of appealing from the grant of the writ of error coram
nobis in the civil case, the State challenged the grant of the writ by
filing a motion to dismiss Ruby's belated criminal appeal with the
Court of Special Appeals in the criminal case.19 The intermediate
appellate court granted the State's motion, reasoning that it did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the belated appeal granted Ruby pursu-
ant to the writ of error coram nobis.' 99 The intermediate appellate
court explained that
[t] he trial court's grant of a writ of error coram nobis was inap-
propriate because the error . . . [petitioner] relies upon to
validate the issuance of the writ does not relate to any fact
not known at either the hearing on his motion for new trial
or at [petitioner] 's original trial that would have affected the
entry of judgment.200
The Court of Appeals, however, correctly noted that the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals did not have jurisdiction to determine the propriety of
the trial court's grant of the petition for writ of error coram nobis. 20 1
Considering that Maryland Rule 8-202(a) mandates that a "notice of
appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or
order from which the appeal is taken '20 2 and that the State did not
file an appeal, 20 3 it was improper for the Court of Special Appeals to
dismiss the belated appeal in the criminal case, holding that it did not




197. See id. (recognizing that the State "failed to file an appeal in the . .. civil case,"
therefore that decision was final and "the correctness of the trial court's grant of the writ of
error coram nobis was, after the time for appeal had passed, no longer appealable").
198. See id. at 112, 724 A.2d at 679.
199. Ruby v. State, 121 Md. App. 168, 172, 708 A.2d 1080, 1082 (1998).
200. Id. at 177, 708 A.2d at 1084.
201. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 112-13, 724 A.2d at 679.
202. Id. at 113, 724 A.2d at 679 (quoting MD. RuLE 8-202(a)).
203. Id.
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civil case improperly issued the writ of error coram nobis.20 4 Thus,
the Court of Appeals's decision to vacate the judgment and to remand
the case to the Court of Special Appeals was procedurally sound.
b. The Availability of the Writ of Error Coram Nobis.-At first
glance, the court's holding in Ruby appears solidly based on Maryland
Rule 8-202 (a).2°5 Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that the
Court of Appeals arrived at the proper result by first recognizing that
the writ of error coram nobis is still available in Maryland °.2 6 The
Ruby court's acknowledgement of the existence of the writ is just one
example of Maryland's firm dedication to the ongoing viability of
common law remedies. 2 7 For example, in State v. Wiegmann,20 8 the
Court of Appeals refused to follow the modern trend of statutorily
abolishing the common law privilege permitting persons to resist an
illegal warrantless arrest, because it was questionable whether the re-
maining remedies were adequate. 201 Similarly, in Hammond v. State,
210
the Court of Appeals relied on common law precedent and the legisla-
ture's silence to interpret three maiming statutes together in accor-
dance with the common law requirement that the maiming,
204. See id. (finding that "because the State failed to appeal the final order of the circuit
court issuing the writ of error coram nobis, the Court of Special Appeals did not have juris-
diction to address the propriety of that final civil order even in that civil case").
205. See id. (recognizing that because "Maryland Rule 8-202(a) mandates that a 'notice
of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the
appeal is taken,'" the state's failure "to appeal the final order of the circuit court issuing
the writ of error coram nobis" terminated its right to appeal and the appellate court ac-
quired no jurisdiction to hear that matter).
206. See id. at 105, 724 A.2d at 676 (recognizing the existence of the writ in Maryland).
207. See, e.g., Harrison v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983) (declining
to abandon the common law doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative
negligence because doing so would involve fundamental and basic public policy considera-
tions properly to be addressed by the legislature); Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183-84,
438 A.2d 494, 499-500 (1981) (declining to alter the common law rule relating to tort
actions against licensed vendors of intoxicating liquors for injuries negligently caused by
an intoxicated patron to an innocent third party); Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 290
Md. 186, 195, 428 A.2d 459, 465 (1981) (refusing to change the common law principles
governing the duty of care owed a trespasser by a property owner).
208. 350 Md. 585, 714 A.2d 841 (1998).
209. Id. at 605-07, 714 A.2d at 851-52. The court in Wiegmann explained that the deci-
sion to modify judicially the common law must be cased on "whether the existing rule...
'is unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to
our people.'" Id. at 605, 714 A.2d at 851 (quoting Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 29, 557
A.2d 210, 216 (1989)). Because of the lack of legislative pronouncement on the issue, the
court refused to answer this question in the affirmative, and included that any change to
the common law on this issue would be "best left to Legislature and its primary power...
to declare the public policy of ... [Maryland]." Id. at 607, 714 A.2d at 851-52.
210. 322 Md. 451, 588 A.2d 345 (1991).
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disfigurement, or disablement be permanent.21 These examples illu-
minate Maryland's "generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not
presumed to repeal the common law 'further than is expressly de-
clared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative
expressed or implied, does not take away the common law.' 2 12
As early as 1932, the Court of Appeals recognized the diminished
usefulness of the writ of error coram nobis.213 The court in Hawks
attributed the potential demise of the writ to the availability of ob-
taining the same results by a motion addressed to the court asking it
to correct its own record.214 Similarly, the Keane court recognized that
the writ's efficacy and usefulness in some states had been destroyed by
statute or modified to some extent by statute or practice.21 5 More
than twenty years later, however, the Madison court dispelled any be-
liefs that the writ of error coram nobis was not available in
Maryland.216
It is significant to note, however, that the revitalization of the writ
by the Madison court was almost short-lived with the Maryland General
Assembly's enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act in
1958.217 The purpose of the Act "was to create a simple statutory pro-
cedure, in place of the common law habeas corpus and coram nobis
remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions and
sentences."218 This language could conceivably be read to suggest
that the writ of error coram nobis was no longer available to challenge
collaterally a criminal judgment. The Court of Appeals in Ruby, how-
ever, strongly alluded to the continued existence of the writ of error
211. Id. at 458-59, 588 A.2d at 348 ("We have no reason to assume that when the Legisla-
ture created the offense of assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable.. . and [subse-
quently] reviewed the statute... it was not fully aware of the requirement at the common
law that maiming, disfigurement, or disablement be permanent.").
212. Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999) (quoting Lutz v.
State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934)).
213. See Hawks v. State, 162 Md. 30, 32, 157 A. 900, 901 (1932) (noting that "[t]he writ
[of coram nobis] has largely fallen into disuse").
214. Id.
215. Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 689, 166 A. 410, 411 (1933) (recognizing that the
writ's "efficacy and usefulness in this country have in some states been destroyed by statute
or practice, and in all states to some extent modified by statute or practice").
216. See Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954) (observing that
"[w]hile the occasions for [the writ's] use have been infrequent, no one has doubted its
availability.... [i]t is still available in Maryland in both civil and criminal cases").
217. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 645A (1958 & Supp. 1963)).
218. See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658, 574 A.2d 898, 909-10 (1990) (citing
Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 446-47, 160 A.2d 912 (1960); State v. D'Onofrio, 221 Md. 20,
288-29, 155 A.2d 643 (1959)).
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coram nobis in Maryland by explaining its enduring allegiance to the
continued viability of common law remedies.2 9
The Ruby court also reaffirmed the existence of the writ of error
coram nobis by clarifying the scope of the Post Conviction Procedure
Act.220 Remedy under the Post Conviction Procedure Act is available
only if the defendant is in custody or subject to conditions of parole or
probation. 22 ' A defendant, however, who is no longer in custody is
not thereby divested of an opportunity to challenge a prior convic-
tion.222 Common law actions, including the writ of error coram nobis,
may still be available. 223 The Ruby court gave deference to the Post
Conviction Procedure Act by conceding that Maryland adopted
England's common law, subject to constitutional conflict, legislative
change, or judicial modification. 224 Nevertheless, in light of the Act,
the Ruby court expressly stated that "the common law writ of error
coram nobis is a procedure still available in this State." 221
The Court of Special Appeals's coram nobisjurisprudence-that
the right to appeal in coram nobis cases has survived the enactment of
the Post Conviction Procedure Act-is also demonstrative of Mary-
land's devotion to the continued availability of common law remedies
with their common law attributes. Prior to the Court of Appeals's de-
cision in Ruby, a line of Court of Special Appeals decisions addressed
the exact question of whether the right to appeal in coram nobis cases
survived the Act.2 26 In Jones v. State,227 the Court of Special Appeals
held that an appeal could lie from the denial of a writ of error coram
nobis.22a Similarly, in Skok v. State,22 9 the intermediate appellate court
perceived no error in the chancellor granting a belated appeal from
219. Ruby, 353 Md. at 111, 724 A.2d at 678 (stating that "the original common law reme-
dies with their common law attributes continue to be viable" in Maryland).
220. Id.
221. See id. (citing Sutton, 319 Md. at 658, 574 A.2d at 908).
222. See id.
223. See id. (citing Fairbanks v. State 331 Md. 482, 492 n.2, 629 A.2d 63, 68 n.3 (1993)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 105, 724 A.2d at 676.
226. See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text (discussing Court of Special Ap-
peals cases dealing with the issue of whether the right to appeal in coram nobis cases
survived the enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act).
227. 114 Md. App. 471, 691 A.2d 229 (1997).
228. Id. at 478, 691 A.2d at 232; see supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Jones court's decision that the right of appeal in coram nobis cases survived the
enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act).
229. 124 Md. App. 226, 721 A.2d 259 (1998).
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his order denying appellant coram nobis.23 ° The Court of Special Ap-
peals has concluded that there is no 'justifiable reason for denying a
right of appeal in a coram nobis petition when the right of appeal is
available to those seeking redress under habeas corpus."2"1 The right
of further review, reasoned the Court of Special Appeals, "ought not
depend upon the name of the vehicle bringing one to the
tribunal. "232
The Ruby court properly declined to address the correctness of
the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Jones, because the issue was
not properly before it.2 33 It is likely, however, that the Court of Ap-
peals will eventually find that the right of appeal in coram nobis cases
survived the adoption of the Act, even though it has held otherwise in
previous cases.2 34 The Court of Appeals has consistently demon-
strated its commitment to the continued viability of common law rem-
edies with their common law attributes, 235 and at common law theright to appeal existed in coram nobis cases.2 36
c. The Scope of the Writ of Error Coram Nobis.-The Ruby
court's refusal to broaden the writ beyond its traditional common law
purpose-to correct factual errors by a court-evidences little pros-
pect for future expansion of the writ. While the federal courts allow
movants to use the writ of error coram nobis to correct constitutional
or other fundamental errors as well as traditional errors of fact,2 3 7
Maryland continues to adhere to the purpose of the writ, as it existed
when Maryland adopted the Common Law of England on July 4,
1776.238 The purpose of the writ at common law was to bring before
the court facts, which were not brought into issue at the trial of the
230. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text (reiterating the holding in Jones that
the right to appeal in coram nobis cases survived the enactment of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act).
231. Jones, 114 Md. App. at 478, 691 A.2d at 232.
232. Id.
233. Ruby, 353 Md. at 106 n.4, 724 A.2d at 676 n.4 (stating that "[t]his Court has yet to
address the correctness of the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Jones and we do not do
so now because ... the issue is not properly before us").
234. See Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447, 160 A.2d 912, 915-16 (1960) (recognizing that
the adoption of the Post Conviction Procedure Act abolished appeals in coram nobis
cases).
235. See supra notes 205-236 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's allegiance to
the continued availability of common law remedies with their common law attributes).
236. See supra notes 78-120 and accompanying text (granting appeals in coram nobis
cases prior to the adoption of the Post Conviction Procedure Act).
237. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the scope of
the writ in federal courts beyond its traditional common law limits).
238. Ruby, 353 Md. at 106, 724 A.2d at 675-76.
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case, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the pro-
ceedings, and which, if known by the court, would have prevented the
judgment.2 19
The common law purpose of the writ of error coram nobis has
been challenged on numerous occasions in Maryland-to no avail.24°
The most notable challenge has been the petition for the writ of error
coram nobis, alleging false testimony by the prosecuting witness.24 ' In
Keane, the Court of Appeals refused to expand the common law pur-
pose of the writ to "permit a review of the evidence given in connec-
tion with the issues actually tried, to determine whether witnesses who
actually testified before a jury sworn on those issues testified
falsely."242 The Keane court explained that the common law and mod-
ern purpose of the writ of error coram nobis was "to determine
whether facts existed which were not known to the court at the trial
and not in issue under the pleadings, but which, if known, would have
prevented the judgment which actually was entered from being
entered."
243
The Court of Appeals continued to adhere to the common law
purpose of the writ of error coram nobis when it treated the motion to
strike out judgment and sentence based on false testimony in Madison
as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. 244 Following Keane, the
Madison court explained that
it is appropriate to say that coram nobis will not lie (1) to cor-
rect an issue of fact which has been adjudicated, even though
wrongly determined, or (2) to determine whether any wit-
nesses testified falsely at the trial, or (3) to present newly dis-
covered evidence, or (4) to strike out a conviction on the
ground that the prosecution was mistaken in his identifica-
tion of the accused as the person who committed the
crime .245
239. See id. at 105, 724 A.2d at 675-76 (noting that the purpose of the writ at common
law was "to bring before the court facts which were not brought into issue at the trial of the
case, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which,
if known by the court, would have prevented the judgment" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954))).
240. See supra notes 83-121 and accompanying text (discussing various unsuccessful chal-
lenges to the common law scope of the writ in Maryland).
241. See supra notes 83-106 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful petitions for
the writ of error coram nobis, alleging false testimony by the prosecuting witness).
242. Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 689, 166 A. 410, 411 (1933).
243. Id.
244. Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 431, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954).
245. Id. at 432, 109 A.2d at 99.
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The parameters of the writ as outlined by the Court of Appeals in
Madison in 1954 are consistent with the scope of the writ as it existed
at common law-to correct errors of fact.246 During the same year,
however, that the Court of Appeals limited the scope of the writ in
Madison, the Supreme Court in Morgan broadened the scope of the
writ in federal courts. 24 7 Today, the federal courts permit the issuance
of the writ to correct constitutional or other fundamental errors as
well as traditional errors of fact.248 The Ruby court recognized the
Court of Appeals's 1954 Madison decision as the most thorough dis-
cussion of the purpose of the writ of error coram nobis in Mary-
land,249 thus demonstrating its desire to adhere to prior law on this
issue rather than to invoke new, more recent approaches adopted by
other jurisdictions. Thus, the Court of Appeals's jurisprudence, up to
and including the Ruby decision, foreshadows the dim prospects in
Maryland of future expansions of the writ of error coram nobis be-
yond its traditional common law limits.
d. The Civil Nature of the Coram Nobis Proceeding.-The most
significant aspect of the Ruby decision is the court's formal announce-
ment that a petition for "a writ of error coram nobis remains a civil
matter in Maryland, independent of the underlying action from which
it arose."25 ° At common law, the petition for the writ of error coram
nobis was a separate civil proceeding.2"1 Therefore, the court's an-
nouncement is not surprising considering Maryland's unwavering
faithfulness to the availability of common law remedies with their
common law attributes.252
246. Id.
247. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954) (approving the practice of
lower federal courts granting writs of error coram nobis to protect broad constitutional
guarantees); see also supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the purpose
of the writ in federal courts beyond its traditional common law limits).
249. Ruby, 353 Md. at 105, 724 A.2d at 675 (noting that the Court of Appeals has "ex-
pressly recognized [the] use and availability [of the writ of error coram nobis] in
Madison").
250. Id. at 111, 724 A.2d at 678-79.
251. Id. at 107, 724 A.2d at 677 (stating that "[a]t common law, a proceeding on a writ
of error coram nobis was a civil matter procedurally independent of the underlying judg-
ment being contested" (citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221 n.36 (1952)));
see also State v. Turner, 231 N.W.2d 345, 349 (1975) (stating that the "writ of error coram
nobis is a common law civil proceeding applied in both civil and criminal judgments"
(citations omitted)); State v. King, 380 P.2d 325, 326 (1963) (stating that "under the com-
mon law ... proceedings upon application for a writ of coram nobis are regarded as civil in
character" (internal citations omitted)).
252. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 111, 724 A.2d at 678 (stating that the "original common law
remedies with their common law attributes continue to be viable").
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The civil nature of the writ is not unique to Maryland. 25  Most
other jurisdictions agree that a proceeding on a writ of error coram
nobis remains a civil matter independent of the underlying judgment
being contested.25 4 In the federal courts, however, the modern status
of the writ as a civil or criminal proceeding is uncertain.255 As the
Court of Appeals in Ruby noted, the tension among the federal cir-
cuits relates to the Morgan footnote's paradoxical language. 256 Al-
though this inconsistency may have perplexed the federal courts,257
Maryland's dedication to the continued existence of common law
remedies with their common law attributes has been left intact.
2 58
The Court of Appeals in Ruby explicitly stated that "[n]otwithstanding
any disagreements among the courts of the federal circuits, no confu-
sion as to the nature of a writ of error coram nobis exists in this jurisdic-
tion . . . . [A] writ of error coram nobis remains a civil matter in
Maryland, independent of the underlying action from which it
arose."
259
5. Conclusion.-In Ruby, the Court of Appeals held that the
Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to determine the
propriety of the trial court's grant of the common law writ of error
coram nobis in Ruby's belated appeal of the denial of his motion for a
new trial in the criminal case. In so doing, the court recognized that
the writ of error coram nobis still exists in Maryland, and is limited in
scope to its traditional common law confines. The court also clarified
that a proceeding on the writ is, as it was at common law, a civil matter
253. Id. at 108-09, 724 A.2d at 677 (recognizing that "[miost other jurisdictions agree
that a proceeding on a writ of error coram nobis remains a civil matter independent of the
underlying case"); see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the nature
of the proceeding on the writ of error coram nobis outside of Maryland).
254. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 108-09, 724 A.2d at 677 (citing cases that have concluded that a
proceeding on a writ of coram nobis [is] a civil matter independent of the underlying
case"); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (same). But see supra note 39 and
accompanying text (citing cases that have determined that a coram nobis proceeding is
part of the original criminal case rather than a separate civil proceeding).
255. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 109, 724 A.2d at 677-78; see also supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the split in the federal courts on the issue of whether coram nobis is
civil or criminal in nature).
256. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 109-10, 724 A.2d at 678; see also supra notes 63-70 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the language of footnote four of the Morgan decision).
257. See Ruby, 353 at 109, 724 A.2d at 677-78 (noting that "[t]he federal circuits are split
on ... [the] issue" of whether error coram nobis is civil or criminal in nature); see also supra
note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the split in the federal courts on the issue of
whether coram nobis is civil or criminal in nature).
258. See Ruby, 353 Md. at 111,724 A.2d at 678 (stating that "[t] he original common law
remedies with their common law attributes continue to be viable").
259. Id. at 110-11, 724 A.2d at 678-79.
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independent of the underlying judgment being contested. Thus,
Ruby represents a confirmation of Maryland's steadfast commitment
to the continued viability of common law remedies with their com-
mon law attributes and its commitment to procedural accuracy in ap-
plying the writ.
MICHELLE L. CURLEY
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
III. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. "Tender of Delivery"for Article 2 Limitations Purposes Is Not
Necessarily Contingent Upon Seller's Satisfaction of Testing Obligations
In Washington Freightliner v. Shantytown Pier,1 the Court of Appeals
held that a breach of implied warranty claim brought by a buyer of
marine engines was time-barred under section 2-725 of the Maryland
Code's Commercial Law Article 2 because although the action was
filed within four years of the date of testing of the engines, it was not
filed within four years of the seller's physical delivery of the engines
for installation.' The court explained that the statute of limitations
begins to run upon "tender of delivery."4 In defining "tender of deliv-
ery," the court applied the general rule that tender of delivery occurs,
and section 2-725 begins to run, when a seller of goods makes physical
delivery to the buyer.5 The court did not postpone the running of the
statute of limitations until after the seller had completed its testing
obligations under the contract.6 In so finding, the court formulated a
rule that will apply generally to contracts for sale unless the contracts
specifically reflect the parties' intent to postpone delivery until goods
are tested and found to be nondefective.7
In so developing this rule, however, the court failed to inquire
into the subjective state of mind of the seller, a consideration required
by section 2-503 of Maryland's Commercial Law Article.8 Despite this
problematic reasoning, the case yields a desirable rule that furthers
the purpose of section 2-725: to give sellers clear notice of the date
upon which they are released from liability for implied warranty
1. 351 Md. 616, 719 A.2d 541 (1998).
2. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997).
3. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551.
4. See also id. at 624-25, 719 A.2d at 545; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725(2)
(1997) (explaining that "[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs... [a] breach
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made").
5. Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551. According to section 2-
725(1), stating that "[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I
§ 2-725(1).
6. Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 636-37, 719 A.2d at 551.
7. See infra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (discussing the precedent set forth
by Washington Freightliner).
8. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-503 (official comment 1) (suggesting that
whether tender of delivery has occurred may depend on whether a seller has offered goods
"as if in fulfillment of the contract" which is a consideration requiring inquiry into the
subjective mind of the seller); see also infra notes 244-252 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing this apparent flaw in the majority's reasoning).
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claims.' Moreover, this decision sends a message to parties doing bus-
iness under Maryland law that they will need to make their intention
clear in the language of their agreement if they wish to postpone the
running of section 2-725 until any testing of the goods is complete.
1. The Case.--Shantytown Pier, Inc. (Shantytown) is a family
business engaged in providing recreational boating trips for custom-
ers in the Ocean City, Maryland area.'0 In furtherance of the com-
pany's business goals, Shantytown's president, Charles Nichols, sought
to build the "largest and the fastest and the sleekest head boat in
Ocean City or up and down the east coast."1" In March 1990, Shanty-
town contracted with Lydia Yachts (Lydia), a Florida boatyard, to con-
struct the vessel to be named the "Ocean City Princess" (O.C.
Princess). 2 To power the O.C. Princess, Shantytown purchased three
"MAN D2840LXE 820-horsepower, 10-cylinder engines from Washing-
ton Freightliner Inc. (WFI), one of the defendants."'" These engines
were manufactured by MAN Roland, Inc. (MAN), also a defendant in
the case.' 4 The contract for sale of the engines included a total
purchase price of "$163,000, 'FOB Pompano Beach, Florida.""' 5 The
9. In Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983) the court
noted that
[w]hile this limitation period may appear relatively short, it was designed by the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code to serve the important function of
providing a point of finality for businesses after which they could destroy their
business records without the fear of a subsequent breach of contract for sale or
breach of warranty suit arising to haunt them .... Hence, the finality necessary
to promote the flow of commerce is effectuated by the limitation period.
Id. at 1266 (citing 3 W.D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 2-725:02, at
479 (1938)); see also infra notes 253-265 and accompanying text (explaining the policy
goals upheld by this decision).
10. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 618-19, 719 A.2d at 542.
11. Brief of Appellees at 3, Washington Freightliner v. Shantytown Pier, 351 Md. 616,
719 A.2d 541 (1998) (No. 38) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
12. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 619, 719 A.2d at 542.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. The abbreviation "FOB" represents the phrase "Free on Board" and is defined
as 
" [
a] delivery term which requires a seller to ship goods and bear the expense and risk of
loss to the F.O.B. point designated." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 642 (6th ed. Centennial ed.
(1891-1991) 1990). In the commercial context, FOB terms are addressed by § 2-319 of the
Maryland Code's Commercial Law article, which explains:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means "free on board") at a
named place, even though used only in connection with the stated price, is a
delivery term under which
(a) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the seller must at that
place ship the goods in the manner provided in this Article (Section 2-
504) and bear the expense and risk of putting them into possession of
the carrier; or
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price quotation for these terms also addressed the delivery, explaining
that the price excluded installation and "included start up and com-
missioning[16] (8 hour allowance)." 17
By September 30, 1990, the three MAN engines had been physi-
cally delivered to Lydia's boatyard by Marine Mechanical Systems
(MMS), a Florida distributor of MAN products and a third defendant
in this case."8 About six months later, on April 20, 1991, after Lydia
had built the O.C. Princess and installed the MAN engines, employees
of Shantytown, MMS, and Lydia commissioned the vessel without inci-
dent. 9 Despite a problem-free trial run at sea, one or more of the
engines failed on numerous occasions in the years following the com-
(b) when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the seller must at his
own expense and risk transport the goods to that place and there tender
delivery of them in the manner provided in this Article (Section 2-503);
(c) when under either (a) or (b) the term is also F.O.B. vessel, car or other
vehicle, the seller must in addition at his own expense and risk load the
goods on board. If the term is F.O.B. vessel the buyer must name the
vessel in an appropriate case the seller must comply with the provisions
of this Article on the form of bill of lading (Section 2-323).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-319 (1997).
16. "Commissioning" is a term used to describe a post-installation testing phase for
marine vessels and their engines. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 621, 719 A.2d at
543. Commissioning in this case included "monitor[ing] operating temperatures, pres-
sures, exhaust temperatures, engine room depression, and record[ing] the values at a vari-
ety of speeds, including wide-open throttle." Id.
17. Id. at 641-42, 719 A.2d at 553 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The
relevant section of the price quotation read in full:
The afore-mentioned price is a firm price and is for delivery,
- FOB Pompano Beach, Florida
- Including, shipping skid, excluding boxing
- Including United States customs duty and custom charges
- Excluding installation
- Excluding any State or Local Tax
- Including start up and commissioning (8 hour allowance) ....
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). While this explanation of the terms of the
contract are quoted in judge Eldridge's dissent, they are not contested facts of the case. See
Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 622-23, 719 A.2d at 544. The court acknowledged that
while
the contract of sale is not in evidence... [t]he record ... does contain a two page
quotation which all parties in effect agree contains the specific terms (as con-
trasted with the general terms) for the sale to Shantytown. The quoted price of
$163,000, F.O.B. Pompano Beach, includes "Start up and Commissioning (8 Hr.
Allowance)."
Id. (footnote omitted). The contract terms that include start-up and commissioning even-
tually give rise to the issue addressed by the Washington Freightliner court. Shantytown ar-
gued that because of these contract terms, the statute of limitations did not begin running
until after the commissioning occurred. See id. at 624, 719 A.2d at 544-45.
18. See id. at 619, 719 A.2d at 542.
19. See id.; id. at 621-22, 719 A.2d at 543-44 (naming the persons present during the
O.C. Princess' commissioning).
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missioning.2 ° In hope of remedying these malfunctions,21 Shantytown
purchased yet another of the MAN engines, which eventually failed as
well.22
On October 6, 1994, Shantytown filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Worcester County against WFI, MMS, and MAN, alleging "breaches of
express warranty, of contract, and of the implied warranties of
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose."23 Judge
Theodore R. Eschenburg denied the defendants' pre-trial motions for
summary judgment, which argued that Shantytown's claims were time-
barred.24 Before trial, Shantytown dismissed all of its claims against
the defendants except for the implied warranty claims.25
At trial, Shantytown argued that the statute of limitations did not
begin until April 20, 1991, when the engines were commissioned.26
The defendants, in their motions for judgment, argued that Shanty-
town's claim was time barred because tender of delivery was made
upon physical delivery of the three MAN engines to Lydia, Shanty-
town's agent. 27 The defendants twice renewed their limitations argu-
ment during the trial, first at the close of Shantytown's case, and
20. See id. at 619, 719 A.2d at 542 (explaining that "[o]n ten separate occasions during
the nearly four years of operating the O.C. Princess, Shantytown experienced failures of
one or another of each of the three engines").
21. See id. at 619, 719 A.2d at 542. Primarily, the engine failures were due to "complica-
tions involving faulty pistons." Id.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 620, 719 A.2d at 543.
24. See id. (discussing howJudge Eschenburg denied the defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment). The applicable statute of limitations in this type of case mandated that
an action for breach of warranty "must be commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrues." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-725(1) (1997). A cause of action accrues
upon breach of the warranty, which "occurs when tender of delivery is made." MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725(2) (1997). In relevant part, the statute reads:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties
may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend
it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of
delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform-
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such per-
formance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725(1) (2) (1997) (emphasis added).
25. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 620, 719 A.2d at 543 (noting that Shantytown
"voluntarily dismissed its express warranty and breach of contract claims").
26. See id.
27. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 618, 719 A.2d at 542 (explaining the two
possible dates and events which might constitute "tender of delivery").
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second at the close of all evidence.2 8 After the jury found in favor of
Shantytown on the breach of implied warranties claim, the defendants
again relied on their limitations argument in motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.29 In denying these motions, trial Judge
Thomas C. Groton stated that Shantytown was
not given control of the engines until they were placed in the
boat and the boat was commissioned, and then when it was
first commissioned, the boat wasn't even in their control. It
was in the control of... more than Lydia .... It was in the
control of some of [the defendants'] representatives that
were part of the commissioning that in essence, were in
charge of the process.30
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
Judge Groton's decision as to the date of tender of delivery."1 The
Court of Special Appeals held that it was the defendants' burden to
prove that the limitations period had run and that "the trial court had
before it evidence from which it reasonably could have decided that
the price quotation and testimony at trial constituted sufficient proof
of a requirement of commissioning [and] that [defendants] had thus
failed to carry their burden of persuasion." 2 Defendants appealed,
and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide "whether
tender of delivery under section 2-725(2) occurred when the defend-
ants delivered the engines for Shantytown to Lydia or when the O.C.
Princess was commissioned." 3
2. Legal Background.-Most of the state legislatures, including
the Maryland General Assembly, have adopted sections of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC or Code) verbatim as their commercial
law statutes.3 4 Such straightforward adoption of UCC provisions fur-
thers one of the primary underlying goals of the UCC: "to make uni-
form the law among the various jurisdictions.""3 Two Code provisions
28. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 620, 719 A.2d at 543 (describing the defend-
ants' motions at trial and the court's rulings).
29. See id. at 622, 719 A.2d at 544.
30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Record Extract at E104).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 623, 719 A.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE I (2d ed.
1980) (explaining that "[b]y 1979, the Uniform Commercial Code ... (with minor varia-
tions), had become law in all states but Louisiana, and law in the District of Columbia and
the Virgin Islands" (footnote omitted)).
35. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1999). For the purposes of this Note, when discussing Mary-
land law the Maryland Code's Commercial Article will be cited, but when discussing cases
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that states often adopt verbatim are U.C.C. § 2-503 (Manner of Seller's
Tender of Delivery) and § 2-725 (Statute of Limitations in Contracts
for Sale).36 While these statutes are often facially identical among
states, state courts may interpret them differently.17
a. The Relevant Code Provisions. -By examining both the pro-
visions themselves and the various case law interpreting those provi-
sions, it becomes more clear when and under what circumstances a
seller of goods triggers the statute of limitations for implied warranty
claims.
(1) Section 2-725: Statute of Limitations in Contracts for
Sale. 8-- Section 2-725's language limits the time a buyer has to sue a
seller for breach of contract or warranties before being time-barred.
It reads, in relevant part:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce
the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not
extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, re-
gardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to fu-
ture performance of the goods and discovery of the breach
must await the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered. 9
In applying the statute, a court need only compare the date of
tender of delivery to the date on which the aggrieved party filed suit.40
Complications arise, however, because section 2-725 and its official
from other states and federal law, the U.C.C. will be cited. As is stated in the above text,
Maryland has adopted the U.C.C.
36. Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-503, 2-725, with CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42a-2-503, 42a-2-725
(1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2-503, 2-725 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-2-503, 84-2-725
(1998); MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW I §§ 2-503, 2-725; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 336.2-503,
336.2-725 (West 1998); N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-503, 2-725 (McKinney 1998); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1302.47, 1302.98 (West 1999), and S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 57A-2-503, 57A-2-725
(1999) (adopting U.C.C. §§ 2-503 and 2-725).
37. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 8 ("Today, many Code sections have been
the subject of judicial interpretation and construction in more than one jurisdiction and
the courts disagree over the meaning of many sections.").
38. MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997).
39. Id. § 2-725(1), (2) (emphasis added).
40. See id. (laying out a formula for determining whether a claim is time-barred).
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comment are silent on what tender of delivery means.41 Instead, sec-
tion 2-503 and its official comment, which deal directly with tender of
delivery, are more instructive.
42
(2) Section 2-503: Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivey.-Sec-
tion 2-503 governs how and when a seller must deliver the goods to a
buyer in a contract for sale.43 In addition, the section defines tender
of delivery as follows: "(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller
put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition and give
the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take
delivery."44
While the text of this section offers only one explanation of
"tender of delivery," the official comment makes it clear that "'tender'
is used in [the Code] in two different senses."45 The comment
explains:
In one sense it refers to 'due tender' which contemplates an
offer coupled with a present ability to fulfill all the condi-
tions resting on the tendering party and must be followed by
actual performance if the other party shows himself ready to
proceed .... At other times it is used to refer to an offer of
goods or documents under a contract as if in fulfillment of
its conditions even though there is a defect when measured
against the contract obligation.46
The comment concludes that "[u]sed in either sense, however,
"tender" connotes such performance by the tendering party as puts
the other party in default if he fails to proceed in some manner. " "
b. Judicial Interpretation of the Code.-
(1) The Controlling Sense of "Tender of Deliveyy".-The two
senses of tender of delivery described in section 2-503's official com-
41. See id. (official comment 1) (lacking instruction on defining "tender of delivery" for
the purposes of the statute of limitations).
42. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-503 and official comment 1 (discussing "tender
of delivery" for the purposes of the U.C.C.).
43. See id. (official comment 1) ("The major general rules governing the manner of
proper or due tender of delivery are gathered in this section."). For example, § 2-503(1)
(a) notes that "tender of delivery must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods they
must be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to take
possession." Id. § 2-503(1) (a). Section 2-503 also deals with requirements pertaining to
the delivery of documents, § 2-503(3) (4) (5), and delivery "where goods are in the posses-
sion of a bailee and are to be delivered without being moved." Id. § 2-503(4).
44. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-503(1).
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ment beg the question: which sense controls in limitations context?4
Case law offers some answers.49 Courts have routinely applied the less
demanding sense of delivery, which requires only "an offer of goods
or documents under a contract as if in fulfillment of its conditions even
though there is a defect when measured against a contract obliga-
tion.""° In this sense, the limitations period in section 2-725 begins to
run regardless of whether the seller delivers defective goods, so long
as the seller delivers "as if in fulfillment of' the contract's
conditions.5 1
Use of a less restrictive tender of delivery can 'be explained on
policy grounds. The purpose of the Code's statute of limitations is to
limit the period of vulnerability for sellers to claims by aggrieved buy-
ers and to limit the time in which sellers must maintain records of
sale.52 The framers of the Code chose a four year period as the statute
of limitations, in keeping with normal commercial standards. 5' The
purpose of this time limit "is to provide a finite period in time when
the seller knows that he is relieved from liability for a possible breach
of contract for sale or breach of warranty."
5 4
(2) Physical Delivery of Goods.-The clearest decisions con-
cerning the application of section 2-725 arise when the seller's only
obligation to the buyer is the physical delivery of goods. The delivery
48. See id. (explaining that "tender of delivery" under the Code "is used . . . in two
different senses.").
49. See, e.g., Navistar Int'l Corp. v. Hagie Mfg. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (applying the definition of delivery that requires only that the seller offer goods as if
in fulfillment of the agreement even though defects might exist); Nelligan v. Tom Chaney
Motors, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Ill. App. 1985) (same); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys.,
Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (D. Del. 1983) (same).
50. U.C.C. § 2-503 (1999) (official comment 1) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Navistar,
662 F. Supp. at 1210 (rejecting the argument that the statute of limitations period embod-
ied in U.C.C. § 2-725 begins to run only after the seller delivers conforming, nondefective
goods); Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1267 (same); Nelligan, 479 N.E.2d at 442 (same); see
also W. HAWKtAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-725:2 (1994 ed. 1994) ("It
should be noted that UCC section 2-725(2) refers to 'tender of delivery' and not 'con-
forming tender of delivery.' Tender of nonconforming goods, therefore, will trigger the
statute of limitations in warranty cases not involving explicit agreements to extend to fu-
ture performance.").
51. U.C.C. § 2-503 (1999) (official comment 1).
52. See Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1266 (explaining that section 2-725 "was designed
by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code to serve the important function of pro-
viding a point of finality for businesses after which they could destroy their business
records without the fear of a subsequent breach of contract for sale or breach of warranty
suit arising to haunt them.").
53. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (official comment 1) (noting that the four-year time limit "is
within the normal commercial record keeping period").
54. Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1267.
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requirement in such cases is satisfied when the buyer takes possession
of the goods after the transaction is complete.55 In such a case, at the
time of sale, the seller has completed all contractual obligations and
has relinquished control to the buyer. The limitations period begins
at this point, and section 2-725 will bar any warranty claim brought by
a buyer if it is not made within four years of the taking of the goods.56
These types of cases that involve a purchase of ready to use goods
provide for a mechanical application of section 2-725, because absent
an agreement to the contrary, the seller is no longer obligated to the
buyer, and the seller does not have any continuing control over the
goods.57
(3) "Tender of Delivery" When the Seller Is Obligated to Assemble or
Install Goods.-A slightly more complicated transaction arises when a
contract requires the seller not only to provide goods, but to assemble
or to install them for the buyer.5 1 In these cases, the courts have de-
veloped the general rule that where a contract expressly obligates the
seller to install the goods purchased, tender of delivery occurs, for
limitations purposes, when installation is complete.59
In Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Products Sales Co., 0 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered a contract
dispute between a buyer of corn syrup storage facilities and a seller
whose obligations included the sale and installation of the materials. 61
The buyer filed a suit for breach of implied warranties less than four
years after the seller had completed the installation of certain heating
55. See Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F. Supp. 611, 612-13 (D. Md. 1982)
(treating as the delivery date for section 2-725 purposes the date upon which buyer took
possession of a tractor from seller).
56. See id. at 613 (barring a breach of warranty claim against a seller of a tractor on
limitations grounds because the buyer commenced action twelve years after simple
purchase and taking possession of the goods).
57. Such a situation provides for a mechanical application of section 2-725 because the
date of delivery is not in dispute. Absent any argument to the contrary, in determining the
date of delivery a court would have no other possible delivery date except for the one upon
which possession changed hands. See id. at 612 (explaining that "[section] 2-725 means
just what it says: a warranty action must be brought within four years of the tender of the
goods forming the basis of the warranty"); id. at 613 (finding that tender of delivery oc-
curred upon the initial exchange of the goods in 1970 and that "[section] 2-725 bars a
warranty action brought in 1982 when plaintiffs make no allegation that the warranty ex-
pressly extended the statutory period"). Thus, simply counting four years from that date
provides for a mechanical application of section 2-725.
58. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing with such
contracts).
59. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (discussing cases supporting this rule).
60. 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 851.
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equipment.6 2 The court decided that OHIO REVISED CODE ANNO-
TATED § 1302.9863 controlled and that the buyer's claim was timely
because the period of limitations began to run when the seller had
completed the installation.64
In Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson Co.,65 the Sixth
Circuit again regarded the seller's completion of the installation as
the proper trigger for Ohio's statute of limitations.66 In this case, the
parties contracted for the sale and installation of a 175-ton "horizontal
automatic radial forging facility,"6 7 but agreed to reduce the limita-
tions period to one year.68 The court held that the buyer's warranty
claims were time-barred by section 2-725 because they were filed over
one year after the seller had completed the required installation of
the machine.6"
Federal courts interpreting Maryland law have made analogous
determinations concerning delivery and the seller's obligations to in-
stall goods. In In re Automated Bookbinding Services,70 the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland considered an appeal from the
order of a bankruptcy referee that turned on the issue of when a
bankrupt buyer received possession of a bookbinding machine. 71 If
the buyer obtained possession when the machine's parts arrived unas-
62. See id. (noting that "the complaint was filed on January 10, 1967," and that "installa-
tion was completed on or about June 20, 1963").
63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.98 (West 1999). This section of Ohio's code is identi-
cal to U.C.C. § 2-725 and its Maryland counterpart. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1302.98 (West 1999), with U.C.C. § 2-725 (1999), and MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-725
(1997).
64. See Val Decker, 411 F.2d at 853-54 (remanding the dispute for further consideration
as it was not barred by the four year statute of limitations).
65. 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978).
66. See Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 819 ("Under section 2-725, a cause of action ac-
crues upon initial installation of the product regardless of whether it functions properly or
not so long as the warranty does not extend to future performance." (citing Val Decker, 411
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969)).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 818 (noting that the contract "contained a one-year limitations period").
The U.C.C. expressly allows parties to reduce limitations periods to a minimum of one
year. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1) ("By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period
of limitations to not less than one year but may not extend it.").
69. See Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 821 (finding that the buyer's warranty claims were
barred by section 2-725 because "suit was not brought until over a year [after
installation]").
70. 336 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Md. 1972), rev'd, 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972); see infra note
74 (discussing the reversal of this case).
71. See Automated, 336 F. Supp. at 1133 (explaining that the issue is which of the bank-
rupt's creditors have priority and that "'[p]ossession' [is] the key word" of the applicable
bankruptcy statute).
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sembled, then one of buyer's creditors had priority in the dispute.72
If, however, the buyer obtained possession when the seller installed
the machine and trained the company's employees, then the seller of
the machine had priority because it had perfected its purchase money
security interest in the machine within ten days of the buyer taking
possession. 7' The court equated tender of delivery of the seller under
section 2-503 of the Maryland Code's Commercial Law Article with
the taking of possession of the assembled machine by the buyer and
found that the seller's purchase money security interest had priority. 4
The court reasoned that because the seller was obliged under the con-
tract to install the machine and to train the buyer's employees in its
operation, the buyer gained possession only when the seller had com-
pleted tender of delivery, that is, when it had completed the installa-
tion and training.75
72. See id. at 1133-35 (discussing the claims of the bankrupt company's creditors and
the governing statute); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 9-312(4) (1997) ("A purchase
money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting
security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security inter-
est is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 20 days
thereafter.").
73. See Automated, 336 F. Supp. at 1133-35 (invoking section 9-312(4) and explaining
that the date upon which the buyer gained "possession" of the machine would determine
which creditor would have priority); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 9-312(4) (1997).
74. See Automated, 336 F. Supp. at 1135. The court stated:
[T]his court holds that tender of delivery and acceptance of what the parties had
bargained for in their purchase and security agreement occurred no earlier than
June 13, 1970 [when seller completed installation] and that possession of the new
binder within the meaning of the U.C.C. vested in Bankrupt [buyer] no earlier
than that date.
Id. Although this holding was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Automated, 471 F.2d
546 (4th Cir. 1972), its relevance to "tender of delivery" remains. The Fourth Circuit re-
versed the case not because of the district court's interpretation that "tender of delivery"
included installation, but because that court chose to equate "possession" as used in the
Maryland Code's Commercial Law Article 9 (Secured Transactions) with the principles of
delivery from the Maryland Code's Commercial Law Article 2 (Sales). See Automated, 471
F.2d at 553 (explaining that possession under section 9-312(4) is not dependent upon
completion of tender of delivery terms "which affect only the buyer and seller of goods").
The Fourth Circuit explained that "[tiender of delivery is a sales concept, employed by
Article 2, which binds a buyer and a seller to contractual conditions. It affects their rights
against each other. It would be a serious error to allow those private conditions to affect
the carefully defined rights of creditors under Article 9." Automated, 471 F.2d at 553 (foot-
note omitted) (emphasis added).
75. See Automated, 336 F. Supp. at 1134 (explaining that "tender of delivery is an essen-
tial step in transactions falling under the U.C.C. §§ 2-503 and 2-507," and that "[u]nder
these facts ... [seller] was in no position to tender delivery under its agreement until the
equipment had been assembled, placed in first class running order, and an employee of
[the buyer] had been trained as an operator"); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I
§§ 2-503, 2-507 (1997) (codifying U.C.C. §§ 2-503, 2-507).
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(4) "Tender of Delivery" and Contractual Requirements of Pre-De-
livery Testing.-The issue of when tender of delivery occurs for statute
of limitations purposes also arises in contracts that require testing of
goods before they are placed at the buyer's disposition. In most cases,
such testing requirements in a contract will not affect the general rule
that "tender of delivery" occurs upon the date of physical delivery.76 If
contract terms are explicit and if they expressly contemplate testing
and delivery, however, the triggering of the limitations period might
be postponed until testing is complete.77
City of New York v. Pullman78 exemplifies this exception. In Pull-
man, a seller of subway cars contracted with the New York City Transit
Authority (NYCTA) to sell 754 "R-46" subway cars.79 Because the de-
sign of these cars was "radically different" from those normally used by
the City,8° the contract specifically required that the seller deliver ten
cars for preliminary inspection and testing so that the NYCTA could
determine whether this new design met the contract specifications."1
If these cars did not meet the specifications, the NYCTA could decide
against receipt of the remaining cars. 2 The seller physically delivered
these ten cars in March 1975, and they passed inspection and testing
in December 1975.83 The seller delivered the remaining 744 cars in
December 1978.84 In July 1979, after several of the cars had exper-
ienced technical failures, the NYCTA and the City of New York sued
the seller for breach of implied warranties.8 5 After a trial in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the
jury rendered judgment and damages for the plaintiffs.8 6
76. See infra notes 119-140 and accompanying text (discussing cases which exemplify
the general rule that physical delivery triggers the limitations period in section 2-725).
77. See infra notes 119-140 and accompanying text (discussing cases so holding).
78. 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981).
79. Pullman, 662 F.2d at 912.
80. See id. at 912-13.
81. See id. at 919 (explaining that "[s]pecification 3.5 of the Equipment Contact" re-
quired "[t] he delivery of ten subway cars for final on-line tests and inspection").
82. See id. ("[U]nder the contract appellees were not obliged to take any steps until
appellants conformed to the specifications by delivering cases which had completed the 30
day test ....").
83. See id. at 912, 919.
84. See id. at 912 ("Following the completion of the online tests, deliveries continued
until December 1978.").
85. See id. at 913 (discussing the malfunctions of the goods and citing the date of initial
filing for breach of warranty).
86. See id. at 912.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, explaining that the
NYCTA's claim was not time-barred under N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-72587 be-
cause tender of delivery occurred and the statute of limitations began
to run at the earliest in December 1975.88 The court explained that
the contract explicitly obligated the seller to deliver goods that con-
formed to the testing standards required of the initial ten cars. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the court reasoned that tender of delivery could not have
occurred until the preliminary testing was completed-December
1975.90 The court explained that, "under the contract [the NYCTA
was] not obligated to take any steps until [the seller] conformed to
the specifications by delivering cars which had completed the 30 day
test, since the contract speci'fically provided that any cars built before
the 30 day test were constructed at the seller's risk.""' Thus, Pullman
stands for the proposition that if the contract contains specific lan-
guage, parties may contract to postpone tender of delivery until after
testing has been completed.
The Second Circuit affirmed the validity of Pullman in H. Sand &
Co., Inc. v. Airtemp Corp., 2 but indicated that agreements to postpone
delivery must be explicit."5 Airtemp deals with a breach of warranty in
a contract for the sale of four motorized chillers.94 All four of the
chillers were sent to the buyer, but one of them had not yet been
tested. 5 This chiller was returned to the seller for testing and then
87. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1998). Note that this statute is identical to UC.C.
§ 2-725 and its Maryland counterpart. Compare N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1998), with
U.C.C. § 2-725 (1999), and MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-725 (1997).
88. See Pullman, 662 F.2d at 919 (explaining that the "tender of delivery could not
occur, and did not occur, until the required test of the sample train was completed in
December 1975," and holding that "no aspect of appellees' cause of action was time
barred").
89. See id. (noting the seller's obligations under the contract).
90. See id. (explaining the "tender of delivery could not occur").
91. Id.
92. 934 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1991); see id. at 455 (citing Pullman, 662 F.2d at 919, and
explaining that "parties may by contract agree that delivery will not be made until some
form of testing has been completed").
93. See id. at 455 (explaining that without contract provisions to the contrary, "where a
contract simply provides for delivery to be followed by testing, the pretesting delivery con-
stitutes 'tender of delivery' within the meaning of N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney
1964)" (citing City of Cincinnati v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 259, 262 (D. Conn.
1986) and Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614 (D. Del.
1977))).
94. Airtemp, 934 F. Supp. at 452. More specifically, these chillers were "motor driven
hermetic centrifugal chillers, which constituted a cooling system." Id.
95. See id. The court explained that the fourth chiller had not been tested, "because by
the time it was ready to be tested [the seller] was in the process of relocating its testing
facilities from Kentucky to Edison, New Jersey." Id.
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sent back to the buyer. 6 The issue before the Second Circuit was
whether material issues of fact existed as to when tender of delivery
occurred: when the four chillers were first delivered or when the seller
tested and returned the final chiller.9 7 The court decided that such
issues of fact existed, explaining that a reasonable jury could find that
after initial delivery, the fourth chiller was not at the buyer's disposi-
tion, but rather, was being held by the buyer so that the seller could
fulfill its testing obligations at a later date.98 In so deciding, the court
affirmed Pullman, noting that "parties may by contract agree that de-
livery will not be made until some form of testing has been com-
pleted."99 Moreover, the court acknowledged that when parties wish
to postpone delivery until after testing, the terms of the contract must
specifically express such intent.'00
The ability of parties to include pre-delivery testing obligations in
contracts for sale has also been confirmed in the federal district
courts. In St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp v. Research-Cottrell,1 ' the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
allow the New York statute of limitations period'0 2 to begin before the
seller and installer of a pollution control system had completed the
clear testing obligations outlined in the contract.10 3 The court rea-
soned that under a running obligation to test the system the seller
could not have placed the system at the buyer's disposition."0 4 Be-
cause there was evidence that the parties intended the seller's testing
obligations to extend well beyond mere physical delivery and installa-
96. See id. (explaining the movement of the fourth chiller).
97. See id. at 453-54. The court stated:
There is no question that the resolution of the date of tender of delivery is mate-
rial, for [buyer] 's ability to bring its claim turns on the resolution of this issue of
fact. The only question, therefore, is whether the issue of fact is genuine, that is,
whether there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that tender of delivery
occurred within four years of the time Sand filed suit.
Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-725(1)).
98. See id. at 454 (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the buyer's agent
was holding the chiller for the seller's convenience and was at the seller's disposition, not
at the buyer's).
99. Id. at 455 (citing City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 919 (2d Cir.
1981)).
100. Id.
101. 788 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
102. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1998). Note that this statute is identical to
U.C.C. § 2-725 and its Maryland counterpart. Compare N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney
1998), with U.C.C. § 2-725 (1999), and MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997).
103. See St. Anne, 788 F. Supp. at 736 (explaining that while testing occurred, seller was
still performing under the contract).
104. See id. (noting that the "plaintiff could not have sued for breach of contract while
[the seller] was still performing under the [c]ontract").
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tion, 10 5 the court reasoned that the seller could not have breached
and the buyer could not have sued, until testing was complete. 10 6 The
court found, "it would be irrational to conclude that the statute of
limitations began to run while [the seller] was still performing. "107
While there are no cases directly on point, cases such as William F.
Wilke, Inc. v, Cummins Dieselo'0 show that Maryland courts have taken
similar steps when dealing with contracts that require testing to be
conducted by the seller.1 0 9 In such cases, parties may postpone tender
of delivery until completion of testing by including detailed terms in
the contract that require the seller to deliver and test the goods to
ensure conformity to the contract's specifications.110 In Wilke, the
Court of Appeals decided that a seller's physical delivery of an emer-
gency diesel generator to a buyer's jobsite "did not amount to delivery
of goods or the performance of obligations conforming to the [sales]
contract."1 1 ' The explicit terms of the contract required that the gen-
erator be "in strict compliance with plans and specifications ... com-
plete in all respects, including all required tests for the sum of
Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($13,300)... This price
includes all requirements set forth in paragraph 39.22 . *..."112 The
court interpreted this clause to mean that the parties intended that
only goods conforming to the several specifications would satisfy the
seller's performance obligations. 3 The contract itself, in conjunc-
tion with statements by the seller that were inconsistent with the
105. See id. (acknowledging that "neither party expected the system to work upon
mechanical completion").
106. See id. (explaining that the "defendant could not have breached the [c]ontract
while it was still performing... [,]" and that the "plaintiff could not have sued for breach
while [the seller] was still performing under the [c]ontract").
107. Id.
108. 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 886 (1969).
109. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing relevant Maryland
precedent).
110. See supra notes 108-109; infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding of Wilke).
111. Wilke, 252 Md. at 618, 250 A.2d at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted).
112. Id. at 613, 250 A.2d at 887 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). Paragraph
39.22 contained the government specifications required of the generator. See id. The
court gave special attention to the length and detail of the specifications and remarked
that "[i] t will be recalled that Wilke's purchase order specifically incorporated the govern-
ment specifications, which consisted of two and a half pages of single-spaced typescript
which detailed the field tests to be performed prior to acceptance by the government." Id.
at 617, 250 A.2d at 890.
113. See id. (discussing the obligations of the parties and commenting that "these tests
were not intended to be an empty ritual").
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buyer's control of the goods, 1 '4 led the court to conclude that physical
delivery of the untested goods, "could not constitute ... [delivery of
goods conforming to the contract] until the generator had been in-
stalled, started up, and field tests completed.., to the satisfaction of
the government."' 
1 5
(5) Post-Delivery Testing and the Need for Explicit Terms to Post-
pone Limitations.--Cases holding that completion of testing constitutes
"tender of delivery," however, have become the exception and not the
general rule.116 In most contracts that permit the buyer to test or to
inspect after physical delivery or installation, the date of the seller's
last substantial contact with the goods represents tender of delivery
and constitutes the breach necessary to trigger the limitations period
in warranty actions." 7 The rule that has developed is that tender of
delivery will be postponed until after testing only when the contract
terms clearly contemplate pre-tender of delivery testing. Parties must
phrase their agreements in detailed terms that reflect their express
intent to obligate the seller beyond mere physical delivery. If the con-
tract does not expressly reflect such intent, the seller's last contact
with the goods, whether that be physical delivery or installation, will
mark tender of delivery and trigger section 2-725. '
The cases that most clearly communicate this rule devote most of
their time distinguishing the holding of Pullman as applicable only to
the unique factual situation that arises when a contract contemplates
pre-delivery testing.119 In Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Inc.,12° the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware applied Dela-
ware's four-year statute of limitations in a breach of warranty action by
114. When asked why the generator was delivered without the batteries necessary for
start-up, an employee of the seller explained that "he did not want... [the buyer] to start
it or fool with it," and stated that "[t]his is my baby until I start it and turn it over to you."
Id. at 613, 250 A.2d at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. at 618, 250 A.2d at 890.
116. See City of Cincinnati v. Dorr-Oliver, 659 F. Supp. 259, 262 (D. Conn. 1986) (explain-
ing that typically "'tender of delivery' as contemplated by section 42a-2-725 [(Connecti-
cut's verbatim adoption of U.C.C. § 2-725) ] is not contingent upon inspection, testing, or
acceptance").
117. See, e.g., id. (finding that the limitations period began upon seller's final installa-
tion, despite contractual testing obligations); Boains v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1134,
1135 (D. Conn. 1971) (same).
118. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997) (explaining
that tender of delivery will trigger a four-year limitations period for breach of warranty
claims).
119. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 259, 263-64 (D. Conn.
1986) (distinguishing Pullman); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1267-
68 (D. Del. 1983) (same).
120. 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983).
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a buyer of expansion joints for use in the construction of a nuclear
power complex. 121 The contract for sale contained a clause that "pro-
vide [d] for the inspection of goods prior to acceptance."'1 22 After the
installed joints malfunctioned and the buyer brought suit, the seller
argued that any breach of warranty claims were time-barred because
tender of delivery occurred when the goods were physically deliv-
ered.123 The buyer, relying on Pullman, argued that the presence of
the inspection clause prevented the running of the limitations period
until the inspection occurred.1 24 The court, however, rejected this ar-
gument and distinguished between inspection clauses like the one in
Pullman, which call for testing before tender of delivery, and the
clause in the present contract, which "focus[ed] not on delivery but
on the preservation of [the buyer's] right to reject after full deliv-
ery. ' 125 The court further distinguished Pullman on factual grounds,
pointing to the level of detail in the Pullman inspection clause1 26 and
the lack thereof in the present contract.127 The court concluded that
delaying the accrual of the statute of limitations until post-delivery in-
spection would undermine the purposes of section 2-725.121
City of Cincinnati v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc.,'129 also distinguished Pullman
from the common section 2-725 limitations case.' 3 ' In this case, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut considered
a contract dispute between a seller of sixteen centrifuges to a water
treatment plant and a buyer who brought the action for breach of
warranty more than four years after installation of the devices.' 3 ' The
121. See id. at 1263-64; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-725 (1998). Note that this
section of the Delaware code is identical to U.C.C. § 2-725 and its Maryland counterpart.
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-725 (1998), with U.C.C. § 2-725 (1999), and MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-725 (1997).
122. Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1267.
123. See id. at 1264 (discussing the seller's limitations argument).
124. See id. at 1267 (explaining buyer's defense to the seller's limitations argument).
125. Id. at 1268. The Ontario Hydro court also opined that Pullman "should not be ap-
plied liberally to all breach of warranty cases." Id. at 1267.
126. See id. at 1267-68 (quoting Pullman's description of the contract terms regarding
inspection and testing); City of New York v. Pullman, 662 F.2d 910, 919 (2d Cir. 1981)
(explaining the terms of the contact).
127. See Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1268 (noting that unlike the contract in Pullman,
"[i]n the present case, there was no finite period for inspection").
128. See id. at 1267 (explaining that to postpone the limitations period until the seller
delivered conforming goods "would circumvent the very purpose of § 2-725, which, as dis-
cussed above, is to provide a finite period in time when the seller knows that he is relieved
from liability for a possible breach of contract for sale or breach of warranty").
129. 659 F. Supp. 259 (D. Conn. 1986).
130. See id. at 263-64 (distinguishing Pullman by its unique factual circumstances and
because the inspection in Pullman was post-delivery).
131. Id. at 260-61.
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contract specifically provided for three levels of testing, one of which
occurred after assembly and installation of the centrifuges. 3 2 After
countless problems during the testing process, the buyer waived the
remaining tests of the materials and ultimately brought action against
the seller when the devices failed.133 The seller relied upon section
42a-2-725,' arguing that the buyer's claim was time-barred. 35 Rely-
ing on Pullman, the buyer argued that until all of the testing had been
completed and the goods accepted, tender of delivery could not have
occurred, and therefore, the limitations period could not begin.1 3
6
The court rejected this argument and explained that "'tender of deliv-
ery' as contemplated by § 42a-2-7 25 is not contingent upon inspec-
tion, testing, or acceptance."1 37  The court also dismissed the
argument that the inspection clauses in the contract contemplated
pre-delivery inspection as was the case in Pullman.' The court rea-
soned that by the explicit language of the contract, the clauses dealt
with the buyer's acceptance, not with the seller's delivery duties.1 3 9
Moreover, "any factual similarity between Pullman and the case at bar
ended when the plaintiff waived the very contract provision [one of
the testing and inspection clauses] that would most align this case to
Pullman." "40
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Washington Freightliner, Inc. v.
Shantytown Pier, Inc.,141 the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of
132. See id. at 260.
133. See id. at 261.
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-725 (West 1999). Note that this section of the Con-
necticut code is identical to U.C.C. § 2-725 and its Maryland counterpart. Compare CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-725 (West 1999), with U.C.C. § 2-725 (1999), and MD. CODE ANN.,
CoM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997).
135. See Dorr-Oliver, 659 F. Supp. at 262.
136. See id. The buyer argued that the date of physical delivery did not control. See id.
The court explained, "[r]ather, the argument runs, it is the date of acceptance that con-
trols for determining whether the statute of limitations has run. On this score, the plaintiff
contends, the suit was instituted in a timely manner because the equipment was not ac-
cepted, following extensive contract-mandated testing, until November 5, 1981." Id.
137. Id. The court added, "[w]hether or not the buyer at that time 'accepts' the goods,
as that term is used in the Code, or, on the other hand, withholds acceptance until he or
she has had an opportunity to fully inspect for defects, does not affect when the buyer must
institute suit for breach of warranty." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ray-
mond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp 614, 617 (D. Del. 1977) (citing
WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ("UCC") § 11-18, at 341).
138. See id. at 264.
139. See id. (explaining that the contract required installation of the equipment rather
than testing before delivery); see also id. at 260 (describing the terms of the contract that
discuss terms of acceptance, but not "tender of delivery").
140. Id. at 264.
141. 351 Md. 616, 719 A.2d 541 (1998).
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Special Appeals, refusing to find that tender of delivery of the initial
engines occurred when the O.C. Princess was commissioned. 142 Judge
Rodowsky, writing for the majority,"' found that while the agreed
price for the engines included start up and commissioning, the terms
of the agreement and the facts surrounding the case did not protect
Shantytown from the general rule that the statute of limitations begins
to run upon physical delivery of goods.144 The court explained that
"[c] ontrary to the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals, the defend-
ants had no burden of persuading the trial court factually that accrual
of the claim was not postponed until commissioning." '45
The majority began its analysis by distinguishing what it labels the
"broad" and "narrow" meanings of "tender of delivery" as explained
by section 2-503 of Maryland's commercial law article and its official
comment.146 The court stated that the "broad" sense is applicable in
the present case, meaning that, unless otherwise specified by the par-
ties, tender of delivery is satisfied by "an offer of goods or documents
under a contract as if in fulfillment of its conditions, even though
there is a defect when measured against the contract obligation."147
The majority explained that the broad definition of tender of delivery
is required by the purpose of section 2-725.148 The court stated that
the Maryland cases which analyze "§ 2-725 unambiguously declared
that the purpose of the statute is to protect defendants from stale
claims." '149
142. Id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (holding that Shantytown's claim was time-barred be-
cause the limitations period began when the seller physically delivered the engines).
143. See id. at 618, 719 A.2d at 541. ChiefJudge Bell andjudges Chasanow and Karwacki
joined in the majority opinion. See id.
144. See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (explaining that "[f]or the purposes of limitations on
implied warranties, the ordinary rule is that the four years begins to run when the goods
are delivered, and the evidence in the case before us does not alter that result").
145. Id. at 624, 719 A.2d at 545.
146. Id. at 624-26, 719 A.2d 545-46. The court described the following as a "narrow"
delivery "an offer coupled with a present ability to fulfill all the conditions resting on the
tendering party and .. .followed by actual performance if the other party shows himself
ready to proceed." Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 2-503 (1997) (official com-
ment 1)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at
624-26, 719 A.2d at 545-46 (discussing the "narrow" sense of delivery).
147. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 625-27, 719 A.2d at 54546 (quoting Mn. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-503 (official comment 1)).
148. See id. at 629-30, 719 A.2d at 547 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
149. See id. at 627, 719 A.2d at 547 (citing Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F.
Supp. 611, 612-13 (D. Md. 1982); Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 377, 368 A.2d 993, 996




The court then distinguished the cases upon which Shantytown
relied. 15' Employing William F. Wilke, Inc., v. Cummins Diesel Engines,
Inc.,151 Shantytown argued that tender of delivery for limitations pur-
poses does not occur until all of the seller's delivery obligations are
complete. 152 The court acknowledged that Wilke used a narrow read-
ing of tender of delivery, but distinguished the case on a factual ba-
sis. 1 53 The court explained that Wilke dealt with section 2-510 of the
Code which explains when risk of loss passes from a seller to a
buyer, 54 not section 2-503 or 2-725, which are the sections of the
Code relevant to the present case.155 Therefore, the court noted, a
case applying the "narrow" definition of tender of delivery to deter-
mine when risk of loss passes is not authority to apply the "narrow"
definition to determine when a limitations period begins.156
Shantytown also relied upon In re Automated Bookbinding Services,
Inc.,157 similarly arguing that delivery does not occur until the seller's
performance is complete. 55' The court explained that in Automated,
where a seller was required to assemble a machine which arrived in
seventeen different boxes, the seller had not tendered goods "as if in
fulfillment" of the contract when it merely delivered those component
parts.' 59 Having simply stated the facts of Automated, however, the
court did nothing more to distinguish them from the facts of the case
at bar.
The majority viewed Shantytown's other arguments as an attempt
to escape the general rule that physical delivery of goods satisfies
tender of delivery in the broad sense of section 2-503.16° Specifically,
150. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 627-30, 719 A.2d at 546-48.
151. 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 866 (1969).
152. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 627, 719 A.2d at 546 (explaining Shanty-
town's argument that "'tender of delivery,' in the limitations context, does not occur until
'all [of] the seller's obligations with respect to physical delivery [have] been fulfilled'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 19, Washington
Freightliner v. Shantytown Pier, 351 Md. 616, 719 A.2d 541 (1998) (No. 38))).
153. See id. at 627-28, 719 A.2d at 547 (discussing and distinguishing Wilke by asserting
there was no tender of delivery).
154. See MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 2-510.
155. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 628, 719 A.2d at 546-47 (distinguishing sec-
tion 2-510 from section 2-725).
156. See id. 628, 719 A.2d at 547 ("Thus, Wilke is not authority for the narrow definition
of 'tender of delivery' under § 2-725.").
157. 336 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Md.), rev'd, 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972).
158. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 628-29, 719 A.2d at 547.
159. See id. at 629, 719 A.2d at 547 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-503 (official
comment 1) (1997).
160. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 630, 719 A.2d at 547 (characterizing Shanty-
town's other arguments as "an effort to avoid the rule of § 2-725 and the results of the
decisions reviewed above").
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the court considered Shantytown's reliance on cases where the con-
tracts required installation or testing.1 6 ' Shantytown had used these
cases to illustrate that in some circumstances-where the seller is ex-
pressly obligated to install or to test the goods after physical delivery,
such obligations might postpone accrual of a warranty claim until the
seller performs all such duties.
162
The court acknowledged existing case law that supports the pro-
position that express obligations of the seller to install goods after
physical delivery might postpone accrual of a claim. 163 The majority,
however, dismissed Shantytown's reliance on these cases because the
defendants in the present case had no obligation to install the motors
after they caused them to be delivered to the Lydia boatyard.
1 64
The majority also drew distinctions between the present case and
those in which testing obligations postponed "tender of delivery." '65
Shantytown had relied primarily upon City of New York v. Pullman 66
and St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co. v. Research-Cottrel116 7 to support the pro-
position that a seller's obligation to test goods necessarily prevents the
section 2-725 limitations period from beginning until the goods are
tested and the standards required by the contract are met.1 6 The
Washington Freightliner majority recognized that in both cases, the
courts found that tender of delivery could not occur for limitations
purposes until the required tests were completed. 169 The majority ex-
plained, however, that "[u] nder the particular contracts involved in
161. See id. at 630-37, 719 A-2d 548-51 (describing and addressing Shantytown's other
limitations arguments).
162. See id. at 630, 719 A.2d 547-48.
163. See id. at 630, 719 A.2d at 548 ("There is case law which stands for the proposition
that the clock in § 2-725 does not begin to run until after goods have been installed, where,
under the contract, the seller is expressly obligated to install." (citing Dowling v. South-
western Porcelain, Inc., 701 P.2d 954, 960 (Kan. 1985); Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash
Register Co., 531 P.2d 41, 47 (Kan. 1975))).
164. See id. at 631, 719 A.2d at 548 (concluding that "[i]n any event, in the case before
us, the defendants contracted to sell engines-not to sell engines and to install them.").
165. See id. at 631-37, 719 A.2d at 548-552 (discussing contracts involving testing in addi-
tion to physical delivery).
166. 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981).
167. 788 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
168. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-36, 719 A.2d at 548-51 (discussing Pull-
man and St. Anne and Shantytown's reliance thereupon).
169. Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-37, 719 A.2d at 548-51 (discussing St. Anne
and Pullman and their respective holdings); see also St. Anne, 788 F. Supp. at 737 (finding
that "tender of delivery did not occur until... defendant either had satisfied the perform-
ance warranty or repudiated its obligation to satisfy the performance warranty"); Pullman,
662 F.2d at 919 (finding that "tender of delivery could not occur, and did not occur, until
the required test of the sample train was completed in December 1975").
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those cases, testing was intended to precede tender of delivery."' 7 °
The court explained that in such cases the parties agreed that only
delivery of conforming goods would satisfy the contract terms and,
therefore, tender of delivery could not occur until the required test-
ing revealed that such goods met those requirements.1 71 According to
the court, in both Pullman and St. Anne, the seller was still performing
under the contract while testing took place, and therefore, no breach
could occur to trigger the limitations period. 172 Moreover, in these
cases, the contractual references to testing were directly related to the
sellers' delivery obligations.1 73 The Washington Freightliner majority ex-
plained that such terms are more akin to express warranties in which
the parties agree that the "narrow" definition of tender of delivery will
apply.'7 4 According to the court, however, in normal cases of implied
warranty, such reasoning does not apply because there has been no
express dealing with pre-delivery performance guarantees fulfilled
through testing. 175  In fact, the majority pointed out that federal
170. Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 631, 719 A.2d at 548.
171. See id. at 633, 719 A.2d at 549 (explaining that "the Pullman contract negated the
possibility that delivery of nonconforming goods could be tender of delivery"); id. at 634,
719 A.2d at 549-50 (noting that "the seller... 'could not have breached the Contract while
it was still fulfilling the performance warranty, which does not place a time limit on defen-
dant's obligation to correct the system."' (quoting St. Anne, 788 F. Supp. at 736)).
172. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632, 719 A.2d 549 (finding that "the Pullman
contract negated the possibility that the delivery of nonconforming goods could be tender
of delivery"); id. at 634, 719 A.2d at 550 (explaining that under the circumstances present
in St. Anne, "no cause of action accrued while the seller 'was still performing under the
Contract'" (quoting St. Anne, 788 F. Supp. at 735)).
173. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-33, 719 A.2d at 548-49 (explaining that
the buyers under the Pullman contract "were not obliged to take any steps until [the seller]
conformed to the specifications by delivering cars which had completed the 30 day test,
since the contract specifically provided that any cars built before the 30 day test was com-
pleted were constructed at the seller's risk" (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Pullman, 662 F.2d at 919)); id. at 633-34, 719 A.2d at 549 (citing
the St. Anne contract's "Performance Warranty" that read: "that seller's performance is
complete once the system satisfies the performance specifications . . . for a continuous
three-day testing period to be conducted within 120 days of 'start up' but in any event not
later than nine (9) months after mechanical completion of the [product]" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Anne, 788 F. Supp. at 731)); see
also infra note 86 (discussing Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del.
1983) and noting the importance of this relationship to delivery in that contract dispute).
174. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-33, 719 A.2d at 548-49 (describing the
differences between express and implied warranties and likening the Pullman contract
terms to the former).
175. See id. at 632, 719 A.2d at 549 (explaining that "[t]he rationale of Pullman is not
transferable to the sales transaction before us"); id. at 634, 719 A.2d at 550 (discussing the
reasoning in St. Anne and concluding that "[t] his reasoning, like that in Pullman, is not
transportable to the implied warranties sued upon in the instant matter").
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courts have declined to extend the Pullman holding to ordinary im-
plied warranty cases.' 7 6
The court also discussed the terms of the agreement between
Washington Freightliner and Shantytown. The contract included the
testing terms "start up and commissioning (8 Hr. Allowance)" in the
price quotation.177 The majority explained, however, that these terms
were clearly not as specific as the terms of the contract in Pullman.17 8
The majority pointed out that in cases lacking such specificity, physi-
cal delivery will trigger the statute of limitations.1 79 Moreover, the
court noted that the testing required in the present case was clearly
not as critical as that required in the cases relied upon by Shanty-
town.18 ' The court concluded that because tender of delivery oc-
176. See id. at 634-35, 719 A.2d at 550 (noting cases that have declined extension of
Pullman to ordinary warranty suits) (citing H. Sand & Co. v. Airtemp Corp., 738 F. Supp.
760 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp.
1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); City of Cincinnati v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 259 (D. Conn.
1986); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983)).
177. See id. at 641-42, 719 A.2d at 553 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) for a reproduction of the
price quotation; see also supra note 17 (explaining the weight of this contractual authority).
178. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (finding that "[iln the
case before us the words 'Start up and Commissioning (8 Hr. Allowance),' the descriptions
by the witnesses of the actual commissioning, and the reports or checklists of the commis-
sioning of the three engines initially purchased by Shantytown fall far short of demonstrat-
ing a situation comparable to Pullman"). The actual contract for sale, though, was not in
evidence on appeal. See id. at 622, 719 A.2d at 544. The court considered only a price
quotation, the terms of which the parties stipulated as containing the relevant terms of the
formal contract. See id. at 622-23, 719 A.2d at 544. This deficiency in the record detracts
from the overall detail of the agreement between the parties.
179. See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 ("For the purpose of limitations on implied warran-
ties, the ordinary rule is that the four years begins to run when the goods are delivered,
and the evidence in the case before us does not alter that result."). In reaching this con-
clusion, the majority discusses, at length, Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261
(D. Del. 1983), which focused on the specificity of testing terms. See Washington Freightliner,
351 Md. at 636, 719 A.2d at 550-51 (discussing Ontario Hydro). In a passage relied upon
and cited by the Washington Freightliner majority, the Ontario Hydro court explained that
"[i]n the present case, there was no finite period for inspection. Moreover, the inspection
clause was not directed to the tender of delivery aspect but rather to Hydro's right to reject
the goods once they were delivered, for the clause focuses not on delivery but on the
preservation of Hydro's right to reject after full delivery." Washington Freightliner, 351 Md.
at 636, 719 A.2d at 550-51 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1268). As is apparent from this passage, the Ontario Hydro
court also weighed in its decision the relationship between the testing clause and the par-
ties' intent as to delivery obligations.
180. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 635, 719 A.2d at 550 (noting that "[iun cases
where the testing was less critical than in Pullman and St. Anne-even though it was still an
element of the contract-courts have held that limitations begin with delivery and not on
completion of testing").
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curred upon the date of physical delivery to Lydia Yachts,
Shantytown's warranty claims were barred by section 2-725."'
In the dissent, Judge Eldridge, joined by Judges Raker and Wil-
ner, agreed that the "broad" definition of tender of delivery con-
trolled in this case, and therefore, for the breach to occur, the seller
must make an "offer of goods 'as if in fulfillment' of the contract['s]"
conditions. 18 2 The three justices, however, rejected the majority's
treatment of tender of delivery as a question of law. 8 ' According to
the dissent, the real issue of the case was not whether physical delivery
is legally synonymous with "tender of delivery," but whether the seller
believed that it had fulfilled all contractual obligations owed to
Shantytown when it had delivered these engines to Lydia's boat-
yard.' 84 The dissent reasoned that, based on the stipulated terms of
the agreement, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the seller
had not tendered delivery until the commissioning because the seller
knew that even after it completed physical delivery, it remained obli-
gated by the "commissioning" terms of the contract. 85 In reaching
this opinion, the dissent reasoned that by the language of the agree-
ment itself, "'delivery' included 'Start up and Commissioning (8 Hr.
Allowance) ."186
Moreover, the dissent rejected the majority's distinction of Wilke
and Automated from the present case. 18 7 The dissent reasoned that in
both cases tender of delivery could not have occurred because "the
seller knew that fulfillment of the contract required more than mere
181. See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551.
182. Id. at 640, 719 A.2d at 552 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw I § 2-725 (official comment 1) (1997)) (agreeing with the majority that "the definition
of 'tender of delivery' in § 2-503 and Official Comment I to § 2-503 provides the analytical
framework within which to decide this case").
183. See id. at 638, 719 A.2d at 552 (disagreeing with the "erroneous premise that the
determination of when tender of delivery occurred in this case is a question of law").
184. See id. at 640, 719 A. 2d at 552-53. The dissent explained that
[t]he question then in a dispute over whether tender of delivery has occurred, is
whether the seller has offered the goods to the buyer "as if in fulfillment" of the
contract. Contrary to the majority's assertion that this is a legal determination, it
is a factual determination involving inquiry into the terms of the contract and the
reasonable beliefs of the seller.
Id.
185. See id. at 641, 719 A.2d at 553 (explaining that the finding of the trial court was
"fully warranted").
186. See id. at 641-42, 719 A.2d at 553 (emphasis added) (discussing the terms of the
contract with regard to delivery and testing).
187. See id. at 642-45, 719 A.2d at 553-55 (discussing Wilke, Inc. v. Cummings Diesel En-
gines, Inc., 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 886 (1969) and In re Bookbinding Automated, 36 F. Supp.
1128 (D. Md.), rev'd on other grounds, 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972) and the distinctions
drawn by the majority).
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physical delivery. "188 According to the dissent, the majority failed to
indicate how these cases are factually at odds with the case at bar, in
which the contract required not mere delivery, but delivery including
start up and eight hours of testing at sea.'8 9
The dissent also criticized the majority's analysis of Pullman and
St. Anne as flawed. 9 ° The three justices argued that these are not ex-
ceptional cases in which the parties expressly invoked the "narrow"
sense of tender such that only conforming goods would satisfy the
contractual terms. 9 Rather, the dissent reasoned, these cases were
merely direct applications of the "broad" sense of "tender of delivery,"
which occurs only when the seller delivers goods as if in fulfillment of
all contractual obligations. 9 The dissent asserted that in both cases,
the seller could not yet satisfy the "broad" meaning of tender of deliv-
ery because it knew, as did the seller in the instant case, that it re-
mained contractually bound to perform something other than mere
physical delivery of the goods.'
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's assertion that Pullman
has been limited in federal courts.'9 4 The dissent explained that one
of the cases cited by the majority was overruled by the Second Circuit,
thereby affirming Pullman."9 5 Also, the dissent attacked the other cases
used to support that assertion because they stood for the rule that
tender of delivery is not contingent upon acceptance, not that tender
188. Id. at 643, 719 A.2d 554 (noting the importance of the seller's knowledge in Wilke);
see also id. at 644-45, 719 at 554-55 (discussing the same in Automated).
189. See id. at 644, 719 A.2d at 554-55 (proposing that "[t]he instant case presents facts
substantially similar to those in Wilke" and that "the majority makes no attempt to distin-
guish the facts of [Automated] from the instant case"). The dissent also explained that
several factually similar cases have held that tender of delivery does not occur upon physi-
cal delivery where the seller is obligated beyond physical delivery. See id. at 645-46, 719
A.2d at 555-56 (listing and describing the holdings of such cases).
190. See id. at 648, 719 A.2d at 556-57 (discussing the majority's analysis of Pullman and
concluding that "[t]his analysis is incorrect," and that "[t]his is also true of St. Anne").
191. See id. (explaining that "Pullman, is nothing more than a straight-forward applica-
tion of the broader meaning of 'tender of delivery'"); id. at 649, 719 A.2d at 557 (finding
that "St. Anne ... is merely an example of a contract where it was impossible for physical
delivery by the seller to constitute tender of goods 'as if in fulfillment of' the contract
because the contract required more").
192. See id. at 648-49, 719 A.2d at 556-57.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 649, 719 A.2d at 557 (criticizing the majority's attempt to exhibit a limited
reading of Pullman).
195. See id. at 650, 719 A.2d at 557. The dissent explained that H. Sand & Co., Inc. v.
Airtemp Corp., 738 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), a case that rejected a plaintiffs reliance on
Pullman, was overruled by H. Sand & Co., Inc., v. Airtemp Corp., 934 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. According to the dissent, this overruling seems to affirm the holding in Pullman rather
than to restrict it. Id.
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of delivery must always be satisfied by physical delivery.' 96 Therefore,
the dissent concluded, a finder of fact would not be precluded from
concluding that delivery in this case occurred only after the O.C. Prin-
cess was commissioned. According to the dissent, until that time, the
seller had not yet offered goods "as if in fulfillment of' the contractual
testing conditions.
19 7
4. Analysis.-In Washington Freightliner, the majority held that
tender of delivery had occurred in spite of the seller's duty to "start up
and commission" and thus found Shantytown's breach of warranty
claim to be time-barred. 98 Maryland's highest court, prior to Wash-
ington Freightliner, has never decided whether testing clauses in con-
tracts for sale will postpone the running of the statute of limitations
until after testing is complete.' 99 In Washington Freightliner, the Court
of Appeals began to set out a rule furthering the principle that tender
of delivery occurs upon physical delivery and generally is not contin-
gent upon the testing of the goods.2z° If parties do wish to postpone
the running of the limitations period as embodied in section 2-725 of
Maryland's Commercial Law, however, the court makes it clear that
they must use contract terms that explicitly invoke the "narrow" sense
of delivery, thus indicating that only goods conforming to contract
specifications will satisfy the seller's obligations.2 0 ' Absent such terms,
the "broad" sense of delivery will apply and physical delivery of non-
conforming goods will constitute tender of delivery, even if there are
obligations upon the seller to test the goods.20 2
196. See id. at 651, 719 A.2d at 558 (criticizing the majority's reliance on City of Cincinnati
v. Domr-Oliver, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 259 (D. Conn. 1986), and Raymond-Dravo-Lagenfelder v.
Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614 (D. Del. 1976)). The dissent agreed that "tender of deliv-
ery" is not contingent upon buyer's acceptance of goods. See id.
197. Id. at 652-53, 719 A.2d at 558-59.
198. Id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551.
199. Courts of otherjurisdictions have addressed this issue. See, e.g., H. Sand & Co., Inc.,
v. Airtemp Corp., 934 F.2d 450, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1991) (considering the issue of when
tender of delivery occurs for limitations purposes); City of New York v. Pullman, 662 F.2d
910, 918-20 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Standard Alliance v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,
819-22 (6th Cir. 1978) (same); St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co., Ltd. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 729, 734-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 659 F. Supp. at 262-64
(same); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1264-68 (D. Del. 1983)
(same).
200. See infra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (discussing the rule developed by
Washington Freightliner).
201. See infta notes 209-225 and accompanying text (describing how parties may post-
pone delivery if they so choose).
202. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (explaining that "[f]or
the purpose of limitations on implied warranties, the ordinary rule is that the four years
begins to run when the goods are delivered, and the evidence in the case before us does
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The Court of Appeals has indicated that this rule should be ap-
plied in a very rigid manner,"0 ' failing to inquire into whether the
seller believed it had completed all of its performance obligations.2 0 4
By declining to consider the subjective state of mind of the seller, the
court avoids an inquiry that might yield a more flexible rule. The
court also adopted a rigid rule by refusing to reason inductively from
substantively analogous Maryland case law.20 5 In addition, the court's
reasoning is problematic because it relies upon section 2-503 of the
Code and its official comment for its definition of "tender of delivery,"
but ignores another provision of that Comment calling for an inquiry
into the subjective state of mind of the seller.20 6
Despite these problems, the resulting rule and its strict applica-
tion are in keeping with the general policy goals of the U.C.C. and its
Maryland counterpart.20 7 Moreover, this decision notifies contracting
parties in Maryland that if they wish to postpone tender of delivery
beyond testing for limitations purposes, they must include clear and
direct contractual language to give that intent legal effect.2 8
a. The Rule Developed: When Testing Obligations Will Postpone
"Tender of Delivery. "--In Washington Freightliner, the court indicated
that unless parties include express terms in their contract indicating
their intent to apply the "narrow" sense of tender of delivery as found
in section 2-503's official comment 1, the "broad" sense of tender of
delivery will apply.209 Under this "broad" sense, the general rule is
not alter that result"); see also infra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (discussing the
rule developed by Washington Freightliner).
203. See infra notes 231-243 and accompanying text (explaining how Washington Freight-
liner indicates a strict application of the rule).
204. See id. at 641, 719 A.2d at 553 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (explaining that the major-
ity opinion is flawed because it failed to address adequately whether the seller believed it
had fulfilled all its performance obligations).
205. See id. at 627-29, 719 A.2d at 546-47 (declining to follow In reAutomated Bookbind-
ing Services, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Md. 1972) or William F. Wilke, Inc., v. Cummins
Diesel Engines, Inc., 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 886 (1969)).
206. See infra notes 244-252 and accompanying text (explaining this logical inconsis-
tency in the majority's reasoning).
207. See infra notes 253-265 and accompanying text (discussing policy goals upheld by
the Washington Freightliner decision).
208. See infra notes 266-269 and accompanying text (discussing the potential message
sent to buyers and sellers conducting business under Maryland law).
209. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 625, 719 A.2d at 545 (explaining that "[i]n
the context of limitations the narrow meaning of tender of delivery has been rejected by
virtually every court that has considered the question"); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I
§ 2-503 (official comment 1) (1997); supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (noting that
tender of delivery has two different meanings). The Washington Freightliner court acknowl-
edged that in some cases, such as City of New York v. Pullman, parties can, by contract,
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that tender of delivery occurs upon physical delivery, irrespective of
testing obligations. 210 The court generates this rule through its analy-
sis of the cases relied upon by the parties.211
For example, in its rejection of Shantytown's reliance on Pullman,
the court first indicated that unless the parties agree that only con-
forming goods will satisfy the seller's performance obligations, testing
clauses in the contract will not prevent physical delivery from trigger-
ing section 2-725.212 Unlike the case at bar, the court read the con-
tract in Pullman as one which required testing to ensure that the
goods ultimately delivered conformed to the agreed contract specifi-
21cations. ~ Such an agreement as to conformity, the court reasoned,
clearly rejected the "broad" sense of tender that allows delivery of
nonconforming goods to trigger section 2-725.214 Because no such
terms regarding conformity were present in the Shantytown agree-
ment, the initial delivery of nonconforming goods constituted tender
of delivery.2 1 5 Thus the court indicated that Maryland courts are un-
"block[ ] the possibility of applying the broader meaning of tender of delivery." Washing-
ton Freightliner, 351 Md. at 633, 719 A.2d at 549 (citing City of New York v. Pullman, 662
F.2d 910, 919 (2d Cir. 1981).
210. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (noting that "the ordi-
nary rule is that the four years begins to run when the goods are delivered, and the evi-
dence in the case before us does not alter that result").
211. In its reasoning, the Washington Freightliner majority addressed several of the cases
relied upon by both parties-WFI and Shantytown. The parties relied most heavily on
Pullman, 662 F.2d 910, St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co., Ltd. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 788 F. Supp.
729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983),
In re Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Md.), and William F. Wilke,
Inc. v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 886 (1968). See Brief of Appel-
lant MAN Roland, Inc. at 10-22, Washington Freightliner, Inc., v. Shantytown Pier, Inc.,
351 Md. 616, 719 A.2d 541 (1998) (No. 38); Brief of Appellant Washington Freightliner,
Inc. at 8-22, Washington Freightliner, Inc. v. Shantytown Pier, Inc., 351 Md. 616, 719 A.2d
541 (1998) (No. 38); Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 9-21, Washington Freightliner (No.
38).
212. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632, 719 A.2d at 548.
213. See id. at 633, 719 A.2d at 549 (stating that "the Pullman contract negated the possi-
bility that the delivery of nonconforming goods could be tender of delivery").
214. See id. (explaining that the Pullman contract rejected the "broad" sense of delivery);
see also id. at 626, 719 A.2d at 546 (describing the "broad" and "narrow" senses of tender of
delivery and noting that "[t]he proposition that nonconforming tender of goods is suffi-
cient to trigger the statute of limitations in § 2-725 is essentially hornbook law").
215. See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (holding that Shantytown's claims are time-barred
and reasoning that "[i]n the case before us the words 'Start up and Commissioning (8 Hr.
Allowance),' the descriptions by the witnesses of the actual commissioning, and the reports
or checklists of the commissioning of the three engines initially purchased by Shantytown
fall far short of demonstrating a situation comparable to Pullman"). The court also noted
that because the actual contract was not in evidence, Shantytown could not argue that the
terms expressly invoked the "narrow" sense of tender of delivery. See id. at 624, 719 A.2d at
544 ("Because the contract of sale is not in evidence, Shantytown cannot argue that the
contract has specifically defined 'tender of delivery.'").
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likely to allow testing to postpone delivery for limitations purposes un-
less the parties agree in the contract that such testing will prevent the
initial delivery of nonconforming goods.216
This proposition is similarly supported by the court's analysis of
St. Anne, a case in which the contract explicitly stated that the seller's
performance would not be complete until after testing.217 According
to the court, the St. Anne contract, like the one in Pullman, contem-
plated a testing process that would guarantee that only delivery of
tested, nondefective goods would satisfy "tender of delivery." 218 The
court declined to equate the terms of the delivery including "Start up
and Commissioning (8 Hr. Allowance)" as an agreement upon the
"narrow" sense of tender of delivery.219 Thus, the Washington Freight-
liner decision indicates that in cases where no such agreement is
found, Maryland courts are likely to apply the "broad" sense of tender
of delivery and to apply the general rule that testing clauses will not
prevent physical delivery from triggering section 2-725.
By ensuring that physical delivery will remain the default trigger
for section 2-725, the court has taken a logical step in the right direc-
tion. Physical delivery represents an ascertainable point in time-a
natural breaking point-to mark the beginning of the limitations pe-
riod. The default rule allows for less ambiguity in contracts for the
sale of goods and less reason for courts to become involved in contract
interpretation.
Also, the rule discourages wasteful litigation. Under the rule set
forth here, express terms that extend the limitations period until test-
ing is complete will so delay the limitations period.22 ° If the terms are
at all unclear as to the extension of the limitations period, a logical
default rule will apply and physical delivery will trigger the limitations
216. See id. at 632-35, 719 A.2d at 548-50 (discussing Pullman and choosing not to reject
its holding, but only to distinguish it from the ordinary warranty case).
217. See id. at 633-34, 719 A.2d at 549-50 (describing the terms of the St. Anne contract as
containing a "performance warranty" that specified when seller's obligations were com-
plete); St. Anne, 788 F. Supp. at 731 (explaining the terms of this "Performance
Warranty").
218. See id. at 634, 719 A.2d at 549 (discussing the terms of the contract and explaining
that "during the period of start-up testing, the goods were neither conforming nor non-
conforming" (citing St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co., Ltd. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 788 F.
Supp. 729, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))).
219. See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (declining to equate the language of the Shantytown
contract to cases in which the parties contracted for the "narrow" sense of tender of
delivery).




period."' Under this strict baseline rule, potential implied warranty
plaintiffs will be discouraged from filing suit if, after an informed re-
view of the contract, the plaintiffs discover language that does not ex-
pressly extend the limitations period until testing is complete.
Obligations set forth in unspecific testing clauses will not provide
plaintiffs with a strong case against sellers of goods.222 Thus, the rule
discourages implied warranty suits that will ultimately be unsuccessful
from being initiated in the first place. In so doing, the rule is likely to
relieve the courts of the duty to resolve needless suits. Similarly, the
default rule discourages implied warrant plaintiffs from wasting their
resources in litigating weak cases against sellers.
Moreover, the court's analysis of Ontario Hydro indicates that con-
tract terms that adopt the "narrow" sense must be clear and must con-
tain definite terms regarding testing obligations.223 In Ontario Hydro,
the buyer was given the right to inspect the goods and to reject them
if they did not conform to specifications.224 The Washington Freight-
liner court, however, made note of the fact that the Ontario Hydro con-
tract terms, unlike the contracts in Pullman and St. Anne, were
indefinite with respect to the duration of testing and any modifica-
tions of the seller's delivery obligations.225 Thus, the court indicated
that in determining whether a contract avoids the "broad" sense of
tender of delivery the definiteness of the terms is an important factor.
By considering the precision of contractual terms in its decision,
Washington Freightliner encourages commercial parties in Maryland to
draft their contracts with care and accuracy. The decision serves as a
caveat to buyers under Maryland law, admonishing them to make cer-
tain that the contract language embodies their intent with specific-
ity.226 Furthermore, Washington Freightliner accomplishes this without
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 636, 719 A.2d at 550 (considering as an issue the "indefiniteness of the
remaining obligations").
224. See Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (D. Del. 1983); see
also supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Ontario Hydro).
225. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 636, 719 A.2d at 550-51. The court noted
that, in the Ontario Hydro contract,
there was no finite period for inspection. Moreover, the inspection clause was
not directed to the tender of delivery aspect but rather to Hydro's right to inspect
the goods and reject them once they were delivered, for the clause focuses not on
delivery but on the preservation of Hydro's right to reject after full delivery.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted (quoting Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1268); see also
Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1264 (discussing the terms of the Ontario Hydro contract).
226. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 636, 719 A.2d at 550-51 (taking into consider-
ation the specificity of contract terms in deciding whether a testing clause extended the
limitations period in section 2-725).
828 [VOL. 59:743
2000] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 829
inhibiting the parties' freedom of contract rights. The decision does
not prevent buyers and sellers from postponing the limitations period
until after testing is complete;227 instead it simply warns the parties
that they must utilize unambiguous terms to effectuate their goals.
228
Furthermore, the court's consideration of the definiteness of
terms encourages the use of contractual provisions that are less likely
to be disputed in court. Parties will be less likely to expend resources
litigating a contractual provision that expressly alters the limitations
period. Similarly, by requiring consideration of the precision of
terms, the court has made it easier for trial courts to apply section
2-725 where contract provisions lack specificity.229 If the terms of the
contract are imprecise, the courts will have an easier decision to sim-
ply apply the default rule that tender of delivery occurs upon the date
of physical delivery.
230
b. Signaling that the Rule will be Strictly Applied.-Washington
Freightliner also signals that this rule is to be applied rigidly by courts,
without significant factual inquiry into whether the seller tendered
goods "as if in fulfillment" of the contract.231 The court makes clear
that whether delivery has been postponed for limitations purposes is
an issue of law.232 Although strongly urged by the dissent, the major-
ity does not inquire into the subjective state of mind of the seller when
227. See id. at 631-35, 719 A.2d at 548-50 (rejecting comparison of the case at bar, which
involved implied warranties, to cases that involved express warranties to deliver goods that
met specific performance standards). To extend the period of limitations, the parties
could simply agree to an express warranty of future performance. Nowhere in the Washing-
ton Freightliner decision did the court restrict parties from implicitly altering the limitations
period for suits arising out of breaches of express warranty. To limit the autonomy of the
parties in this manner would be in conflict with section 2-725. See MD. CoDE ANN., CoM.
LAw I § 2-725(2) (explaining that "where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform-
ance" the limitations period would not begin to run until "the breach is or should have
been discovered").
228. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 636, 719 A.2d at 550-51.
229. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining that absent a dispute as to
the terms altering tender of delivery, a court need only apply section 2-725 mechanically,
using the date of physical delivery as the trigger for the limitations period).
230. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining that absent a dispute as to
the terms altering tender of delivery, a court need only apply section 2-725 mechanically,
using the date of physical delivery as the trigger for the limitations period).
231. See id. at 624, 719 A.2d at 545 (explaining that the issues before the court are ques-
tions of law); id. at 640, 719 A.2d at 552 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
treatment as an issue of law whether "the seller has offered goods to the buyer 'as if in
fulfillment' of the contract").
232. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 624, 719 A.2d at 545 ("Shantytown argues that
tender of delivery had been postponed [for statute of limitations purposes]. As presented
in this case, that issue is one of law.").
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it first delivers goods.2 33 Rather, the majority devotes most of its atten-
tion to the actual agreement between the parties and whether that
agreement can be read as explicitly adopting the "narrow" sense of
delivery.2 3 4 By treating tender of delivery as a question of law and de-
emphasizing the importance of whether the seller believed its per-
formance was complete, Washington Freightliner indicates that if parties
wish to postpone tender of delivery until after testing, such intent
must appear expressly in the contractual language. That this rule is
meant to be strictly applied is also evidenced by the court's resistance
to clearly analogous persuasive authority that analyzes tender of deliv-
ery for purposes other than determining limitations issues. 235 Wilke,
for example, presents a very similar fact pattern where the seller was
obligated to deliver, start up, and test a generator. 236 In Wilke, how-
ever, the court did not analyze tender of delivery for limitations pur-
poses, but rather for the purposes of determining when the risk of loss
passes from the buyer to the seller under section 2-510 of the Mary-
land Code. 2 37 In Wilke, tender of delivery was postponed because sec-
tion 2-510 applied the "narrow" definition of tender of delivery.2 38 As
233. See id. at 641, 719 A.2d at 553 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (discussing what the dissent
perceives as the true issue of the case and explaining that "[i]n this case, therefore, it was
necessary to determine as a matter of fact whether, when they delivered the engines to
Lydia for installation in the O.C. Princess, the defendants believed that they had fulfilled
their contract obligations, despite the fact that the engines later proved to be
nonconforming").
234. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-37, 719 A.2d at 548-51 (discussing the
contracts in Pullman and St. Anne as adopting the "narrow" sense of delivery and distin-
guishing them from the agreement in the present case).
235. See id. at 627-30, 719 A.2d at 546-47 (rejecting Shantytown's reliance upon factually
similar cases such as In re Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Md.
1972) and William F. Wilke v. Cummins Diesel Engines, 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 886 (1969)); see
also supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text (discussing Wilke); supra notes 157-159 and
accompanying text (discussing Automated).
236. See Wilke, 252 Md. at 613, 250 A.2d at 887 (describing the obligations of the seller as
evidenced by the contractual language).
237. See id. at 616-17, 250 A.2d at 889-90 (analyzing the Wilke dispute as an issue of "risk
of damage" rather than one of limitations); see also Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 628,
719 A.2d at 547 ("The question in Wilke was when the risk of loss passed from seller to
buyer under § 2-510(1)."); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-510(1) (1997) ("Where a
tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the contract as to give a right of rejection
the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.").
238. See Wilke, 252 Md. at 618, 250 A.2d at 890 (discussing official comment to section
2-510 and noting that the Comment states regarding subsection (1) that "the seller by his
individual action cannot shift the risk of loss to the buyer unless his action conforms with all
the conditions resting on him under the contract' (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-510(1) (official comment 1) (1997))); see
also Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 628, 719 A.2d at 547 (explaining that in Wilke, the
Maryland Court of Appeals "made it expressly clear that § 2-510 applied the narrow defini-
tion of 'tender of delivery'" (citing Wilke, 252 Md. at 618, 250 A.2d at 890)).
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Washington Freightliner makes clear, however, section 2-725 is triggered
by the "broad" sense of tender of delivery which, according to the
court, imposes a far stricter standard for allowing testing to postpone
the tender of delivery.239 The court's conclusion regarding section
2-725 indicates the court's desire to impose a separate rule for limita-
tions purposes that will not borrow from cases that employ less restric-
tive standards for when testing clauses will postpone tender of
delivery.
The intended rigidity of this rule is further supported by Washing-
ton Freightliner's rejection of Automated, an analogous case in which a
contract required a seller to ensure that a bookbinding machine met
certain performance standards.240 The Washington Freightliner court
did not attempt to distinguish the facts in Automated from those of the
case at bar, noting only that "[i]t is apparent that the seller in the
Automated Bookbinding case had not tendered goods 'as if in fulfillment
of the contract's conditions." 241  Rather, the court explained Auto-
mated as dealing with an issue of "possession" under Maryland Code
section 9-312(4), not one of limitations under section 2-725, and then
quickly distinguished the case by discussing "Maryland cases which do
analyze § 2-725. "1242 This summary rejection of analogous case law fur-
ther indicates that the rule developed by Washington Freightliner should
not be construed liberally in light of cases that may be factually similar
but do not expressly deal with limitations issues.243
239. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 624-27, 719 A.2d at 545-46 (applying the
"broad" sense of tender of delivery to warranty claims for the purpose of section 2-725); see
also supra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (explaining the rule set forth by Washing-
ton Freightliner for postponing tender of delivery for limitations purposes).
240. See In reAutomated Bookbinding Servs. Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D. Md. 1972)
rev'd, 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the contract in this case required the
seller to "put said property in first class running order" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
241. Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 629, 719 A.2d at 547 (quoting MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAw I § 2-503 official comment 1 (1997)); see id. at 644, 719 A.2d at 555 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the majority makes no attempt to distinguish the facts of [Auto-
mated] from those of the instant case").
242. Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 629, 719 A.2d at 547 (emphasis in original); see
id. (discussing Automated as involving an issue of"possession" and citing the following Mary-
land cases dealing with section 2-725: Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F. Supp. 611
(D. Md. 1982); Mattos, Inc., v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993 (1977); Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A-2d 460 (1976)).
243. This proposition is further supported by Washington Freightliner's clear agreement
with cases that limit Pullman, a case in which limitations did not begin until after testing
and inspection was complete. See id. at 634, 719 A.2d at 550 (noting that "[flederal district
courts, including those in the Second Circuit, have not read Pullman as an invitation to
postpone the accrual of limitations made under U.C.C. § 2-725 beyond actual delivery"
(citing H. Sand & Co. v. Airtemp Corp., 738 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); see also Long
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
c. A Logical Flaw in the Court's Reasoning.--The court's adop-
tion of this strict rule, however, is based on a problematic line of rea-
soning. As the court makes clear, a decision of when "tender of
delivery" occurs for limitations purposes is rooted in section 2-503 and
its official comment.24 4 The majority refers to this section of the Code
throughout its opinion, analyzing "tender of delivery" in relation to
the two definitions provided in section 2-503's official comment.
24 5
The court fails, however, to address adequately an important clause
within that Comment.
The Comment clearly states that under the "broad" sense of deliv-
ery-the sense invoked and applied by the majority, "tender of deliv-
ery" can occur when a seller offers goods "as if in fulfillment of [the
contract's] conditions. '24 6 Logical application of this language re-
quires that to determine when delivery occurs, courts must inquire
into whether the seller believed its conduct had fulfilled the condi-
tions of the contract. The majority, however, makes no such factual
inquiry.247 Instead, the court simply decides, as a matter of law, that
the seller satisfied the "broad" sense of delivery upon physical delivery
of the goods.24 8
This apparent inconsistency in reasoning leads the court to make
weak distinctions of cases interpreting Maryland law such as Wilke and
Automated.249 As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the
court can legally distinguish these cases to prevent their use as
mandatory authority. 250 The court not only made these legal distinc-
Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(finding Pullman inapplicable because the entire balance of goods in the case at bar was
delivered in a single installment); City of Cincinnati v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 259,
264 (D. Conn. 1986) (similarly distinguishing Pullman); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc.,
569 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (D. Del. 1983) (distinguishing Pullman on both factual and policy
grounds).
244. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 624-28, 719 A.2d at 545-46 (explaining that
the meaning of tender of delivery for limitations purposes is found in section 2-503 and its
official comment).
245. See id. at 624-638, 719 A.2d at 545-551 (explaining the majority opinion and citing
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-503 and its official comment I throughout).
246. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-503 official comment 1 (1997).
247. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 624-638, 719 A.2d at 545-51 (explaining the
majority opinion, but failing to inquire into the subjective beliefs of the seller).
248. See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551.
249. See generally id. at 627-29, 719 A.2d at 546-47 (distinguishing Wilke and Automated
from the case at bar).
250. For example, the majority is not bound by Wilke because that case turned upon
"when the risk of loss passed from seller to buyer under § 2-510(1) [," id. at 628, 719 A.2d
at 547, and not when tender of delivery occurred for the purposes of section 2-725. Simi-
larly, the issue in Automated is distinguished as one of possession of goods in a bankruptcy
dispute rather than one of limitations in a warranty action. See In ReAutomated Bookbind-
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tions, but also explained that under the facts of both cases, the broad
definition of delivery was not satisfied, nor did the seller offer the
goods as if in fulfillment of the contract's conditions.251 Here the
court's reasoning is problematic for two reasons. First, in distinguish-
ing these cases, the majority apparently makes issue of the subjective
intent of the seller, a course that it refuses to take in dealing with the
case at bar.252 Second, while the majority discusses these two cases at
length as ones that warrant postponement of tender of delivery, it
completely fails to distinguish them factually from the present case.
These inconsistencies lead to a conclusion and a rule that is legally
sound, yet logically flawed.
d. Supporting the Strict Rule on Policy Grounds.-While the
court's reasoning is troublesome and somewhat unstable, the result-
ing rule is not. The rule developed by Washington Freightliner holds
that unless parties clearly contract for delivery of conforming goods,
the general rule will apply and physical delivery of nonconforming
goods will trigger section 2-725 regardless of testing obligations.253
The policy goals of section 2-725 support this rule and its potentially
strict enforcement. One of the purposes of section 2-725 is to give
sellers clear notice of when they are no longer liable for breach of
warranty claims by aggrieved buyers. 254 As Washington Freightliner ex-
plains, when sellers explicitly contract for conforming goods, tender
ing Servs., 336 F. Supp. 1128, 1134-35 (analyzing a dispute between creditors of a bankrupt
company according to an issue of possession).
251. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 628, 719 A.2d at 546 ("Under the facts in
Wilke there was no tender of delivery in either the narrow or the broad sense. The goods
were not conforming and the seller did not make 'an offer of goods.., under a contract as
if in fulfillment of its conditions.'" (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 2-503 (official
comment 1) (1997))); id. at 629, 719 A.2d at 547 ("It is apparent that the seller in the
Automated Bookbinding case had not tendered goods 'as if in fulfillment of the contracts
conditions." (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-503 (official comment 1))).
252. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 624-638, 719 A.2d at 545-51 (explaining the
majority opinion, but failing to inquire into the subjective beliefs of the seller).
253. See supra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (discussing the rule formed by the
Washington Freightliner majority).
254. See Ontario Hydro, 569 F. Supp. at 1266. In Ontario Hydro, the court noted that
[w]hile this limitation period may appear relatively short, it was designed by the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code to serve the important function of
providing a point of finality for businesses after which they could destroy their
business records without the fear of a subsequent breach of contract for sale or
breach of warranty suit arising to haunt them... [h]ence, the finality necessary to
promote the flow of commerce is effectuated by the limitation period.




of delivery may be postponed beyond testing.2 55 When they do not,
tender of delivery will occur upon physical delivery or installation of
the goods.256
By creating a strict rule requiring clear agreement as to tender of
delivery, Washington Freightliner serves this purpose of section 2-725.
Under a contract specifically incorporating a narrow sense of delivery,
a seller would know, because of the terms of the contract, that the
date upon which the goods conform is also the date that triggers the
limitations period.25 7 By imposing a rule that all other agreements
are to be governed by the "broad" sense of delivery, sellers are given
notice that the period of vulnerability will begin upon physical deliv-
ery or installation, and end four years later, regardless of remaining
obligations to test the goods or subject them to inspection.2 58
A strict, dichotomous rule also is supported by one of the general
policy goals of the U.C.C., that is, "to simplify, clarify and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions."25 9 The rule proposed by
Washington Freightliner envisions a simple and clear division of cases for
limitations purposes.2 6 ° In the first category, there are cases in which
the parties clearly agree that the "narrow" definition of tender of de-
livery will govern the contract. 261 In such cases, section 2-725 can be
mechanically applied from the date upon which testing shows the
goods to be conforming. 26 2 In the second category, there are cases
that by their contract terms exhibit something less than a clear inten-
tion to invoke this "narrow" sense. 263 In these cases, section 2-725 also
can be mechanically applied, regardless of any unspecific inspection
255. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 633, 719 A.2d at 549 (distinguishing Pullman
from the present case and explaining that "the Pullman contract negated the possibility
that delivery of nonconforming goods could be tender of delivery," and stating that "[t]he
Pullman contract blocked the possibility of applying the broader meaning of tender of
delivery").
256. See id. at 637, 791 A.2d at 551 (holding that "[flor the purposes of limitations on
implied warranties, the ordinary rule is that the four years begins to run when the goods
are delivered, and the evidence in this case does not alter that result").
257. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997) (explaining the four-year limitations
period).
258. See generally id. (implying that four years after delivery sellers will no longer be sub-
ject to suit).
259. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1999).
260. See supra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (discussing the rule embodied by
the Washington Freightliner decision).
261. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-35, 719 A.2d at 548-50 (describing Pull-
man and St. Anne as such cases).
262. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997) (explaining the applicable limita-
tions period of breach of warranty claims).
263. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (distinguishing the case
at bar as "fall [ing] far short of demonstrating a situation comparable to Pullman").
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terms, from the date of physical delivery or installation.264 This "one
or the other" characteristic of the Washington Freightliner analysis
brings more clarity and simplicity than any case-by-case flexible and
subjective standard of tender of delivery could.
Finally, this rule is desirable because it protects sellers of commer-
cial goods from being liable for an unreasonable amount of time.
The strict rule adopted by Washington Freightliner protects sellers in
cases where a third party is responsible for the installation of goods
before testing. This restrictive rule prevents a seller's period of liabil-
ity from being unreasonably extended due to any unforeseen delays
caused by the party responsible for installation. A contrary rule would
allow the limitations period to be postponed indefinitely while instal-
lation of the goods occurred, thus leaving the seller at the mercy of
the installing party. Such a rule would render the statute of limita-
tions wholly ineffective by providing an inherently flexible period of
limitations.26'
e. Sending a Message to Commercial Parties in Maryland.-The
rule imposed in Washington Freightliner is not as harsh as it appears.
The rule sends a message to commercial buyers doing business under
Maryland law that mere testing obligations in a contract will not serve
to postpone delivery for limitations purposes.266 The strict applica-
tion of this rule should communicate to buyers that if they wish to
bind a seller beyond mere physical delivery or installation for implied
warranty purposes, they should specifically invoke the "narrow" sense
of tender of delivery by including language in their contract expres-
sing such intent.267 Washington Freightliner also warns buyers to be cau-
tious and specific in drafting such clauses, indicating that even terms
that clearly require testing by the seller 268 will not affect the general
264. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-725 (1997) (explaining the applicable limita-
tions period of breach of warranty claims).
265. See Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (D. Del. 1983) (ex-
plaining that the limitations period provides "a point of finality," and thus "promote [s] the
flow of commerce").
266. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 632-37, 719 A.2d at 548-51 (distinguishing the
case at bar from cases in which specific contract terms allowed postponing of delivery until
testing was completed).
267. See id.; see also supra notes 209-243 and accompanying text.
268. See 351 Md. at 636, 719 A.2d at 550-51 (discussing Ontario Hydro and the issue of
indefiniteness as it pertains to postponing delivery). Under Washington Freightliner, such
terms as "Start up and Commissioning (8 Hr. Allowance)" can be considered as an exam-
ple of language that is insufficiently specific to postpone delivery for limitations purposes.
See id. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (citing these terms of the agreement and finding them
insufficient to postpone delivery until after testing is complete).
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rule that section 2-725 begins to run upon physical delivery. 69 Only
when parties unequivocally invoke the "narrow" sense of delivery or
agree that tender of delivery is contingent upon the completion of
testing will the limitations period extend beyond the four years follow-
ing physical delivery.270
5. Conclusion.-In Washington Freightliner, the Court of Appeals
held that under a contract for the sale of marine engines, the limita-
tions period for implied warranty claims in section 2-725 of the Mary-
land Commercial Law Article began to run when the seller physically
delivered the goods, not when the seller fulfilled its obligations to test
the engines.271 With this decision, the court has sent a message that
only the clearest contract language will postpone accrual of the limita-
tions period beyond physical delivery of goods. 27 2 Also, the court has
indicated that this is not a flexible rule. 273 The court's reasoning is
problematic in determining when "tender of delivery" occurred be-
cause it fails to consider the subjective state of mind of the seller, a
course of inquiry suggested by section 2-503 and its official
comment.274
Nevertheless, the rule imposed by the court upholds the purpose
of the statute of limitations in section 2-725 by providing sellers with a
more clear idea of when they might be subject to suit.2 7 5 Moreover,
Washington Freightliner puts buyers on notice as to the steps they need
to take to ensure the longest limitations period possible. Under this
decision, the process involves a specific agreement that the "narrow"
sense of delivery will govern the contract and that only the delivery of
tested, nondefective goods will trigger the statute of limitations.276
While the rule as applied in the present case may seem harsh on buy-
269. See Washington Freightliner, 351 Md. at 637, 719 A.2d at 551 (noting that the general
rule is that physical delivery triggers section 2-725).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See supra notes 266-269 and accompanying text (describing the message sent by the
decision in Washington Freightliner).
273. See supra notes 231-243 and accompanying text (discussing how the decision indi-
cates a rigid rule).
274. See supra notes 244-252 and accompanying text (critiquing the reasoning of the
Washington Freightliner majority).
275. See supra notes 253-265 and accompanying text (analyzing Washington Freightlineron
policy grounds).
276. See supra notes 209-232 and accompanying text (explaining the rule developed in
Washington Freightliner).
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ers, it need not be if they heed its warnings and take greater care in




A. Applying the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Forfeitures: Stare Decisis of
Misinterpreted Case Law Prevails
In One 1995 Corvette v. Mayor of Baltimore,' the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the exclusionary rule applies to all civil in rem for-
feitures in Maryland.2 The court concluded that evidence obtained
from a vehicle search conducted without probable cause was not ad-
missible in a civil forfeiture proceeding in which it was alleged that the
vehicle was used to transport illegal drugs.3 In doing so, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals4 which
had relied on the Supreme Court's continued refusal to extend the
exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.5 To achieve this universal ap-
plication, the Court of Appeals relied on a long list of cases interpret-
ing the relevant United States Supreme Court decision, One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,6 as categorizing all civil in rem proceed-
ings as quasi-criminal and therefore universally applying the exclu-
sionary rule.7 The Court of Appeals, however, applied a distorted
form of stare decisis to preserve a misinterpretation of outdated case
law. In addition, the Court of Appeals's universal application of the
exclusionary rule to all civil in rem forfeitures departs from criminal
application of the exclusionary rule where exceptions have been
made. Although the Court of Appeals's decision was motivated by the
court's strong policy against civil forfeiture,' it results in the inconsis-
tent application of the exclusionary rule in Maryland.
1. The Case.-The police arrested the petitioner, Weldon Con-
nell Holmes, on drug-related charges and seized his 1995 Corvette af-
ter they stopped his car and found 548 grams of cocaine inside.9 Prior
1. 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680 (1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 321 (1999).
2. Id. at 139, 724 A.2d at 693-94.
3. Id.
4. See Mayor of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. 691, 706 A.2d 43
(1998), rev'd, One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680.
5. Id. at 808-10, 706 A.2d at 101.
6. 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (holding that the exclusionary rule applied to a civil in rem
forfeiture).
7. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 123-24 nn.5-6, 724 A.2d at 684-85 nn.5-6.
8. Id. at 138-39, 724 A.2d at 692 (noting that "forfeitures are disfavored in law because
they are considered harsh extractions, odious, and to be avoided when possible" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Frederick City Police Dep't v. One 1998
Toyota Pick-Up Truck, 334 Md. 359, 375, 639 A.2d 641, 649 (1994))).
9. See id. at 116-17, 724 A.2d 681. Police officers conducting a general surveillance
saw Holmes park his red Corvette. See id. at 116, 724 A.2d at 681. The officers, members of
the Northwest District Drug Enforcement Unit, who were unfamiliar with Holmes, watched
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to the preliminary hearing, the State's Attorney dropped the criminal
charges,1" but subsequently filed an action for forfeiture of the Cor-
vette based on article 27, section 297, of the Maryland Code,11 which
provides for the forfeiture of vehicles used to transport illegal sub-
stances and for the forfeiture of any property obtained in exchange
for illegal controlled substances.1 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the evi-
dence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and,
therefore, should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. 3 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the judge allowed both parties to submit
memoranda on the issue, and ruled in favor of Holmes. 4 The trial
court determined that the police lacked probable cause to believe
controlled, dangerous substances were in the vehicle, and based on
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, concluded that the exclusion-
an unknown man give Holmes a black bag before he drove away. See id. After stopping
Holmes, one of the officers told him that he believed that Holmes had participated in a
drug transaction and asked to see inside the bag, explaining that the officers would request
a drug-sniffing dog if he refused. See id. Holmes quickly opened and closed the bag. See
id. An officer saw a plastic bag that he believed contained illegal drugs, and the police
then arrested Holmes on drug-related charges. See id An officer removed the bag from
the car, looked inside, and discovered approximately 500 grams of cocaine. See id. at 116-
17, 724 A.2d at 681. Officers also found smaller bags containing an additional 48 grams of
cocaine inside a brown paper bag in the car. See id. at 117, 724 A.2d at 681.
10. Id. at 116 n.1, 724 A.2d at 681 n.i. The record did not reflect the reason for drop-
ping the criminal case; however, the State revealed at the forfeiture hearing that the prose-
cutor was concerned about defeating a motion to suppress. The constitutionality of the
stop, search and seizure were, therefore, never adjudicated. Id.
11. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1996). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Property subject tofoifeiture.-The following shall be subject to forfeiture and no
property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled dangerous substances ...
(2) All raw materials, products and equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled dangerous substance...
(4) All... vehicles... which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection...
(10) Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange
for a controlled dangerous substance in violation of this subheading, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange ....
Id. Legislative changes between Holmes's arrest in 1996 and the Court of Appeals's deci-
sion did not substantially alter the relevant subsections. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at
117 n.2, 724 A.2d at 681 n.2.
12. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 117, 724 A.2d at 681-82.
13. See id. at 117-18, 724 A.2d at 682. The trial judge denied Holmes's motion to dis-
miss three times, but allowed a continuing motion for the record. See id.
14. See id.
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ary rule applied to civil forfeiture cases and dismissed the case.' 5 The
State appealed.16
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower court's deci-
sion." Referring to the "undiluted civil status of the proceeding," the
court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to such forfeit-
ures.1" The court explained that One 1958 Plymouth does not stand for
the proposition that the exclusionary rule should be applied to illegal
searches and seizures in civil in rem forfeitures cases.' 9
Holmes appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
decide whether the exclusionary rule applied to civil in rem
forfeitures.2"
2. Legal Background.-
a. Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Proceedings.-The exclusion-
ary rule was developed in the early twentieth century by the Supreme
Court and requires the suppression of any evidence obtained through
an illegal search and seizure in federal courts.2' State acceptance of
the rule, however, was slow, and only one-third of the states had
adopted the exclusionary rule by the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court extended the applicability of
the exclusionary rule to the states in 1961.23
The Supreme Court has allowed three exceptions to the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases. First, the exclusionary
15. See Mayor of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. 691, 698, 706 A.2d 43,
46 (1998).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 810, 706 A.2d at 101.
18. Id. at 809, 706 A.2d at 101.
19. Id. at 808-10, 706 A.2d at 101.
20. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 139, 724 A.2d at 693. After the Court of Appeals's
decision, the State appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the interpretation of One
1958 Plymouth as applying the exclusionary rule to all civil in rem forfeitures. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 120 S. Ct. 321 (1999).
21. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (excluding evidence ille-
gally seized by federal officials and finding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
evidence illegally seized by local officials).
22. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). In Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to the states. Id. at 33. Despite this ruling, half of the remaining states that
considered the issue enacted the exclusionary rule for criminal proceedings during the
1950s because of a lack of alternative protections and remedies. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651;
see also People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1995) (applying the exclusionary rule to
criminal proceedings only after "other remedies have failed to secure compliance with the
constitutional provisions").
23. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (holding "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court").
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rule does not prohibit the testimony of a witness identified through
evidence obtained in an illegal search.24 Second, the exclusionary
rule does not prohibit the use of illegally seized evidence to impeach a
criminal defendant.25 Third, the exclusionary rule does not apply
when law enforcement officers act in good faith upon a warrant they
reasonably believed to be lawful.26
b. Application of Exclusionary Rule to Civil Forfeiture Proceed-
ings.--In 1886, the Supreme Court, in Boyd v. United States,27 held that
the Fourth Amendment applied to a civil customs forfeiture provision
deemed "quasi criminal."28 In Boyd, the Government seized thirty-five
cases of plate glass, alleging that the owners committed fraud punisha-
ble by forfeiture under the customs revenue laws.29 The defendant
entered a claim for the goods.3" During the trial, the court granted
an order requiring the defendant to produce invoices to prove the
contents of the cases.3" The defendant produced the documents
while objecting that this order required self-incrimination and was
therefore inadmissible.32 The trial court entered judgment upon a
jury verdict in favor of the United States, which was subsequently af-
firmed by the circuit court.33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to examine whether the compelled production of private documents
constituted an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment.34 The Supreme Court held that the compelled production of
personal papers violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and also violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on un-
reasonable searches and seizures.3 5
24. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (discussing how the exclusionary rule did not apply to testimony of a
witness identified through an illegal search).
25. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (concluding that the policies
of the exclusionary rule do not bar the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment
purposes).
26. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 (1984) (clarifying that the "good
faith exception" is applicable because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter po-
lice misconduct).
27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28. Id. at 634.
29. Id. at 617-18.




34. Id. at 622.
35. Id. at 634-35. This holding was later abrogated in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463 (1976), which held that the search of a defendant's office and seizure of his business
2000]
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The Court in Boyd recognized the "intimate relation" between the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on illegal searches and seizures and
the Fifth Amendment prohibition of coerced self-incrimination, not-
ing that illegal searches and seizures are usually intended to make per-
sons incriminate themselves.3 6 Further, the Court stated that while
forfeiture may be civil in form, it is criminal in nature. 7 Under the
applicable federal customs statute, forfeiture, along with a fine and
incarceration, was available as a criminal penalty.3 " The Court found
that had Boyd been indicted, he could have been fined and impris-
oned, and the glass could have been forfeited.39 The Court then
stated that the Government could not decline to file a criminal indict-
ment so that illegally obtained evidence could be salvaged for use in a
civil procedure of forfeiture.4 ° The Court declared that civil proceed-
ings that penalize criminal offenses are quasi-criminal, and therefore,
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures and the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion clause apply.41
Over fifty years later, the Supreme Court, in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania,42 held that the exclusionary rule applied to a
forfeiture proceeding.43 In One 1958 Plymouth, two officers of the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board stopped a car that had just
crossed into the state from NewJersey after noting that the vehicle was
riding low in the rear.44 The officers questioned the driver, and upon
searching the car and trunk, found thirty-one cases of liquor that did
not have Pennsylvania tax seals.45 They arrested the driver and
charged him with violating Pennsylvania liquor control statutes.46
Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the State filed a petition to seize
the car.47 The trial court dismissed the petition because the incrimi-
nating evidence, the liquor, was obtained in an illegal search.4" The
records did not violate his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Id. at
471-74.
36. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.




41. See id. at 634-35.
42. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
43. Id. at 702.




48. See id. at 695.
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Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court, re-
versed the judgment, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania af-
firmed the decision.49 Citing the Supreme Court's application of the
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio,5" the Pennsylvania high court held
that the exclusionary rule applied only to criminal prosecutions, but
not to forfeiture proceedings that were civil in nature.5' The Su-
preme Court reversed this decision, concluding that the forfeiture
proceeding was "quasi-criminal" in character.52 The Supreme Court
emphasized that if the defendant was convicted of any of the possible
criminal offenses involved, he would be subject to a fine ranging be-
tween $100 and $500, which was far less severe than the civil forfeiture
of the driver's vehicle, which was valued at $1000.53 The Court ex-
plained that "it would be anomalous indeed, under these circum-
stances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized
evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring
the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same
evidence would be admissible."54
While the "quasi-criminal" civil penalties and the criminal penal-
ties were codified in the same statute in One 1958 Plymouth,5 5 subse-
quent case law addressed issues regarding civil penalties that were
codified independently of criminal statutes. For example, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Ward,56 held that the issue of whether a
penalty is civil or criminal is a question of "statutory construction."57
The Ward Court held that the judiciary should overrule a legislature's
classification of a penalty as civil only when "the statutory scheme...
[is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention."5
c. Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Proceedings other
than Forfeiture.-The Supreme Court has chosen not to extend the ex-
clusionary rule to a number of other civil proceedings, including
49. See id.
50. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 700-01.
53. Id. at 701.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 701 n.9 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-494(a) (West 1964 Supp.)).
56. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
57. Id. at 248.
58. Id. at 248-49. The issue in Ward was whether a civil penalty of up to $5000 per
violation in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was quasi-criminal, thus invoking Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination protections. See id. at 244-45.
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grand jury proceedings,59 federal habeas corpus review, 60 tax forfeit-
ures of gambling proceeds,6 and civil deportation proceedings.62
An often cited case regarding the application of the exclusionary
rule to civil proceedings is United States v. Janis.6 3 Janis addresses the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to a federal civil proceeding
utilizing evidence that was obtained by state police in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.64 In Janis, Los Angeles police officers obtained a
search warrant and conducted a search in an effort to locate book-
making paraphernalia.65 They seized $4940 in cash and betting
records, and they arrested the defendant.66 Subsequently, the arrest-
ing officer contacted the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which as-
sessed wagering taxes of $89,026.09 against the defendants after
examining the records.67 The IRS, per federal statute, levied the
$4940 as partial satisfaction of the assessment.6 The district court
found that the warrant was based on a defective affidavit and quashed
the warrant.69 The district court ordered all of the respondent's be-
longings returned except for the cash which had been levied by the
IRS. 7' The respondent later filed for a refund with interest because
the assessment was based on illegally obtained evidence. 7' The court
excluded the evidence and ordered that the IRS refund the amount
assessed.7 2
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in this instance would not further the
purpose of the rule, as state law enforcement officers would likely not
59. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (holding that a witness
before the grand jury could be compelled to answer questions based on evidence obtained
from an unlawful search and seizure).
60. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (holding that after the State has
provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a pris-
oner need not be granted habeas corpus relief on the grounds that evidence obtained
through illegal search and seizure was admitted at trial).
61. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (holding that evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not excluded from a federal civil tax proceeding).
62. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (holding that evidence
obtained in connection with peaceful arrests by I.N.S. officers is not excludable in an I.N.S.
civil deportation hearing).
63. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
64. Id. at 434.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 436.
67. See id. at 437.
68. See id.
69. Janis, 428 U.S. at 437-38.
70. Id. at 438.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 438-39.
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be deterred by making "concededly relevant and reliable evidence""3
unavailable to federal authorities."4 The Court noted that "[i]n the
complex and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has ap-
plied... [the exclusionary rule] to exclude evidence from a civil pro-
ceeding, federal or state."75 The Court distinguished its application of
the exclusionary rule to the civil forfeiture in One 1958 Plymouth on
the ground that the forfeiture in that case was actually a penalty for a
criminal offense.76
d. States Vary in Application of the Exclusionary Rule in Civil in
rem Forfeitures.-Six states, Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, North
Dakota, and Washington, have expressly applied the exclusionary rule
to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings prior to the Court of Special Ap-
peals holding in One 1995 Corvette.7 7 The California Court of Appeal,
however, was persuaded by the Court of Special Appeals analysis in
One 1995 Corvette and declined to apply the exclusionary rule to a civil
forfeiture proceeding against $241,600 seized by the police. 78 The
claimant appealed summary judgment forfeiting $241,600 that was
seized from a briefcase in his car.79 The California Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that questions of fact existed regarding claimant's
interest in the money, claimant's standing to oppose forfeiture"0 and
claimant's knowledge that the money was linked to illegal drugs.8 "
The California Court of Appeal distinguished the statute in One 1958
Plymouth as combining criminal and civil penalties8 2 and found the
statute in One 1995 Corvette to be analogous to the California statute. 3
The California Court of Appeal held that application of the exclusion-
ary rule to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings is "unnecessary and of
little additional benefit" noting this was certainly the case when the
property was owned by a third-party who had not been convicted. 4
The California Court of Appeal concluded by stating that the Su-
73. Id at 447.
74. Id. at 454.
75. Id. at 447.
76. See id. at 447 n.17.
77. See infra note 123.
78. See California v. $241,600 United States Currency, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588, 595 (Ct.
App. 1998).
79. Id. at 589-90. The claimant had denied ownership of the money several times and
later filed for return of the money. See id. at 590.
80. Id. at 594.
81. Id. at 596.
82. Id. at 594-95.




preme Court had refused to apply the exclusionary rule to civil pro-
ceedings "and . . . decline[d] to do so . . in this civil forfeiture
case."
8 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In One 1995 Corvette, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the exclusionary rule applies to civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings.86 The court explained that One 1958 Plymouth is still
good law, as the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled it and
because a long line of lower court references to the case illustrate its
strong precedential value.8" The court reasoned that because of the
continued viability of One 1958 Plymouth, it would be inappropriate to
overrule the case.88
The majority began its opinion by providing an extensive discus-
sion of the One 1958 Plymouth decision.8 9 The court then addressed
the Court of Special Appeals's rejection of the continued validity of
One 1958 Plymouth.9" The court had noted that the United States Su-
preme Court, as recently as 1994, had cited One 1958 Plymouth as au-
thority for applying the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture
proceedings. 9' The court then pointed out that eleven of the thirteen
United States courts of appeals "have interpreted ... [One 1958 Plym-
outh] to stand for the proposition that the exclusionary rule applies to
civil in rem forfeitures."92 Although the court recognized that many of
these cases referred to One 1958 Plymouth in dicta only, the majority
asserted that these decisions "consistently accept the interpretation of
. .. [One 1958 Plymouth] as applying the exclusionary rule to civil in
rem forfeiture proceedings."93 Therefore, the One 1995 Corvette major-
ity refused to "overrule" One 1958 Plymouth and concluded that it was
the court's "duty to continue to apply One Plymouth."94
The One 1995 Corvette court then addressed the respondent's ar-
gument that the forfeiture proceeding at issue in the present case was
distinguishable from the forfeiture proceeding in One 1958 Plym-
outh.95 Rejecting the argument, the court found that the civil in rem
85. Id.
86. 353 Md. at 139, 724 A.2d at 692.
87. Id. at 121-24 & nn.5-6, 724 A.2d at 684-85 & nn.5-6.
88. Id. at 126, 724 A.2d at 686.
89. See id. at 118-21, 724 A.2d at 682-83.
90. Id. at 121-26, 724 A.2d at 684-86.
91. Id. at 122, 724 A.2d at 684 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop-
erty, 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993)).
92. Id. at 123, 724 A.2d at 684 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 124, 724 A.2d at 685.
94. Id. at 126, 724 A.2d at 686.
95. Id.
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forfeiture proceeding in the present case was "quasi-criminal" within
the meaning of Boyd, One 1958 Plymouth, and their progeny.96 The
court first dismissed the suggestion that the application of the exclu-
sionary rule should depend upon whether the forfeiture law is "puni-
tive."97 Instead, the court explained that because the exclusionary
rule was meant to remedy Fourth Amendment violations, the proper
consideration was whether the Fourth Amendment applied to civil
proceedings such as this one.9" The court then looked to the lan-
guage and history of the Fourth Amendment, which indicated no limi-
tation to criminal trials, but instead suggested a broader goal of
ensuring "freedom from unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures of any kind."99 The court concluded that "Fourth Amend-
ment protections ... apply regardless of the criminality of the conduct
of the owner of the property or the use to which the property is
put."100
Next, the court rejected the respondent's assertion that the label
"quasi-criminal" is limited to forfeiture proceedings, such as the one
in One 1958 Plymouth, where the civil penalties could exceed the crimi-
nal penalties.10 ' The court reasoned that because of the wide range
of criminal penalties and property values subject to forfeiture, the re-
spondent's argument "would lead to the absurd situation where the
exclusionary rule would or would not be applicable depending upon
the value of the item seized."'0 2 The court also rejected the respon-
dent's argument that the One 1958 Plymouth holding was limited to
forfeiture statutes that authorize a civil forfeiture only after a criminal
conviction and thus did not apply to the present case because, under
Maryland's forfeiture statute, criminal charges are irrelevant as to
whether a civil forfeiture can be pursued.10 3 The court explained that
although criminal charges may not be necessary to trigger the Mary-
land statute, criminal conduct or criminal intent must be proven to
subject property to forfeiture.104
The court determined, instead, that the more sound interpreta-
tion of One 1958 Plymouth would label as "quasi-criminal" any forfei-
96. Id. at 126-27, 724 A.2d at 686; see also infra notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
97. 353 Md. at 127, 724 A.2d at 686.
98. Id. at 127-28, 724 A.2d at 687.
99. Id. at 130-31, 724 A.2d at 688.
100. Id. at 131, 724 A.2d at 689.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 132 n.9, 724 A.2d at 689 n.9.
103. Id. at 133, 724 A.2d at 689.
104. See id., 724 A.2d at 689-90.
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ture action based upon "inherently criminal activity, ' 05 regardless of
whether it was indictable or what the punishment was. Applying this
standard to the Maryland forfeiture law at issue, the court concluded
that it was "quasi-criminal" in nature "because criminality is at the ba-
sic foundation of the conduct from which a forfeiture suit may arise
under the ... statute.' 10 6
The court also rejected the respondent's contention that One
1958 Plymouth covered only forfeiture actions triggered by a criminal
conviction and that the Maryland forfeiture statute did not require
the commission of a crime. 10 7 The court again emphasized that al-
though the Maryland statute does not require or create a criminal
proceeding, "criminal evidence .. . is typically necessary to prove a
forfeiture case under [the Maryland statute]. ' O8 The majority also
suggested that declining to apply the exclusionary rule in these types
of cases would allow the government to circumvent the requirement
of the Fourth Amendment "by proceeding under the auspices of a
civil action that authorizes the taking of private property, but only if
that property is used, or intended to be used, for criminally-related
purposes."' 09
Finally, the court cited a policy reason for applying the exclusion-
ary rule to "quasi-criminal" cases such as the present case. The court
stated that "the need for deterrence [of illegal searches and seizures]
exceeds the societal costs" of applying the exclusionary rule.110 The
court indicated that the failure to apply the exclusionary rule in cases
such as the present one "could lead to a separate line of police work
devoted to forfeitures."'' Additionally, the court noted that despite
its repeated warnings that forfeitures in Maryland are disfavored, gov-
ernments have "increasingly filed civil forfeiture actions in lieu of
criminal charges, knowing that constitutional protections provide
greater obstacles to their criminal cases, and that forfeitures have a
great financial impact not only on the defendant but on the govern-
ment's coffers as well."' 112 The court concluded, therefore, that the
application of the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings was
105. Id., 724 A.2d at 690.
106. Id. at 135, 724 A.2d at 690.
107. Id. at 135, 724 A.2d at 691.
108. Id. at 136, 724 A.2d at 691.
109. Id. at 137, 724 A.2d at 691.
110. Id. at 138, 724 A.2d at 692.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 138-39, 724 A.2d at 692 (citing William Patrick Wilson, Should the Ranch Go
Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in
the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. Rav. 1309, 1328 (1992)).
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necessary to deter police from conducting illegal searches and
seizures.' 
13
4. Analysis.-In One 1995 Corvette, the Court of Appeals demon-
strated a strong policy against the use of civil forfeiture, holding that
the exclusionary rule should be applied to all civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings.114 The Court of Appeals's holding is inconsistent with
Maryland and federal case law in three respects. First, its interpreta-
tion of One 1958 Plymouth conflicts with its own subsequent rulings
and those of the Supreme Court that have limited the application of
the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. Second, universal applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to all civil in rem forfeitures is inconsis-
tent with its application in criminal cases, which allows for exceptions.
Finally, this interpretation is inconsistent with One 1958 Plymouth,
which limited the holding to "quasi-criminal" in rem forfeiture pro-
ceedings. Over the last thirty years, the "quasi-criminal" classification
has been replaced by a deference to statutory interpretation-the leg-
islature's intent to declare a penalty civil or criminal.' 15 The court
should have classified the forfeiture penalty in One 1995 Corvette as
civil and declined to apply the exclusionary rule.
a. Misinterpreting a Long Line of Cases Citing One 1958 Plym-
outh.-One 1995 Corvette, a case of first impression in Maryland,"1 6
rests on the interpretation and viability of One 1958 Plymouth, a thirty-
four year-old case which is the primary Supreme Court precedent on
point.'1 7 The court's principal reason for not distinguishing One 1958
Plymouth from the case at bar was the existence of a long line of cases
that cited One 1958 Plymouth as standing for the application of the
exclusionary rule to all civil in rem proceedings.1 " This contention
contains three significant flaws. First, as the One 1995 Corvette court
acknowledged, many of these cases are merely persuasive as their cita-
113. See id. at 138, 724 A.2d at 692.
114. Id. at 139-40, 724 A.2d at 692-93.
115. See id. at 82-83, 724 A.2d at 770-71 (summarizing the Court's transition from char-
acterizing civil forfeiture proceedings as "quasi-criminal" to relying on the legislation to
identify whether a proceeding is civil or criminal); see also U.S. v. Ward 242, 248-49 (1980)
(discussing the Court's reliance on express or implied legislative intent to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal and stating that the Court "has often stated that
the question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter
of statutory construction").
116. See Mayor of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. 691, 721, 706 A.2d 43,
58 (1998) (noting that "[n]o previous Maryland decision has ever squarely addressed this
issue").
117. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 118, 724 A.2d at 682.
118. Id. at 122-23 & nn.4-6, 724 A.2d at 684-85 & nn.4-6.
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tions to One 1958 Plymouth were in dicta.'19 Second, the majority of
the cases cited were not on point. Of the thirteen federal cases cited
in footnote five of the One 1995 Corvette decision, only four were on
point.12  The remaining nine cases included five in which the search
was held to be legal 21 and four cases that involved other issues includ-
ing a tax proceeding and a criminal forfeiture.122 Of thirty-four state
cases cited in footnote six of the One 1995 Corvette decision, only six
were on point.121 In nine of the remaining state cases, the search at
119. Id. at 124, 724 A.2d at 685 (noting that "in many of these federal and state cases,
the various courts refer to [One 1958 Plymouth] primarily in dicta").
120. See United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.
1994) (affirming summary judgment against the government in a civil forfeiture action
against $191,910 seized in a search for illegal drugs that was conducted without probable
cause); United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 1994) (vacating summary judg-
ment in favor of the government in a real property forfeiture proceeding and remanding
for evidentiary hearing to determine whether evidence of illegal gambling resulting in the
forfeiture was obtained in a legal search); United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955
F.2d 712, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming the dismissal of a civil forfeiture action against
cocaine-laced money obtained in a warrantless search); United States v. South Half of Lot 7
& Lot 8, 876 F.2d 1362, 1370 (8th Cir.) (dismissing 13 civil forfeiture proceedings against
real property that was seized without probable cause), vacated and reh 'ggranted, 883 F.2d 53
(1989), rev'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1990).
121. The search at issue was found to be legal in five of the cited cases and therefore the
applicability of the exclusionary rule was not in debate. See United States v. 500 Delaware
Street, 113 F.3d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. One Lot of United States Cur-
rency, 103 F.3d 1048, 1053 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 9844 South Titan Court, 75
F.3d 1470, 1492 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297,
1303 (5th Cir. 1983); and United States v. 1988 BMW 7501L, 716 F. Supp. 171, 176 (E.D.
Pa. 1989).
122. See Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1994) (concerning an action for declar-
atory and injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act against
the IRS); Wolf v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding the exclusionary
rule was not applicable to the tax proceedings at bar); United States v. Elgersma, 929 F.2d
1538, 1548 (holding that the exclusionary rule applied as the penalty at issue was crimi-
nal), vacated and reh'g granted, 938 F.2d 179 (11th Cir. 1991), affd on other grounds, 971 F.2d
690 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D.N.J.
1990) (holding that testimony stemming from evidence obtained in an illegal search is
admissible in a civil forfeiture proceeding as long as probable cause for forfeiture is estab-
lished through independent evidence).
123. See Berryhill v. State, 372 So. 2d 355, 355 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (reversing the judg-
ment of forfeiture against alcohol in a dry county because the search was illegal); Kaiser v.
State, 752 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Ark. 1988) (remanding the civil forfeiture of a pistol and ten
thousand dollars because the State did not prove the reliability of the telephone tip that
precipitated the search); In re Flowers, 474 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Iowa 1991) (reversing the
civil forfeiture of $1982 seized in an illegal search); State v. One 1987 Toyota Pickup, 447
N.W.2d 243, 249 (Neb. 1989) (reversing a criminal forfeiture of a truck seized in an illegal
search); State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 523 N.W.2d 389, 394-95 (N.D. 1994) (re-
manding forfeiture proceeding against a pickup truck to determine whether probable
cause for the seizure existed); Deeter v. Smith, 721 P.2d 519, 520 (Wash. 1986) (holding
that an automobile forfeiture under the Washington State Uniform Controlled Substances
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issue was held to be legal. 124 Five cases involved administrative hear-
ings. 125 The remaining fourteen proceedings were merely courts' an-
ecdotal comments regarding civil in rem forfeitures based on illegal
searches.1 26 Thus, their persuasive value is minimal.
Act is quasi-criminal and therefore reversing a forfeiture that was based on an illegal
search).
124. See Idaho Dep't of Law Enforcement v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 824 P.2d 142, 147
(Idaho Ct. App. 1991); People ex rel. Waller v. Seeburg Slot Machs., 641 N.E.2d 997, 1004
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Caudill v. State, 613 N.E.2d 433, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Boston
Housing Auth. v. Guirola, 575 N.E. 2d 1100, 1105 (Mass. 1991); In re Forfeiture of
$176,598, 505 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Mich. 1993); A 1983 Volkswagen v. County of Washoe, 699
P.2d 108, 109 (Nev. 1985) (per curiam); In re$207,523.46 in U.S. Currency, 536 A.2d 1270,
1272 (N.H. 1987); In re One 1967 Peterbil Tractor, 506 P.2d 1199, 1202 (N.M. 1973); Pitts
v. State, 428 S.E.2d 650, 652 (Ga. App. 1993).
125. Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1304 (Me. 1992) (administrative
driver's license suspension proceeding); In re Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor
Auth., 249 N.E.2d 440, 442 (N.Y. 1969) (liquor license proceeding); Loyal Order of Moose
Lodge 1044 v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm'n, 663 N.E.2d 1306, 1306 (Ohio 1995) (liquor
permit hearing); Board of License Comm'rs v. Pastore, 463 A.2d 161, 162 (R.I. 1983) (li-
quor license hearing); Commonwealth v. E.A. Clore Sons, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 901, 902 (Va.
1981) (State Department of Labor proceeding).
126. These proceedings range from an involuntary conservatorship to one regarding
state seizure of livestock based on allegations of animal cruelty. See Wohlstrom v.
Buchanan, 884 P.2d 687, 693 (Ariz. 1994) (reversing a civil forfeiture of $125,000 that was
based on an unconstitutional state law requiring the claimant to indicate his interest in and
method of acquiring the property under penalty of perjury); Conservatorship of Susan T.,
884 P.2d 988, 997 (Cal. 1994) (in bank) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to involuntary conservatorship proceedings); People v. Lot 23, 707 P.2d 1001, 1004-05
(Colo. App. 1985) (holding certain items seized in an otherwise legal search were not
subject to forfeiture because no nexus to crime was established); In re One 1987 Toyota,
621 A.2d 796, 800 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (resting on a question of fact as to whether the
vehicle was used to transport illegal drugs); District of Columbia v. Ray, 305 A.2d 531, 534
(D.C. 1973) (determining that a libel claim based on an illegal search did not preclude
civil forfeiture); State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Killen, 667 So. 2d 433,
436-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (dismissing a Fourth Amendment illegal search claim
because claimant did not file a timely objection); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 75 (La.
1979) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a probation hearing unless the
search was conducted in bad faith); State ex rel. Fuhr v. Carrier, 765 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989) (holding a forfeiture invalid because the arresting officer was not the one
who seized the vehicle); State v. Seven Thousand Dollars, 642 A.2d 967, 975 (N.J. 1994)
(holding that money discovered in the search of a vehicle was not subject to forfeiture
because no connection with illegal activity was established); State ex rel. State Forester v.
Umpqua River Navigation Co., 478 P.2d 631, 637 (Or. 1970) (holding that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply in a civil forfeiture proceeding to evidence obtained by individuals
who were not law enforcement officers); In re Investigating Grand Jury, 437 A.2d 1128,
1129 (Pa. 1981) (involving a motion for a protective order to bar disclosure of grand jury
evidence); State v. Western Capital Corp., 290 N.W.2d 467,469 (S.D. 1980) (holding rested
on statutes governing contracts and deceptive trade practices); Pine v. State, 921 S.W.2d
866, 874 (Tex. App. 1996) (finding that the State was not precluded from pursuing the
forfeiture of livestock based on charges of animal cruelty even if the initial seizure was
illegal); Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (reversing judg-
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The third flaw is that one case cited actually refuted the court's
argument. In State v. Western Capital Corp.,1 27 the Supreme Court of
South Dakota cited One 1958 Plymouth, Boyd, and other cases as sup-
porting the use of the exclusionary rule when penalties are criminal
but not when the purpose of the statute is remedial. 12' The court
distinguished Boyd by explaining that civil and criminal penalties were
contained in a single statute in Boyd, while civil and criminal penalties
were codified separately in subsequent Supreme Court cases. 129 The
court stated that in these subsequent cases, which are analogous to
One 1995 Corvette, the Supreme Court has deferred to the legislature's
intent that the forfeiture be regarded as civil in nature.' ° Under this
analysis, the exclusionary rule would apply to illegally obtained evi-
dence in proceedings involving criminal penalties but not in proceed-
ings that threaten only civil penalties.
b. The Courts' Refusal to Extend the Exclusionary Rule to Civil
Cases.-As the Court of Special Appeals's decision in One 1995 Corvette
illustrated, neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court has
applied the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings subsequent to One
1958 Plymouth.'31 The lower court also persuasively argued that appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings based on
One 1958 Plymouth conflicts with a long line of subsequent precedent
in which the Supreme Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, has de-
clined to apply the exclusionary rule to various civil proceedings.
1 3 2
Indeed, the Supreme Court has, subsequent to One 1958 Plym-
outh, ruled that an illegal search would not be suppressed via the ex-
clusionary rule in state grand jury proceedings,1 33 in a federal habeas
ment and vacating the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp tax assessed on marijuana and cocaine
seized in an illegal search).
127. 290 N.W.2d 467 (S.D. 1980).
128. Id. at 472 (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Mayor of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. 691, 721, 766-68, 706
A.2d 43, 58, 80-81, revd, One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680.
132. See id. at 722-23 n.12, 706 A.2d at 58-59 n.12. In the Court of Special Appeals's
majority opinion, Judge Moylan stated that to interpret One 1958 Plymouth as holding that
the exclusionary rule should be universally applied to all civil forfeitures would be "freak-
ishly aberrational" in view of the other circumstances in which the rule did not apply and
"inconsistent with what is now the long prevailing Supreme Court attitude." Id.
133. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (compelling a witness
before the grand jury to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure).
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corpus review, 13 4 in a dispute for the return of funds seized by the IRS
as part of a tax assessment, 135 or in a deportation hearing.1 36 Also, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied the exclusionary rule in
such contexts as a sentencing hearing, 137 in a contempt hearing re-
garding the violation of an earlier injunction, 138 in a hearing to re-
voke probation,3 9 and in an administrative hearing to terminate the
employment of an adjunct member of a county sheriff's
department. 14
0
As shown by the variety of proceedings in which the exclusionary
rule has not been applied, application of the exclusionary rule in for-
feiture proceedings would, indeed, seem "freakishly aberrational."14 '
Moreover, inconsistent application of the exclusionary rule to civil
proceedings will minimize any incremental deterrence of illegal
searches and seizures. If the court is correct that police conduct ille-
gal searches and seizures because they believe that the evidence can
be used in forfeiture proceedings, then the illegal searches and
seizures will continue in pursuit of the civil penalties listed above, re-
gardless of the application of the exclusionary rule in in rem
forfeitures.
134. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (holding that after a Fourth
Amendment claim has been litigated, a prisoner can not be granted habeas corpus relief
on the grounds that evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure was admitted
at trial).
135. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (holding that evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment in a good faith effort by state police is not excluded
in a federal civil tax proceeding when the federal government can prove no participation
in the illegal search).
136. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (holding that in a civil
deportation hearing, the exclusionary rule does not apply to an admission of status as an
illegal alien obtained after an illegal arrest).
137. See Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 486, 425 A.2d 632, 645 (1981) (finding that the
exclusionary rule "does not extend to the sentencing stage of a criminal cause").
138. See Whitaker v. Prince George's County, 307 Md. 368, 383, 514 A.2d 4, 12 (1986)
(refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to illegally obtained evidence offered to support an
injunction against operating prostitution related activities because "no deterrent effect
could be anticipated by applying the rule to [such] proceedings").
139. See Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 249, 522 A.2d 1348, 1360 (1987) (asserting that the
Supreme Court's "evaluation and rejection of the application of the [exclusionary] rule to
proceedings other than the criminal trial . . . leads to the logical conclusion that ... the
rule would not generally apply to [civil parole revocation proceedings]").
140. See Sheetz v. Mayor of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208, 214, 553 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1989)
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to illegally obtained evidence in dis-
charge proceeding against police officer because the "deterrent benefits" would be
minimal).
141. See supra note 107.
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c. Criminal Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule.-Further sup-
port for not applying the exclusionary rule to every civil in rem forfei-
ture case lies in the original application of the rule to criminal cases.
As the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted, the exclusionary rule
does not apply universally to all criminal proceedings. Exceptions in-
clude the good faith exception'4 2 and the exception for impeachment
of the defendant.'4 3 In both of these situations, the Supreme Court
found that the application of the exclusionary rule would not deter
officers from illegal searches and seizures. For example, in examining
arguments against the good faith exception in United States v. Leon, the
Court dismissed as speculation the contention that officers would
more carefully scrutinize warrant affidavits if the exclusionary rule ap-
plied when a warrant was defective due to judicial error.'4 4 The Court
concluded that, in general, the high cost of excluding evidence out-
weighed the minimal incremental deterrent effect of applying the ex-
clusionary rule and a case-by-case analysis should be performed to
determine if application of the rule is appropriate in each particular
case.' 4 5 The Court of Special Appeals illustrated that the exclusionary
rule is not applied universally to all criminal proceedings.14 6 The
Court of Appeals did not acknowledge these exceptions, choosing in-
stead to focus on the importance of the exclusionary rule and on its
application.'4 7 While the Supreme Court has advocated a case-by-case
approach for applying the exclusionary rule in criminal cases, the
Court of Appeals stated that the exclusionary rule should be applied
to all "civil drug related forfeiture cases."' 48 Unlike the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals, the Court of Appeals did not weigh the societal cost of
142. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply in a murder conviction in which officers reasonably relied
upon a warrant which was defective because of errors made by the magistrate issuing the
warrant); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary
rule does not universally apply to evidence obtained in an illegal search when officers
reasonably relied on a warrant which was later found to be invalid).
143. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980) (holding that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to illegally obtained evidence that is used to impeach the
defendant).
144. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918.
145. Id. at 922.
146. See One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. at 710-15, 706 A.2d at 54-55 (examining excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule such as: identification of witnesses through illegal searches,
impeachment, and the good faith exceptions).
147. One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 127-33, 724 A.2d at 686-89.
148. Id. at 138, 724 A.2d at 692 ("[I]n a civil drug-related forfeiture case, the need for
deterrence exceeds the social cost. Without the application of the exclusionary rule to
section 297 forfeiture actions, officers could seize contraband, absent sufficient probable
cause to do so, even in a criminal context to prove the wrongdoer's criminality.")
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foregoing a forfeiture solely because the search was tainted.'4 9 This
blanket application of the exclusionary rule creates a higher standard
for civil forfeiture of property than the Leon standard for criminal
proceedings. 150
d. The Plain Text of One 1958 Plymouth.-Equally important
is the content of the actual opinion in One 1958 Plymouth. Perhaps
most significantly, the Supreme Court in One 1958 Plymouth confined
its decision to the specific type of forfeiture at issue in that case.
1 5 1
The Court framed the issue as whether the exclusionary rule applied
to "forfeiture proceedings of the character involved here."1 52 The Court
also stated that the exclusionary rule applied to "such forfeiture pro-
ceedings.' 1 53 The Court narrowed the application of the exclusionary
rule to a subset of forfeitures a third time in summarizing its
reasoning:
In sum, we conclude that the nature of a forfeiture proceed-
ing, so well described by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd, and the
reasons which led the Court to hold that the exclusionary
rule of Weeks v. United States, is obligatory upon the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment, so well articulated by
Mr. Justice Clark in Mapp, support the conclusion that the
exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings such
as the one involved here.
1 54
Narrowing language in the statement of the issue, the holding,
and the conclusion casts doubt upon the argument that the Supreme
Court intended that the exclusionary rule apply to civil forfeitures of a
different type than the one at issue in that case. A single instance of
limiting language may be dismissed as unintentional; however, three
instances cannot be ignored. The language narrows the opinion to
cases in which penalties originally characterized as civil are considered
criminal in nature.155 Civil penalties that are included in criminal
statutes and that are more severe than the criminal penalty fall into
149. Id. at 137-38 (focusing cost benefit analysis on whether or not the exclusionary rule
would deter police from conducting illegal searches).
150. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text (discussing Leon).
151. See One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. 691, 764-65, 706 A.2d 43, 79-80 (noting that the
One 1958 Plymouth court engaged in "a very fact-specific and ad hoc analysis," placing partic-
ular emphasis on the severity of the respective criminal and civil penalties involved).
152. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (emphasis
added).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 701 (distinguishing the case as relating to a civil forfeiture for violating a
criminal law that is more punitive than the criminal penalty).
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this category and are the sole focus of One 1958 Plymouth.156 Also, this
interpretation is further supported by the Supreme Court's subse-
quent refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to other types of civil
proceedings.
157
e. Civil versus Quasi-Criminal Penalties.-Despite the Court of
Appeals's reluctance to do so, One 1995 Corvette can be distinguished
from One 1958 Plymouth based on the fact that One 1995 Corvette did
not involve civil penalties that were more severe than the criminal
penalties.'1 8 Under the possible civil penalties, the defendant in One
1995 Corvette could have lost his automobile while under criminal pen-
alties, he could have been sentenced to twenty years in prison, five
years without parole, and $25,000 in fines. 159 The Court of Appeals
found this interpretation untenable as it focused on the value of the
items rather than on the nature of the forfeiture statute.' 60 The
court's analysis overlooks the fact that courts routinely utilize discre-
tion in determining whether a civil penalty is so severe as to render it
criminal.'61 In addition, although the range in value of automobiles
has vastly increased over the last thirty years, courts are certainly capa-
ble of looking beyond the mere value of the item and weighing the
effect of the respective civil and criminal penalties.
Also, as the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Ward,'6 2 a
court should disregard a legislative label of a penalty as civil only when
the "clearest proof' indicates that the statutory scheme was "so puni-
tive either in purpose or effect as to negate that [legislative] inten-
tion. '  Additionally, in cases where the civil and criminal penalties
are codified separately and the civil penalties are not deemed to be so
severe as to become criminal, the Supreme Court defers to legislative
intent. For example, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, a
156. See id.
157. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (referring to cases in which the Su-
preme Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings).
158. See One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. at 764-65, 706 A.2d at 79-80. The Court of
Special Appeals distinguished One 1995 Corvette from One 1958 Plymouth by explaining that
"the anomaly" between the sanctions that the Supreme Court found significant in One 1958
Plymouth were not remotely present in this case. Id. at 764, 706 A.2d at 79.
159. Id.
160. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 132 n.9, 724 A.2d at 689 n.9. According to the
court, identical searches of a Rolls Royce and an inexpensive 20-year old vehicle would
result in different applications of the exclusionary rule under the approach advocated by
the lower court: the illegally uncovered evidence would be excluded in the case of the
Rolls Royce and admissible against the owner of the inexpensive vehicle. Id.
161. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
162. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
163. Id. at 248-49 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21 (1960)).
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jewelry dealer who was acquitted of smuggling charges moved to bar
civil sanctions on the grounds of double jeopardy.164 The Supreme
Court in One Emerald held that the issue of civil versus criminal was
"one of statutory construction." '165 The Court emphasized that the
civil and criminal sanctions were contained in different sections of the
code which both distinguished the penalties and showed a clear inten-
tion to provide for both.166 The Court thus found "no reason for frus-
trating that design."'67 One 1995 Corvette is analogous. A criminal
conviction is irrelevant when filing a forfeiture action under the Mary-
land forfeiture statute. 6 As the Court of Special Appeals pointed
out, the criminal and civil penalties with which Mr. Holmes could
have been charged evolved from distinct statutes which were enacted
sixteen years apart.169 This is distinguishable from both Boyd, in
which the civil and criminal penalties were contained in the same stat-
ute17° and One 1958 Plymouth, in which the civil forfeiture could be
filed only after a criminal conviction was obtained.171
f The Court of Appeals Underlying Policy Against Forfeiture Legis-
lation.-The Court of Appeals in One 1995 Corvette revealed its true
purpose for ruling as it did at the end of the opinion-to further the
court's policy against government forfeitures to deter police miscon-
duct.172 However, it is unlikely that this decision will further this pol-
icy goal to the extent that the court appears to believe it will. First, the
court's argument that "the need for deterrence [of illegal searches
and seizures] exceeds the societal costs" of applying the exclusionary
rule in civil forfeiture proceedings 73 ignores the extensive list of civil
proceedings in which the exclusionary rule does not apply. This in-
164. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
165. Id. at 237.
166. Id. at 236-37.
167. Id.
168. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(i) (describing the standards for seizing and
forfeiting).
169. Mayor of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md. App. 691, 804-06, 706 A.2d 43,
98-100.
170. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634 (listing the criminal penalties including a fine, imprison-
ment, and forfeiture, and discussing how the prosecutor could forego the indictment and
proceed with a civil forfeiture action).
171. See One 1958 Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 694 n.2 (quoting the statute that terminated
property rights in vehicles used to illegally transport alcohol).
172. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 138-39, 724 A.2d at 692 (noting that in Maryland
"forfeitures are disfavored ... because they are considered harsh extractions, odious, and
to be avoided where possible" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frederick City
Police Dep't v. One 1998 Toyota Pick-Up Truck, 334 Md. 359, 375, 639 A.2d 641, 649
(1994))).
173. Id. at 138, 724 A.2d at 692.
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consistent application of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings is
likely to cause confusion rather than to deter misconduct. Also, the
court's concern that not applying the exclusionary rule to civil in rem
forfeitures "could lead to a separate line of police work devoted to
forfeiture"174 overlooks the purpose of police work. Seizing items for
use in future undercover work does not reduce the number of
criminals on the street. To argue that the police would, on a grand
scale, conduct illegal searches and seizures to obtain items to be used
in undercover operations assumes continued employment rather than
the conviction of criminals as the fundamental goal of the police. An
illegal search that results in the seizure of an automobile does not
incarcerate the alleged criminals. Certainly, the court has cause to be
concerned that civil forfeiture statutes may provide a way for the Gov-
ernment to inflict a civil penalty against a suspect when the probable
cause requirement for a search is not met. The Government, how-
ever, must still meet the civil burden. If a party can show that the
Government purposefully sought to seize property unlawfully, the ap-
propriate legal remedy is a civil suit against the offending officers.' 75
5. Conclusion.-In One 1995 Corvette, the Court of Appeals,
caught in the vice grip of stare decisis, held that the exclusionary rule
applied to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings in Maryland based on the
continued viability of the one precedent, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania.'76 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly over-
ruled One 1958 Plymouth, state courts should still be able to distinguish
the case and should not fall victim to convenient and mistaken inter-
pretations repeated often throughout the years. The Court of Ap-
peals's contention that the Supreme Court in One 1958 Plymouth
classified all civil in rem forfeitures as "quasi-criminal" ignored the sub-
sequent evolution of the law on when a "civil" penalty should be con-
sidered criminal. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings for
the thirty-four years since One 1958 Plymouth. As a result of this hold-
ing, the exclusionary rule is applied to civil in rem forfeitures but not
to any other civil proceeding. This inconsistent application of the
174. Id.
175. United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 451 (1st Cir. 1980) (dis-
missing the dissent's proposal that this warranfless search should preclude forfeiture as this
would unduly prevent the Government from a valid forfeiture when a more successful
deterrent, a damage remedy, is available).
176. See One 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 126, 724 A.2d at 686.
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rule will promote neither the court's underlying goal nor the purpose
of the rule-the deterrence of illegal searches and seizures.
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B. A Dereliction of Duty by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Failing
to Recognize the Mistake of Fact Defense as a Necessary Component to
Guaranteeing a Defendant's Constitutional Due Process Rights
In Owens v. State,' the Court of Appeals examined whether state
and federal due process rights require that a defendant charged with
statutory rape be allowed to argue, as a defense, that he reasonably
believed the victim to be above the age of consent.2 The court held
that a refusal to allow an affirmative defense of mistake of age to a
statutory rape charge did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights to due process.3 In addressing the due process claims, the court
reasoned that "within certain constitutional limits, states may 'create
strict criminal liabilities by defining criminal offenses without any ele-
ment of scienter." 4 In so stating, the court demonstrated the contra-
diction within its decision: the right to due process not only provides
this defining "constitutional limit" to legislative authority, but it also
personifies the concept that "privileges so fundamental as to be inher-
ent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the
thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, how-
ever crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof."5 By failing
to recognize a mistake of fact defense to statutory rape, the court ne-
glected its constitutional duty to ensure that defendants are accorded
their essential due process rights.
1. The Case.--On April 11, 1997, a police officer on a routine
nighttime patrol discovered a parked car in a public park in Baltimore
County several hours after the park had closed.6 As the officer ap-
proached the vehicle, he observed two people within: Timothy Owens
1. 352 Md. 663, 724 A.2d 43 (1999).
2. Id. at 674, 724 A.2d at 48. In Maryland, the age of consent is set at fourteen years of
age. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a)(3) (1996).
3. Owens, 352 Md. at 667, 742 A.2d at 45. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution provides, in part, that no "State [shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Article 24 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights provides that "no man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in
any manner, destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24.
4. Owens, 352 Md. at 672, 742 A.2d at 47 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
150 (1959)).
5. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (holding that the presence of
the defendant in a prosecution for a felony is a condition of due process to the extent that
a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence).
6. See Record Extract at 13, Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 724 A.2d 43 (1999) (No.
129).
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in the rear seat, shirtless and in the process of putting on his pants,
and Ariel Johnson in the passenger's side putting on her pants.'
When the officer asked for identification from the occupants,
Timothy Owens produced his driver's license which identified him
and indicated that his date of birth was April 27, 1978.8 Having no
identification with her, Johnson gave the officer her name and stated
that she was sixteen.9 When asked for her date of birth, she hesi-
tated"0 and stated that her birthday was October 16, 1981."1 When
the officer asked again for her age, and she again replied "sixteen.'
' 2
The officer then asked Miss Johnson how she could be sixteen if she
was indeed born in October 1981. Johnson did not respond."3 After
obtaining the telephone number for Johnson's residence, the officer
contacted the residence and learned that her date of birth was actu-
ally October 16, 1983, making her thirteen years old at the time of the
incident."
The officer then asked Miss Johnson to step out of the car to
speak with him.' 5 As she stepped out of the car, the officer observed a
latex condom fall on the ground next to the vehicle. 6 The condom
was tested by the Maryland State Police, and it was found to contain
sperm, which Mr. Owens stipulated was his. 7
Timothy Owens was subsequently charged with second degree
rape in violation of section 463 (a) of the Maryland Annotated Code
and was tried on August 27, 1997, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County.' s Owens "proceed [ed] by way of a not guilty" and agreed to
the statement of facts, which the prosecutor read into the record.' 9 At
that point, the defense filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section
463 was unconstitutional because it violated Owens's due process







14. See id. at 15. Johnson initially gave the officer a false telephone number and only
presented the officer with her true home telephone number after the officer attempted to




18. See id. at 4. Section 463(a) provides, in part, that "[a] person is guilty of rape in the
second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person .... [w]ho
is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than
the victim." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a).
19. See Owens, 352 Md. at 667, 724 A.2d at 45.
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rights under both the United States Constitution and the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.20 The defense's argument had the following
two bases: (a) the victim was unconstitutionally precluded from testi-
fying that she lied in telling Owens that she was sixteen years old; and
(b) the defense of reasonable mistake of fact was necessary to avoid
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumptions and to comport with due
process.21 The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that mis-
take of age could only be used as a mitigating factor in determining
sentencing. 22 Owens was found guilty of second degree rape and was
sentenced to "eighteen months imprisonment with all but the time
served (12 days) suspended, eighteen months probation, . . . [and
was] ordered.to register as a child sex offender and to submit to DNA
testing. '' 21 Owens appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but, prior




a. Strict Liability Crimes in General.-Under common law, a
defendant can argue that he possessed "an honest and reasonable be-
lief in the existence of circumstances that, if true, would make the act
for which the person was indicted an innocent act."'25 The notion that
an injurious act can amount to a crime only when inflicted intention-
ally is not a "provincial or transient" one.26 The common law rule that
some mens rea is required for a crime is "firmly embedded" in our
justice system. 27 Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that
20. See id.
21. See Record Extract at 15-23; Owens, 352 Md. at 667, 724 A.2d at 45.
22. See Owens, 352 Md. at 667-68, 728 A.2d at 45.
23. See id. at 668, 728 A.2d at 45.
24. See id.
25. Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 250 (N.M. 1990) (citing State v. Gonzales, 99 N.M. 734,
cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 855 (1983)) (stating, in addition, that if there
is evidence that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, defendant enter-
tained a belief of fact that if true would make his conduct lawful, the defendant is entitled
to instruction on mistake of fact).
26. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952) (stating that as states codi-
fied common law crimes in early American history, "even if their enactments were silent on
the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the prin-
ciple but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it
required no statutory affirmation").
27. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (observing that "the requirement
of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded" in the common law, and that "[t]he
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence" (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978))).
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"offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored."28 Strict
liability crimes, therefore, are recognized exceptions to the general
rule that mens rea is required for criminal prosecution.
29
There exist two classes of strict liability crimes: "public welfare"
offenses and "lesser legal wrong" offenses.3" Public welfare offenses
include violations of traffic regulations and motor vehicle laws, and
sales of misbranded articles.3 ' As the Court of Appeals noted in
Dawkins v. State,3 2 "the penalty [for public welfare offenses] . . .is so
slight that the courts can afford to disregard the individual in protect-
ing the social interest."33 This "disregard for the individual" is digesti-
ble only because the asserted purpose of public welfare penalties is to
regulate, rather than to punish or to correct behavior. 4
28. Id. at 606 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)); see also Moris-
sette, 342 U.S. at 271-73 (concluding that a statute making it a crime to embezzle, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert government property had been wrongly construed as not
requiring proof of intent).
29. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255 (discussing the development of crimes with no mental
element in America as grounded in offenses that involve "neglect where the law requires
care or inaction where . . .[the law] imposed a duty").
30. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 599-600, 632 A.2d 797, 811 (1993) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing the evolution of statutory criminal law and the two classes of strict
liability crimes that have emerged: public welfare offenses and "lesser legal wrong" or
"moral offenses" and referencing the Supreme Court's discussion of strict liability crimes
in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952)).
31. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 644-45, 547 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1988) (noting the
expansion of the doctrine from cases involving liquor and adulterated milk to include
"violations of traffic regulations and motor vehicle laws, sales of misbranded articles and
sales or purchases in violation of anti-narcotics laws" (citing Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 73 (1933)); see also Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 578, 632
A.2d 797, 800 (1993) (discussing the evolution of strict liability statutes after the Industrial
Revolution in response to the demands of public health and welfare arising from the new
complexities of society); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise and Fall of
Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REv. 337, 389 (1989) (stating that in the case of public
welfare offenses, strict liability is justified for the following reasons: (1) to "deter profit-
driven manufacturers ... from ignoring the well-being of the consuming public"; (2) an
inquiry into mens rea in the case of minor infractions would exhaust the resources of the
courts; (3) "the imposition of strict liability is not inconsistent with the moral underpin-
nings of the criminal law.., because the penalties are small" and carry no stigma; and (4)
the legislature is constitutionally empowered to create strict liability crimes for public wel-
fare offenses).
32. 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041.
33. Id. at 644, 547 A.2d at 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sayre,
supra note 31, at 70).
34. See id. at 644-45, 547 A.2d at 1044-45; see also People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850, 852
(Cal. 1956) (reversing a conviction for bigamy and concluding that "if a bonafide and
reasonable belief that facts existed which left him free to remarry" the defendant cannot
be guilty of the crime of bigamy).
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The "lesser legal wrong" theory of strict liability focuses on the
defendant's intent to commit a related crime.35 Because the defen-
dant actually intended to do some legal or moral wrong, the defen-
dant is guilty not only of the crime intended but also of a greater
crime for which he may not have the requisite mental state. 36 Take
for example, in jurisdictions where extra-marital sex (adultery) is a
crime; if a man had an affair with a women under the age of consent,
in addition to his clear guilt for the lesser legal wrong of adultery, the
man would also be guilty of the greater crime of statutory rape, re-
gardless of his intent-his knowledge of the girl's age. Intent for the
greater crime is inferred from the intent to commit a smaller crime.37
b. Statutory Rape as a Strict Liability Crime.-In the United
States, the majority rule is that "a defendant's knowledge of the age of
a victim is not an essential element of statutory rape."3" The only in-
quiry under this rule is whether a defendant had sexual intercourse
with a statutorily prohibited person.39
Indeed, no court had ever permitted a defendant's mistaken be-
lief as to the age of a victim to be a defense to statutory rape until the
California Supreme Court in People v. Hernandez4" in 1964.41 The Her-
nandez court held that, in the absence of a legislative directive other-
wise, a charge of statutory rape is defensible where a criminal intent is
lacking.42 The court's decision was based almost entirely on "primor-
35. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 601, 632 A.2d 797, 601 (1993) (Bell, J., dissent-




38. Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as De-
fense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R. 5th 499, 499, § 2[a], at 508 (1997) (noting that a "majority
of jurisdictions whose higher courts have considered the issue [of statutory rape] have
declined to .. .allow a reasonable-mistake defense [as to the victim's age]").
39. See id. § 2[a], at 508 (observing that, under the majority rule, "[piroof of statutory
rape requires merely proof of an act of sexual intercourse and proof that the victim is
below the prohibited age").
40. 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
41. See Campbell, supra note 38, at 499 (noting that prior to the Hernandez decision in
1964, "it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken
belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape" (citing
People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964))).
42. Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 677. The Hernandez court specifically addressed and over-
turned People v. Ratz, 46 P. 916 (Cal. 1896), which held that intent was not a necessary
element for statutory rape and thus an instruction to the jury regarding the defendant's
lack of knowledge of the victim's age was unwarranted, Ratz, 46 P. at 916, and People v.
Griffin, 49 P. 711 (Cal. 1897), which held that it was no defense to the charge of statutory
rape that the defendant did not know that the victim had a mental infirmity and thus was
incapable of giving consent, Griffin, 49 P. at 712. Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 677.
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dial concepts" of criminal jurisprudence, namely that under the com-
mon law notion of mens rea, "it is not conduct alone but conduct
accompanied by certain specific mental states which concerns, or
should concern the law."4" The Hernandez court refuted the assump-
tion used to eliminate intent as an element in previous statutory rape
cases: that the wrongdoer assumes the risk when the act is committed,
regardless of the age of the female or circumstances surrounding the
act.44 The court explained:
There can be no dispute that a criminal intent exists when
the perpetrator proceeds with utter disregard of, or in the
lack of grounds for, a belief that the female has reached the
age of consent. But if he participates in a mutual act of sex-
ual intercourse, believing his partner to be beyond the age of
consent, with reasonable grounds for such belief, where is
his criminal intent? In such circumstances he has not con-
sciously taken any risk. Instead he has subjectively elimi-
nated the risk by satisfying himself on reasonable evidence
that the crime cannot be committed. If it occurs that he has
been mislead, we cannot realistically conclude that for such
reason alone the intent with which he undertook the act sud-
denly becomes more heinous.45
The court's position is supported by the California Penal Code's treat-
ment of intent in section 20 of the California Penal Code, which pro-
vides that "there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and
intent, or criminal negligence" to constitute the commission of a
crime.4 6 Section 26 of the California Penal Code adds that one is not
capable of committing a crime "who committed the act or made the
omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact which dis-
proves any criminal intent."47 Clearly, the California Supreme Court's
recognition and application of common law notions of a requisite
criminal intent, coupled with modern legal postulates48 regarding the
43. Id. at 675.
44. Id. at 676.
45. Id.
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988).
47. Id. § 26.
48. See Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 675 (discussing the California Penal Code's requirement
of a "joint operation of act and intent" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cal.
Penal Code § 26)); see also id. at 676 n.2 (referencing the MODEL PENAL CODE's provision in
section 213.6.(1) concerning mistake as to age (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6.(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
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affirmative defense of mistake of fact, inspired this fundamental
change in course with regard to statutory rape law.49
To date, a total of three jurisdictions have followed California's
example and created ajudge-made defense: Alaska, New Mexico, and
Utah.50 In State v. Guest," the Alaska Supreme Court considered
whether an honest and reasonable mistake of fact regarding the vic-
tim's age may serve as a defense to statutory rape.52 Unlike the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, which relied on common law principles and
the inferred intent from other statutory provisions to allow for the
affirmative defense of mistake of fact, the Alaska Supreme Court scru-
tinized the need for an intent requirement from a constitutional per-
spective.53 In support of its decision to import a mens rea
requirement, the court relied on prior opinions where it had held
that "it would be a deprivation of liberty without due process to con-
vict a person of a serious crime without the requirement of criminal
intent."54 According to the Guest court, if a particular statute is not
aimed at regulating a public welfare offense,55 only two options exist:
either a requirement of criminal intent must be read into the statute
or the statute must be found to be unconstitutional.56 Because of the
judiciary's general reluctance to declare laws unconstitutional, the
49. No constitutional claim was raised, and the California Supreme Court did not ad-
dress the constitutionality of a statute that did not require mens rea. Indeed, the court
used the common law and language in other sections of the California Penal Code to infer
an intent requirement into the rape statute. See supra note 42 and accompanying text
(noting the movement of the court away from imposing criminal sanctions absent culpabil-
ity where the governing statute expressed no legislative intent or policy to be served by
strict liability); see also Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 676-77 (noting the recent use of sections 20
and 26 in the Penal Code to find an intent requirement for the crime of bigamy).
50. See Campbell, supra note 38, § 3, at 513, § 4, at 518; State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836
(Alaska 1978); Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1990); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah
1984); see also Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 583, 632 A.2d 797, 803 (1993) (discussing the
fact that the highest appellate courts of four states have determined that statutory rape laws
require an element of mens rea as to the victim's age).
51. 583 P.2d 836.
52. Id. at 837.
53. See id. at 838.
54. Id. (citing Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 667, 680-81 (Alaska 1971); Speidel v. State, 460
P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969)).
55. The Alaska Supreme Court stated in Speidel v. State, that exceptions to the require-
ment of criminal intent exist for "public welfare" offenses under strict liability. Speide 460
P.2d at 78. Strict liability crimes, according to the court, are a narrow class of regulation
for which the penalties are often relatively small and conviction carries no great oppro-
brium. Id. at 79.
56. Guest, 583 P.2d at 839 (citing Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978);
Alex, 484 P.2d at 680-81; Speide, 460 P.2d at 80).
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court decided instead to read a requirement of criminal intent into
the statutory rape statute.57
Alaska recently reaffirmed its position in State v. Fremgen,58 in
which the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision de-
claring unconstitutional a statute which prohibited a defendant from
presenting a mistake of age defense.59 The court maintained that a
refusal to allow the mistake of age defense to statutory rape would
impose criminal liability without a criminal intent, thus violating
Alaska's Constitution.6" The court reiterated that because crime is a
"compound concept," it only results from the "concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand."61
New Mexico addressed the issue of whether mistake of fact
should be a permissible defense to statutory rape in Perez v. State.6 2
The New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the structure of its statu-
tory rape laws to infer the legislature's intention to treat defendants
differently depending on the age of the victim.6" In New Mexico,
"[c]riminal sexual penetration of a child under thirteen is always a
first-degree felony."64 But when a child is between thirteen and six-
teen years of age, and the defendant is at least eighteen years of age,
the crime is fourth-degree sexual penetration.65 This distinction led
the court to determine that while the protection afforded by strict lia-
bility is necessary for children under thirteen, the same is not true of
victims aged thirteen to sixteen.66 As a result, the court held that,
57. Id. at 839 & n.7 (citing Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 31; Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289,
296 (Alaska 1978); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316, 321 (Alaska 1975); Hoffman v. State, 404
P.2d 644, 646 (Alaska 1965)).
58. 914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1996).
59. Id. at 1246.
60. See id. at 1245.
61. Id. at 1245 n.2.
62. 803 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1990).
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(a) (Michie 1978)).
65. See id. (referencing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(d) (Michie 1978)).
66. Id. (concluding that the "statutes clearly reflect the legislature's intention that de-
fendants charged with criminal sexual penetration be treated differently depending on the
age of the victim" and that this policy is consistent with "protecting those least able to make
free decisions about whether to engage in sexual activity" (citing State v. Hargrove, 771
P.2d 166, 171 (N.M. 1989)); see also State v.Jalo, 696 P.2d 14, 16 (Or. 1985) (holding that
because an Oregon statute created different liabilities for sexual intercourse with persons
under 18, under 16, under 14, and under 12, a reasonable mistake of age defense was not
available in determining whether a partner was 16); State v. Dodd, 765 P.2d 1337, 1338
(Wash. App. 1989) (holding that the defendant's mistaken belief that the girl was 15 years
old may exonerate the defendant of the crime of sexual intercourse with someone under
14, but not the lesser-included offense of having relations with someone under 16).
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because the victim was older than thirteen, the defendant in Perez
should have been allowed to present the defense of mistake of fact.6 7
In State v. Elton,68 the Utah Supreme Court construed the state's
unlawful sexual intercourse statute69 to mean that a conviction could
not lie unless the state proved a criminal intent as to each element of
the offense, including the victim's age.70 The court pointed to the
requirement, under Utah law, that for an offence to be considered a
strict liability offense, the statute defining the offense must "clearly
indicat[e] a legislative purpose to impose strict liability. '71 The court,
therefore, concluded that because Utah's unlawful sexual intercourse
statute did not mention strict liability, the element of criminal intent
must be included.72  The Utah legislature, however, has since
amended its code to disallow mistake of age as a defense to unlawful
sexual intercourse.73
While most of the higher courts that have addressed this issue
have declined to follow Hernandez, the California decision has had a
resounding impact upon state legislatures. 4 In fact, some variation of
the mistake of age defense now exists in seventeen states.75 Moreover,
federal criminal law permits a mistake of age defense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2243.76 Finally, the American Law Institute (ALI), in its Model Pe-
nal Code, also provides for an affirmative defense of mistake of fact. 7 7
Specifically, the ALI's Model Penal Code states:
67. Perez, 803 P.2d at 251. The court further commented that "[s]ection 30-9-11 (d) is a
'numbers game,' whose outcome is determined not only by the child's age, but by the
relative age of the defendant. When the law requires a mathematical formula for its appli-
cation, we cannot say that being provided the wrong numbers is immaterial." Id.
68. 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984).
69. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401 (1953).
70. Elton, 680 P.2d at 729.
71. Id. at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102
(1953)).
72. See id.
73. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304.5(2) (1995) (providing that mistake of age is not a
defense to unlawful sexual intercourse).
74. See Campbell, supra note 38, § 2(a), at 309 (noting that although only four jurisdic-
tions have followed the example of Hernandez and created a judicially-made defense to
statutory rape, "Hernandez' greatest impact has been with state legislatures").
75. See id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c) provides:
In a prosecution [for engaging in a sexual act with another person who has at-
tained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years, and is at least
four years younger than the person so engaging] it is a defense, which the defen-
dant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant rea-
sonably believed that the other person had attained the age of 16 years.
18 U.S.C. § 2243(c) (Supp. 1999).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Whenever . .. the criminality of conduct depends upon a
child being below the age of 10, it is no defense that the
actor did not know the child's age, or reasonably believed
the child to be older than 10. When criminality depends on
the child's being below a critical age other than 10, it is a
defense for the actor to prove that he reasonably believed
the child to be above the critical age.78
A mistake of fact defense to statutory rape is not a new or novel
shift in legal perspectives, as is evidenced by the fact that seventeen
states and the federal government, via legislation, four states, via judi-
cial caveat, and the Model Penal Code have established or ascertained
this affirmative defense as a critical requirement for fair and judicious
prosecutions. As discussed below, the Maryland legislature failed to
capitalize on the opportunity in 1976 and 1977 to include a mens rea
element in the crime of statutory rape. It is the duty of the court,
however, to ensure that the majority's craftsmanship in the legislature
does not come at the expense of minority rights. As the following
section demonstrates, Maryland courts have permitted the constitu-
tional rights of its defendant-citizens to be overlooked.
c. Statutory Rape as a Strict Liability Crime in Maryland.-
(1) The Development of Statutory Rape Provisions in Maryland.-
Rape and other sexual offenses were reformed and codified during
the 1976 and 1977 sessions of the Maryland legislature. 79 The two
most significant modifications included: (a) an increased number of
degrees of sexual offenses, distinguishable by the type of contact that
existed between the defendant and the victim;"° and (b) in cases of
statutory rape, a requirement that the defendant be at least four years
older than the victim.81 A mens rea requirement for statutory rape
did appear in the Senate version of the Sexual Offenses Act.8 2 For
78. Id.
79. SeeJ. William Picher, Note, Rape and Other Sexual Offense Law Reform in Maryland, 7
U. BALT. L. R~v. 151-52 (1977) (discussing the evolution of the comprehensive legislation
regarding rape and sexual offenses which emerged from the 1976 and 1977 Maryland legis-
lative sessions).
80. See id. at 159-162 (discussing the two degrees of rape and the four degrees of sexual
offense created by the Maryland legislature in 1976).
81. See id. at 160-61 (discussing the two subsections of second degree sexual offense
developed by the 1976-77 legislative session; section 463(a) (3) pertains to a sexual offense
committed with a person under the age of fourteen, with the perpetrator at least four years
old, and section 463(a) (3) pertains to a sexual offense committed with a person under the
age of sixteen, with the perpetrator at least four years older).
82. 1976 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL vol. I, S. 358, at 1363-65 (providing that "the per-
son performing the sexual act knows or should know" that the person was under the age of
consent). Additionally, the Senate version mandated a first degree sexual offense if the
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reasons unclear in the legislative history, however, the House of Dele-
gates rejected the Senate amendments in favor of their version which
did not require mens rea in its definition of statutory rape."3 The
House version ultimately became law.8 4
Statutory rape offenses, defined in article 27 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, are prosecuted under four separate categories:
second degree rape, and second, third, and fourth degree sexual of-
fenses. Second degree rape requires vaginal intercourse with a person
who is under fourteen years of age by a person who is at least four
years older than the victim.8 5 Any person violating this provision is
guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for
up to twenty years.8 6
A second degree sexual offense requires the engaging in a sexual
act with a person who is under fourteen years of age by a person who
is at least four years older than the victim.8 7 Any person violating this
provision is also guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to
imprisonment for up to twenty years.8 8
A third degree sexual offense requires sexual contact with a per-
son who is under fourteen years of age by a person who is at least four
years older than the victim.8" Third degree sexual offenses also in-
clude sexual acts or vaginal intercourse with a person either fourteen
or fifteen years of age with the person performing the sexual act or
intercourse at least twenty-one years of age.°" Any person violating
victim was under the age of twelve, while second, third, and fourth degree offenses pro-
tected those under the age of fourteen. Id. at 1363.
83. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 587, 632 A.2d at 805 (citing 1976 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL,
vol. II, S. 358, at 3761).
84. See 1976 Md. Laws 1536.
85. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a) (3) (1996).
86. See id. § 463(b).
87. See id. § 464A(a) (3). The definition of "sexual act" includes cunnilingus, fellatio,
anilingus, or anal intercourse, but expressly excludes vaginal intercourse. See id. § 461.
Sexual act also means the penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or anal
opening of another person's body if the penetration can be reasonably construed as being
for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either party and if the
penetration is not for accepted medical purposes. See id.
88. See id. § 464A(b).
89. See id. § 464B(a) (3). "Sexual contact" is defined as the intentional touching of any
part of the victim's or actor's anal or genital area or other intimate parts for the purposes
of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either party and includes the penetration,
however slight, by any part of a person's body, other than the penis, mouth, or tongue into
the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that penetration can be reasonably
construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for the abuse of
either party. See id. § 461. It does not include acts commonly expressive of familial or
friendly affection, or acts for accepted medical purposes. See id.
90. See id. § 464B(a)(4)-(a)(5).
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this provision is guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to
imprisonment for up to ten years.91
A fourth degree sexual offense requires the engaging in sexual
acts or vaginal intercourse with a person either fourteen or fifteen
years of age, and the person performing the act must be at least four
years older than the victim.9 2 Any person violating this provision is
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is subject to imprison-
ment for up to one year, and a $1000 maximum fine.9"
While Maryland largely distinguishes the degrees of the offense
of statutory rape by the type of contact that existed between the perpe-
trator and the victim, the state also plays the "numbers game" by
designating that vaginal intercourse and sexual acts committed on a
person of the age of fourteen or fifteen years a crime of a lesser de-
gree.94 Not only does the age of the victim determine the degree of
the crime, but the age of the defendant does as well: defendants who
are twenty-one years or older are prosecuted for a felony for the same
act that, when committed by a twenty-year-old, would be a misde-
meanor.95 Despite the willingness to treat potential defendants differ-
ently based on their age (an unmalleable fact of convenience for the
court but an unfortunate fact of coincidence for the defendant), the
following section will demonstrate that the Maryland courts have re-
fused to treat potential defendants differently with respect to their
mental state at the time of the crime.
(2) Maryland Case Law: Garnett v. State.-In 1993, the
Court of Appeals, in Garnett v. State,9 6 considered whether the statu-
tory rape law should, by implication, require an element of mens rea
as to the victim's age.97 In Garnett, a twenty-year-old retarded man
with an IQ of fifty-two, was charged with statutory rape for having in-
tercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl.98 The defense proffered evi-
dence that the victim had previously told Garnett that she was sixteen,
yet the trial court excluded the evidence as immaterial, ruling that
91. See id. § 464B(b).
92. See id. § 464C(3).
93. See id. § 464C(b).
94. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the Perez court's comments
that New Mexico's statutory rape offenses were a "'numbers game' whose outcome is deter-
mined not only by the child's age, but by the relative age of the defendant").
95. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 464B(a) (4)-(a) (5) & 464C(a) (2)-(a) (3).
96. 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993).
97. Id. at 583, 632 A.2d at 803.
98. Id. at 574, 632 A.2d at 798. Garnett's guidance counselor stated that Garnett read
on the third-grade level, did arithmetic on the fifth-grade level, and interacted with others
socially at the level of an 11- or 12-year-old. See id.
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"the only requirements for establishing guilt are that there was vaginal
intercourse, [and] that [the victim] was under fourteen years of age
and [the defendant] was at least four years older."99
In its majority opinion, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the
common law requirement that an accused have acted with a culpable
mental state, 00 and recognized the modern criticisms of statutory
rape as a strict liability crime.' 1 Based on the statute's legislative his-
tory, however, the court concluded that the current law imposed strict
liability for statutory rape offenses and did not allow for a mistake of
age defense.10 2 Because the legislature "explicitly raised, considered,
and then explicitly jettisoned any notion of a mens rea element with
respect to the . . . [victim's] age," the court believed that any new
provision introducing mens rea or permitting a defense of reasonable
mistake of age should come from the legislature.10 3
The two dissenting judges, Judges Eldridge and Bell, each as-
serted notably different reasons for disagreeing with the majority.
Judge Eldridge agreed with the majority that "an ordinary defen-
dant's" mistake of age was not a defense to the crime of statutory
rape.' 4 Judge Eldridge, however, did not believe that, by rejecting
one specific knowledge requirement, the legislature had necessarily
mandated that all evidence concerning the defendant's knowledge
was immaterial. 0 5 He justified this argument on the following
grounds: (1) other strict liability crimes existed in which the legisla-
ture had not intended to impose criminal liability regardless of the
defendant's state of mind;0 6 and (2) the penalty provision associated
99. See id. at 575, 632 A.2d at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 578, 632 A.2d at 800 (discussing justice RobertJackson's statements in Moris-
sette v. United States, 341 U.S. 246 (1952), which emphasized the universal notion that evil
intent is required for a crime to occur).
101. See id. at 579, 632 A.2d at 801 (discussing the rejection of the concept of strict
criminal liability by modem scholars, including Professors LaFave and Scott, and Dean
Richard G. Singer; the court specifically cites Dean Singer's conclusion that "the predicate
for all criminal liability is blameworthiness; it is the social stigma which a finding of guilt
carries that distinguishes the criminal [penalty] from all other sanctions. If the predicate is
removed, the criminal law is set adrift" (citing Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens
Rea: The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. Rstv. 337, 404-05 (1988))).
102. Id. at 584-87, 632 A.2d at 803-05.
103. Id. at 587-88, 632 A.2d at 805.
104. Id. at 589, 632 A.2d at 806 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (asserting that although a defendant's mistake as to the age of the victim is not a
defense to a statutory rape charge, this "does not mean, however, that the [statutory rape]
statute contains no mens rea requirement at all").
106. See id. at 589-90, 632 A.2d at 806 (stating that such offenses "do require 'fault' to
the extent that they can be interpreted as legislative judgment that persons who intention-
ally engage in certain activities and occupy some peculiar or distinctive position of control
are to be held accountable for the occurrence of certain consequences" (quoting W.
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with violating the statutory rape law was severe, 10 7 which constituted
strong evidence that the Legislature did not intend to create a pure
strict liability offense.'0 8 Judge Eldridge concluded that the Legisla-
ture assumed that a defendant would be able to appreciate the risk
involved with intentionally and knowingly engaging in sexual activities
with a young person.' 9 Judge Eldridge asserted that "[t]here is no
indication that the General Assembly intended that criminal liability
attach to one who, because of his or her mental impairment, was una-
ble to appreciate the risk."' 0
Chief Judge Bell, on the other hand, argued that "[t]o hold as a
matter of law, that . . . [the statutory rape lawi does not require the
State to prove that a defendant possessed the necessary mental state to
commit the crime, . . . 'offends a principle ofjustice so rooted in the
traditions of conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal' and is, therefore, inconsistent with due process."'11 Judge Bell
emphasized the common law notions of criminal action, namely that
"a wrongful act and a wrongful intent must concur to constitute what
the law deems a crime."112 Referring to a recently decided case con-
cerning the strict liability crime of carrying a concealed weapon,
Judge Bell argued that criminal intent can and should be read into a
statute when the statutory language does not expressly require an ele-
ment of criminal intent.'1 "
According to Chief Judge Bell, while a state legislature has the
power to define the elements of the criminal offenses within its juris-
diction, it may not do so with impunity.1'4 Strict criminal liability,
LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw ch. 3, § 3.8(c), at 349 (1986)). Judge
Eldridge, however, failed to enumerate the "not-so-strict" liability crimes he references in
his opinion.
107. Section 463(a) of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides that the felony of stat-
utory rape is punishable by a maximum of 20 years imprisonment. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 463(b) (1996).
108. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 590, 632 A.2d at 806 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 590-91, 632 A.2d at 806-07 (stating that because the defendant knows that the
activity is considered immoral or improper and knows that 'consent' by persons too young
is ineffective, he has, after appreciating this risk, intentionally determined to engage in the
sexual conduct).
110. Id. at 591, 632 A.2d at 807.
111. Id. at 593-94, 632 A.2d at 808 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ran-
son, 942 F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934))).
112. Id. at 595 (quoting Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 643, 547 A.2d 1041, 1043
(1988)).
113. Id. at 597, 632 A.2d 810 (referring to Anderson v. State, 328 Md. 426, 444 (1992),
which held that to convict a defendant of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, proof
that the defendant intended to use the object as a weapon is required).
114. Id. at 612, 632 A.2d at 817.
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Chief Judge Bell argued, is limited by state and federal constitu-
tions' 15 Both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and article 24 of Maryland's Constitutional Declaration of Rights "pro-
tect[ ] an accused from being convicted of a crime except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element necessary to constitute the
crime." '16 Judge Bell concluded that when the legislature promulgates
a statute that excludes the defendant's mental state as an element, it
creates an irrebuttable presumption which runs afoul of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Owens v. State, the Court of Appeals
held that a defendant's due process rights were not violated when,
upon being charged with statutory rape, the trial court prevented the
defendant from presenting his defense that he reasonably believed
that the victim was above the age of consent.118 The court concluded
that "[t]he legislature's decision to disallow a mistake-of-age defense
to statutory rape furthers its interest in protecting children in ways
that may not be accomplished if the law were to allow such a
defense."" 9
The court began its opinion with a lengthy recitation of the law
concerning mens rea requirements and due process of law.1"' The
court then turned to and rejected Owens's argument that due process
required him to be allowed to present a mistake of age defense to the
charge of statutory rape. 121 The court first explained that cases, both
federal and state, did not support Owens's position,1 2 2 noting that
"when interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has
often endorsed the concept of strict criminal liability."1 23 The court
115. See id. at 611-12, 632 A.2d at 817.
116. See id. at 614, 632 A.2d at 818 (emphasis added) (citing In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 604, 685 (1975)); see also U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § I
(guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24 (providing "[t]hat no man ought to be
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner, destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land").
117. Garnett, 332 Md. at 616, 632 A.2d at 819 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating that irrebut-
table presumptions have historically been disfavored because they conflict with overriding
presumptions of innocence afforded to the accused and that they have inhibited the fact-
finding process of the jury).
118. Owens, 352 Md. at 667, 724 A.2d at 45.
119. Id. at 685, 724 A.2d at 54.
120. Id. at 668-74, 724 A.2d at 45-48.
121. Id. at 674-75, 724 A.2d at 48-49.
122. Id. at 676, 724 A.2d at 49.
123. Id. at 677, 724 A.2d at 50.
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also dismissed the risk of significant punishment as a factor support-
ing the unconstitutionality of statutory rape as a strict liability crime,
noting that the substantiality of the penalty has only been used as an
indicator of legislative intent, not as a constitutional litmus.
1 2 4
The court then addressed the due process requirement "that per-
sons of ordinary intelligence and experience have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know what actions are prohibited so that they may conform
their conduct according to the law.' 12' The majority concluded that
the statutory rape law provided "constitutionally sufficient notice." 126
The court explained that the conduct penalized by the statutory rape
law was conduct which Owens "could have avoided," as it involved
"conscious activity which gives rise to circumstances that place a rea-
sonable person on notice of potential illegality. ' 127 Moreover, in the
case of statutory rape "the perpetrator confronts the underage victim
personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim's
age. 1 28
Next, the court considered Maryland's interest in enacting the
statutory rape law, and how well the law was suited to that interest,
concluding that "the state's purpose in promoting the physical and
mental health of children is a compelling one and the statute is prop-
erly designed to accomplish this purpose." 29 The court described at
length, the state's "interest in promoting the welfare of children ...
from the potential harm caused by sexual activity involving chil-
dren." 'q ° The legislature, the court reasoned, had enacted rape laws
to prevent pregnancies, the risk of venereal diseases, psychological
damage, and even permanent damage to a child's organs. 3' The
court also emphasized the dangers associated with sexual abuse and
sexual assault of children, stressing that "sexual crimes against chil-
dren exact heavy social costs. 1 3 2 Therefore, according to the court,
124. Id. at 678, 724 A.2d at 50.
125. Id. at 679, 724 A.2d at 51 (citing Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 120, 389 A.2d 341,
345 (1978)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 679-80, 724 A.2d at 51 (citing State v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa
1981)).
128. Id. at 680, 724 A.2d at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1994)).
129. Id. at 681, 724 A.2d at 52.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 681-83, 724 A.2d at 52-53.
132. Id. at 683, 724 A.2d at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision in Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 375 (N.J. 1995), and its discus-
sion of the research that indicates a number of psychosocial problems that are more com-
mon in adults molested as a child).
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the "deterrent effect" that results by placing the risk of error in judg-
ment as to a potential sex partner's age solely in the adult is necessary
to protect those whose "immaturity and innocence prevents them
from appreciating the full magnitude and consequences of their
conduct." 1
3
Finally, the court dismissed Owens's argument that the statutory
rape statute created an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption
that the defendant intended to engage in the prohibited conduct with
one under the age of fourteen.13 4 In rejecting this challenge, the
court stated that the statute "protects children from sexual conduct,"
regardless of the defendant's intent to engage in the prohibited con-
duct and regardless of the victim's purported consent.1 3 5 Thus, the
court concluded that there is no irrebuttable presumption of intent
under the statute; rather, intent is irrelevant to the injury.1 36
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bell, joined by Judge Cathell,
argued:
To hold, as a matter of law, that § 463(a) (3) does not require
the State to prove that a defendant possessed the necessary
mental state to commit the crime, i.e. knowingly engaged in
sexual relations with a female under 14, or that the defen-
dant may not litigate that issue in defense, "offends a princi-
ple ofjustice so rooted in the traditions of conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental" and is, therefore,
inconsistent with due process.1
37
Judge Bell maintained that section 463(a) (3) offends both substantive
and procedural due process. 13 Substantive due process requires that
the defendant possess some level of fault for a criminal conviction,
while procedural due process requires that the prosecution overcome
133. Id. at 684, 724 A-2d at 53 (quoting People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Mich.
1984)).
134. Id. at 687, 724 A.2d at 55.
135. Id. at 688, 724 A.2d at 55.
136. See id. at 689, 724 A.2d at 56. The court further asserted that even if the statute at
issue did create such an irrebuttable presumption, "the nexus between the presumption
and the state's interest in protecting children is sufficient enough to ameliorate any due
process concerns." Id. (citing Rita Eidson, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27
UCLA L. REv. 757, 811 (1980)).
137. Owens, 352 Md. at 694, 724 A.2d at 58 (Bell, J., dissenting) (quoting Garnett v.
State, 332 Md. 571, 584-85, 632 A.2d 797, 802-04 (1993) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
138. See id. at 695, 724 A.2d at 59 (quoting Garnett, 332 Md. at 625, 632 A.2d at 824 (Bell,
C.J., dissenting)).
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the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt.'39
Judge Bell emphasized that knowledge of the victim's age is not only
proof of the defendant's guilt, "it is absolutely dispositive of it and...
it is fatal to the only defense the defendant would otherwise have."'' 40
Thus, according to Judge Bell, section 463 (a) destroys absolutely the
concept of fault and renders meaningless the presumption of inno-
cence and the right to due process. 1 ' Judge Bell concluded that
where the legality of the activity depends upon the ages of the partici-
pants, at the very least the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age
must be proven.
14 2
Moving to the procedural due process violations, Judge Bell
stated that "[e]ven if the appellant were on notice that having sexual
relations with someone below the consensual age constitut[ed] statu-
tory rape, this does not mean . . .that the appellant knew that the
particular female . . .was underage"'143 and "notice means more than
simply cursory knowledge of the law."' 44 In fact, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to permit strict liability where it would mean con-
victing persons whose conduct would not even alert them to the
probability of strict regulation. 145 Judge Bell also criticized the major-
ity for overlooking the second prong of the procedural due process
test: the opportunity to present a defense.'46 In denying the defen-
dant this opportunity, Judge Bell concluded that the court has made
the appellant the victim of an irrebuttable presumption which cannot
pass constitutional scrutiny. 1
4 7
139. See id. Judge Bell disagreed with the majority's rationale that the legislature has
absolute authority to create strict liability crimes because a "culpable mental state is and
continues to be an essential element of a criminal offense . . ." without which occurs a
violation of a defendant's due process rights and each defendant ought to be protected
from "unfair procedure and from deprivation of substantive rights." Id. at 697, 724 A.2d at
60.
140. Id. at 696, 724 A.2d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garnett, 332
Md. at 626, 632 A.2d at 824 (Bell, C.J., dissenting)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 700-01, 724 A.2d at 61-62 (criticizing the majority for "forgetting that the
critical issue in a statutory rape case is the 'age of the rape victim' which serves two related,
but distinct purposes: (1) it establishes the victim's capacity to consent and (2) it repre-
sents notice to a defendant of a proscribed conduct").
143. Id at 698, 724 A.2d at 60.
144. Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)).
145. Id. at 699, 724 A.2d at 61 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 618).
146. Id. at 700, 724 A.2d at 61; see also id. at 702, 724 A.2d at 62 (arguing that the right to
present a defense is a fundamental substantive due process right that must be weighed
against the state's interest in "promoting the physical and mental health of children").
147. Id. at 701, 724 A.2d at 62.
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
4. Analysis. -Writing for the Supreme Court in Morissette v.
United States, Justice Robert Jackson observed:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient no-
tion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law
as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil.148
This statement embodies the fundamental notion that establishing
criminal intent is the cornerstone of the American scheme of justice,
strikes at the heart of due process, and thus, is indispensable to our
system of law.1 49 This fundamental notion can be salvaged in statutory
rape crimes by allowing defendants, such as Owens, to present a rea-
sonable mistake of fact defense. Notwithstanding the fact that statu-
tory rape does not fall within the traditionally permissible categories
of strict liability crimes, the prohibition of a mistake of fact defense
violates substantive and procedural due process and creates an uncon-
stitutional irrebuttable presumption of culpability.
a. Prohibiting a Mistake of Fact Defense to Statutory Rape Violates
Procedural and Substantive Due Process. -The protection of fundamental
rights from arbitrary and unreasonable action is the bedrock of due
process.'5 ° Toward that end, legislation must be fair and reasonable
in content (substantive due process) as well as application (procedu-
ral due process).' 5 ' The Supreme Court has utilized the concept of
148. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
149. Cf Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (noting that the test for deter-
mining whether a right is protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment
often looks to whether the right is "among those 'fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."' (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932))).
150. SeeJeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. Sch. Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating
that the constitutional right to "substantive due process," or the freedom from arbitrary
and capricious government action, requires that an interest in liberty or property be
impaired).
151. See, e.g., AIbright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 295 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the Court has recognized that a variety of state actions have such serious effects on
protected liberty interests that they may not be undertaken arbitrarily, or without observ-
ing procedural safeguards); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (demonstrat-
ing concern for procedural due process when stating that "where a person's good name,
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (demonstrating concern for substantive due process by holding that state law
requiring parents to send children to public school violates due process because "rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasona-
ble relation to some purpose within the competency of the State").
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"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment to embrace certain funda-
mental values as within its constitutional interpretive authority.
15 2
From protecting the economic and property rights in Lochner v. United
States15 3 to finding a fundamental right to privacy in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,15 14 the Supreme Court has interpreted liberty to encompass a
number of principles deemed to be rooted in "the very nature of our
free Republican government. 155
Surely a right to present a defense on one's behalf in a criminal
proceeding is to secure that liberty our Constitution seeks to pro-
tect.'5 6 The goal of "preventing miscarriages of justice and assuring
that fair trials are provided for all defendants"' 5 7 is evidenced by the
fact that many of the explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights pertaining
to the criminal process have been applied to the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; 158 the
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination;' 5 9 and
the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel,16 ° to a speedy trial,16 ' and to
confrontation of witnesses.
16 2
Included in a defendant's fundamental due process rights is the
right to present a defense, or a right "to a fair opportunity to defend
152. The Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana discussed the many rights that have
been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: the rights of speech, press, religion, the rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally
seized, the right to be free of compelled self-incrimination, the right to counsel, to a
speedy and public trial, and to confront witnesses. 391 U.S. at 146, 148 (1968).
153. 198 U.S. 445 (1905) (holding that the right to contract for weekly work hours was
protected as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
154. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right to use contraception within a marriage
was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
155. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1789) (demonstrating an early inclination to invalidate
legislation apart from explicit constitutional limitations).
156. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 296 (1994) (stating that "an official accusa-
tion of serious crime has a direct impact on a range of identified liberty interests" and that
impact is of "sufficient magnitude to qualify as a deprivation of liberty warranting constitu-
tional protection").
157. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148.
158. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 391-92 (1914)).
159. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
160. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
161. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
162. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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against the State's accusations."163 The Maryland legislature's failure
to designate such an opportunity for the accused within its statutory
rape provision constitutes an unconstitutional omission that the judi-
ciary has a duty to remedy.1 6
4
Procedural due process is the principle of fairness that governs
the means by which government deprives a person of some life, liberty
or property interest.165 Timothy Owens was deprived of his liberty
when he was convicted of the felony of statutory rape. 66 This depriva-
tion will be continuous as there are particular rights to which Owens
will no longer be privy and obligations that he must now endure,
namely, he is not permitted to vote in federal elections, 67 and he is
forced to register as a child sex offender for the rest of this life.16
163. Owens, 352 Md. at 702, 724 A.2d at 62 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Taliaferro v.
State, 295 Md. 376, 403, 456 A.2d 29, 44 (1983) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973))).
164. See Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substan-
tive Criminal Law and Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1571, 1621 (1978) (stating that a consti-
tutional rule against strict criminal liability requires "only that the defendant be given an
opportunity to litigate his culpability respecting each element of the offense, .... it does not
disturb the legislative choice except to the extent the legislature wants to both designate
some fact as an element and wants to make irrelevant defendant's culpability as to that
fact").
165. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (stating that the "require-
ments of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by
the 14th Amendment's protection of liberty and property").
166. See Owens, 352 Md. at 668, 724 A.2d at 45 (noting that Owens was sentenced to "18
months of imprisonment for statutory rape, although it was suspended").
167. See MD CONST. art. I, § 4 (limiting the right to vote of a person convicted of an
infamous or another serious crime). According to the Human Rights Watch, 46 states
prohibit felons from voting while incarcerated, 32 states prohibit felons from voting while
on parole, 29 states prohibit voting while on probation, and 14 states prohibit convicted
felons from voting for life. Of these 14 states which prohibit voting for life, Tennessee and
Washington only prohibit voting for those convicted prior to 1986 and 1984 respectively,
and Maryland and Arizona only prohibit voting for life after the conviction of the second
felony. The remaining ten states: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Mexico, Virginia and Wyoming prohibit persons from voting for life after the
first felony conviction. See Human Rights Watch & The Sentencing Project, Losing the Vote:
The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (visited May 23, 2000) <http:/
/www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/>.
168. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792. Section 792 provides, in relevant part, that child
sexual offenders shall register with the local law enforcement agency of the county where
the child sexual offender resides. Id. § 792(c) (3). The registration shall include the regis-
trant's name, address and place of employment, a description of the crime for which the
registrant was convicted, the date of conviction, the jurisdiction in which the registrant was
convicted, a list of any aliases used by the registrant and the registrant's Social Security
number. Id. § 792(d)(1)(i)-(vi). The authority shall also obtain a photograph and finger-
prints from the registrant. Id. § 792(d)(2). The Department of Public Safety and Correc-
tional Services shall maintain a central registry of registrants to be released to the public in
accordance with regulations. Id. § 792(d) (3) (ii), (d) (5).
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The constitutional safeguards of due process must be available at
every step of a state process that seeks to brand its citizens with the
lifetime stigma of convicted felon and child sex offender.'69 Minimal
procedural due process demands that parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard and notified of that right. 171 Owens's
rights were clearly affected, and he was, as all defendants of felonies
ought to be, entitled to be heard-to present a defense. The Mary-
land statute, however, pertinaciously precluded Owen from present-
ing a defense.
Such a procedural defect results in the inequitable treatment of
defendants facing statutory rape charges. Defendants who behave
negligently or with reckless disregard for the age of the victim are
deemed by law to be as guilty as those who are induced to perform a
sexual act with a woman who falsely asserts that she is of the age of
consent. It is intellectually dishonest to mask these obvious, and oth-
erwise relevant, differences by the swift imposition of a guilty verdict.
Without some form of mens rea requirement for statutory rape, the
state convicts equally those who are not equally culpable.
c. Statutory Rape as a Strict Liability Crime Establishes Unconsti-
tutional Irrebuttable Presumptions, which Conflict with Traditional Presump-
tions of Innocence.-The importance of establishing intent as an
individual element to a crime, as opposed to relying on presumptions,
was emphasized in Morissette v. United States, in which the Court stated
that "the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruc-
tion [to the jury] that the law raises a presumption of intent from the
act." 71 The Court has also stated that Congress's power to dispense
with the intent requirement is subject to constitutional limits of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement. 72 Thus, irrebut-
169. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (stating that "only when
the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired
can oppressive results be prevented"); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Supreme Court decisions which have found statutes and processes that impose
sordid labels or attach unpalatable stigma to a person without a hearing unconstitutional).
170. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79-81 (1972) (holding that prejudgment re-
plevin statutes deprived a defendant of property without procedural due process of law as
they denied an opportunity to be heard before chattels were taken).
171. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (concluding that the mere
omission of any mention of intent is not to be construed as eliminating that element from
the crime defined; thus, a statute which made it a crime to convert government property,
to be constitutionally valid, requires a defendant to possess the criminal intent to wrong-
fully or maliciously deprive another of property).
172. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 227 (1957) (holding that a person without
knowledge of the duty to register with the city may not be convicted under a felon registra-
tion law consistent with due process).
20001
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
table presumptions, present in both the Maryland court's instructions
to infer intent and the legislature's power to dispense with intent,
have "long been disfavored and held violative of due process."''
73
Maryland's statutory rape law presumes two things: first, that girls
under fourteen years of age are incapable of providing competent
consent to sexual intercourse,1 74 and second, that the perpetrator
knew or should have known that he was engaging in sexual inter-
course with a girl under the age of fourteen. 175 Yet, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, a fact conclusively presumed "is not necessarily
or universally true in fact."' 76 Therefore, by excusing the prosecutor
from having to establish the truth of the fact, statutory rape is ren-
dered arbitrary and capricious, and hence, unconstitutional. 177 The
inaccuracy of these presumptions, as applied in Owens, demonstrates
the veracity of the Supreme Court's statement. The purported victim
in Owens not only consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant,
but facilitated the "crime" by lying to Owens about her age.'17 Owens,
whose guilty mind was conclusively presumed by the court, actually
acted on the basis of the victim's misrepresentation, a fraud which was
foisted upon the police as well. These inconsistencies demonstrate
how irrebuttable presumptions, in the words ofJustice Scalia, "conflict
with the overriding presumptions of innocence with which the law en-
dows the accused and invade the fact-finding function which in a
criminal case is [the exclusive province of the jury]. ' '179
The majority in Owens, after acknowledging that "this court and
the Supreme Court have held . . . statutes that create conclusive, ir-
rebuttable presumptions may violate due process," '8 attempts to jus-
tify this violation by claiming that the "nexus between the
presumption and the state's interest in protecting children is suffi-
173. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) (invalidating a statute that conclusively
presumed that the applicant's residence when he applied for admission to Connecticut
University remained his residence throughout his college years).
174. See Owens, 352 Md. at 687, 724 A.2d at 55.
175. See id.
176. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452.
177. Cf Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 87, 48 A.2d 600, 603 (1946) (invalidating a Mary-
land Racing Commission rule that provided if, after testing blood or urine from a horse,
the test shows the presence of a drug, the trainer will be subject to penalties whether or not
he administered the drug, because the presence of the drug will be conclusive evidence
that there was knowledge of the fact on the part of the trainer).
178. Owens, 352 Md. at 667, 724 A.2d at 45.
179. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
jury instructions relieving the prosecution of its burden of providing the existence of predi-
cate facts beyond reasonable doubt violate a defendant's due process rights).
180. Owens, 352 Md. at 689, 724 A.2d at 55.
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cient enough to ameliorate any due process concerns." ' ' Thus, the
majority casually dismisses this legitimate concern without demon-
strating how the state's interest in protecting children would be
thwarted by allowing the defendant the opportunity to rebut the
presumption.
A mistake of fact defense would continue to relieve the prosecu-
tion of the burden of proving culpable mens rea to obtain a convic-
tion, but the presumption of culpability would not be irrebuttable. The
defendant would be permitted to challenge the presumption by prov-
ing he acted in a manner that does not warrant the severe punishment
and conviction whose imposition is currently automatic.
d. Statutory Rape Does not Fall Within the Permissible Categories of
Strict Liability Crimes.--Statutory rape cannot be properly categorized
as a public welfare offense as it is a serious felony carrying a potential
sentence of twenty years in prison."8 2 Society is willing to acquiesce to
strict liability for the violation of regulatory edicts because the result-
ing punishments are light. Maryland's statutory rape provision, how-
ever, not only carries a lengthy sentence but requires that child sex
offenders register with the county in which they live and submit to
DNA testing.'83 This branding of the "scarlet letter" is even more un-
settling when one learns that the Maryland Legislature recently passed
a law allowing the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Ser-
vices to post on the Internet a current listing of each person regis-
tered as a child sex offender. 8 4 These can hardly be characterized as
light penalties, and arguably indicate that the Legislature's concern is
far more with punishment than with regulation. The punishments for
statutory rape are far too severe to be included with other public wel-
fare offenses, and far too severe to preclude defendants charged
thereunder from demonstrating a lack of criminal intent.
Neither can statutory rape be justified as a strict liability crime by
classification as a "lesser legal wrong" offense.'85 To do so would re-
quire the defendant to have committed a lesser legal wrong that
181. Id., 724 A.2d at 56.
182. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(b) (1996); see also Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571,
580, 632 A.2d 797, 801 (1993) (stating that statutory rape contrasts markedly with the
other strict liability regulatory offenses and their light penalties).
183. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792.
184. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(j) (6) (amending, in May 1999, the authority of the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services pertaining to the release of infor-
mation to the public to include the authority to "post on the Internet a current listing of
each registrant's name, offense, and other identifying information . . .").
185. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the two historical justifications
for strict liability crimes as 'public welfare offenses' and 'lesser legal wrong offenses').
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would, in essence, provide the intent for the greater liability crime.
The only such possibility is a finding that Owens, in engaging in pre-
marital sex, committed a crime; however, premarital sex is not a crime
in the state of Maryland.1"6 Therefore, statutory rape exists'as some-
what of an anomaly in Maryland's criminal jurisprudence, fitting into
neither of the accepted bases-public welfare or lesser legal wrong
offenses-for establishing strict criminal liability.
The Owens's court attempted to compensate for this obvious fail-
ure by arguing that the real necessity for strict liability crimes is deter-
rence. 18 7  The court stated that "precisely because the statute
eliminates the need for the state to prove that the potential defendant
knew or was unreasonable in the failure to recognize that the victim
was under age fourteen, the statute may reasonably be expected to
have some deterrent effect."188 The majority, however, failed to real-
ize that even with a mistake of fact defense, the state is not required to
prove the potential defendant's knowledge, as the burden of establish-
ing this affirmative defense would be placed upon the defendant.'
Thus, if the majority truly believed what it asserted-that because the
state does not have to prove intent for a crime, that crime is de-
terred-then allowing the defendant to present (and prove) a reason-
able mistake of fact should not lessen the deterrent impact of the
statute. Not only is the theory behind the majority's assertion-that
because statutory rape has no mens rea requirement it deters would-
be violators-dubious, but it is illogical. An individual who has no
basis for believing he is engaging in unlawful conduct will not be de-
terred from engaging in that behavior.19 Without any indication that
his conduct was wrong, Owens had no reason to alter his conduct, and
therefore could not possibly have been deterred.
Indicative of the disfavor in which strict criminal liability resides,
the Model Penal Code states that, as a minimum requirement of cul-
186. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 602, 632 A.2d at 812 (noting that the "lesser legal wrong
theory does not provide a viable rationale for holding a defendant strictly liable for statu-
tory rape where premarital sex is not criminal").
187. Owens, 352 Md. at 685, 724 A.2d at 54.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Steve v. Alaska, 875 P.2d 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (finding a statute
which places the burden of proof on a defendant to show reasonable mistake as to age in a
statutory rape case by a preponderance of the evidence was not unconstitutional since the
defendant's belief as to the victim's age was a matter of defense, not an element of the
crime).
190. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 401, 427 (1993) (arguing that "the strict liability doctrine violates utilitarian
theories of criminal punishment because an individual who has no basis for believing he is
engaging in unlawful conduct will not be deterred from engaging in that behavior").
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pability, a person is not guilty of a criminal offense unless he acts pur-
posely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.191 The Code also
recognizes a defense of mistake of fact to negate mens rea for those
defendants who have not acted out of criminal negligence.'92 In
either case, the state must prove intent or provide the defendant an
opportunity to demonstrate the absence thereof. The commentators
to the Model Penal Code disapprove of statutory rape, as a strict liabil-
ity crime, specifically because "the prosecutions often proceed even
when the defendant's judgment as to the age of the complainant is
warranted by her appearance, her sexual sophistication, her verbal
misrepresentations, and the defendant's careful attempts to ascertain
her true age." 9 ' The Model Penal Code commentary succinctly states
the problem with statutory rape and other strict liability crimes:
"[c]rimes does and should mean condemnation and no court should
have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant's
act was culpable ... this is too fundamental to be compromised.' 194
e. Inconsistency in the Adjudication of Strict Liability Offenses:
Anderson v. State.-The weighty constitutional arguments that cham-
pion the necessity of a mistake of fact defense, have been inconsis-
tently and incompatibly applied by the Maryland courts to the state's
strict liability crimes. In Anderson v. State,195 the Court of Appeals re-
cently overturned the conviction of a defendant for carrying a con-
cealed utility knife, "a strict liability offense," because the trial court
failed to consider the intended use of the utility knife.' 96 In Anderson,
the applicable statute provided that a person who carries a concealed
weapon shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
fined not more than $1000 or be imprisoned in jail for not more than
three years.' 97 The court reasoned that all knives are not dangerous
or deadly weapons and that, depending on the circumstances, the
concealed carrying of some cutting tools may be considered lawful.' 98
The construction of this statute, which requires only an intent to carry
191. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
192. Id. § 2.04. The drafters of the Code implicitly concede that sexual conduct with a
child of such extreme youth (the Model Penal Code applies strict liability for children
under 10 years of age) would spring from a criminally negligent state of mind. Hence the
mistake of fact defense does not apply here. See Comment § 213.6.
193. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 580, 632 A.2d at 801 (citing Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mis-
take of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 105, 106 (1965)).
194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (comment) (emphasis added).
195. 328 Md. 426, 614 A.2d 963 (1992).
196. Id. at 444, 614 A.2d at 972.
197. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(a) (1996).
198. See Anderson, 328 Md. at 437, 614 A.2d at 968.
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the instrument in a concealed fashion, looks only to the object's po-
tential as a weapon, without considering the intended use of the
"weapon."19 9 When the court questioned the state on the status of
other objects, such as a carpenter's hammer or a woman's hairpin, the
state answered that criminally charging a person for the carrying of
such items would be left to the exercise of the police officer's or pros-
ecutor's discretion at the preliminary stages of the criminal process.2°°
Thus, the prosecutor was able to consider the nature of the tool and
the intent of its holder prior to the trial, but claimed that neither it
nor the court were able to consider intent under the statute at trial.
The Court of Appeals found that this raised procedural due process
questions "concerning notice to the public of the conduct that is con-
sidered criminal," and concluded that "[a] construction of a statute
which would cast doubt on its constitutional validity should be
avoided."201
Two analogous characteristics of Anderson and Owens are worth
noting. First, the majority in Owens stated that the defendant's asser-
tion of reasonable mistake of fact regarding the victim's age is best
considered as a mitigating circumstance at sentencing.20 2 In Anderson,
however, the same court claimed that a defendant's "intent" could not
be used at the discretion of the prosecutor when determining whether
or not to charge a person for carrying a concealed weapon. 20 3 In
Owens, it appears that the court is simply employing the "intent" tool
at a different stage of criminal prosecution (sentencing) and at the
discretion of a different officer of the court (the judge). The Anderson
court was unwilling to allow this discretion to substitute for intent at
the charging stage in a criminal prosecution, yet the Owens court ap-
pears perfectly willing to allow a judge's discretion to substitute for a
defendant's knowledge of a consenting partner's age after the defendant
has already been convicted. If the discretion of a prosecutor prior to be-
ing charged for a misdemeanor offense was found to have been insuf-
ficient protection of due process rights, certainly the discretion of the
judge after a defendant is convicted of a felony ought to be consid-
ered insufficient as well. This is particularly true when the stigma at-
tached to and punishment for a felony is much harsher than those
associated with a misdemeanor.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 438, 614 A.2d at 968.
201. Id.
202. Owens, 352 Md. at 687, 724 A.2d at 55.
203. Anderson, 328 Md. at 438-39, 614 A.2d at 969.
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Second, the Anderson court emphasized that "construction of a
statute which would cast doubt on its constitutional validity should be
avoided."2 °4 Intent in Anderson became an element of the crime
through judicial construction in order to ensure the constitutionality
of the statute, as notions of fundamental fairness and due process
forced the court to read the element of mens rea into the crime.20 5
By allowing a mistake of fact defense to statutory rape, intent becomes
a factor to be considered by the jury, not an element of the crime to
be established by the state. In this respect, both the constitutionality
of the statute and the state's interest in protecting children can be
preserved.2 °6
f Allowing a Mistake of Fact Defense will Distinguish the True
Victims from the Self-made Victims. -Even if an actor takes all reasonable
steps to ensure that the crime of statutory rape is not committed, a
"victim" may still spout falsehoods upon which a reasonable person
may rely. The victim in these circumstances becomes a victim by her
own volition. As the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Her-
nandez, "if it occurs that [t]he [defendant] has been misled, we cannot
realistically conclude that the intent with which he undertook the act
suddenly becomes more heinous."20 7 In Owens, the felonious act was
induced by the fraudulent misrepresentation of a young woman.20 8
Had the young woman-the very person for whom the government
has gone to great lengths to protect-not contributed to the defen-
dant's misperception, she might never have become a victim. Con-
versely, the defendant, who became one by a reasonable mistake of
fact, is not a "socially dangerous individual who needs to be incapaci-
tated or reformed."20 9 Despite the absence of moral blame, the defen-
204. Id. at 438, 614 A.2d at 968.
205. See id.
206. The assertion that mistake of fact must be made by judicial caveat is not necessarily
meant to exclude action by the Legislature. However, if the Legislature fails to act, the
Constitution of the United States and Maryland's Declaration of Rights impel the judiciary
to accept its responsibility to protect a defendant's due process rights.
A mistake of fact defense is permitted in nearly half the states in the country today,
and in many other countries around the world. See Levenson, supra note 190, at 435 (as-
serting that "other countries have reconciled more effectively the strict liability doctrine
with general principles of moral culpability"). For example, Canada, Australia, New Zea-
land, and South Asian and African codified systems recognize a "good faith defense" to
strict liability crimes, where a reasonable mistake of fact will exonerate common law and
statutory offenses without discrimination. See id. at 435-49.
207. People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal. 1964).
208. Owens, 352 Md. at 667, 724 A.2d at 45.
209. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 579, 632 A.2d 797, 801 (1993) (citing WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTING W. Sco-rr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 242-43 (2d ed. 1986)).
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dant is now subject to the stigma of a criminal conviction which he, by
law, must also broadcast to the community.
There is a need to reexamine the method by which victims are
defined in criminal proceedings. Presently, the defendant bears the
burden for the broad underlying assumptions about the neediness
and inability to consent of the victim's class. In circumstances such as
those that existed in Owens, the defendant, in theory becomes an un-
witting victim of the judicial institution. By inducing the "criminal"
act, the "technical victim" has simultaneously ensured that her partner
will suffer among the most severe deprivations of liberty: a felony con-
viction without the presentation of a defense to the charges. Such
deprivations remain anathema to the concepts of due process of law.
5. Conclusion.-A reasonable mistake of fact defense allows sec-
tion 4463 to comport with both substantive due process, which re-
quires defendants to possess some level of fault for criminal
convictions, and procedural due process, which requires that the de-
fendant have a fair opportunity to be heard. An affirmative defense
reinserts mens rea into the strict liability crime of statutory rape, thus
ensuring the culpability of those criminally punished in our judicial
system. An affirmative defense, by definition, guarantees a defendant
a fundamental due process right: the opportunity to be heard-the
opportunity to present a defense. As the Maryland statute is currently
interpreted and applied by the courts, this right is infringed not by a
narrowly tailored means of protecting the government's interest, but
by an overly broad suppression of a person's ability to speak in his own
defense. A statute that irrebuttably presumes the guilt of the defen-
dant and then renders him mute offends the traditional principles of
justice and fair play that characterize American jurisprudence. This
stifling of the defendant becomes even more reprehensible when con-
sidering the harsh penalties imposed upon him: potential imprison-
ment for up to twenty years and registration as a child sex offender for
life. Despite the absence of moral blame, the defendant is now sub-
ject to the stigma of a criminal conviction which he must, by law,
broadcast to the community. Without a mistake of fact defense, statu-
tory rape prosecutions produce two entities: a 'victim,' only by legal
definition and a convicted felon without culpability. In Owens v. State,
the Court of Appeals exhibited a dereliction of duty by failing to rec-
ognize due process as a constitutional limit to legislative authority and
failing to assume its constitutional responsibility to ensure that due
process rights of the accused are not compromised.
MICHELLE R. VANyvo
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V. CONTRACTS
A. The Invalidation of Collection Cost Provisions Under Maryland Law
In United Cable Television of Baltimore L.P. v. Burch,1 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that in the absence of explicit statutory au-
thority, any contractual provision charging a fee for the late payment
of money owed is unenforceable if the amount charged is greater
than a rate of six percent interest on the principal owed.2 The court
relied on Maryland cases and common law authorities to support its
interpretation of the prejudgment interest rule as limiting damages
for the unlawful withholding of money to the legal rate of interest on
that sum.' The court, however, misinterpreted the pre-judgment in-
terest rule as being a cap on damages for the breach of any obligation
to pay a sum certain on a date certain, whereas it had previously inter-
preted the rule as being a gap-filler, applicable only to cases where
parties had not previously agreed to a measure of damages. In addi-
tion, the court failed to recognize the numerous Maryland cases apply-
ing the collection cost rule, which stipulates that agreements to
allocate collection costs to the breaching party as a separate element
of damages are valid and enforceable. The court's misinterpretation
of the prejudgment interest rule and failure to apply the collection
cost rule will have the following negative consequences for Maryland
businesses and consumers: (1) it is likely to increase the incidence of
breach; (2) it will lead to higher prices for nonbreaching consumers;
and (3) it potentially creates enormous liability for businesses that
have charged late fees in the past.
1. The Case.-United Cable Television of Baltimore Limited
Partnership (United) provides cable television service to approxi-
mately 112,000 residents of Baltimore City pursuant to written con-
tracts.4 In consideration for cable services,5 each customer agrees to
pay a subscription fee at the beginning of each month.6 The written
agreement between United and its customers also contains a clause
1. 354 Md. 658, 732 A.2d 887 (1999).
2. Id. at 683-85, 732 A.2d at 900-01.
3. See id. at 668-81, 732 A.2d at 893-99 (discussing the Maryland cases and the other
authorities that address the prejudgment interest rule).
4. See id. at 663-64, 732 A.2d at 889-90. United is a subsidiary of the Denver based
cable franchisor, Telecommunications, Inc. (TCI) and does business as TCI of Baltimore.
See id. at 662-63, 732 A.2d at 889.
5. Cable services provided by United include installing a cable connection to the cus-
tomers' homes, loaning equipment to the customers, and transmitting programs to the
customers' homes. See id. at 689, 732 A.2d at 904 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
6. See Burch, 354 Md. at 663, 732 A.2d at 890.
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:743
that obligates customers to pay an administrative fee if they do not pay
their bill by the due date. v
In November 1995, two customers of United, Louis Burch and
Phillip Vincent, filed a class action on behalf of consumers subscribing
to cable television service in Baltimore City, alleging that United's late
fee was unlawful.8 At the circuit court level, the primary issue was
whether the late fee constituted a valid liquidated damages clause, or
an unenforceable penalty.9 United argued that the fee was proper
because it was a reasonable advance estimate of the damages caused
by a subscriber's failure to pay by the due date. t ° The evidence
showed that customers who pay their bills late cause United to incur
some costs associated with the collection process;1' however, each
party produced experts who gave conflicting opinions as to the actual
amount of those costs.
12
The trial judge held that fifty cents was a reasonable estimate of
the actual damages caused by a subscriber's late payment.' Conse-
quently, United's five dollar late fee was not a reasonable estimate of
damages and was, therefore, an unenforceable penalty. 4 Accord-
ingly, the trial court concluded that United was not entitled to four
7. See id. at 664, 732 A.2d at 890. The clause states: "If you do not pay your bill by the
due date, you agree to pay [United] an administrative fee for late payment. The adminis-
trative fee is intended to be a reasonable advance estimate of our costs which result from
customers' late payments and non-payments." Id. The agreement also states that "the ad-
ministrative fee is not interest, a credit service charge or a finance charge." Id. United
increased this late fee from four dollars to five dollars in January 1993. See id. at 663, 732
A.2d at 890.
8. See id. at 662, 666, 732 A.2d at 889, 891. The plaintiffs brought their charges in
four counts: (1) violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA), (2) violation
of the common law of liquidated damages, (3) violation of the Maryland Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC), and (4) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Burch v. United Cable Television of Baltimore, No. 95311038/CL204287 (Cir. Ct.
Balt. City Sept. 16, 1997).
9. See Burch, 354 Md. at 662, 732 A.2d at 889.
10. See id. at 667, 732 A.2d at 892. The court stated that "[t]he essence of United's
position is that it is entitled to recover as damages six categories of late payment costs: (1)
local office handling, mailing, and notification; (2) cost of funds; (3) data processing and
billing; (4) field collections; (5) in-house/outside collection; and (6) bad debt." Id. (quot-
ing Brief of Appellant at 14, United Cable Television v. Burch, 354 Md. 658, 732 A.2d 887
(1989) (No. 82)).
11. See id. at 665, 732 A.2d at 890-91. The evidence showed that at various stages in the
collection process, United may incur the costs of mailing additional notices, placing phone
calls, receiving phone calls, and sending technicians to the customers' residences. See id. If
United is unable to collect an account, they write it off as bad debt and turn it over to a
collection agency. See id., 732 A.2d at 891.
12. Id. at 666, 732 A.2d at 891. United's expert calculated the cost per delinquent
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dollars and fifty cents of every five dollar late fee it collected, and en-
tered judgement against United for $6,701,503.60 in excessive late
fees, plus $897,015.11 in prejudgment interest.1 5
Subsequent to this decision, United appealed the judgement for
excess late charges and the award of attorneys' fees to the Court of
Special Appeals.16 However, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of cer-
tiorari sua sponte before the intermediate appellate court considered
the appeal.
17
2. Legal Background.-Under Maryland law, the parties to a con-
tract may agree to stipulate damages for breach of contract.' 8 Taylor
v. Grafton 9 establishes the circumstances under which such a liqui-
dated damages clause is valid. To be enforceable, a liquidated dam-
ages clause must identify a specific sum of money that is a reasonable
advance estimate of anticipated damages, which are incapable of exact
ascertainment at the time of contract formation.2"
With respect to the breach of an obligation to pay money, the
prejudgment interest rule and the collection cost rule determine
which costs may be included in the calculation of damages. The pre-
judgment interest rule establishes that interest at the legal rate on the
15. Id. Prejudgment interest was calculated as simple interest at a rate of six percent
per year. Id. The trial court ordered United to pay the entire $7,598,518.71 judgment into
a "common fund." Burch v. United Cable Television of Baltimore, No. 95311038/
CL204287, at 5 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Nov. 26, 1997). The court then established a plan for
paying the award of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and two awards to Plaintiffs Burch
and Vincent out of the fund. Id. The remainder constituted a "Refund Fund" out of which
restitution to class plaintiffs was to be made. Id.
16. Burch, 354 Md. at 667, 732 A.2d at 892.
17. Id.
18. See infra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland law pertaining to liq-
uidated damages).
19. 273 Md. 649, 332 A.2d 651 (1975).
20. Id. at 663, 332 A.2d at 661. The court stated that
where the parties, at or before the time of execution of the contract, agree upon
and name a sum therein to be paid as liquidated damages in lieu of anticipated
damages which are in their nature uncertain and incapable of exact ascertain-
ment, that the amount so named in the agreement will be regarded as liquidated
damages, not as a penalty, unless the amount so agreed upon and inserted in the
agreement be grossly excessive and out of all proportion to the damages that
might reasonably have been expected to result from such breach of the contract.
And whether the damages are incapable of exact ascertainment should be deter-
mined from the subject-matter of the contract considered in light of all the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances connected therewith and known to the parties
at the time of its execution.
Id. (citations omitted).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sum owed is recoverable as a matter of right.2" The collection cost
rule establishes that parties may agree to allocate collection costs, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, to the party who breaches their payment obli-
gation.2 If the courts have modified these rules in any respect since
they first applied them over one hundred years ago, it was only to
broaden their scope by applying them to payment obligations arising
out of different types of contracts.
The Court of Appeals applied the prejudgment interest rule in
Brown v. Hardcastle.23 The defendant in Brown failed to make timely
mortgage payments. 24 Under the terms of the mortgage agreement,
he paid interest at a rate of one percent per year.25 The agreement
did not contain a provision stipulating the rate of interest to be
charged in the event that the borrower failed to pay on time.26 The
court held that in the absence of an express agreement regarding the
rate of interest on default payments, the law sets the measure of inter-
est at the legal rate of six percent per year.27 The court reasoned that
this was the correct measure of damages because it reflected the exact
loss sustained by the plaintiff.28
Three years later, in Bowie v. Hall,29 the Court of Appeals enunci-
ated the collection cost rule. The court considered whether the mea-
sure of damages for breach of a similar obligation to pay money could
be greater than the legal rate of six percent interest."0 The Bowie
court held that it could, recognizing that parties are free to enter into
contracts as long as they are not contrary to the law or to public pol-
21. See Winder v. Diffenderffer, 2 Bland 166, 204 (1829) (stating that "[legal interest is
the measure of damages which the law allows in all cases for the [unlawful] detention of
money" (emphasis added)); Brown v. Hardcastle, 63 Md. 484, 491-92 (1885) (holding that
in the absence of an express agreement otherwise, the appropriate measure of damages for
default payments is the sum owed plus interest at the legal rate).
22. See Bowie v. Hall, 69 Md. 434, 435-36 (1888) (recognizing the validity of a contract
clause that allocated collection costs, including attorneys' fees, to a party who breached his
obligation to pay a sum certain on a date certain).
23. 63 Md. 484 (1885).
24. See id. at 486.
25. See id. at 492.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 491-92 ("[T]he weight of best authorities is, we think, decidedly in favor of
making interest on overdue instruments to run at the legal rate, after due and unpaid.").
28. See id. at 491.
29. 69 Md. 433, 16 A. 64 (1888).
30. Id. at 434, 16 A. at 64. The agreement at issue in Bowie stipulated that if payment
was not received at maturity, the debtor agreed to pay all expenses involved in collecting
the payment, including attorneys' fees. Id.
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icy.3" The court determined that the provision at issue did not "vio-
late . . . [any] principle of law or public policy" because it
"contain[ed] no element of oppression to the borrower. "32 Further-
more, the court determined that the allocation of collection costs to
the breaching party was not contrary to the law or public policy
against usury because it only allowed the lender to recover his princi-
pal with legal interest, but nothing more.33 In evaluating whether the
provision was usurious, the court considered the net sum of money
received by the lender, not the total sum paid by the breaching
party.3
4
Maryland courts have applied both the prejudgment interest rule
and the collection cost rule without significant modification since
their inception. 35 The only apparent modifications by the courts have
been to broaden their scope by applying them to cases where the
breached obligation arises out of different types of contracts. 6
One example of the broadened scope of the prejudgment inter-
est rule is Atlantic States Construction Co. v. Drummond & Co.,3 7 in which
the Court of Appeals applied the rule to a payment obligation arising
under a construction contract. In that case, Drummond & Company
(Drummond) provided paving services under a subcontract to Atlan-
tic States Construction Company (Atlantic), which was a general con-
tractor to the owner, Laurel Plaza.3" The subcontractor agreement
provided that payment was due to Drummond from Atlantic thirty
days after completion of the work, acceptance by the architect and
owner, and full payment by the owner to Atlantic. 9 Laurel Plaza,
however, went bankrupt before approving the subcontractor's work.
40
31. Id. at 435, 16 A. at 65 ("Parties have the right to make their contracts in what form
they please, provided they consist with the law of the land; and it is the duty of the courts so
to construe them, if possible, as to maintain them in their integrity and entirety.").
32. Id.
33. Id. at 435-36, 16 A. at 65.
34. Id. (stating that the effect of the provision was "clearly not to put any money above
the legal rate of interest into the pocket of the lender").
35. See, e.g., Atlantic States Constr. Co. v. Drummond & Co., 251 Md. 77, 246 A.2d 251
(1968); Eidelman v. Walker Dunlop, 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972); Gaither v. Tolson,
84 Md. 637, 36 A. 449 (1897); Noyes Air Conditioning Contractors v. Wilson Towers Ltd.
Partnership, 122 Md. App. 283, 712 A.2d 126 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Atlantic States, 251 Md. at 78, 246 A.2d at 252 (construction contract); Eidel-
man, 265 Md. at 539, 290 A.2d at 781 (commercial lease); Gaither, 84 Md. at 642, 36 A. at
450 (mortgage); Noyes Air, 122 Md. App. at 286, 712 A.2d at 127 (contract for the sale of
goods and services).
37. 251 Md. 77, 246 A.2d 251 (1968).
38. See id. at 78, 246 A.2d at 252.




Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that Atlantic bore the risk of
the owners insolvency and held that because Drummond had com-
pleted the work, and it had been accepted by the architect prior to the
owner's insolvency, the subcontractor's payment was due thirty days
after the owner's insolvency. 4' The court then applied the prejudg-
ment interest rule and held that Drummond was entitled to legal in-
terest on the sum owed beginning thirty days after the owner became
insolvent.42
Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop43 provides another example of the
broadened application of the prejudgment interest rule. In Eidelman,
the defendant's payment obligation arose from his status as a guaran-
tor on a lease of commercial real estate.4 4 The lease provisions in-
cluded an eight-year term, with a monthly rent of seven hundred
dollars, payable in advance.45 The lessee operated a drugstore on the
property, but the business failed approximately four years into the
lease period, and the lessee subsequently stopped paying the monthly
rent.46 The Eidelman court applied the prejudgment interest rule,
stating that "[i] nterest is recoverable as of right upon contract to pay
money on a day certain"47 and that "[s]ums payable as rent come
within this holding and a landlord is entitled to interest on rent from
the day it becomes due and payable.148 Thus, the Eidelman court fur-
ther broadened the application of the prejudgment interest rule by
including an obligation arising under a commercial real estate lease
within the ambit of the rule.
With respect to the collection cost rule, the Court of Appeals has
similarly preserved the substance of the rule while expanding its appli-
cation by applying it to payment obligations that have arisen out of
various types of contracts. For example, in Gaither v. Tolson,49 the
Court of Appeals applied the collection cost rule to validate a cove-
41. See id. at 83, 246 A.2d at 254 (citing Dyer v. Bishop, 303 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1962)).
42. Id. at 85, 246 A.2d at 255 ("If the contractual obligation be unilateral and is to pay a
liquidated sum of money at a certain time, interest is almost universally allowed from the
time payment is due." (quoting Affiliated Distillers v. R.W.L. Wine & Liquor, 213 Md. 507,
516, 132 A.2d 582 (1987))).
43. 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972).
44. Id. at 539, 290 A.2d at 781.
45. Id. at 539-40, 290 A.2d at 781-82.
46. Id. at 540, 290 A.2d at 782.
47. Id. at 545, 290 A.2d at 784 (citing Isle of Thye Lard Co. v. Whisman, 262 Md. 682,
279 A.2d 484 (1971); St. Paul v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971);
A. & A. Masonry v. Polinger, 259 Md. 199, 269 A.2d 566 (1970); City Pass Ry. v. Sewell, 37
Md. 433 (1873)).
48. Id. (citing Brown v. Bradshaw, 245 Md. 524, 226 A.2d 565 (1967); Dennison v. Lee,
6 G. &J. 383 (1833)).
49. 84 Md. 637, 36 A. 449 (1897).
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nant in a mortgage to pay all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the
collection of the underlying debt."° The mortgagor in this case,James
Cockey, was forced to sell the mortgaged property to pay the debt.51
The sale was arranged by the mortgagee, Thomas Gaither, who, for
purposes of making the sale, assigned the mortgage to George
Gaither.52 Upon sale of the land, the auditor allowed $402 in trustees'
commissions for conducting the sale, and attorney's commissions in
the amount of $377 for earlier attempts to collect on the debt.53 Mary
Tolson, the holder of a second mortgage, challenged the validity of
the covenant allowing attorneys' fees.54 The Gaither court, citing
Bowie, held that the covenant to pay attorneys' fees was valid.5 5 The
court explained that the obligation to pay was one of the mutual obli-
gations arising between the parties at contract formation. 56
In addition, the Court of Special Appeals recently applied the col-
lection cost rule to a contract for the sale and installation of air condi-
tioning equipment in Noyes Air Conditioning Contractors v. Wilson Towers
Limited Partnership.5 7 In Noyes Air, the electric utility company,
PEPCO, had offered rebates to customers who replaced old equip-
ment with more energy efficient equipment.58 Wilson Towers agreed
to pay Noyes, an air conditioning contractor, $82,750 minus the
amount of PEPCO's rebate in consideration for installing new energy
efficient equipment in Wilson's apartment complex. 9 The dispute
arose because the actual rebate was less than the estimate included in
the contract.6" The trial court held that Wilson was liable for the full
contract price, despite the fact that the actual rebate was less than
originally expected.61 Despite the fact that the contract also provided
for a one and one-half percentage (11/2%) finance charge per month
on past due accounts and all reasonable collection fees, attorney's fees
and court costs, the trial judge refused to award interest and costs to
Noyes.6 2 The Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision regard-
50. Id. at 642, 36 A. at 450.




55. See id. (citing Bowie v. Hall, 69 Md. 434, 435 (1888)).
56. See id. at 639, 36 A. at 449-50.
57. 122 Md. App. 283, 712 A.2d 126 (1998).
58. Id. at 286, 712 A.2d at 127.
59. See id.





ing the award of attorney's fees, interest and costs.6 3 The intermedi-
ate appellate court explained that the trial court did not have the
discretion to "alter the terms of a written contract, executed in good
faith by knowledgeable parties, establishing as a matter of right the
liability for costs, attorney's fees, and interest in case of default by one
of the parties."64 The court added that although a trial court retained
the discretion to decide what constituted a reasonable award of attor-
ney's fees, costs, and interest "the court may not alter the terms of the
contract agreed to by the parties by denying either party the benefit of
the agreement."" This holding broadens the type of payment obliga-
tion covered by the collection cost rule as it applies the rule to a con-
tract for the sale of labor and equipment.66 Noyes also clarifies that the
0.5% per month legal rate of interest is not a maximum measure of
damages as the court upheld the provision charging one and one-half
percent interest per month on overdue payments.67 Accordingly,
Noyes affirmed the collection cost rule, which enforces agreements to
liquidate damages, regardless of whether they allow damages above
the legal rate of interest.68
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In United Cable Television v. Burch, the
Court of Appeals affirmed a $7,598,518.71 judgement against United
Cable, holding that the measure of damages for a contract to pay
money was limited to the amount promised plus interest at the legal
rate.69
The majority70 began its opinion by noting that there are two
types of prejudgment interest-discretionary and of right-and that
" [b] oth versions are 'in the nature of an element of damages.' 71 The
court further explained that "[t] he ordinary rule in contract cases, if
the contract requires payment of a sum certain on a date certain, is
63. Id. at 291, 712 A.2d at 130.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 292, 712 A.2d at 130.
66. See id. at 286, 712 A.2d at 127 (indicating the agreement was for the sale and instal-
lation of air conditioning equipment).
67. Id. at 288, 712 A.2d at 129.
68. See id.
69. Burch, 354 Md. at 688, 732 A.2d at 892. The judgment included damages in the
amount of $6,701,503.60 and prejudgment interest calculated at 6% per year in the
amount of $897,015.11. Id. at 666, 732 A.2d at 891.
70. The majority opinion was authored by Judge Rodowsky, and joined by Bell, El-
dridge, Raker, Wilner, and Cathell. Id. at 661, 732 A.2d at 889.
71. Id. at 668, 732 A.2d at 892 (quoting Maryland State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353
Md. 313, 327, 726 A.2d 238, 245 (1999)).
896 [VOL. 59:743
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
[that] prejudgment interest typically is allowed as a matter of right. 72
The court then noted that the critical rule, recognized by a number of
authorities, was that " [w] here the contract or obligation is for the pay-
ment of a definite sum of money[,] the measure of damages is the
amount of money promised to be paid, with legal interest, the allow-
ance of interest being [a] matter of legal right. '73 Therefore, accord-
ing to the Burch court, damages for a breach of contract to pay money
is limited to the lawful rate of interest.7 4
Having established its view that damages for breach of a payment
obligation are limited to legal interest, the Burch court explained two
effects that the rule has on liquidated damages clauses. 75 First, the
majority explained the common law rule that in an agreement to pay
a larger sum upon the failure to pay a smaller sum, the larger sum is a
penalty and not enforceable as liquidated damages.76 This rule, how-
ever, does not invalidate any agreement to charge legal interest on the
sum for the duration of a default period because legal interest is the
upper bounds of damages allowed. 77 Second, the Burch court reiter-
ated the rule that in order to constitute a valid liquidated damages
clause, the anticipated damages must be "uncertain and incapable of
exact ascertainment."7' The majority reasoned that because the com-
mon law provides a formula for calculating damages for breach of a
contract to pay money, such as the contract here, those damages are
both certain and capable of exact ascertainment. 79
The Burch court then asserted that there was no independent stat-
utory basis for enforcing United's five dollar late fee.8 ° Although the
court recognized that there are a number of Maryland statutes "that,
72. Id. at 669, 732 A.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 343, 614 A.2d 560, 572
(1992)).
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting 1J.P. POE,
PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF LAW IN MARYLAND § 584C, at 608 (5th Tiffany ed.
1925).
74. Id. at 671, 732 A.2d at 894.
75. Id. at 672-75, 732 A.2d at 894-96.
76. Id. at 672, 732 A.2d at 894 (quoting Geiger v. Western Maryland R.R. Co., 41 Md. 4,
15 (1874)).
77. See id. at 674, 732 A.2d at 896 (quotingJ.G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES § 311, at 970-71 (4th ed. 1916)).
78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anne Arundel County v. Norair
Eng'g Corp., 275 Md. 480, 492, 341 A.2d 287, 293 (1975)).
79. Id. at 675, 732 A.2d at 896.
80. See id. ("[T]here is no statute in Maryland, applicable to United's accounts with its
subscribers, that alters the common law rule described [earlier in the opinion].").
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in various ways, acknowledge the imposition of late charges, " " it rea-
soned that these statutes, viewed against the common law rule, "per-
mit that which would otherwise be unpermitted" rather than
"regulating that which is permitted, but otherwise would be unregu-
lated." 2  Therefore, because these statutes do not expressly
"authoriz[e] or regulat[e] United's late charge," the court held that
the late charge would continue to be subject to the common law rule
restricting damages to the legal rate of interest.13
Having established its view that in the absence of explicit statu-
tory authority, United's late fees are limited by the Maryland common
law rule, which caps damages for late payment at the legal rate of in-
terest, the Burch court discussed three potential reasons for declining
to follow this rule. 4 First, the court noted that a number of decisions
from other jurisdictions, and at least one from the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, have concluded that late charges are not penalties,
but contribute instead "reasonable compensation in commercial
transactions." 5 The Burch court also recognized two policy arguments
in favor of allowing late charges: (1) invalidating late charges would
only cause a company to spread the cost of collecting on delinquent
accounts to all its customers rather than assessing them against those
who are responsible for the increased costs, and (2) the costs incurred
in collecting on delinquent accounts exceed a six percent per annum
interest on those accounts.86 Nevertheless, the court refused to be
swayed by these arguments, explaining that "the Maryland common
law rule of damages for the breach of a contract to pay money should
not be changed by judicial decision."8 "
The Burch court justified its refusal to change the common law
rule based on the nexus between that rule and the Maryland Constitu-
tion, which sets the lawful rate of interest at six percent per year.8
81. Id. The court divided these statutes into four "classes." Id. Those of the first class
"regulate the amount and timing of a late charge." Id. The statues labeled as class two also
regulate the amount and timing of late charges, but additionally, expressly state that such
late charges are not interest. See id. at 676-77, 732 A.2d at 897. Those of the third class
authorize late charges "without fixing any maximum late charge." Id. at 677, 732 A.2d at
897. Finally, the fourth class of statutes "simply recognize that late charges, or late charges
permitted by law, may in fact be assessed." Id at 678, 732 A.2d at 898.
82. Id. at 680, 732 A.2d at 899.
83. Id. at 681, 732 A.2d at 899.
84. See id. at 681-82, 732 A.2d at 899-900.
85. Id. at 682, 732 A.2d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mattividi
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The majority reasoned that since the interest-only rule is tied to the
Maryland Constitution, any court-instituted change to that rule would
"have the same effect as judicially changing the Constitution or as ju-
dicially enacting a statute that has not been enacted by the General
Assembly."8"
The Burch court then held that United's five dollar late fee was an
unenforceable penalty, reasoning that "because United's damages are
fixed by common law to an easily determined amount, United's at-
tempt to increase the damages by a liquidated damages provision pro-
duces a penalty."9 ° The court, however, made it clear that this
decision was not meant to "intimate [any] opinion on whether late
charges in other types of transactions . . .are or are not interest."91
Therefore, using an estimated monthly charge of twenty dollars, the
court calculated the maximum monthly damages to be ten cents per
delinquent account.9 2
In the lone dissenting opinion, Judge Chasanow criticized the
majority for deciding the case on the issue of permissible damages
without giving either party an opportunity to brief or to argue that
issue.9" Judge Chasanow then characterized the contract at issue as a
contract for services that was in no way a loan of money.94 He argued
that most of the authorities cited by the majority, including Section 57
of Article III, were not applicable because they were limitations on
usury.9 5 Judge Chasanow argued that usury laws apply to loans, for-
bearance, and similar transactions, but not to sales.9 6 He then argued
that United's agreement was not subject to usury laws because it was a
sales agreement under which the customer was given the option of
paying a cash or credit price.97 Judge Chasanow explained that when
the customer uses the service before paying for it, United charges
them an additional five dollars for extending credit, and that such
89. Id. at 683, 732 A.2d at 900.
90. Id. at 685, 732 A.2d at 901.
91. Id.
92. Id., 732 A.2d at 901-02. The court also considered the issue of the circuit court's
award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Id. at 685-88, 732 A.2d at 902-03. This issue,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
93. Id. at 689, 732 A.2d at 903-04 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe major-
ity opinion may be a good example of why appellate courts should not decide cases on
issues neither briefed nor argued by parties").
94. Id. at 689-90, 732 A.2d at 904 (stating that "it is indisputable that the contracts
require pre-payment for cable service and use of cable equipment and are not in any way
loans of money to the customers by United").





cash or credit transactions did not violate usury laws because they
were a sale and not a loan of money.98
The dissent then identified two elements of damages that United
should have been allowed to recover. 99 First, United should have
been permitted to recover collection costs because the Court of Ap-
peals had never before held that a promise to pay reasonable costs of
collection was void or capped by the legal rate of interest."00 As Judge
Chasanow noted, "United presented an abundance of evidence, not
refuted or rejected by the majority, that its collection costs were rea-
sonable and necessary because of the nature of its business."' 0 ' The
dissent faulted the majority for not explaining why collection costs
were not allowed as a separate element of damages.' 0 2 Second, the
dissent argued that the court should have permitted damages for the
"special injury" resulting from the customers' retention of United's
cable boxes and other equipment.' 3 Judge Chasanow relied on the
rule of usury law that if the promisee has some special injury beyond
the loss of the use of money, a liquidated damages provision was not
unenforceable if it provides damages in excess of the permissible in-
terest on the sum.'0 4 The dissent would have allowed damages for
retention of equipment because the customers' retention of equip-
ment in this case caused a "special injury" under this rule.10 5
Judge Chasanow concluded his dissent by warning that the major-
ity's interpretation of the law may have "significant implications. °106
He explained that under the majority approach, the maximum allowa-
ble late fee is six percent per year, unless the legislature enacts an
explicit statute to the contrary. 10 7 Judge Chasanow predicted that
"there are [a] great number[ ] of contracts that may be rendered usu-
rious by the majority opinion, and class action lawyers will have vast
new vistas to explore."10 8 Judge Chasanow also noted that continu-
98. Id. (citing Falcone v. Palmer Ford, 242 Md. 487, 219 A.2d 808 (1966)).
99. Id. at 692, 732 A.2d at 905.
100. See id. at 693, 732 A.2d at 905-06 ("Contractual attorney's fees and court costs are
forms of permissible collection costs and have not been limited by the amount of permissi-
ble interest, even with loan transactions regulated by the usury laws.").
101. Id., 732 A.2d at 906.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 693-94, 732 A.2d at 906.
104. Id. (citing 5 A.L. CORIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1065, at 374-75 (1964)).
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ously computing late fees of .5% per month would present a chal-
lenge to companies.1" 9
4. Analysis.-The Burch court disrupted Maryland's well-
established law of contract damages by modifying the prejudgment
interest rule and overruling the collection cost rule.110 These disrup-
tions are not justified because the court misinterpreted the former
and wrongly ignored the latter. Furthermore, this opinion is detri-
mental to Maryland businesses and consumers for the following three
reasons: (1) it is likely to increase the incidence of breach; (2) it will
lead to higher prices for nonbreaching consumers; and (3) it poten-
tially creates enormous liability for businesses that have charged late
fees in the past.
a. The Court Misinterpreted the Prejudgment Interest Rule and
Wrongly Ignored the Collection Cost Rule.-Prior to Burch, the prejudg-
ment interest rule and collection cost rule provided a framework for
calculating damages for the breach of an obligation to pay a specific
sum of money on a specific date. The prejudgment interest rule pro-
vided that interest was allowed as a matter of right as an element of
damages for such a breach.1" Maryland courts applied this rule as a
gap-filler, to provide a measure of damages in cases where the parties
did not otherwise agree to one before the breach.112 The collection
cost rule provided that the nonbreaching party could also recover col-
lection costs as a separate element of damages in cases where both
parties agreed to that stipulation prior to the breach. 1"' The Burch
court replaced this framework with the rule that damages for the
breach of an obligation to pay a sum certain on a date certain are
always limited to the sum owed plus interest at the legal rate.11 4
109. Id.
110. See infra section 4.a.
111. See supra note 21.
112. See Brown, 63 Md. at 491-92 (awarding legal interest for default on mortgage pay-
ments where the parties' agreement did not stipulate any damages for the borrower's fail-
ure to make timely payments); see also Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop, 265 Md. 538, 545, 290
A.2d 780, 784 (1972) (awarding legal interest as damages for nonpayment of rent under
commercial lease that included no term stipulating damages for late payment); Atlantic
States Constr. Co. v. Drummond & Co., 251 Md. 77, 85, 246 A.2d 251, 255 (1968) (award-
ing legal interest as damages for nonpayment under construction contract that included
no provision stipulating damages).
113. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the origins of the collection
cost rule).
114. Burch, 354 Md. at 668-73, 732 A.2d at 892-95 (explaining the court's interpretation
that interest is the only measure of damages for breach of an obligation to pay a sum
certain on a date certain).
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The Burch court correctly stated the prejudgment interest rule-
that in cases where a party breaches an obligation to pay a sum certain
on a date certain, interest is allowed as a matter of right.11 5 The ma-
jority, however, incorrectly interpreted the prejudgment interest rule
to limit damages to the sum owed plus interest. The court relied on
Brown to support its interpretation that, under Maryland law, the cor-
rect measure of damages is the sum owed plus interest, and nothing
more. 1 6 Brown, however, does not support this proposition for two
reasons. First, in Brown, the only element of damages that the appel-
lant sought was the sum owed plus interest. 17 In Burch, however, the
cable company incurred collection costs in addition to losses associ-
ated with the time value of money."n Assuming arguendo that Brown
limits damages associated with the time value of money to the sum
owed plus interest at the legal rate, the Burch court still failed to show
how this justifies limiting other elements of damages to anything
other than their actual cost. The second reason that Brown does not
support the Burch court's interpretation is that the issue in the Brown
case concerned the proper method of calculating damages in the ab-
sence of an agreement stipulating damages, 19 whereas the issue in
Burch involved the enforceability of such an agreement. 2 ° The Brown
court recognized that the legal right to damages can come from either
the terms of the contract, or in the absence of such terms, from state
law.12' The Brown court held, in a case involving the right to damages
based on state law rather than the terms of a contract, that the correct
115. Id. at 668-69, 732 A.2d at 893 (recognizing that "[t]he ordinary rule in contract
cases, if the contract requires payment of a sum certain on a date certain, is [that] prejudg-
ment interest is typically allowed as a matter of right." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 343, 614 A.2d 560, 572 (1992))).
116. See id. at 670, 732 A.2d at 893 (stating that Brown applied the rule that damages for
contracts to pay money are limited to the legal rate of interest).
117. See Brown, 63 Md. at 485 (stating that the appellant's prayer for relief consisted of
the sale of real estate for payment of a mortgage debt, without any claim for consequential
damages).
118. See Burch, 354 Md. at 667, 732 A.2d at 892 (listing the following categories of costs
incurred as a result of breach: mailings, phone calls, and site visits).
119. See Brown, 63 Md. at 492 (stating that the mortgage agreement stipulated that "in-
terest at one percent was to be paid until the principal became due, and is silent as to the
rate after due").
120. See Burch, 354 Md. at 668, 732 A.2d at 893 (identifying the provision in the agree-
ment between United and its customers as a contractual liquidated damages provision).
121. See Brown, 63 Md. at 491-92 (citing Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 127 (1859) for
the proposition that a creditor is entitled to interest by operation of law when the contract
does not specify a rate of interest due in the event of late payment).
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measure of damages is the sum owed plus interest at the legal rate. 122
This holding dealt specifically with damage claims based on state law,
and thus, has no bearing whatsoever on damage claims based on the
terms of freely negotiated contracts.1
23
The Burch court also relied on Loudon v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby
County124 to demonstrate that its interpretation was consistent with the
common law rule that damages for breaching a contract to pay money
are limited to the legal rate of interest.125 In that case, the United
States Supreme Court held that a contractor's damages were limited
to interest, stating that " [t] he law assumes that interest is the measure
of all such damages."1 26 As the Brown court made clear, however, the
measure of damages provided by the law is relevant only where the
terms of the contract do not provide for a measure of damages.' 2 7
Thus, Loudon is inapposite because it concerned a situation where
there was no prior agreement to stipulate damages, whereas the par-
ties in Burch agreed to a measure of damages.1 28
In addition to misinterpreting the prejudgment interest rule, the
Burch court wrongly ignored the collection cost rule.1 29 The court,
acting sua sponte, raised the issue of whether United was permitted to
recover collection costs as an element of damages.13 It then dis-
missed the issue by simply stating that United "[was] not entitled to
prove costs of collection as damages." 31 The majority, however, never
explained why collection costs should not be permitted as an element
of damages.' 3 2 Since Bowie v. Hall in 1888, Maryland courts have per-
122. See id. at 491 (stating that "the weight of best authorities is, we think, decidedly in
favor of making interest on overdue instruments to run at the legal rate, after due and
unpaid").
123. See id. at 491-92 (explaining that when an agreement is silent on the matter of
interest rates during a period of default, state law establishes that the proper measure of
damages is interest at the legal rate during the period of default).
124. 104 U.S. 771 (1881).
125. See Burch, 354 Md. at 670, 732 A.2d at 893-94.
126. Loudon, 104 U.S. at 774.
127. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
128. See Loudon, 104 U.S. at 744 (noting that the contract at issue provided only that
payment would be made in the form of bonds).
129. See Burch, 354 Md. at 693, 732 A.2d at 905-06 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court of Appeals "has never before held that a promise to pay reasonable costs of
collection is void or limited to the amount of permissible interest on the payment").
130. The issue on appeal was whether the five dollar late fee was a reasonable estimate
of damages, and not whether United was entitled to recover collection costs as an element
of damages. See Burch, 354 Md. at 667, 732 A.2d at 892.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 693, 732 A.2d at 906 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he major-




mitted collection costs as an element of damages in cases where par-
ties have agreed to liquidate those damages prior to the breach.'
3
The court did not attempt to distinguish the provision in Burch from
those in previous collection cost cases; rather, the court ignored the
line of collection cost cases altogether. 13 4 By not addressing Bowie and
its progeny, the court implicitly overruled that line of cases.
b. United v. Burch is Bad for Maryland Businesses and Consum-
ers.-Not surprisingly, the Burch court's misinterpretation of the pre-
judgment interest rule and its apparent rejection of the collection cost
rule will be detrimental to Maryland businesses and consumers. The
rule adopted by the court limiting damages on contracts to pay money
to the legal rate of interest will have an extremely broad impact, con-
sidering that most contracts include a term requiring payment of a
sum certain on a date certain. 135 As a matter of policy, this rule is
troublesome because (1) it is likely to increase the occurrence of con-
tractual breaches; (2) it will lead to higher prices for nonbreaching
consumers; and (3) it potentially creates enormous liability for busi-
nesses that have charged late fees in the past.
All sellers of goods and services will run the risk of becoming un-
willing creditors under this rule.136 Any buyer who breaches a pay-
ment obligation is liable only for the balance owed plus interest at six
percent per year. 137 Therefore, a buyer might be encouraged to with-
hold payment if he could get a higher rate of return on the money
elsewhere. 131 In effect, this rule gives every buyer the option of paying
for goods and services when payment is due, or paying down the bal-
ance as if it were a loan with an indefinite term and a fixed annual
rate of six percent interest. 3  Therefore, this law is detrimental to
133. See Bowie, 69 Md. at 435-36 (recognizing the validity of a contract clause that allo-
cated collection costs, including attorneys' fees, to a party who breached his obligation to
pay a sum certain on a date certain).
134. Nowhere in its decision did the Burch majority refer to any of the cases in Maryland
that have dealt with the validity of collection cost provisions in contracts.
135. See Maryland Chamber of Commerce's Memorandum of Law in Support of Recon-
sideration or Clarification of June 8, 1999 Opinion at 5, United Cable Television of Balti-
more L.P. v. Burch, 354 Md. 658, 732 A.2d 887 (1999) (No. 82) (noting that "virtually every
contract requires one party or the other or both to pay money").
136. Id. at 11 (arguing that "as consumers discover that, by refusing or delaying to make
payment, they can cause unwitting sellers to become involuntary creditors-limited to col-
lecting a maximum interest rate of six percent on the unpaid balance").
137. See id.
138. Of course, a buyer might also consider the value of the continued business relation-
ship of the seller in deciding whether or not to pay on time.
139. In an amicus brief, the Telecommunications Association of Maryland, Delaware,
and the District of Columbia also argued that as a result of this rule, cable service providers
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sellers because it is likely to cause buyers to breach payment obliga-
tions more frequently.
This new interpretation of the law also forces sellers to reallocate
costs in a less efficient manner, which includes charging higher prices
to nonbreaching parties. Burch prohibits sellers from allocating col-
lection costs to the parties who breach their payment obligations. 140
Collection cost provisions promote efficiency because they internalize
the cost of breach within the group of customers who are best able to
avoid the harm resulting from breach. 141 Sellers who can not recover
collection costs from breaching parties will spread those costs among
all customers, regardless of whether they meet their payment obliga-
tions.14 2 Therefore, the court's rule in this case will cause near-term
and long-term price increases for nonbreaching consumers. In the
near-term, nonbreaching customers will incur a price increase equal
to a pro rata share of the current total cost of collecting delinquent
accounts. In the long-term, the nonbreaching customers' pro rata
share will continue to increase because the total cost of collecting de-
linquent accounts will rise as a result of the higher frequency of
breach.
The Burch decision threatened to expose many Maryland busi-
nesses to enormous unforeseen liability for the past over-collection of
late fees.143 This threat arises from the fact that the Burch court fun-
damentally changed the law of damages while asserting that its inter-
pretation has been the law in Maryland since 1851.144 Prior to Burch,
will disconnect service immediately after the customer breaches the payment obligation.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration at 9, United
Cable Television of Baltimore L.P. v. Burch, 354 Md. 658, 732 A.2d 887 (1999) (No. 82).
Once the cable company disconnects service, the customer will be required to pay a feder-
ally authorized reconnection charge of twenty to forty dollars. See id. at 9, 12.
140. See Burch, 354 Md. at 667, 732 A.2d at 892 (stating that United may not recover
costs of collection as an element of damages under a contract for the payment of money).
141. Late paying customers are best able to avoid causing the seller to incur collection
costs because they, not the seller, make the decision to pay or not to pay on time. See
Maryland Chamber of Commerce's Memorandum of Law in Support of Reconsideration
or Clarification ofJune 8, 1999 Opinion, supra note 134, at 3-4 (arguing that late fees serve
the useful purpose of imposing the cost of late payments on those customers who pay late).
142. See Burch, 352 Md. at 682, 732 A.2d at 900 (acknowledging United's policy argu-
ment that the rule would "result in spreading the cost of the delinquencies in payment
across all subscribers").
143. See Maryland Chamber of Commerce's Memorandum of Law in Support of Recon-
sideration or Clarification of June 8, 1999 Opinion, supra note 135, at 8 (asserting that
"many thousands of Maryland contracts are vulnerable to attack" as a result of Burch).
144. See Burch, 354 Md. at 683, 732 A.2d at 900 (asserting that Maryland common law, in
conjunction with Article III, § 49, of the Maryland Constitution, limits damages for breach
of a contract to pay money to six percent interest on the sum owed, while failing to ac-
knowledge Maryland's line of collection cost cases beginning with Bowie in 1888).
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however, the law seemed clearly to permit collection cost provi-
sions.145 Any party who exercised their rights to recover collection
costs under such a provision could arguably be forced to return all
amounts in excess of the six percent measure of damages.'4 6 As Judge
Chasanow argued in his dissent, this opinion could be a significant
detriment to Maryland businesses by creating "vast new vistas" for class
action lawyers to explore.14 7
The Maryland General Assembly responded quickly to the Court
of Appeals's unsettling decision by enacting legislation that effectively
overruled the Burch holding that late fees are limited to one half per-
cent interest on the sum owed per month.1 48 Section 14-1315 allows
parties to a consumer contract to agree to a monthly late fee provision
that is as high as five dollars or 10% of the sum owed, whichever is
greater, or 1.5% on the sum owed. 149 Moreover, the legislature made
clear in the enacting legislation that these limitations governing late
fee provisions are applicable retroactively to November 5, 1995.15°
The effect of this retroactivity is to close the "vast new vistas" of class
action litigation that the Burch court opened temporarily and that
Judge Chasanow warned of in his dissent.''
5. Conclusion.-The Burch court establishes that absent statutory
authority, contractual provisions assessing late fees are limited to the
145. See Bowie v. Hall, 69 Md. 433, 16 A. 64 (1888); Gaither v. Tolson, 84 Md. 637, 36 A.
449 (1897); Noyes Air Conditioning Contractors v. Wilson Towers Ltd. Partnership, 122
Md. App. 283, 712 A.2d 126 (1998); see also supra notes 29-68 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the expanded application of the collection cost rule to include payment obliga-
tions arising out of a variety of types of contracts).
146. United's subscribers expressly agreed to pay a late fee to compensate for collection
costs. See Burch, 354 Md. at 664, 732 A.2d at 890. Nevertheless, the court stated that
United should have been permitted to retain only a maximum of 0.5% interest on the sum
owed. See id. at 685, 732 A.2d at 902.
147. See id. at 694, 732 A.2d at 906 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
148. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-115(f) (2000) (establishing that in a consumer
contract, monthly late fees are limited to either (1) five dollars or 10% of the sum owed,
whichever is greater; or (2) 1.5% of the sum owed).
149. Id.
150. S.B. 145, 414th Sess. of the Gen. Assembly (Md. 2000) (stating that the Act shall
"apply to all late fees provided for in contracts entered into, or in effect, on or after No-
vember 5, 1995").
151. See Burch, 354 Md. at 694, 732 A.2d at 906 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (warning that
the majority opinion created a legal uncertainty with respect to late fees that could poten-
tially be exploited by class action lawyers).
In April 2000, Maryland courts docketed approximately seventeen class actions chal-
lenging the reasonableness of late fees. Bridget Gutierrez, Late Fees Bill Passes G.A., Awaits
Glendening's Signature, THE DAILY REcoRD, Apr. 5, 2000, at 3A. Section 14-1315(f) presuma-
bly eliminates all these late fee challenges by providing a statutory basis for late fee clauses
retroactive to November 5, 1995.
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six percent annual rate of legal interest as set forth in Section 57 of
Article III of the Maryland Constitution.'5 2 The court's reasoning for
the rule is flawed because it misinterprets the prejudgment interest
rule as a cap on damages, whereas it was previously applied only as a
gap-filler to provide a measure of damages where the parties had not
done so themselves by express agreement. Furthermore, the court
failed to apply the collection cost rule, which enforces agreements like
the one between United and its customers which allocates collection
costs to a breaching party. The Burch court established a rule that
threatened to increase the frequency of breach because the law grants
consumers the option of delaying payment indefinitely by limiting
damages to a mere 0.5% per month. Under such a rule, as more and
more consumers begin to realize that they have the option to delay
payment indefinitely, the number of default accounts would increase.
Nonbreaching customers would be harmed by this rule because busi-
nesses would respond to it by charging higher prices to all customers
as a means of recovering collection costs. Finally, the rule threatened
to expose businesses to unforeseen liability for charging late fees to
customers under agreements that clearly seemed to be enforceable
under Maryland law at the time the agreements were made. The
Maryland legislature responded quickly and correctly to the Burch
court's unsettling decision by statutorily overruling a precedent that
would have been bad for Maryland businesses and consumers.
MICHAEL ROLF HILL
152. Burch, 354 Md. at 689, 732 A.2d at 904 (Chasanow,.J., dissenting).
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VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Court of Appeals Properly Rules Cagjacking a General
Intent Crime
In Harris v. State,1 the Court of Appeals considered whether
carjacking2 is a specific or general intent crime.' The court, in a 4-3
decision, concluded that it was not, reasoning that there was "nothing
in the language of the statute, the legislative history, or the nature of
the crime itself to suggest that the Legislature intended to make
carjacking a specific intent crime."4 A review of the statute's legisla-
tive history5 and its plain language convinced the court that the Gen-
eral Assembly intended to create a new offense that did not require
1. 353 Md. 596, 728 A.2d 180 (1999).
2. The offense of carjacking is defined in Section 348A of Article 27 of the Maryland
Annotated Code. Article 27 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Elements of the offense.-(1) An individual commits the offense of carjacking
when the individual obtains unauthorized possession or control of a motor vehi-
cle from another individual in actual possession by force or violence, or by put-
ting that individual in fear through intimidation or threat of force or violence.
(2) An individual commits the offense of armed carjacking when the individual
employs or displays a deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of a
carjacking.
(e) Defenses.-It is not a defense to the offense of carjacking or armed carjacking
that the defendant did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of the motor
vehicle.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348A (1993).
3. Harris, 353 Md. at 599, 728 A.2d at 181. Specific intent crimes are those which
require "some specific mental element or intended purpose above and beyond the mental
state required for the mere actus reus of the crime itself." Wieland v. State, 101 Md. App. 1,
39, 643 A.2d 446, 464-65 (1994). When the crime consists only of a general intent to do
the immediate act and embraces no additional purpose or design to be accomplished be-
yond that immediate act, that crime is considered to be one of general intent. See id. at 40,
643 A.2d at 465. Maryland's view that voluntary intoxication may be a defense to specific
intent crimes but not to general intent crimes "is also the approach taken in most other
jurisdictions." See State v. Shell, 307 Md. 46, 63, 512 A.2d 358, 367 (1986) (discussing
voluntary intoxication as a defense in other jurisdictions).
4. Harris, 353 Md. at 616, 728 A.2d at 190.
5. The General Assembly enacted Section 348A as emergency legislation on April 26,
1993, following the brutal carjacking murder of Dr. Pamela Basu in Howard County, Mary-
land. See Act of April 26, 1993, ch. 69, 1993 Md. Laws 1084; see also Mobley v. State, 111 Md.
App. 446, 453, 681 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1996) (citations omitted).
In September 1992, Pamela Basu was taking her twenty-two month-old daughter to a
nursery in a prosperous residential area in Howard County, Maryland. See F. Georgann
Wing, Putting the Brakes on Carijacking or Accelerating It? The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U.
RicHi. L. REV. 385, 390-91 (1994) (describing Basu's carjacking). At a road junction, two
men pulled her out of her late-model BMW and drove away, with her arm still tangled in
the seatbelt outside her car. See id. at 391. They dragged her almost two miles until she fell
away from the car, sideswiping a fence at one point to try to dislodge her. See id. She
subsequently died from massive internal injuries. See id.
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"any additional deliberate or conscious purpose beyond that of ob-
taining unauthorized possession or control of a motor vehicle."6 The
court explained that the statute had a dual purpose: "to enhance the
penalties applicable to individuals who use force or threat of force or
intimidation to obtain possession or control of a motor vehicle and to
make it easier for prosecutors to obtain convictions for carjacking."7
Consistent with its past efforts to construe statutes so as to effectuate
the legislature's broad goals,' the Court of Appeals was correct in rul-
ing that carjacking is a general intent crime.
1. The Case.--On November 26, 1996, the appellant, Timothy
Harris, and his friend, Jack Tipton, were at the home of a mutual
friend playing cards and drinking alcohol.9 Tipton offered to drive
Harris home, but testified that Harris became angry when he refused
to drive into the District of Columbia.1 ° Harris then forcibly removed
Tipton from the car and drove away.'1 Appellant was subsequently
indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George's County for carjacking,
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and second degree assault. 12
At trial, Harris attempted to assert the defense of voluntary intoxi-
cation. 3 He testified that he was drinking alcohol and smoking mari-
juana throughout the evening and could not remember the events
that occurred after he left his friend's house.' 4 Harris argued that he
was too intoxicated to form a specific intent, and requested a jury in-
struction on voluntary intoxication.' 5 The trial court instructed the
jury that "when charged with an offense requiring specific intent, a
defendant cannot be guilty if he was so intoxicated by drugs and/or
alcohol that he was unable to form the necessary intent."' 6 The court,
however, declined to instruct the jury that carjacking required specific
6. Harris, 353 Md. at 607, 728 A.2d at 185.
7. Id. at 608-09, 728 A.2d at 186 (footnotes omitted).
8. See id. at 606, 728 A.2d at 184 (reaffirming that "the cardinal rule in statutory con-
struction is to effectuate the Legislature's broad goal or purpose" (citing Gagliano v. State,
334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994))); see infra notes 21-26 (discussing this
concept).




13. See id. Voluntary intoxication is recognized in Maryland as relevant to determine
the existence of the mens rea for specific intent crimes, but not for general intent crimes.
See Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 63, 68-70, 512 A.2d 358, 367, 369-70 (1986) (discussing Mary-
land's approach to voluntary intoxication).
14. See Harris, 353 Md. at 600, 728 A.2d at 181.
15. See id.
16. Id., 728 A.2d at 181-82.
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intent, instead instructing that of the three charges, only the unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle required specific intent.1 7
The jury found Harris not guilty of the unauthorized taking of a
motor vehicle, and guilty of carjacking and assault."l The trial judge
imposed a sentence of imprisonment of thirty years, with all but eigh-
teen years suspended for the carjacking, and a ten-year concurrent
sentence for the assault.19 Harris appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its "own mo-
tion to address the issue of whether specific intent is an element of the
crime of carjacking."20
2. Legal Background.-
a. A Brief Survey of Maryland Judicial Statutory Interpretation.-
The Court of Appeals has consistently stated that "[t] he cardinal rule
of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the legislature. '2 1 Courts look first to the actual language of the
statute,22 because "[t]he primary source of legislative intent is, of
course, the language of the statute itself."23
When statutory language is free from ambiguity, courts generally
do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative
17. See id., 728 A.2d at 182.
18. See id.
19. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 728 A.2d 180 (1999) (No.
81).
20. Harris, 353 Md. at 601, 728 A.2d at 182.
21. Giant Food, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 356 Md. 180,
188, 738 A.2d 856, 860 (1999) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)); see also Board of
License Comm'rs, v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999) (quoting same
passage); Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (same); Coburn v.
Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996) ("This Court has made it clear that
the cardinal rule in construing any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature" (citing Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 600 A.2d at 429)).
22. See Toye, 354 Md. at 122, 729 A.2d at 410 ("Legislative intent first must be sought in
the actual language of the statute."); Anne Arundel County v. City of Annapolis, 352 Md.
117, 123, 721 A.2d 217, 220 (1998) (noting that in determining legislative intent "[w]e
start by examining the language of the statute"); Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v.
Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997) ("Our search for
legislative intent begins, and usually ends, with the words of the statute at issue." (citing
Shuman, Kane v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 688 A.2d 929, 931 (1995))); Coburn, 342 Md. at
256, 674 A.2d at 957 (stating that "[t]he primary source for determining legislative intent is
the language of the statute itself"); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995)
(noting that in construing the meaning of a statute, "[w]e start by examining the language
of the statute" (citing Tucker v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730
(1986))); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429 (recognizing that "[t]he first step in deter-
mining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language" (citing Fish Market v. G.A.A.,
337 Md. 1, 650 A.2d 705 (1994))).
23. Tucker, 308 Md. at 73, 517 A.2d at 731.
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intent.24 Maryland's highest court has also stated that in construing a
statute, it "assume[s] that the words of the statute are intended to
have their natural, ordinary and generally understood meaning in the
absence of evidence to the contrary."25 The court has further com-
mented that "where statutory language is plain and free from ambigu-
ity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, courts are not at
liberty to disregard the natural import of words with a view towards
making the statute express an intention which is different from its
plain meaning. "26
However, "where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one
meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the
literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in
light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. "27
Additionally, where the legislature has chosen not to define a term
used in a statute, the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that the
term should "be given its ordinary and natural meaning 'without
resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of ex-
tending or limiting its operation. '2
When dealing with a criminal statute that is ambiguous, the rule
of lenity may apply, entitling the defendant to the benefit of the ambi-
guity. 29 As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[1]enity expressly
prohibits a court from interpreting a criminal statute to increase the
penalty it places on a 'defendant when such an interpretation can be
based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] in-
tended."'' 0 The rule of lenity therefore applies only when statutory
24. See, e.g., id., 517 A.2d at 732 ("Of course, where statutory provisions are clear or
unambiguous, no construction or clarification is needed or permitted .... .").
25. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98, 570 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990) (citing Tucker v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1986)).
26. Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 434-35, 635 A.2d 977, 979 (1994) (quot-
ing Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 63-64 (1987)).
27. Tucker, 308 Md. at 75, 517 A.2d at 732 (citing State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d
275 (1975); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961)).
28. Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474, 403 A.2d 788, 791 (1979) (quoting Schweitzer v.
Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438, 374 A.2d 347, 352 (1977)).
29. See Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 651, 689 A.2d 610, 614 (1997) ("An ambiguous
penal statute is subject to the 'rule of lenity' which requires that such statutes be strictly
construed against the State and in favor of the defendant." (citing Harris v. State, 331 Md.
137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993); State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 754, 589 A.2d 193, 195
(1990); Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539-40, 546 A.2d 465, 468-69 (1988); N. SINGER, SUTH-
ERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03, at 102-03 (5th ed. 1993))).
30. Gardner, 344 Md. at 651, 689 A.2d at 614 (quoting Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214,
222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived .... we
can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." Holloway v. United States,
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language is so vague and legislative history so obscure that courts can
do little more than hazard a guess as to legislative intent.
Ultimately, whether language is ambiguous or not, courts aim for
logical interpretations of statutes-interpretations that construe stat-
utes "reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the
enacting body."3 Courts examine the larger framework within which
a statute is written and continually strive to heed the overriding pur-
pose and goal of the statute, because the search for legislative intent is
most accurately characterized as "an effort to 'seek to discern some
general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the statute.'32
b. Maryland's Approach to General and Specific Intent Crimes.-
There are at least two components of every crime-"the actus reus or
guilty act and the mens rea or guilty mind or mental state accompany-
ing a forbidden act."'3 3 It is "an axiom of criminal jurisprudence" that
the accused must have acted with a culpable mental state to be guilty
of a crime. 4 With regard to the mens rea element of criminal offenses,
Maryland is one of many states that has adopted the specific intent-
general intent distinction. 35 For offenses where no showing of partic-
ular intent is required, the Court of Appeals has held that the general
intent to do the criminal act must be established.36
Courts have developed the distinction between specific and gen-
eral intent crimes in response to the problem of the intoxicated of-
fender.37 In this situation, the concern is how to reconcile two
conflicting theories on the fairest method by which to deal with intoxi-
cated offenders: "[o] n the one hand, the moral culpability of a
526 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1999) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998)).
31. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992).
32. Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)
(quoting Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland's Statutes Quo, 43 MD. L.
REv. 647, 653 (1984)).
33. Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 578, 632 A.2d 797, 800 (1993).
34. Id.
35. SeeWieland v. State, 101 Md. App. 1, 35, 643 A.2d 446, 462 (1994); see supra note 87
(listing states that currently observe the general/specific intent distinction to include Cali-
fornia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
West Virginia, and Wyoming (list not exhaustive)).
36. SeeWarfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 496, 554 A.2d 1238, 1249 (1989) (clarifying that
while the misdemeanor crime of breaking and entering required no proof of felonious
intent, "[t]his is not to say, however, that a general intent is not necessary [and that]
[miens rea to break and enter must be established").
37. See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969) (stating that the distinction
"evolved as a judicial response to the problem of the intoxicated offender").
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drunken criminal is frequently less than that of a sober person effect-
ing a like injury[;] [o]n the other hand, it is commonly felt that a
person who voluntarily gets drunk and while in that state commits a
crime should not escape the consequences.
38
The Court of Special Appeals, in Wieland v. State,39 quoting the
California Supreme Court, explained the distinction between general
and specific intent:
When the definition of a crime consists of only the descrip-
tion of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a
further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether
the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This inten-
tion is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the
definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act
or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is
deemed to be one of specific intent.4 °
In Wieland, the court also established that determining whether a
particular crime possesses a necessary specific intent requires an ex-
amination of "each crime on an ad hoc basis."'" The appropriate in-
quiry, then, is whether, "in addition to the general intent to do the
immediate act, [the crime] embraces some additional purpose or de-
sign to be accomplished beyond that immediate act."42
Almost a decade earlier, in Shell v. State,43 the Court of Appeals
explained the concept of a specific intent:
"A specific intent is not simply the intent to do the immedi-
ate act but embraces the requirement that the mind be con-
scious of a more remote purpose or design which shall
eventuate from the doing of the immediate act. Though as-
sault implies only the general intent to strike the blow, as-
sault with intent to murder, rob, rape or maim requires a
fully formed and conscious purpose that those further conse-
quences shall flow from the doing of the immediate act. To
break and enter requires a mere general intent but to com-
mit burglary requires the additional specific intent of com-
mitting a felony after the entry has been made .... This is
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. 101 Md. App. 1, 643 A.2d 446 (1994).
40. Id. at 37, 643 A.2d at 464 (quoting Hood, 462 P.2d at 377); see also supra note 3
(discussing specific and general intent).
41. 101 Md. App. at 37, 643 A.2d at 464.
42. Id. at 37-38, 643 A.2d at 464.
43. 307 Md. 46, 512 A.2d 358 (1986).
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why even voluntary intoxication may negate a specific intent
though it will not negate a mere general intent."44
The Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals continue
to be painstaking in their efforts to clarify the difference between gen-
eral and specific intent,45 perhaps in part due to the skepticism with
which the distinction is looked upon in academic circles. 46 The essen-
tial distinction is between the intent to commit an act (general intent)
and the intent to produce a consequence (specific intent) .4  The
Court of Special Appeals has observed that:
[a]ccurately employed, the term "specific intent" designates
some specific mental element or intended purpose above
and beyond the mental state required for the mere actus reus
of the crime itself. Were it not so, every intentional crime
would be deemed a specific intent crime and there would no
longer even be such a category as that of general intent
crimes.48
c. Federal Courts' Treatment of the General/Specific Intent Distinc-
tion.-Many federal courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have con-
cluded that "[i]n the absence of an explicit statement that a crime
44. Id. at 62-63, 512 A.2d at 366 (quoting Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 277, 305, 398
A.2d 426, 442 (1979)).
45. In cases such as Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 277, 398 A.2d 426 (1979) and Shell v.
State, 307 Md. 46, 512 A-2d 358 (1986), the courts have attempted to fine tune and further
clarify Maryland's specific intent law. In Shell, Judge Eldridge "conducted a thorough re-
view of both specific intent generally and of the significance of the specific intent-general
intent distinction to the defense of voluntary intoxication." Wieland, 101 Md. App. at 35-
36, 643 A.2d at 463.
46. See Wieland, 101 Md. App. at 35, 643 A.2d at 463 (noting the criticism of such a
distinction in academia (citing JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 142
(2d ed. 1960))).
47. See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 379 (1969) (determining that it would be im-
proper to allow evidence of intoxication to relieve a man of responsibility for the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon).
In Hood, the Supreme Court of California, addressing voluntary intoxication, ex-
plained that
a drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do something simple, such as
strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has reached the stage of unconscious-
ness. What he is not as capable as a sober man of doing is exercising judgment
about the social consequences of his acts or controlling his impulses toward anti-
social acts. He is more likely to act rashly and impulsively and to be susceptible to
passion and anger. It would therefore be anomalous to allow evidence of intoxi-
cation to relieve a man of responsibility for the crimes of assault with a deadly
weapon or simple assault, which are so frequently committed in just such a
manner.
Id.
48. Wieland, 101 Md. App. at 39, 643 A.2d at 464-65.
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requires specific intent,... only general intent is needed."49 For ex-
ample, the Sixth Circuit's rule of construction is that if a criminal stat-
ute "does not specify a heightened mental element such as specific
intent, general intent is presumed to be the required element."5 ° Both
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits define the distinction between specific
and general intent crimes in terms of how the intent is proved: gen-
eral intent is proved "by probing the defendant's subjective state of
mind" whereas specific intent is proved "by objectively looking at the
defendant's behavior in the totality of the circumstances. 5 1
d. The Federal Carjacking Statute.-The federal carjacking
statute, as it was originally formulated,52 was consistently construed by
courts as a general intent crime.5' However, the statute was amended
by Congress in 1994 to require specific intent.54 This new specific in-
tent requirement was first recognized by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Randolph.5 5 The Randolph court explained that "[i]n deter-
mining whether a crime is a general intent offense or a specific intent
49. United States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that federal
crime of assault resulting in serious bodily injury requires only general intent (citing
United States v.Johnston, 543 F.2d 55, 58 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Martin, 536 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Meeker, 527 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir.
1975))); see also United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing
that "[w] hen a statute does not contain any reference to intent, general intent is ordinarily
implied"); United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1990) (presuming general
intent when statute does not specify a specific intent).
50. United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Brown, 915
F.3d at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
51. United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1065 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that trans-
mitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce requires only a general in-
tent to threaten) (quoting DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 149).
52. Before a 1994 amendment, the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 provided criminal pun-
ishments for "[w]hoever, possessing a firearm . . . takes a motor vehicle that has been
transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so." 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (1992).
53. See United States v. Payne, 83 F.3d 346, 347 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
taking element of carjacking does not require an intent to permanently deprive a victim of
a motor vehicle and, therefore, holding that carjacking is a general intent crime); United
States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that carjacking is a general
intent crime and that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes);
United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling carjacking a general
intent crime because the statute contains no reference to any intent, and thus eliminates
the defense of diminished capacity which is only cognizable for specific intent crimes).
54. SeeAct of Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60003(a) (14), 108 Stat. 1968, 1970
(1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)) (adding the requirement that
the perpetrator act "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm").
55. 93 F.3d 656, 661 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "no federal court appears to have
construed § 2119's new intent requirement").
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offense, [we] look to such factors as 'the elements of the offense' and
'the words and the purpose of the statute."'' 56 The court also stated
that "if Congress wished to establish a specific intent crime, it would
[write] with the intent to [do a particular act.]" 57 Because Congress
had used this exact intent language in its 1994 amendment, the Ran-
dolph court determined that it had intended to incorporate a specific
intent element into the federal carjacking statute 8.5  Additionally, the
court examined the legislative history surrounding the 1994 amend-
ment and concluded that it did not "contravene [this] conclusion. 59
e. Other States' Interpretations of Carjacking Statutes Similar to
Maryland's.-The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has inter-
preted the District's carjacking statute as a general intent offense.6 °
That statute requires only that the taking of the vehicle be performed
"recklessly."61 The D.C. Court of Appeals interpreted the mens rea of
recklessness as something less than specific intent when it stated, in
Pixley v. United States,62 that "[a]n utterly heedless (perhaps alcohol-
induced) mistaken belief in ownership accompanying a forcible de-
mand for possession would ... satisfy the [carjacking] statute, though
not [the robbery statute]."63 Therefore, the Pixley court concluded
that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to the crime of
carjacking.64
California courts have recognized that whereas robbery involves
an intent to "permanently deprive" a victim of property, carjacking is
satisfied by an intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim
56. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.Jim, 865 F.2d 211, 213
(9th Cir. 1989)).
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingJim, 865 F.2d at 214).
58. See id.
59. Id. (relying on language from the House Conference Report on the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which "characterizes [the change in language]
as the 'addition of an intent standard for carjacking'" (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-
711 (1994))).
60. See Pixley v. United States, 692 A.2d 438, 440 (1997) (stating that, unlike robbery,
carjacking does not require "proof of a specific intent to steal the property taken").
61. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2903(a) (1) (1981) states:
A person commits the offense of carjacking if, by any means, that person
knowingly or recklessly by force or violence, whether against resistance or by sud-
den or stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in fear, or attempts to do so,
shall take from another person immediate actual possession of a person's motor
vehicle.
62. 692 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1997).
63. Id. at 440.
64. See id.
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of the vehicle.65 In People v. Antoine,66 the California Court of Appeal
for the Fourth District noted that the California legislature's primary
purpose behind enacting a special carjacking statute with a penalty
greater than that for second degree robbery was that "carjacking is a
particularly serious crime that victimizes persons in vulnerable settings
and, because of the nature of the taking, raises a serious potential for
harm to the victim, the perpetrator and the public at large. '67 The
court explained that "[w]hether a carjacker is seeking thrills, [i.e., in-
tending a temporary deprivation] or 'wheels,' [i.e., intending a per-
manent deprivation], the danger to the victims and to society is
equally great.
68
Florida's carjacking statute also provides that a "taking" of the
vehicle is sufficient, whether the offender intends the deprivation to
be temporary or permanent.69 Thus, there is no requirement to
prove specific intent to permanently deprive to be convicted of
carjacking in Florida.7°
In contrast to the District of Columbia, California, and Florida,
New York classifies carjacking as robbery in the second degree.7" New
65. See, e.g., People v. Green, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 263 (Ct. App. 1996). The text of the
California carjacking statute states:
(a) "Carjacking" is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of
another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or
immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will
and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in
possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means
of force or fear.
(c) This section shall not be construed to supersede or affect Section 211 [rob-
bery statute]. A person may be charged with a violation of this section and Sec-
tion 211. However, no defendant may be punished under this section and
Section 211 for the same act which constitutes a violation of both this section and
Section 211.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 215 (West 1999).
66. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.133 (West 1999). The relevant portion reads:
(1) "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of
larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently
or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the
course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
Id.
70. See, e.g., James v. State, 745 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming
the defendant's carjacking conviction on the ground that the defendant intended to, at
the very least, temporarily deprive the owner of possession or custody of his vehicle).
71. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 160.10 (McKinney 1999). The relevant portion reads:
A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals prop-
erty and when:
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York Penal Law defines robbery as a "forcible stealing";72 therefore,
proof of specific intent to exert permanent control over the property
taken or to cause permanent loss to the owner is required.73 The New
York Court of Appeals stated in People v. Jennings74 that the specific
intent of larceny "is simply not satisfied by an intent temporarily to use
property without the owner's permission, or even an intent to appro-
priate outright the benefits of the property's short-term use."75 While
the New York robbery statute does not contain a specific intent re-
quirement, a robbery charge incorporates the specific intent require-
ment of the lesser included larceny offense. 76 Thus, larcenous intent
(i.e., specific intent to permanently deprive) is an indispensable ingre-
dient of the crime of robbery.
In New York, carjacking is the fourth aggravating factor for rob-
bery in the second degree.77 This fourth aggravating factor was added
in 1995 in response to the carjacking phenomenon.78 In approving
the legislation, the Governor explained:
Instances of drivers being shot, assaulted, threatened, physi-
cally dragged, or otherwise forced from their vehicles have
become so common as to have given rise to the term
1. He is aided by another person actually present; or
2. In the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight there-
from, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;
or
(b) displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun
or other firearm; or
3. The property consists of a motor vehice, as defined in section one hundred
twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law (emphasis added).
72. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 160.00 (McKinney 1999). Having defined robbery as a "forcible
stealing," the New York robbery statute differentiates robbery from theft by violent or
threatening circumstances. See People v. Chessman, 429 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (App. Div.
1980) (declaring that force coupled with larceny equals robbery).
73. In New York, whether a robber commits first, second, or third degree robbery, the
requisite intent which the prosecution must prove remains the same. See People v. Gage,
687 N.Y.S.2d 202 (App. Div. 1999).
74. 512 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1986).
75. Id. at 660.
76. People v. Chessman, 429 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that al-
though the robbery statute does not require specific intent per se, a prosecutor must meet
the intent requirement associated with the lesser included crime of larceny).
77. There are three degrees of robbery. The basic offense, robbery in the third de-
gree, occurs when a person forcibly steals property. The addition of any one of the aggra-
vating factors elevates the crime to robbery in the second or first degree. For robbery in
the second degree, the aggravating factors are: "aided by another actually present," "causes
physical injury," "displays what appears to be a firearm," or robs a "motor vehicle." N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 160.00 (1990) (Practice Commentary).
78. Id.
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'carjacking' ... Under current law, however, in some carjack-
ing cases the most serious charge prosecutors can bring is
third-degree robbery, a class D felony offense carrying a max-
imum sentence of just seven years .... Given the serious-
ness, increasing incidence and urgent need to deter
carjacking, in carjacking cases, prosecutors should always be
able to charge at least second-degree robbery.
79
e. Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Specific Intent Crimes.-
It has long been accepted in Maryland that while voluntary intoxica-
tion is a defense to a specific intent crime, it is not a defense to a
general intent crime."0 Because the law holds individuals responsible
for their actions of criminal conduct, voluntary intoxication provides
no defense for those accused of a general intent crime." With regard
to specific intent crimes, however, the question becomes one of de-
gree: whether the accused was sufficiently intoxicated to negate the
specific intent required.8 2
Under early English common law, there was no such defense as
voluntary intoxication." Anyone guilty of a crime, though voluntary,
was punished as though sober when committing the crime.8 4 In the
United States, the departure "from the early English rule came after
murder was divided into degrees, whereupon evidence of intoxication
was admitted to negate premeditation and deliberation. " " The ex-
ception allowing drunkenness to disprove the mens rea for first degree
79. Id. (citing Governor's Approval Memorandum 27).
80. See Avey v. State, 249 Md. 385, 388, 240 A.2d 107, 108 (1968) (noting the majority
rule that where intoxication exists to a degree that it deprives the accused of his capacity to
form a specific intent, one cannot be convicted of a crime requiring that intent); see also
Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 58-63, 512 A.2d 358, 364-66 (1986) (surveying Maryland cases
which allowed the assertion of voluntary intoxication as a defense to specific intent crimes
but not general intent crimes).
81. See Shell, 307 Md. at 62-63, 512 A.2d at 366 (explaining the more remote purpose or
design marking specific intent as a reason why voluntary intoxication may negate a specific
intent, but not a mere general intent).
82. See id. at 61, 512 A.2d at 366 (emphasizing that the degree of intoxication required
to negate specific intent is substantial); see also State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 607-08, 298
A.2d 378, 381 (1973) ("Evidence of drunkenness which falls short of a proven incapacity in
the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime merely establishes that the
mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion and
does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequence of his act.").
83. See Shell 307 Md. at 59 n. 11, 512 A.2d at 364 n.11 (citing 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 1 § 6, at 2 (1716); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § III, at 25-26 (1898)).




murder was eventually adapted to other offenses requiring a particu-
lar mens rea.86
Maryland's view that voluntary intoxication can serve as a defense
in specific intent, but not general intent crimes, is the approach taken
in most other jurisdictions.8 7 Only a select few jurisdictions allow vol-
86. See id. (citing Pigman v. Ohio, 15 Ohio 555 (1846); Director of Pub. Prosecutions v.
Beard, A.C. 479 (1920)).
87. See id. at 63, 512 A.2d at 367; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:15 (West 1997) (pro-
viding that the intoxicated condition of an offender during commission of a crime is im-
material except, inter alia, where circumstances indicate that the intoxication has
precluded the offender's ability to form specific intent); People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377
(Cal. 1969) (in bank) (observing that the distinction between specific and general intent
crimes evolved as a judicial response to the problem of the intoxicated offender, and rec-
ognizing that on occasion, the moral culpability of a drunken animal is less than that of a
sober individual effecting a like injury); Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1985)
(noting that the Florida Supreme Court has long recognized voluntary intoxication as a
defense to specific intent crimes); State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 620 (Idaho 1991) (acknowl-
edging that it is well established in Idaho that the degree to which intoxication affects
intent is a question of fact to be determined by the jury); People v. Mocaby, 551 N.E.2d
673, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that in order to constitute a defense to a criminal
charge, the intoxication must be so extreme as to render defendant wholly incapable of
forming the requisite intent to commit the crime in question); State v. Caldwell, 385
N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986) (noting that it has been the general rule in Iowa that, al-
though voluntary intoxication cannot constitute a defense to a crime, it may negate crimi-
nal intent if such intent is an element of the crime charged); State v. McDaniel, 612 P.2d
1231, 1237 (Kan. 1980) (stating that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general
intent crime, although it may be used to demonstrate an inability to form a particular state
of mind necessary for a specific intent crime); Commonwealth v. Troy, 540 N.E.2d 162, 166
(Mass. 1989) (commenting that voluntary intoxication has no mitigating effect for a gen-
eral intent crime, in this case, rape); People v. Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Mich.
1982) (holding that the offenses of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree
murder are general intent, not specific intent crimes, thus voluntary intoxication is not a
defense); State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 1979) (citations omitted) (acknowl
edging that voluntary intoxication is a valid defense only if specific intent is an essential
element of the crime in question); State v. Lesiak, 449 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Neb. 1989) (hold-
ing that the offense of procuring liquor for a minor does not involve a specific criminal
intent, and thus, voluntary intoxication is not a defense); Nevius v. State, 699 P.2d 1053,
1060 (Nev. 1985) (holding that for a defendant to obtain a jury instruction on voluntary
intoxication as negating specific intent, evidence must show the defendant's consumption
of intoxicants, the intoxicating effect of said intoxicants, and the resulting effect on the
defendant's mental state); State v. Tapia, 466 P.2d 551, 553 (N.M. 1970) (stating that spe-
cific intent is not required for a second-degree murder conviction, thus voluntary intoxica-
tion is no defense); State v. White, 229 S.E.2d 152, 157 (N.C. 1976) (noting that since
specific intent is not an essential element of the crime of common-law arson, voluntary
intoxication is not a defense); Boyd v. State, 572 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)
(finding only a general criminal intent requirement for rape, such that voluntary intoxica-
tion is not available as a defense); State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993) (com-
menting that it is well settled law in Rhode Island that if specific intent is an essential
element of a crime, then defendant's intoxication may be offered to negate specific intent
if the intoxication is of such a degree as to completely overpower the defendant's will and
render his mind incapable of reasoned thought); State v. Primeaux, 328 N.W.2d 256, 259
(S.D. 1982) (deciding that the 'depraved mind' requirement of South Dakota's second-
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untary intoxication to negate any mental state."8 Likewise, only a few
states absolutely preclude voluntary intoxication evidence in all
cases.8 9 Most jurisdictions, like Maryland, fall somewhere in the spec-
trum between the two extremes."° While the distinction between spe-
cific and general intent crimes has drawn criticism from both courts
and scholars, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland maintains that "it
degree murder statute requires only general intent to do the acts which caused the harm
and thus, agreeing with lower court's determination that a voluntary intoxication dimin-
ished capacity instruction was improper); State v. Keeton, 272 S.E.2d 817, 820 (W. Va.
1980) (acknowledging that while voluntary drunkenness does not ordinarily excuse a
crime, it may reduce the degree of a crime or negate a specific intent); Crozier v. State, 723
P.2d 42, 51 (Wyo. 1986) (stating that in Wyoming, intoxication may negate the existence of
a specific-intent element of a specific-intent crime, but it is not a factor affecting a general-
intent crime).
88. See Shell, 307 Md. at 63 n.13, 512 A.2d at 367 n.13 (noting that Hawaii and Iowa, by
statute, admit evidence of voluntary intoxication whenever it is relevant to any element of
an offense) (citing Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-230 (1976); Iowa Code Ann. § 701.5 (West
1979)).
89. See Shel 307 Md. at 64 n.14, 512 A.2d at 367 n.14 (identifying Missouri and Texas
as states which, by statute, preclude admission of voluntary intoxication evidence in all
cases); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995) (stating that intoxication is no defense
to any criminal charge if the intoxication was voluntary); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-704(c)
(1988) (stating that voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or
omission); Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.076.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996) (noting that evidence
that an individual was voluntarily intoxicated shall never be admissible for the purpose of
negating a mental state which is an element of the offense); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203
(1995) (providing that an intoxicated individual is criminally responsible for his conduct
and a voluntarily intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense, nor may it be con-
sidered when determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the of-
fense); White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784, 787-88 (Ark. 1986) (declaring that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense in criminal prosecutions); McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151,
1160-61 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially concurring) (holding firm to the common law rule
that there is no injustice in holding a person responsible for crimes committed in a state of
voluntary intoxication, on the basis that, if one casts off the restraints of reason by a volun-
tary act, no wrong is done to him if he is held accountable for any crime he may commit in
that condition); State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (stating that a
jury may not consider intoxication on the issue of a defendant's mental state); State v.
Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1977) (adopting the rule that voluntary intoxication,
where it has not produced permanent insanity, is never an excuse for or a defense to
crime, regardless of whether the intent involved be general or specific).
90. See Shell, 307 Md. at 64, 512 A.2d at 367 (noting that most other jurisdictions distin-
guish between specific intent and general intent).
91. The general intent/specific intent distinction is far from perfect. Courts have con-
tinually recognized the limitations and difficulties in applying the distinction, most notably
that an actor who is so intoxicated that he is unable to intend a proscribed consequence is
likely to be similarly unable to intend a forbidden act. See Hood, 462 P.2d at 378 (stating
that there is only a linguistic difference between an intent to do an act already performed
and an intent to do that same act in the future); People v. Kelley, 176 N.W.2d 435, 443
(Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (recognizing the argument that there is no intrinsic meaning to the
terms "specific intent" and "general intent").
Due to the technical difficulties involved in applying the specific intent doctrine, the
Model Penal Code developed a new method for achieving partial responsibility for intoxi-
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does serve to reconcile fairness to the accused with the need to pro-
tect the public from intoxicated offenders and to deter such
persons."
92
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Harris v. State, the Court of Appeals
held carjacking to be a general intent crime."3 Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Raker 4 concluded that there is nothing in the language of
the carjacking statute, the legislative history of the statute, or the na-
ture of the crime itself to suggest that the Legislature's intent was to
make carjacking a specific intent crime.95 Because the court ruled
that carjacking was not a specific intent crime, it followed that volun-
tary intoxication could not be raised as a defense.9 6
After setting forth the text of the carjacking statute, 9 7 and ex-
plaining the difference between a specific and a general intent
crime,9s the court turned to the question of the carjacking statute's
requisite intent. The court began by stating that, "[viiewing the stat-
ute as a whole, the language of the carjacking statute does not evi-
dence an intent on the part of the General Assembly to create a
specific intent crime."9 9 The court explained that where the statute in
question contains no "reference to intent, general intent is ordinarily
implied."'0 0 Because "[t]he General Assembly has created specific in-
tent crimes, using explicit language to indicate the required specific
intent" the court reasoned that "when the legislature desires to create
a specific intent crime, it knows how to do so.
10 1
The court next looked to the "plain language of the statute. 10 2
The court recognized, first, that "the Legislature clearly and unequivo-
cally provided that any sentence imposed for carjacking may be sepa-
rate from and consecutive to a sentence for any other offense arising
from the conduct underlying the offenses of caijacking or armed
cated offenders. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) (1962) (Explanatory Note). The Model
Penal Code allows intoxication evidence to be admitted in prosecutions for crimes requir-
ing purpose or knowledge, but not in those requiring only recklessness or negligence. Id,
92. Shell, 307 Md. at 65, 512 A.2d at 367.
93. Harris, 353 Md. at 599, 728 A.2d at 181.
94. Judge Raker's majority opinion was joined by Judges Rodowsky, Wilner, and
Cathell. See id.
95. Id. at 616, 728 A.2d at 190.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 601-02, 728 A.2d at 182.
98. See id. at 603-05, 728 A.2d at 182-84.
99. Id. at 606, 728 A.2d at 184.
100. Id., 728 A.2d at 184-85 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 49 F.2d 1398, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
101. Id. at 606 n.3, 728 A.2d at 185 n.3 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 29(a) (1996)).
102. Id. at 606, 728 A.2d at 184.
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cajacking."' ' Second, the court noted that by explicitly stating in
the carjacking statute that a lack of intent to permanently deprive the
owner of the vehicle was not a defense, the General Assembly had
focused on the issue of specific intent, but chose not to include a dif-
ferent intent requirement. 10 4 Because the General Assembly did not
include a different specific intent, the court reasoned, the statute re-
quired only the intent to do the proscribed act.
10 5
The court turned next to the legislative history of the carjacking
statute. 10 6 It determined that the General Assembly had two primary
goals in enacting the statute: first, to enhance the penalties applicable
to individuals who carjack, 10 7 and second, to enable prosecutors to
obtain carjacking convictions more easily.' In light of these goals,
the court concluded that the General Assembly "did not intend to
require a specific intent to achieve some additional consequence be-
yond the immediate act of taking the vehicle."10 9
Finally, the court considered the nature of the crime of carjack-
ing itself.110 It noted that a temporary deprivation of the vehicle was
"substantially certain to result, regardless of the desire of the actor,"
from the commission of the act itself, and that the General Assembly
provided no indication that the mind of the perpetrator needed to
contemplate a "more remote purpose of design which shall eventuate
from the doing of the immediate act."111 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the legislature's "clear intent" was to make carjacking a
general intent crime." 2
The court then considered the treatment of carjacking statutes in
other states and in the federal system."' It noted that several other
states had determined that carjacking is a general intent crime.1 14
The majority also observed that under the federal statute, prior to the
1994 amendment, carjacking was consistently construed as a general




107. See id. at 608-09, 728 A.2d at 186 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 609, 728 A.2d at 186 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 610, 728 A.2d at 186.
110. Id.
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 611, 728 A.2d at 187.
114. See id. at 611-12, 728 A.2d at 187 (naming Michigan and the District of Columbia as
two locales which hold carjacking to require only a general intent); see also supra notes 61-




intent crime.1 1 5 Only in 1994, when the statute was amended to re-
quire that the taking be with the "intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm," was the statute interpreted to require a specific
intent."'
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Bell' 1 7 took issue with the
majority's characterization of carjacking as a general intent crime.' 1 8
Chief Judge Bell argued that negating the intent to permanently de-
prive as a defense did not equate to eliminating altogether the re-
quirement to prove specific intent to temporarily deprive the owner of
the vehicle.1 19 He further urged that the General Assembly, in speci-
fying the specific intent which is not a defense, was "inferentially
recogniz[ing] that another, lesser specific intent may be a defense."'' 20
The dissent submitted that to interpret the statute as not requiring
any intent to deprive would render the word "permanently" superflu-
ous, contrary to the rules of statutory construction. 12' The dissent fur-
ther advocated for the application of the rule of lenity, 122 arguing that
the statute was, "at best ambiguous," and where a criminal statute is
ambiguous, the conflict should be resolved in the defendant's
favor. 1
23
The dissent also analogized carjacking to robbery, a common law
offense in Maryland which requires proof of a specific intent to per-
manently deprive an individual of his property. 124 The dissent relied
on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Martinez,'25 in which
that court stated that the federal robbery and carjacking statutes were
identical with respect to intent, thereby concluding that since rob-
bery, under federal law, is a general intent offense, carjacking should
115. See Harris, 353 Md. at 612, 728 A.2d at 187-88; see also supra note 53 (discussing
federal courts' interpretation of the federal carjacking statute).
116. Id. at 613, 728 A.2d at 188 (citing United States v. Randolph, 93 F.2d 656, 661 (9th
Cir. 1996)). The majority also rejected Harris's argument that "carjacking is little more
than aggravated robbery without the need to prove specific intent to permanently de-
prive." Id. at 614, 728 A.2d at 188. The court reasoned that because the element of each
crime was different, each could be committed without committing the other. See id.
117. The dissent was joined by judges Eldridge and Chasanow. See id. at 617, 728 A.2d at
190 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 621, 728 A.2d at 192.
120. Id.
121. Id. ("It is well settled that 'absent a clear intent to the contrary, a statute is to be
read so that no work.., is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.'"
(quoting Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 636 A.2d 448 (1994))).
122. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of lenity).
123. Id. at 621, 728 A.2d at 192.
124. See id. at 623, 728 A.2d at 193.
125. 49 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995).
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be as well. 126 Under this rationale, the dissent argued that "since rob-
bery under Maryland law is a specific intent offense and the carjacking
statute negates only the intent permanently to deprive, carjacking re-
quires proof of specific intent as well.
1 27
Chief Judge Bell also found it illogical and fundamentally unfair
that felony theft, robbery, and armed robbery are all specific intent
crimes with punishments of up to fifteen years, and twenty years of
imprisonment, respectively, yet carjacking is a general intent crime
and thus, easier to prove, but with the much harsher punishment of
up to thirty years' imprisonment.128 The dissent concluded that this
result was unreasonable, and that the majority should have rejected its
interpretation in favor of one that would yield a more reasonable
result. 129
4. Analysis.-In ruling carjacking a general intent crime, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland correctly interpreted the statute in a
manner that effectuated the General Assembly's broad goals and was
consistent with the nature of carjacking, while maintaining uniformity
with other states' rulings on similar statutes.
a. The Harris Court Correctly Interpreted the Carjacking Statute as
not Requiring Specific Intent.-The main point of contention between
the majority and dissenting opinions in Harris was the language of
subsection 348A(e) of the carjacking statute: "It is not a defense to
the offense of carjacking or armed carjacking that the defendant did
not intend to permanently deprive the owner of the motor vehicle."'
' 3 0
The majority viewed the elimination of specific intent to permanently
deprive as clear evidence that the General Assembly did not intend to
make carjacking a specific intent crime. 131 The court properly rea-
soned that this language demonstrated the General Assembly's appar-
ent intent that one could commit the offense by committing the act,
without the need for any "additional deliberate and conscious pur-
pose or design [toward] accomplishing a very specific and more re-
mote result."1" 2
126. See Harris, 353 Md. at 623, 728 A.2d at 193 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (citing Martinez,
49 F.3d at 1401).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 627, 728 A.2d at 194-95.
129. See id.
130. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348A(e) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the distinction
between specific intent and general intent).
131. See Harris, 353 Md. at 607, 728 A.2d at 185.
132. Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 63, 512 A.2d 358, 366 (1986) (quoting Smith v. State, 41
Md. App. 277, 305, 398 A.2d 426, 442 (1979)).
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Like the New York statute which classifies carjacking as robbery in
the second degree and thus requires that specific intent to perma-
nently deprive be proven,1 3 the Maryland General Assembly could
have included specific intent had it desired. It could have inserted
express words of intent, but elected not to. This is relevant because,
as the Harris majority noted, the legislature has drafted numerous spe-
cific intent statutes using express intent language. 134 The absence of
words of intent in the carjacking statute speaks of general intent with
almost as much force as actual words could. Consistent with the pre-
sumption employed by a number of courts that absence of an explicit
requirement of specific intent equated to a requirement of only gen-
eral intent,1"5 the Court of Appeals of Maryland correctly held that
the carjacking statute requires only general intent.
The conclusion that the legislature deliberately omitted specific
intent language from the statute is also supported by the purpose of
the General Assembly in enacting the carjacking statute and the legis-
lative history of the statute. The statute was enacted in the 1993 Ses-
sion of the General Assembly in response to an alarming escalation in
vehicle hijacking in 1992 and, in particular, the violent carjacking
murder of Dr. Pamela Basu in Howard County, Maryland. 136 While
the separate acts constituting a carjacking fell within chargeable of-
fenses, the legislature felt that "the existing penalties [were] wholly
inadequate for the gravity of the offense. 1 37
133. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (setting forth the text of the New York
carjacking statute).
134. See Harris, 353 Md. at 606 n.3, 728 A.2d at 180 n.3 (listing burglary in the first,
second, and third degrees as specific intent crimes which the General Assembly created
using explicit language to indicate specific intent).
135. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (citing cases that have adopted this
presumption).
136. See Price v. State, 111 Md. App. 487, 494-95, 681 A.2d 1206, 1209 (1996) (recogniz-
ing that the enactment of the Maryland carjacking statute was motivated by "'the alarming
escalation of armed hijacking of vehicles,' and specifically . . . [by] the case of Pamela
Basu" (quoting Brief of Appellant, Price v. State, 111 Md. App. 487, 681 A.2d 1206 (1996)
(No. 2033))); see also Harris, 353 Md. at 608, 728 A.2d at 185 (noting that the carjacking
bills were introduced as emergency legislation in response to the Pamela Basu carjacking).
In 1992, there were 445 carjacking incidents, in which twelve people were either killed or
seriously injured, and thirty-nine which involved major injury. See Price, 111 Md. App. at
495, 681 A.2d at 1209.
137. See Harris, 353 Md. at 608, 728 A.2d at 185-86 (quoting testimony of Steven B. Lar-
sen of the Governor's Legislative Office before the Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee
on Senate Bill 339); see also Price, 111 Md. App. at 497, 681 A.2d at 1211 (stating that "the
intent of the legislature [in enacting the carjacking statute] was to proscribe actions which
although already crimes, i.e., robbery, were deemed to be of such an aggravated nature as to
require specific legislation and punishment") (emphasis added).
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Carjacking under the Maryland statute is essentially robbery of a
motor vehicle without the added requirement of proving an of-
fender's specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his prop-
erty.138 Since the purpose of the enactment was to provide harsher
penalties than those available prior to the enactment of the statute,
1 3 9
and to send a message to carjackers that penalties would be severe,
reading anything but a general intent requirement into the statute
would only serve to frustrate legislative intent.140 Also, requiring pros-
ecutors to prove that a defendant had a specific intent would make it
more difficult to obtain convictions for carjacking, contrary to the in-
tent of the legislature.
141
b. The Harris Court Correctly Determined that Carjacking is, by its
Nature, a General Intent Crime.--The appropriateness of the Harris deci-
sion under the general/specific intent doctrine is confirmed by its
consistency with decisions from other states interpreting similar
carjacking statutes.
Although Maryland's carjacking statute contains even less statu-
tory language on intent than the carjacking statutes of the District of
Columbia, California, and Florida, courts in those states have also in-
terpreted their respective statutes as requiring only general intent. 14 2
Both California and Florida punish offenders that act with "the intent
to either permanently or temporarily deprive."' 43 This is consistent
with the concept of general intent, because it is inherent in the nature
of the crime of carjacking that obtaining unauthorized possession or
control from another will necessarily include temporary deprivation
138. See id.
139. See Hartis, 353 Md. at 608, 728 A.2d at 186 (quoting Steven B. Larsen of the Gover-
nor's Legislative Office before the Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee on Senate Bill
339).
140. See id. at 608-09, 728 A.2d at 186 (noting that one of the goals of the carjacking
statute was "to enhance the penalties applicable to individuals who use force or threat of
force or intimidation to obtain possession or control of a motor vehicle").
141. See id. ("It is clear that the broad aim of the [cajacking] statute was to... make it
easier for prosecutors to obtain convictions for carjacking."); see also People v. Antoine, 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the California legislature was moti-
vated to make carjacking a crime "because of its growing frequency among thrill seekers
and because of the difficulty in convicting such individuals of traditional robbery").
142. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text (citing and interpreting the D.C., Cali-
fornia, and Florida carjacking statutes as requiring only general intent).
143. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 215 (West 1999) (requiring that a carjacking perpetrator act
"with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of
the motor vehicle of his or her possession"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.133 (West 1999) (defin-
ing carjacking as "the taking of a motor vehicle ... with intent to either permanently or
temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle").
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from the other person. 144 Thus, temporary deprivation is intrinsic to
the commission of the crime and is indicative of some intended pur-
pose above and beyond the mental state required for the mere actus
reus of the crime itself.
145
Also, as the California Court of Appeal recognized in People v.
Antoine, whether a carjacker's intent is momentary thrill or permanent
deprivation of property from the rightful owner, the danger to the
victims is equally great. 14 6 Intent, beyond a general intent to commit
the act, would be difficult to determine, as it would involve delving
into the mind of the criminal. Furthermore, intent beyond what in-
tent plainly existed for the actus rea of the crime, is inconsequential to
the Maryland carjacking statute-much in the same way that breaking
and entering may result from a well-planned scheme or merely the
rash, impetuous conduct of a defendant, carjacking may also result
from either of the two scenarios.
c. Federal Courts' Interpretation of the Federal Carjacking Statute
Supports the Majority's Ruling.--Consistent with federal courts which
have interpreted the absence of explicit words of intent in the origi-
nally enacted federal carjacking statute as signifying only general in-
tent, 1 7 the Court of Appeals similarly and correctly construed section
348A as a general intent crime. 148 The Court was understandably
hesitant to read in a requirement that the General Assembly did not
see fit to include. Moreover, accepted rules of statutory construction
in the state of Maryland forbid courts from "disregard [ing] the natu-
ral import of words with a view towards making the statute express an
intention which is different from its plain meaning. "149
d. The Dissent's Argument for Specific Intent is Supported by
Neither Statutory Construction Nor Prior Case Law.-The dissent's argu-
ment for reading specific intent into the Maryland carjacking statute
is not supported by either a common sense approach to statutory con-
struction or prior case law. First, although the dissent argues that the
rule of lenity is applicable,' 50 the rule of lenity is inappropriate in a
144. Harris, 353 Md. at 610, 728 A.2d at 186.
145. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of specific in-
tent and contrasting it with general intent).
146. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
147. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (detailing federal courts' interpreta-
tion of statutes with no explicit intent language).
148. Harris, 353 Md. at 611-12, 728 A.2d at 187.
149. Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 63-64 (1987).
150. See Harris, 353 Md. at 621-22, 708 A.2d at 192 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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case, such as this, where legislative intent may be discerned."' The
rule of lenity must be used only in cases of ambiguity, and not applied
simply as a means to promote leniency in criminal punishment. 5 2 In
the present case, there is information from which to ascertain the Leg-
islature's purpose in creating the carjacking statute, including the
plain language of the statute and the legislative history surrounding its
enactment. 153 Both the language and the history provide insight to
the General Assembly's purpose in creating section 348A. 154 With this
information, there is no need to guess the legislative intent in creating
the statute, thereby eliminating the need to apply the rule of lenity.
Therefore, applying the rule would only serve to defeat the General
Assembly's goal to send a message to offenders that carjacking is a
crime which would be punished harshly. 15
5
The dissent also argues that the use of the word "permanently" in
subsection (e) of the statute only negates a specific intent to perma-
nently deprive, so that the legislature may have intended "that an-
other, lesser specific intent may be a defense."' 56 However, this
argument is flawed for several reasons. First, it ignores the well-
accepted principle that when a statute does not mention intent, gen-
eral intent is assumed to apply.'57 Also, if some assumption must be
made, it is more reasonable to assume that if the legislature wished to
include some specific intent requirement, it would have written it into
the statute."5 ' By explicitly excluding the need to show an intent to
permanently deprive, the legislature quite possibly might have intended
to require only an intent to temporarily deprive, which, as demon-
151. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (quoting the Supreme Court as holding
that "[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid may be
derived. . . . [courts] can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
152. See generally Dillsworth v. State, 308 Md. 354, 365,519 A.2d 1269, 1274 (1987) ("Len-
ity ... serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one." (quoting
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981))).
153. See Harris, 353 Md. at 607-10, 728 A.2d at 185-87 (analyzing the plain language of
§ 348A and the legislative history, both of which serve to illuminate the reader as to the
legislature's purpose in creating the statute).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 608-10.
156. See id. at 621, 708 A.2d at 192 (Bell, C.J., concurring).
157. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (illustrating the principle that when
statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity and expresses a definite meaning,
courts are not free to attempt to make the statute express an intention which is different
from its plain meaning).
158. See Harris, 353 Md. at 606 n.3, 728 A.2d at 185 n.3 (noting the General Assembly's
past use of explicit specific intent language as an indication that when it desires to create a
specific intent crime, it knows to include explicit language).
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strated earlier, is inherent in the general intent requirement of
carjacking. 5 9
The dissent's next argument for reading specific intent into the
carjacking statute stems from an analogy to robbery, a common law
offense in Maryland requiring specific intent to permanently de-
prive."6 This argument is unpersuasive because it does not propound
any new reason to accept the claim that the carjacking statute negates
only the permanent intent to deprive, and not the need for a specific
intent reading altogether. Also, it ignores the majority's point that
" [t] he elements of carjacking differ from the elements of robbery and
each offense can be committed without committing the other
offense."'
16 1
The dissent's final criticism of the majority's decision is the in-
verse relationship that will not exist between the general intent crime
of carjacking and the severity of the punishment. The dissenters
found it illogical that the legislature could have intended that the spe-
cific intent crimes of theft, robbery, and armed robbery would have
lesser punishments than the general intent crime of carjacking, which
is easier to prove in court. 162 The severity of a crime and its corre-
sponding punishment, however, are not necessarily a function of
whether it requires specific or general intent. Indeed, there are many
crimes requiring only general intent (i.e., depraved heart murder, fel-
ony murder) that have far greater penalties attached than many spe-
cific-intent crimes such as robbery and burglary.16 Also, the
legislative history of the Maryland carjacking statute demonstrates that
the legislature was most concerned with the particularly violent and
frightening nature of carjacking rather than the deprivation of the
motor vehicle.1 6 ' Therefore, it is appropriate that the penalties for
159. Id. at 607, 728 A.2d at 185.
160. See id. at 623, 728 A.2d at 192 ("[S]ince robbery under Maryland law is a specific
intent offense and the carjacking statute negates only the intent to permanently deprive,
carjacking requires proof of specific intent as well.").
161. Id. at 614, 728 A.2d at 188 ("An essential element of carjacking, unlike robbery, is
the taking of a specific type of property, i.e., a motor vehicle. Unlike robbery, the carjack-
ing statute requires no movement or asportation, only unauthorized possession or
control.").
162. Id. at 626, 728 A.2d at 195.
163. Both depraved heart murder (falling under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 411 (1957))
and felony-murder (MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1957)) carry penalties of 30 years and
life, respectively.
164. See Harris, 353 Md. at 608, 728 A.2d at 185 (recognizing that the intent of the
Maryland legislature in enacting the carjacking statute was to reach activity, although al-
ready criminal, that was of such an aggravated nature as to require specific punishment);
Price v. State, 111 Md. App. 487, 495, 681 A.2d 1206, 1209 (1996) (noting commentary in
favor of the carjacking bill that emphasized "the terror of the victim" in carjacking scena-
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carjacking, even without a specific intent requirement, be greater
than those for robbery and theft.
5. Conclusion.-In keeping with the cardinal rule in statutory
construction of reading the statute to effectuate the legislature's
broad aim, the General Assembly did not intend for carjacking to be a
specific intent crime. The absence of intent language, the General
Assembly's explicit provision that "any sentence imposed for carjack-
ing may be separate from and consecutive to a sentence for any other
offense arising from the conduct underlying the offense of carjack-
ing,"'165 and the elimination of the specific intent to permanently de-
prive as a defense all point toward the legislative intent to make
carjacking a general intent crime. When further analyzed within the
rubric of the statute's dual purpose-to enhance the penalties appli-
cable to individuals who use force or threat of force to obtain control
or possession of a vehicle and to make it easier for prosecutors to ob-
tain convictions 16 6 -the legislative intent is relatively clear. The most
effective way to implement these goals is through the prosecution of
carjacking as a general intent crime. The majority made a practical
appeal to common sense with its reading of the plain language of the
carjacking statute. In concluding that carjacking is a general intent
crime, the Court of Appeals reached the proper result and appropri-
ately refused to engage in a far-reaching statutory interpretation that
would have only served to interfere with the legislature's fundamental
goals.
ANNE S. CONNOLLY
rios); see also People v. Antoine, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 534 (1996) (explaining that the
California legislature created the crime of carjacking because "[i]t is a very serious crime
that victimizes persons in vulnerable settings and, because of the nature of the taking,
raises a serious potential for harm to the victim").
165. Harris, 353 Md. at 607, 728 A.2d at 185 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348A(d)
(1997 Supp.)).
166. See id. at 608-09, 728 A.2d at 186.
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B. Kidnapping: How Far is Enough? Maryland Adopts the Majority's
Approach Toward the Asportation Element of Kidnapping
In State v. Stouffer,' the Court of Appeals considered whether the
asportation element of Maryland's kidnapping statute was incidental
to the murder of a kidnapping victim and, if felony murder, the kid-
napping being the underlying felony, was supported by sufficient evi-
dence'2 The Court of Appeals adopted the majority approach by
examining the circumstances surrounding the kidnapping, including
the time and the quality of the victim's confinement, as well as the
asportation of the victim.' The Court of Appeals correctly joined the
majority approach; by weighing the circumstances surrounding the
kidnapping, Maryland courts will be more in tune with the intent of
modem kidnapping statutes.4
1. The Case.-On February 27, 1989, Jeffrey Fiddler was found
dead near an entrance ramp of Interstate 81 near the Maryland-
Pennsylvania border.' Fiddler had two stab wounds to the chest, de-
fensive wounds on the back of his right hand, and abrasions on his
buttocks and left leg.6 When found, he was wearing a sweatshirt,
pants, no underwear, and unlaced shoes.7 Grass and leaves were
found on the bottom of Fiddler's left foot, and a greasy, granular ma-
terial was found on his back.8
The medical examiner opined:
(1) Fiddler died of the large stab wound to the chest,
which punctured a lung; (2) that wound would have caused
extensive bleeding; (3) the stabbing did not occur where the
body was found; (4) Fiddler was probably wearing the sweat-
shirt, but not the pants or shoes, when stabbed; (5) the pants
and shoes were placed back on the body after the stabbing;
(6) before Fiddler died and without his pants on, his body
had been dragged across a rough granular black surface; and
(7) death was not instantaneous, but ensued from bleeding
within a half hour after the stabbing.9
1. 352 Md. 97, 721 A.2d 207 (1998).
2. Id. at 99, 721 A.2d at 208.
3. 1& at 113, 721 A.2d at 215.
4. See infta notes 113-119 (exploring the focus of modern kidnapping statutes).
5. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 100, 721 A.2d at 209.
6. See id, at 101, 721 A.2d at 209.
7. See id at 100-01, 721 A.2d at 209. Incidentally, it was not Fiddler's common prac-
tice to not wear underwear or to go without tying his shoes. See id. at 101, 721 A.2d at 209.
8. See id at 101, 721 A.2d at 209.
9. Id Very little blood was found in the ditch, supporting the fact that the stabbing
occurred elsewhere. See id.
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Very little direct evidence was available for trial,"° partly because
six years had passed between the crime and the indictment of Charles
Stouffer. 1 Apparently, Stouffer was part of a community of twenty- to
thirty-year-olds who socialized and partied together.1 2 Part of this
group conducted criminal activity, which included drugs and weap-
ons, out of a pizza place called Rocky's pizza. 3 There was evidence
that Fiddler may have been killed because he was revealing too much
information about the criminal activity occurring at Rocky's. 4 There
was also some evidence that Stouffer and others intended to frighten
Fiddler, to quiet him, but events grew out of control. 5 Other evi-
dence suggested that "Stouffer and others were simply upset over at-
tention Fiddler was paying to one 'Becky."'16
The State's theory was that Stouffer and his accomplices chased
and then kidnapped Fiddler in Hagerstown.17 According to the State,
they then took him to a field, forced him to partially disrobe and then,
possibly to avoid his escape, stabbed him in the chest. 8 Stouffer and
Burral then allegedly put a bleeding Fiddler in the trunk of Stouffer's
car and drove to the Maryland-Pennsylvania border, where they
dumped his body. 9 The State claimed that Fiddler was still alive
when Stouffer and his accomplices drove away.2" Stouffer claimed,
however, that Fiddler was simply moved to facilitate his beating and
was not part of a kidnapping. 21
10. See id. at 100, 721 A.2d at 208. No weapon was recovered; no fingerprints were
found linking Stouffer to the crime scene; no confessions were made; and no one actually
claimed to have witnessed the kidnapping. See id. Three of Fiddlers' hairs and a non-
identifiable blood trace was found in Stouffer's car, but the evidence could not conclu-
sively place Fiddler's injured body in Stouffer's car. See id. at 102, 721 A.2d at 209.
11. See id. at 99, 721 A.2d at 208. William Burral, one of Stouffer's accomplices, was
also tried and convicted for second degree murder and sentenced for 30 years. See Burrall
v. State, 352 Md. 707, 724 A.2d 67 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832 (1999).
12. See Stouffer, 352 Md. at 99, 721 A.2d at 208.
13. See id. at 99-100, 721 A.2d at 208.
14. See id. at 100, 721 A.2d at 208.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See Stouffer, 352 Md. at 101, 721 A.2d at 209.
18. See id. at 101, 721 A.2d at 209. Patricia Moore, a friend of Stouffer, gave a state-
ment that Stouffer admitted to her that he had helped beat Fiddler and had ridden
around in a car with him. See id. at 103, 721 A.2d at 210. She claimed Stouffer said that
there was a struggle, where Fiddler tried to escape and that this is where the stabbing took
place. See id. Moore later disavowed her statement at trial, but it was admitted into evi-
dence. See id.
19. See id. at 101, 721 A.2d at 209. Three of Fiddler's hairs were found in the back of
Stouffer's car, along with a non-identifiable blood trace on the inside of the car door. Id.
at 102, 721 A.2d at 209.
20. See id. at 101, 721 A.2d at 209.
21. See id. at 104, 721 A.2d at 210-11.
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Charles Edward Stouffer was convicted by the Circuit Court of
Washington County of kidnapping and felony murder.22 Kidnapping
was the underlying felony for the felony murder conviction. The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.23 The
intermediate appellate court held that the "evidence indicate [d] the
homicide was not committed in perpetration of the underlying fel-
ony" and thus reversed the judgment of conviction for felony mur-
der.2 4 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider if the
separate convictions for kidnapping and felony murder, with the kid-
napping being the underlying felony of the felony murder, were sup-
ported by sufficient evidence. 5
2. Legal Background.-
a. Kidnapping.-
(1) The Maryland Kidnapping Statute.-In Maryland, kidnap-
ping is a felony defined by Maryland Code Article 27, section 337
(1957), which states:
Every person, his counselors, aiders or abettors, who shall be
convicted of the crime of kidnapping and forcibly or fraudu-
lently carrying or causing to be carried out of or within this
State any person... with intent to have such person carried
out of or within this State, or with the intent to have such
person concealed within the State or without the State, shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for not more than thirty years.
Maryland's kidnapping statute has been interpreted to require
false imprisonment plus some asportation of the victim.2 6 Under
Maryland law, "[c] ommon law false imprisonment is the unlawful de-
tention of a person against his will,2 7 and [k]idnapping adds the re-
quirement of 'carrying the victim to some other place."' 28 Thus,
22. See id. at 97, 721 A.2d at 207. The jury acquitted Stouffer of first degree premedi-
tated murder. See id. at 104, 721 A.2d at 210. The trial court imposed a life sentence for
the felony murder conviction and a thirty-year sentence for the kidnapping conviction.
Stouffer v. State, 118 Md. App. 590, 596, 702 A.2d 861, 864 (1997).
23. Stouffer, 118 Md. App. at 596, 703 A.2d at 864.
24. Id. at 596, 703 A.2d at 864; see infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing
the felony murder charge).
25. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 99, 721 A.2d at 208.
26. Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 432, 439 A.2d 542, 558 (1982); see also Paz v. State,
125 Md. App. 729, 739, 726 A.2d 880, 884 (1999) (requiring false imprisonment plus
asportation).
27. Paz, 125 Md. App. at 739, 726 A.2d at 884 (citing Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 38-
39, 139 A.2d 209 (1958)).
28. Id. (quoting Johnson, 292 Md. at 432, 439 A.2d at 439).
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kidnapping in Maryland is false imprisonment plus some movement
of the victim.
29
Maryland's kidnapping statute broadens the common law defini-
tion of kidnapping. The legislative intent behind enacting the statute
was to broaden the common law definition of kidnapping from mov-
ing a victim from one country to another to include intra-state move-
ment (a movement only in Maryland)."
Kidnapping also has an intent requirement. There are two ways
to form the requisite mens rea to kidnap in Maryland: (1) an intent
to carry the victim to another place or (2) an intent to conceal such
victim in or out of the State.3'
(2) The Asportation Element of Kidnapping: How Far is
Enough?-Recently, other jurisdictions have recognized that some
crimes, such as assault and rape, have an asportation merely inciden-
tal to the commission of the crime. 32 In other words, the perpetrator
usually moves the victim in the normal course of committing the
crime, and thus kidnapping should not apply. Jurisdictions that do
not recognize the merely incidental movement as kidnapping have
been described as using the "majority view" while jurisdictions that
read the statute literally have been described as using the "traditional
rule."33
29. See id. (citing Tate v. State, 32 Md. App. 613, 615, 363 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 278 Md.
736 (1976)) (stating that false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping and
if kidnapping is proved, false imprisonment is also proved).
30. McGrier v. State, 125 Md. App. 759, 769, 726 A.2d 894, 899 (1999); see also Lester v.
State, 9 Md. App. 542, 544, 266 A.2d 361, 363 (1970) (citing Hunt v. State, 12 Md. App.
286, 278 A.2d 637 (1971)) (stating the definition for kidnapping as "the forcible abduction
or carrying away of a man, woman or child from their own country into another country")
(citation omitted). The legislature wanted "to include the forcible or fraudulent carrying,
or intent to carry a person within as well as without the State." Id.; see infra section 4.b
(examining the history of the kidnapping statute).
31. See Mn. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 337 (1957); see also Lester, 9 Md. App. at 544, 266 A.2d
at 363.
32. See generally Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Seizure or Detention for Purpose of Commit-
ting Rape, Robbery, or Other Offense as Constituting Separate Crime of Kidnapping, 39 A.L.R. 5th
283 (1996) (illustrating how jurisdictions differ in their approach to the asportation
element).
33. See Stouffer, 352 Md. at 106, 721 A.2d at 211 (traditional view); id. at 109, 721 A.2d at
213 (majority view); see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d
Cir. 1979) (citing People v. Chessman, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (Cal. 1952), and illustrating
the traditional rule by stating, "it is the fact, not the distance, or forcible removal which
constitutes kidnapping in this state"); 1988-DEC Army Law. 32, The Military's Anomalous
Kidnapping Laws (1988) (arguing against military prosecutors having the discretion to
charge the accused under either the traditional or majority view of kidnapping).
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(i) The Traditional View.-According to the traditional rule,
any asportation of the victim, no matter how short the distance, is suf-
ficient to establish the crime of kidnapping. 4 In jurisdictions that fol-
low this rule, courts read the kidnapping statute literally and focus on
the forcible removal and not its distance to constitute the crime of
kidnapping.
3 5
(ii) The Majority View.-The majority of jurisdictions follow
the "majority view."36 The majority view is that "kidnapping statutes
do not apply to unlawful confinements or movements 'incidental' to
the commission of other felonies."3 7 The policy behind this approach
is to prevent overzealous enforcement of the kidnapping statutes."
The Court of Special Appeals in McGrier noted that Maryland's kid-
napping statute carries a severe maximum sentence of thirty years in-
carceration.39 The court further warned that kidnapping is usually a
"prelude to some other crime" and to interpret the statute broadly
might allow a thirty-year sentence for more minor crimes such as "as-
sault, transporting persons for purposes of prostitution, petty street
crimes, and minor sex offenses."40
Other courts have noted the significant penalties of a kidnapping
conviction and the chance of kidnapping to "overrun other crimes
such as robbery, rape, and assault."4 In Cotton, a labor strike grew
out of hand and a victim was moved between ten and fifteen feet.4 2
The California court was not willing to recognize the "incidental"
movement as enough to constitute kidnapping.43 Thus, as a safe-
guard, courts usually will not apply the kidnapping statute if the move-
ment was merely incidental to the commission of another offense.4 4
34. See, e.g., Stouffer, 352 Md. at 106, 721 A.2d at 211 (citing Bery, 604 F.2d at 225).
35. See, e.g., id.
36. Wozniak, supra note 32, at 356.
37. Id.
38. See Stouffer, 352 Md. at 107, 721 A.2d at 212; see also McGrier v. State, 125 Md. App.
759, 769, 726 A.2d 894, 899 (1998) (expressing concern for imposing the harsher kidnap-
ping sentences for lesser crimes with inherent movements).
39. McGrier, 125 Md. App. at 769, 726 A.2d at 899.
40. Id.
41. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 107, 721 A.2d at 212 (quoting Cotton v. Superior Court, 364
P.2d 241, 244 (Cal. 1961)).
42. Cotton, 364 P.2d at 244.
43. Id. A recent California decision upheld Cotton, stating "the central thrust of Cotton
is contained in our reasoning that the Legislature did not intend to apply criminal sanc-
tions where the 'slightest movement' is involved." People v. Reed, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 788
(Ct. App. 2000) (citing Cotton, 364 P.2d at 244).
44. See McGrier, 125 Md. App. at 769, 726 A.2d at 899. According to an annotator, a
New Jersey court has
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Thus, as a safeguard, courts usually will not apply the kidnapping stat-
ute if the movement was merely incidental to the commission of an-
other offense.45
As a result, the majority view has evolved and appears in three
different tests.4 6 The first asks "whether the confinement, movement,
or detention was merely incidental to the accompanying felony or
whether it was significant to warrant independent prosecution."47
The second, adds an additional inquiry of "whether the detention or
movement substantially increased the risk of harm over and above
that necessarily present in the accompanying felony."48 The third ex-
amines the resulting movement or confinement which:
(1) must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely inciden-
tal to the other crime; (2) must not be the kind inherent in
the nature of the other crime; and (3) must have some sig-
nificance independent of the other crime, in that it makes
the other crime substantially easier to commit or substan-
tially lessens the risk of detection.49
b. The Felony Murder Rule.-Felony murder in Maryland is
any murder that is committed during the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate a felony.5 ° Article 27, section 410 of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code states that any "murder which shall be committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any... kidnapping as de-
fined in §§ 337 and 338 of this article .. .shall be murder in the first
degree."'" The purpose of the felony murder rule is to hold felons
strictly liable for the deaths that they commit in the perpetration of a
pointed out that kidnapping, which was only a misdemeanor at common law, has
become in modern legislation one of the most severely punished offenses .... It
was desirable to restrict the scope of kidnapping, as an alterative or cumulative
treatment of behavior whose chief significance was robbery or rape because the
broad scope of this overlapping offense had given rise to serious injustice.
Wozniak, supra note 32, at 355-56 n.3 (citing State v. Tronchin, 539 A.2d 330 (1988)).
45. See generally Wozniak, supra note 32; McGrier v. State, 125 Md. App. 759, 769, 726
A.2d 894, 899 (1999).
46. Wozniak, supra note 32, at 357.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Model Penal Code also requires a "substantial" confinement or a "substan-
tial" movement of the victim. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1998).
50. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 410 (1997 Cum. Supp.). Felony murder falls under the
common law crime of murder and § 410 divides the common law crime of murder into
degrees for purposes of punishment. See Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 645, 566 A.2d 103,
104 (1989); see also Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 441, 444 A.2d 1034, 1036 (1982) (citing
Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 435-36, 408 A.2d 711, 715 (1979) and stating that the felony
murder doctrine has not been abrogated by statute in Maryland).
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410.
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crime. 52 The statute was also designed to relieve the State of its bur-
den to prove the intent to kill when a person commits felonious con-
duct that results in death.
To establish felony murder, there must be some connection be-
tween the underlying felony and the death. 54 The felony and death
cannot simply coexist in time by mere coincidence, but there has to
be some causal connection. 5' The Court of Appeals in Campbell v.
State defines the connection in terms of proximate cause.56 Campbell
requires proof of something more than the Tort theory of proximate
cause,5 7 stating "[b] ecause of the extreme penalty attaching to a con-
viction of felony murder, a closer and more direct causal connection
between the felony and the killing is required. '58 With the victim's
liberty at stake, as compared to Tort liability, courts now require a
stronger connection.5 9 Thus, in terms of kidnapping, to prove felony
murder during the commission of a kidnapping, the state would need
to connect the killing with an element of the kidnapping-moving or
imprisoning the victim.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Stouffer, the Court of Appeals
adopted the majority approach to reading the asportation element of
kidnapping statutes.6" In doing so, the court rejected the Court of
Special Appeals's "overarching intent standard," focusing instead on
the independent intent to kidnap the victim.6 1
To explain its shift in focus, the court outlined the State's theory
and the defendant's theory of the case. The State's theory was that
Fiddler was moved from Hagerstown to the field with the intent of
beating him in order to teach him a lesson.6 2 Defendant's theory was
52. Campbell, 293 Md. at 450, 444 A.2d at 1041.
53. See Whittlesey v. State, 326 Md. 502, 521, 606 A.2d 225, 234 (1992) (citing Bruce v.
State, 317 Md. 642, 645, 566 A.2d 103 (1989)).
54. See Stouffer, 352 Md. at 116, 721 A.2d at 216; see also Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258,
272, 744 A.2d 1, 8 (2000) (requiring that "there be some nexus between the killing and the
underlying felony" (citing Stouffer, 352 Md. at 116, 721 A.2d at 216)).
55. See, e.g., Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 644, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974) (hold-
ing that more than a mere coincidence in time and place must be shown to prove felony
murder).
56. Campbell, 293 Md. at 450-51, 444 A.2d at 1041.
57. Id The Court of Appeals stated that "[tiort law is primarily concerned with who
shall bear the burden of loss, while criminal law is concerned with the imposition of pun-
ishment." Id. at 451, 444 A.2d at 1041.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. See id,
60. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 113, 721 A.2d at 215.
61. Id. at 115, 721 A.2d at 216.
62. See id. at 104, 721 A.2d at 210.
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that Fiddler was moved to a place to facilitate his beating and that an
asportation for that purpose did not constitute kidnapping.6 3 The is-
sue presented for the court was "whether the asportation of Fiddler,
while still alive, was simply to facilitate the assault, or murder, and did
not, therefore, constitute the separate crime of kidnapping."6 4
To reach the question of kidnapping, Fiddler needed to be alive
when the asportation occurred. The Maryland kidnapping statute
speaks in terms of carrying "any person" and the court assumed that a
corpse is not a "person" under the statute.6 5 It was, therefore, impor-
tant for the court to determine whether Fiddler was still alive during
the perpetration of the kidnapping.6 6 The Court of Appeals found
two reasonable inferences of asportation of a live victim: one from the
initial point of abduction and the other from the place of the beating
to the Maryland-Pennsylvania border.6 7
The court then discussed the variety of cases and different ap-
proaches in examining "whether, and under what circumstances, the
detention, confinement, or asportation of a victim initially accosted
for the purpose of robbery, sexual assault, or some other crime will
suffice to sustain a separate conviction for kidnapping."68 The court
stressed the need for a careful review of precedent and persuasive de-
cisions because similar kidnapping regulations varied in degree and
breadth.6 9 Providing a detailed analysis of such regulations, the court
determined that "Maryland's statute requires a 'carrying [of the vic-
tim]' and is not divided into degrees."7"
a. Shifing Away from the Traditional Rule.-The court ex-
amined the traditional rule, where any asportation, no matter how
short the distance, is enough to establish the crime of kidnapping.
71
The court relied on an example from a Connecticut case where a
63. See id., 721 A.2d at 210-11. Defendant also contended that transporting a dead
body would not constitute kidnapping. Id., 721 A.2d at 211.
64. Id at 104-05, 721 A.2d at 211.
65. Id. at 105, 721 A.2d at 211.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court stressed that the testimony of the medical examiner and the fact that
Stouffer lived for up to thirty minutes after the stabbing was indicative that he was alive for
at least part of the time while being driven to the border. Id.
68. Id. at 106, 721 A.2d at 211; see also supra note 32, at 283 (cataloguing the variety of
approaches).
69. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 106, 721 A.2d at 211. The court noted that some statutes are
similar to false imprisonment, others include "taking" of a person, some include both tak-
ing and confinement and some are further divided into degrees or dependent on defen-





clerk was moved a short distance, at knifepoint, to the back of a gro-
cery store.72 Here, the Court of Appeals noted, under the traditional
rule, a court would likely find kidnapping.73 By advocating a literal
interpretation of a kidnapping statute, the traditional rule analysis
considers the forcible removal of a victim during the commission of a
felony to be a separate crime. 4
Recognizing the validity of these concerns, the court then dis-
cussed other jurisdictions, concluding that most of them hold that
"kidnapping statutes do not apply to unlawful confinements or move-
ment 'incidental' to the commission of other felonies."75 Such a lit-
eral reading of the kidnapping statute could lead to overzealous
enforcement, however, with "persons who have committed such sub-
stantive crimes as robbery or assault-which inherently involve the
temporary detention or seizure of the victim-will suffer the far
greater penalties prescribed by the kidnapping statutes., 76 Under the
majority rule, some crimes inherently involve movement of a victim.
Simply put, many courts now believe that the traditional kidnapping
rule has the potential to "'overrun' other crimes, such as robbery,
rape and assault.
77
Examining the various applications of the majority rule, the court
identified two methods of applying the majority approach- a rigid
method and a flexible method.7' According to the court, such cir-
cumstances include: "how long the victim was held, how far the victim
was taken, where the victim was taken, whether the abduction ex-
ceeded what was necessary to the commission of the other crime and
whether the abduction itself substantially increased the risk of harm
beyond the risk inherent in the commission of the other crime." 79 In
contrast, the court noted very few courts have applied the rigid ap-
proach, which is the antithesis of the traditional rule in that it finds
72. Id. at 106, 721 A.2d at 212 (citing State v. Vass, 469 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1983)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 107, 721 A.2d at 212.
75. Id. (citing Wozniak, supra note 32, at 356).
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v.
Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 1979)).
77. Id. (quoting Cotton v. Superior Court, 364 P.2d 241, 244 (Cal. 1961)).
78. Id. (flexible method); id. at 107 n.2, 721 A.2d at 212 n.2 (rigid method). See gener-
ally Wozniak, supra note 32, at 283. Almost all of the courts use the flexible standard,
which scrutinizes the circumstances surrounding the confinement or movement.
79. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 108, 721 A.2d at 212 (citing State v. Farmer, 445 S.E.2d 759 (W.
Va. 1994); State v. St. Cloud, 465 N.W.2d 177 (S.D. 1991).
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almost any movement as incidental or inherent to the underlying
felony.80
The court then considered a variety of standards or guidelines
devised by courts in formulating the majority, flexible standard. Some
courts have focused on "distance, duration, and danger.""1 Other
courts have examined:
(1) the duration of the detention or asportation; (2)
whether the detention or asportation occurred during the
commission of a separate offense; (3) whether the detention
or asportation which occurred is inherent in the separate of-
fense; and (4) whether the asportation or detention created
a significant danger to the victim independent of what posed
by the separate offense.82
The court also cited a three-part test from Kansas that examines
whether the movement or confinement was "slight, inconse-
quential," whether it was "of the kind inherent in the nature
of the crime," and whether it has "some significance inde-
pendent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime
substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the
risk of detection. 83
Through its review of other courts' applications of the majority
rule, the court found that most majority applications were "fact spe-
cific." 4 As stated by the court, " [w] hether the confinement or move-
ment of the victim is merely incidental to another crime depends, in
nearly every case, on the circumstances."' The court then identified
factors, which if found missing, increase the prospect of the court re-
versing a separate kidnapping conviction:
80. Id. at 107 n.2, 721 A.2d at 212 n.2 (citing People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 (N.Y. 1965),
in which no kidnapping was found where during the course of a robbery, the victim was
confined over 20 minutes and driven over 27 blocks). The rigid view does not consider the
circumstances (e.g., the distance the victim was held and the time he/she was confined).
See id. New York later moved away from the rigid, majority standard and now considers the
circumstances surrounding the kidnapping. People v. Miles, 245 N.E.2d 688, 695 (N.Y.
1969)).
81. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 108, 721 A.2d at 213.
82. Id. at 108-09, 721 A.2d at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1979)). The Eleventh Circuit
adopted an identical test. See id. (citing United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529 (1lth Cir.
1990)).
83. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 109, 721 A.2d at 213 (quoting State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731
(Kan. 1976)). Delaware and Florida also have adopted this test. See id. at 108, 721 A.2d at
213 (citing Burton v. State, 426 A.2d 829 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1981); Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d
963 (Fla. 1983)).




If the victim is not moved too far, is not held for longer than
is necessary to complete the other crime, and is not sub-
jected to any significant peril from the confinement or move-
ment itself, if the confinement or movement can reasonably
be viewed as undertaken solely to facilitate the commission
of the other crime, and if commission of the other crime
normally involves (even if it does not legally require) some
detention or asportation of the victim.8 6
The court then considered how kidnapping has been interpreted
through Maryland case law. In two early cases,87 the court hinted at a
rule that resembled the majority approach. According to the court,
both cases discussed the possibility of kidnapping being "incidental"
or an "integral part" of another crime, but "the facts of each case justi-
fied separate kidnapping convictions.""8 The court then cited an-
other line of Maryland cases that followed the traditional rule where
the fact of asportation and not the distance or the circumstances was
controlling." The most striking example was Carey v. State,"° where
the court applied the traditional rule to find kidnapping where the
victim was moved from the upstairs and locked in the basement for
one day. 1 Thus, Maryland courts have been inconsistent in applying
either the modern or traditional rules.
The court then considered the competing policy constraints of
limiting overzealous prosecution and the fact that kidnapping usually
accompanies other crimes. On one hand, the kidnapping statute
could transform "a host of lesser-punished sex and street crimes into
30-year eligible kidnappings," and "the Legislature [never] intended
for § 337 to be read in that broad a fashion."9 2 On the other hand,
86. Id., 721 A.2d at 213-14.
87. See Lester v. State, 9 Md. App. 542, 266 A.2d 361 (1970) (stating that the court
would not reach the issue if the movement was "incidental" because there was ample evi-
dence of defendant's intent to kidnap the victim and to have a hostage, separate from his
intent to consummate a rape); Rice v. State, 9 Md. App. 552, 267 A.2d 261 (1970) (differ-
entiating between a slight movement and the defendant dragging the victim several blocks
to confine her in his apartment).
88. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 111, 721 A.2d at 214; see supra note 116 (discussing the two
cases).
89. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 111, 721 A.2d at 214 (citing Moore v. State, 23 Md. App. 540,
329 A.2d 48 (1974) and rejecting the defendant's complaint that the state did not prove
how far the victim was moved, instead focusing on the fact that the victim was moved).
90. 54 Md. App. 448, 458 A.2d 90, affid, 299 Md. 17, 472 A.2d 444 (1984).
91. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 111, 721 A.2d at 214 (citing Carey, 54 Md. App. at 452, 458 A.2d
at 92).
92. Id. at 112-13, 721 A.2d at 215.
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the court needed to balance the threat of "overzealous enforcement"
with the fact that kidnappings rarely occurred in and of themselves.93
As a result, the court joined the majority view, urging a case-by-
case analysis with a "focus on those factors that seemed to be central
to most of the articulated guidelines." '94 Those factors included:95
1. How far, and where, was the victim taken?
2. How long was the victim detained in relation to what
was necessary to complete the crime?
3. Was the movement either inherent as an element, or,
as a practical matter, necessary to the commission of the
other crime?
4. Did it have some independent purpose?
5. Did the asportation subject the victim to any addi-
tional significant danger?96
The court then applied these factors to Stouffer and concluded
that the "evidence sufficed to sustain a separate kidnapping convic-
tion."9 7 First, the fact that Stouffer was driven, as far as a field outside
Hagerstown, in contrast to being dragged into a nearby alley, was
enough to make the distance "considerable."98 Second, based on the
"considerable" distance Stouffer was moved, the court had difficulty
accepting Stouffer's theory that his group was only trying to beat Fid-
dler because "Fiddler could have been beaten anywhere."99 In con-
trast, if Stouffer meant to scare Fiddler then Fiddler's asportation,
coupled with the fact that he was stripped partially naked in a field,
would be proof of this purpose.100 Under either theory, the court
considered being "forced into a compact car with three or four other
men and driven for some distance as a hostage" and the fact that Fid-
dler was isolated in a field, with no hope of escape, as subjecting Fid-
dler to additional, significant danger.' t
The court also focused on the fact that Fiddler was not released
after the beating in the field. Kidnapping is a continuous crime, and
does not cease until the "victim's liberty ... is restored."' 2 According
93. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 113, 721 A.2d at 215.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also McGrier v. State, 125 Md. App. 759, 726 A.2d 894 (1998).





102. Id. at 114, 721 A.2d at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Gomez, 622 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Conn. 1993)).
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to the medical examiner, Fiddler was alive for up to about thirty min-
utes after the stabbing.1 0 3 The court used this continuation of the
kidnapping to question Stouffer's theory that he meant only to beat
Fiddler. The court considered the second movement of Fiddler as
evidence that the kidnapping "was certainly not merely incidental to
the beating."'10 4
Having established the underlying felony of kidnapping, the
court next examined the felony murder charge. The court contrasted
the jury's finding that the death of Fiddler occurred during the com-
mission of the kidnapping with the Court of Special Appeals' reversal
on the grounds that Stouffer's "'overarching intent' was not to kidnap
Fiddler but to simply beat him."'0 5 The court disagreed with both the
Court of Special Appeals and Stouffer's brief, which stated "[t]he
beating that culminated in the fatal stabbing was not done to further
the kidnapping; rather, the kidnapping was carried out to further the
beating. As a result, there was no felony murder."10 6
Because Maryland's felony murder statute requires a nexus be-
tween the underlying felony and the murder,0 7 the court continued
its application of the flexible modern rule by examining "whether the
evidence sufficed to show that Fiddler was murdered 'in the perpetra-
tion of a kidnapping."' 08 The court resolutely concluded that "Fid-
dler was stabbed in order to prevent his escape" in furtherance of the
kidnapping.0 9 The court determined that the "overarching intent"
standard that the Court of Special Appeals applied was irrelevant be-
103. Id. at 101, 721 A.2d at 209.
104. Id. at 114, 721 A.2d at 215-16.
105. Id. at 114-15, 721 A.2d at 216. In Stouffer v. State, the Court of Special Appeals
found
no direct or inferential evidence before the trier of fact that the announced pur-
pose of Stouffer's mission-to scare Fiddler-was to be accomplished by forcibly
confining and transporting him . . . the means to be employed in intimidating
Fiddler... was the infliction of serious bodily harm in a reckless and dangerous
manner with indifference to the consequences.
118 Md. App. 590, 619, 703 A.2d 861, 875-76 (1997).
106. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 115, 721 A.2d at 216.
107. See id. at 116, 721 A.2d at 216; see also Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258, 272, 744 A.2d 8-
9 (2000) (stating that "mere coincidence between the underlying felony and the killing is
not enough; the conduct causing death must be in furtherance of the design to commit
the felony"); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 410 (1997 Cum. Supp.) (stating that all murder
committed "in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any... kidnapping as defined
in § 337 [is] . . .murder in the first degree").
108. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 116, 721 A.2d at 216.
109. Id., 721 A.2d at 216-17.
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cause whatever motive Stouffer had, there was an independent intent
to kidnap Stouffer. t1 °
The Court of Appeals is able to find felony murder on two theo-
ries. The first is that kidnapping is a continuous crime until the vic-
tim's liberty is released. 1 ' Because Fiddler was never released, he was
murdered in the perpetration of the kiidnapping.'1 2 The second the-
ory is that the kidnapping was intended to teach Fiddler a lesson.' 13
Thus, the beating was intended to further the kidnapping.1 1 4 The
court determined that either theory was sufficient to reverse the Court
of Special Appeals and affirm the Circuit Court's felony murder
conviction. 
15
4. Analysis.-By adopting the modern rule in Stouffer, the Court
of Appeals is now more in tune with the harms that modern kidnap-
ping statutes are meant to prevent. By minimalizing the traditional
rule's strict attention to asportation, Stouffer better applies the modern
kidnapping statute.
a. The Majority Rule better Enforces the Modern Kidnapping Stat-
ute.-The traditional rule has an antiquated application in a modem
time, and the majority rule better enforces the harms the modern kid-
napping statute is meant to prevent."1 6 The harms kidnapping is
meant to prevent have changed between common law kidnapping
and recent kidnapping statutes. Under common law, kidnapping was
designed to prevent the taking of a person from his own country and
sending him into another." 7 The main focus of the law was to punish
"the unlawful carrying away of victims out of the country to obtain
110. Id.
111. See id., 721 A.2d at 217.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 116-17, 721 A.2d at 217.
114. See id. at 117, 721 A.2d at 217; see also supra notes 17-21. This is the opposite theory
of what the Defendant suggests. Instead of kidnapping to perpetrate the beating, the beat-
ing was done to further the kidnapping.
115. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 117, 721 A.2d at 217.
116. See generallyJohn L. Diamond, Kidnapping: A Modern Definition, 13 AM.J. CRIM. L. 1,
1 (1985) (arguing that the "metaphysics of asportation" should be de-emphasized and the
court should focus on the time and quality of the victim's imprisonment).
117. See id. at 2 (citing R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 229 (3d ed. 1982)); see also
Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 38, 139 A.2d 209, 215 (1958).
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labor for American colonization." l"' Thus, asportation was a key ele-
ment in elevating the crime of imprisonment to kidnapping.119
Modern kidnapping statutes extend the common law definition
to a carrying in or out of state.12 ° Thus, the focus of the crime is
localized and is no longer limited to a victim being transported out of
the country. 121 Because minimum movements are recognized to sat-
isfy the asportation element of kidnapping, this shift of focus reflects
the statute's intent to prevent substantial isolation of and danger to a
person. 122
In addition, modem society is mobile and most criminals have
access to transportation. 2' Thus, in terms of kidnapping, asportation
is much more prevalent because of the intrastate nature of the statute
and easier access to transportation. Focusing on the movement of a
victim should not be the sole approach. 124 Rather, the circumstances
surrounding the kidnapping need to be considered, and the majority
rule allows this approach.
In its rationale for rejecting the traditional rule and adopting the
modern, the court acknowledges the need to look beyond the asporta-
tion of the victim. First, the court rejects the traditional rule because
fixating on "any asportation" will have the practical effect of "overrun-
ning" lesser crimes. 125  The court also rejects the majority-rigid
rule, 26 because it has the opposite effect, and being too lenient, al-
lows for injustice. 127 The court noted that in almost every jurisdiction
118. Diamond, supra note 116, at 35. Maryland's early kidnapping statutes were con-
cerned with out-of-state carrying and the selling of slaves entitled to freedom after a term
of years. See 1809 Md. Laws 575 (creating a two- to ten-year penalty for the forcible and
fraudulent carrying out of state); see also 1817 Md. Laws 659 (not allowing slaves entitled to
freedom after a term of years to be sold out of state).
119. Diamond, supra note 116, at 35; see also Midgett, 216 Md. at 3840, 139 A.2d at 215-16
(noting that Maryland still uses asportation as the distinction between false imprisonment
and kidnapping and other jurisdictions abolish this distinction).
120. See supra notes 116-119; see also Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 540 (1953) (noting how in the 1920s kidnapping was expanded to include extor-
tion). In 1933, Maryland repealed its kidnapping statute of 1924 and allowed for an inter
or intra state carrying of the victim. 1933 Md. Laws 1122.
121. Midgett, 216 Md. at 38, 139 A.2d at 216.
122. Diamond, supra note 116, at 34 (arguing that movement is irrelevant and that the
focus of kidnapping statutes should be on the time and quality of confinement of the
victim).
123. Id. at 35; see also A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, supra note 120, at 540 (showing
how in the 1920s kidnapping became focused on interstate transportation of the victim
and the famous Lindbergh kidnapping/extortion crime).
124. Diamond, supra note 116, at 34.
125. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 107, 721 A.2d at 212.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also supra notes 34-35 (examining the rigid rule).
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that follows the flexible-majority rule, courts need to examine "in
nearly every case ... the circumstances, even when guidelines ... are
applied." 12s In both the traditional and rigid-modern rules, merely
focusing on the asportation in and of itself is not enough to make a
decision; courts, like in Stouffer, need to look beyond the movement of
the victim. Thus, the court acknowledged that asportation is a factor,
but not necessarily the only focus.
In adopting the majority rule, the court stressed the importance
of examining factors outside the asportation. 129 Two of the factors
considered by the court examine the duration and quality of the con-
finement in addition to the movement of the victim.'
3 0
The first factor is "how long was the victim detained in relation to
what was necessary to the commission of the other crime."'13 1 This
may be read as examining the duration of the confinement and/or
the duration of the asportation. If it is read as examining the dura-
tion of the confinement, then it no longer deals with the movement of
the victim. In McGrier v. State, the Court of Special Appeals applied
this factor to see if kidnapping was incidental to a rape and concluded
that it was not because the duration of the entire confinement was lim-
ited to the time required to complete the rape.13 2 Thus, the Court of
Special Appeals in applying this factor looked at the duration of the
entire confinement as opposed to focusing just on the asportation. 3
Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals in Paz v. State ex-
amined the duration of the entire confinement, not just of the aspor-
tation of the victim.134 In finding that kidnapping was incidental to
rape, the court concluded that because the rape was interrupted, the
victim was not detained long enough to constitute the separate crime
of kidnapping.1 5 The court, however, implied that if the rape had
128. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 110, 721 A.2d at 213.
129. Id. at 110, 721 A.2d at 213-14; see also McGrier v. State, 125 Md. App. 759, 770, 726
A.2d 894, 899 (1998); supra note 121 (stating the factors).
130. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 110, 721 A.2d 213 (how long was the victim detained in relation
to what was necessary to the commission of the other crime and did the asportation subject
the victim to any additional significant danger).
131. McGrier, 125 Md. App. at 770, 726 A.2d at 899.
132. The total time the victim was held was about two minutes, enough for the defen-
dant to complete the rape and for the victim to flee. Id. at 772, 726 A-2d at 900-01. The
court also found that the victim was taken a short distance and that there was no indepen-
dent purpose. Id.
133. Id. at 772, 726 A.2d at 900. The victim was briefly moved a few feet from the hall-
way to the basement, enough to satisfy false imprisonment, but not kidnapping. See id.
134. 125 Md. App 729, 740, 726 A.2d 880, 885 (1998).
135. Id. Defendant dragged the victim about twenty-five feet, across a street into an
alleyway. Id. at 734, 726 A.2d at 882. The court also found kidnapping incidental to rape
because the victim was not taken far. Id, at 740, 726 A.2d at 885.
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not been interrupted, there might have been a significant enough de-
tention to qualify for kidnapping.136 Thus, the court was willing to
consider the confinement of the victim outside the asportation.
Another factor that the Stouffer court established is whether the
asportation subjects the victim to any additional significant danger.1 3 7
Utilizing this factor, the court recommended that future Maryland
courts look beyond the actual danger associated with the asportation
itself to the quality of the confinement.'38 In dicta, the court in Mc-
Grier gave examples of what would meet this factor. 139 Such examples
included "leaving a victim of a rape or robbery in a remote area, or
locking employees in a bank vault or freezer." 40 All of these exam-
ples look at the quality of the confinement and not the asportation.
In other words, they examine the victim's circumstances after the as-
portation.141 Moreover, in Stouffer the court engages in comparing
perils.' 42 It compares the danger to Fiddler being beaten in down-
town Hagerstown with the danger of being taken to a field to be
beaten. 143 In its analysis, the court did not focus on the additional
danger facing Fiddler during the car ride, but rather turned its atten-
tion on the quality and conditions of the confinement after the
asportation. 14
4
Thus, in Stouffer and two post-Stouffer cases, 145 Maryland courts
have examined the duration and quality of the victim's confinement,
which are circumstances outside the asportation of the victim. By
adopting the modern rule, courts have been able to see beyond the
136. Id.
137. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 113, 721 A.2d at 215.
138. See id. at 114, 721 A.2d at 215 (finding increased peril in being taken to a deserted
field, alone at the mercy of victim's captors); McGrier, 125 Md. App. at 773, 726 A.2d at 901
(finding no additional danger in moving from a hallway to adjoining steps leading to
basement).
139. McGrier, 125 Md. App. at 773, 726 A.2d at 901.
140. Id.
141. One may argue that these are additional dangers caused by the asportation, and
thus the court is focusing on the asportation. Although, in the bank vault situation, one
could imagine where employees are at work and moved an extremely short distance. Thus,
the court would need to focus on the quality and duration of the confinement to sustain a
kidnapping conviction.
142. Stouffer, 352 Md. at 114, 721 A.2d at 215.
143. See id. The court looks at the danger inherent in the asportation itself, "being
forced into a compact car with three or four other men and driven as a hostage"; the court
also considers the dangers or quality of the confinement after the asportation: "the grave
peril implicit from being taken to a field somewhere, alone, completely at the mercy of his
abductors." Id.
144. See supra notes 123-104 (applying the factors to Stouffer).
145. See Paz v. State, 125 Md. App. 729, 726 A.2d 880 (1998); McGrier v. State, 125 Md.
App. 759, 726 A.2d 894 (1998).
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asportation element to examine the underlying circumstances of the
kidnapping.
14 6
c. The Future of Kidnapping in Mayland. -The wisdom of the
majority rule's looking past the circumstances surrounding the aspor-
tation is also recognized by the formulators of the Model Penal
Code.' 4 7 The Model Penal Code definition of kidnapping acknowl-
edged that certain circumstances, without any asportation, should be
enough to constitute kidnapping:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes an-
other from his place of residence or business, or a substantial
distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if he unlaw-
fully confines another for a substantial period in a place of
isolation, with any of the following purposes:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hos-
tage; or
(b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight there-
after; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another; or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any govern-
mental or political function.
1 48
Unlike the Model Penal Code, Maryland still requires some as-
portation of the victim. 1 49 An excellent example of the difference be-
tween Model Penal Code kidnapping and Maryland's kidnapping is
Carey v. State.'50 Carey bound and sexually assaulted his victim in an
upstairs bedroom and then dragged her down two flights of stairs and
locked her in a basement closet for thirty-six hours.151  Using the
traditional rule, the court stated, "it matters not that the victim was
asported but a short distance. "1512 Under the modern rule, this aspor-
tation might fail because the movement may be viewed as incidental
to the rape.'53 To sustain the kidnapping charge, the court will need
146. See supra section 4.a; see also infra notes 147-174.
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1998).
148. Id.
149. See supra note 121.
150. 54 Md. App. 448, 458 A.2d 90 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 17, 472 A.2d 444 (1984).
151. See id. at 452, 458 A.2d at 92. Carey told the victim, "this is your cage, this is where
you are going to die" as he locked her in the basement closet. Id
152. Id. at 452, 458 A.2d at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Isaacs v.
State, 31 Md. App. 604, 616, 358 A.2d 273 (1976)).
153. Compare McGrier v. State,.125 Md. App. 759, 726 A.2d 894 (1998) (movement from
hallway to stairs is not sufficient) and Paz v. State, 125 Md. App. 729, 726 A.2d 880 (1998)
(dragging a victim from a parking lot to a dark alley across the street was not sufficient)
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to examine factors outside the asportation (e.g. the thirty-six-hour du-
ration and conditions of the confinement). Under the Model Penal
Code, this constitutes confinement for "a substantial period in a place
of isolation." 15 4 The Model Penal Code acknowledges that harms kid-
napping are meant to prevent are independent of the asportation of
the victim.155 Thus, both Stouffer and the Model Penal Code examine
the circumstances surrounding the asportation.156 The Model Penal
Code, however, unlike Maryland's statute, does not require an aspor-
tation at all in some scenarios.
Perhaps the Model Penal Code's formulation of kidnapping is
the next step for Maryland in the continuum of minimalizing the
traditional rule's fixation on asportation of the victim. Stouffer may
signal a middle ground where asportation is considered, as a factor, in
determining when to impose the severe penalties that accompany a
kidnapping conviction.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals was correct in adopting
the majority rule and expanding its analysis to the circumstances sur-
rounding the asportation. The modern rule better reflects the harms
and goals of modern kidnapping statutes.
B. CRAIG MASON
with Carey, 54 Md. App. 458, 458 A.2d 90 (holding that movement down two flights of stairs
was sufficient under the traditional rule).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1. A place of isolation is not a geographic location but
isolation from society and its usual protections. Id (citing Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 687
A.2d 836 (Pa. Super. 1996) (noting that one's own apartment may be a place of isolation).
As little as thirty minutes has been found to be a substantial period of isolation. Id. (citing
State v. La France, 569 A.2d 1308 (N.J. 1990)).
155. See supra notes 147-154 and accompanying text (explaining how the Model Penal
Code examines the circumstances).
156. Compare section 4.a (arguing that the modem rule examines the entirety of the
circumstances), with note 121.
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C. Beyond the Abuser to the Enabler: Extending Criminal Liability to
Caregivers who Fail to Protect a Child from Sexual Abuse by a Third Party
In Degren v. State,1 the Court of Appeals examined whether an
adult with the responsibility for supervising a minor child could be
held criminally liable under Maryland's child abuse statute2 for failing
to prevent a third party from molesting or exploiting the child.' The
court answered in the affirmative, and concluded that the Petitioner,
Sharon Degren, was guilty of child abuse for her failure to prevent the
sexual abuse of Jennifer B. while the minor child was in her care.4 In
reaching this decision the court determined that the definition of sex-
ual abuse under the statute contemplates "not just an affirmative act
in directly molesting or exploiting a child, but one's omission or fail-
ure to act" when there is a legal duty to do so and where it is reasona-
bly possible to act.' The court based its broad interpretation of the
statute on its legislative purpose and on the continued expansion of
its scope through subsequent amendments.6 Further support was pro-
vided by prior Maryland cases in which the court interpreted the phys-
ical child abuse statute to include a failure to act as well as an overt
act.7 The court, in reaching its decision, was also consistent with the
national trend in punishing all forms of child abuse.8 Thus, the court
continues the current trend of expanding the scope of criminal liabil-
ity for child abuse by allowing prosecution of not only the perpetrator
of the abuse, but also of the supervising adult of the child who know-
ingly enables the abuse to occur.
1. The Case.-In the summer of 1996, when the victim, Jennifer,
was twelve years old, Jennifer's mother made custodial arrangements
1. 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999).
2. Id. at 416-17; see also Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1996).
3. Degren, 352 Md. at 405, 722 A.2d at 889.
4. See id. at 428, 722 A.2d at 900.
5. Id. at 425, 722 A.2d at 899.
6. See infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Maryland child abuse
statute and its subsequent amendments).
7. Degren, 352 Md. at 424, 722 A.2d at 899. The court discussed and relied upon Pope
v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979), which restricted the class of persons to whom
the child abuse statute applies to caretakers who have a mutually consensual relationship
with the party legally responsible for the care of the child, and upon State v. Fabritz, 276
Md. 416, 425-26, 348 A.2d 275, 280-81 (1975), which interpreted the child abuse statute in
cases of physical abuse to include acts of omission where one had a legal duty to act, in
reaching their decision. Id.
8. See Degren, 352 Md. at 424 & n.11, 722 A.2d at 899 & n.11; see also Christine Adams,
Note, Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children From Sexual Abuse: Addressing the Problem of
Denial, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 519, 524-33 (1994) (discussing the trend in various states of
increasingly holding parents criminally liable for condoning the abuse of their children).
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with Sharon Degren and her husband, Nick Degren, for Jennifer to
remain at their home on two separate occasions; once in June, for a
period of one week, and again in August, for a period of two weeks.9
Jennifer knew Sharon and Nick Degren and did not object to the
arrangements."°
During the first of her visits to the Degren home, Jennifer testi-
fied that one night she fell asleep on Sharon and Nick's bed, and she
awoke to Nick having sexual intercourse with her.1 While this was
occurring, Sharon was sitting on the corner of the bed "watching tele-
vision and watching them."' 2 When Nick asked Sharon "if she felt
right with him having sexual intercourse" with Jennifer, Sharon re-
sponded that "[s]he really didn't care." 3 Nick stopped when Jennifer
told him to get off of her, and Jennifer then left the room.' 4 Sharon
denied this event ever took place.' 5
During her visit in August, Jennifer testified that she had inter-
course with Nick on two separate occasions, and that during both
times Sharon was aware of the intercourse and did nothing to inter-
vene. 6 On the first such occasion, August 10th, Sharon was in the
room while Jennifer and Nick had intercourse."t Although Sharon
acknowledged that she was present at the time her husband and Jen-
nifer were having sex, she claimed she did not intervene because her
husband could be abusive at times and she "was afraid that he would
hit [her].""8 On the second occasion, August 15th, Sharon acknowl-
edged that she left the room as Jennifer and Nick were having
intercourse.' 9
On August 14, 1996, Jennifer testified that while she was asleep in
Sharon and Nick's bed, she awoke to Sharon and a male houseguest,
Rick Dobsha, engaged in sex on the same bed in which she was sleep-
9. See Degren, 352 Md. at 405, 722 A.2d at 889.
10. See id. The Degrens were friends of Jennifer's mother, and Jennifer had known
them for about three years. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 406, 722 A.2d at 889. Sharon claimed that the incident could not have
taken place because she had not yet moved into that apartment until July. See id.
16. See id. at 406-08, 722 A.2d at 889-90.
17. See id. at 406, 722 A.2d at 889-90. Jennifer also alleged that after having sex with
Nick, Sharon had oral sex with her. See id.
18. Id., 722 A.2d at 890 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted).
19. See id. at 408, 722 A.2d at 890-91.
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ing.2° Although there were several different accounts of this incident
from Jennifer, Rick, and Sharon, all were in agreement that later that
morning Rick had sex with Jennifer, and that Sharon was aware of
this, but did nothing to intervene on the child's behalf.
2 1
Sharon Degren was found guilty by a Charles County Circuit
Court jury of four counts of child abuse for her involvement in the
molestation of Jennifer. 22 She was sentenced to four concurrent ten-
year sentences, and "[f] ive years of each sentence were suspended in
favor of five years of probation. '23 In 1997, she appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals.2 4 In an unpublished opinion,2 5 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals vacated one condition of the petitioner's probation, but
affirmed the trial court's verdict in all other respects. 26 On March 24,
1998, Sharon Degren filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals asserting that the lower courts erred in their
holding that a caretaker of a minor child may be guilty of sexual child
abuse under the child abuse statute for failure to prevent the sexual
molestation or exploitation of the minor child by a third party.27 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to resolve this issue.28
2. Legal Background.-Prior to the enactment of Maryland's
child abuse statute, parents were held criminally responsible for the
abuse inflicted by third parties based on the common law theory of
criminal negligence. 29 In an effort to address this issue more effec-
tively, the Maryland Legislature passed its first child abuse statute in
1963.30 Subsequent amendments to the original statute, which have
20. See id. at 406-07, 722 A.2d at 890.
21. See id. at 407, 722 A.2d at 890.
22. See id. at 404, 722 A.2d at 889. Sharon was charged with "four counts of child
abuse, four counts of second degree rape, three counts of second degree sexual offense,
one count of third degree sexual offense, and two counts of conspiracy for the involvement
in the sexual molestation of Jennifer." Id. She was acquitted on three counts of second
degree rape and three counts of second degree sexual offense. See id. The jury could not
agree on a verdict as to one count of second degree rape, one count of third degree sexual
offense, and one count of conspiracy. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id,
25. Degren v. State, No. 1135, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 25, 1998).
26. See Degren, 352 Md. at 404, 722 A.2d at 889.
27. See id. at 404-05, 722 A.2d at 889.
28. See id. at 405, 722 A.2d at 889.
29. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353, 164 A.2d 467, 474 (1960) (concluding
that a mother's failure to protect her child from the malicious attacks perpetrated by her
boyfriend constituted "gross and criminal negligence" which contributed to the cause of
her child's death).
30. See Act of April 30, 1963, ch. 743, 1963 Md. Laws 1536 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § I1A (Supp. 1962)). This statute, under the subtitle "Assault on Child," defined as
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consistently expanded coverage of liability under this statute, have sig-
naled the Legislature's intent to protect "children who have been the
subject of abuse."" a Additionally, Maryland case law prior to Degren
has interpreted physical child abuse to include a caregiver's failure to
act.32 This legislation and case law reflects the trend of courts nation-
wide to extend "the scope of criminal liability for failure to act in
those situations in which the common law or statutes impose a respon-
sibility for the safety and well-being of others."33
a. Origins of a Parent's Legal Duty to Protect in Maryland:
Palmer v. State.-Prior to the enactment of Maryland's child abuse
statute in 1963, the Court of Appeals held, in Palmer v. State,34 that
because parents have a legal duty to their child, their failure to inter-
vene on the child's behalf in cases of aggravated abuse resulting in
a felony particular mistreatment of certain minor children by or in the presence of a spe-
cific class of persons, and provided the penalty therefore. Id. The statute provided:
Any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent or tempo-
rary care or custody of a minor child under the age of fourteen years who mali-
ciously beats, strikes, or otherwise mistreats such minor child to such degree as to
require medical treatment for such child shall be guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction, shall be sentenced to not more than fifteen years in the Penitentiary.
Id.
31. Degren, 352 Md. at 419, 722 A.2d at 896 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 423, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975) (quoting Act of May 24,
1973, ch. 835, 1973 Md. Laws. 1708)).
32. See Fabritz, 276 Md. at 426, 348 A.2d at 281 (concluding that the caretaker's failure
to act to provide treatment to an injured child was "cruel and inhumane" within the mean-
ing of the statute as the terms are commonly understood); see also Pope v. State, 284 Md.
309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (restricting the class of persons covered by the child abuse
statute, while reaffirming the principle established in Fabritz); Nancy A. Tanck, Note, Com-
mendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect Their Children from
Abuse, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 659, 666-70 (discussing the Maryland cases holding parents and
caregivers criminally responsible for their child abuse).
33. State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. 1982); see, e.g., State v. Miranda, 715
A.2d 680, 690 (Conn. 1998) (concluding that the defendant, the mother's live-in boy-
friend, had a duty to protect the minor child, and the failure to do so was in violation of
the state's assault statute); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 155 (Wis. 1986) (conclud-
ing that defendant's conduct in continuing to leave her children in the care of their father,
in spite of her knowledge that he was both physically and sexually abusing them, and her
failure to protect them from such abuse, fell within the prohibitions of the child abuse
statute); Walden, 293 S.E.2d at 787 (holding that "the failure of a parent who is present to
take all steps reasonably possible to protect the parent's child from an attack by another
person constitutes an act of omission by the parent showing the parent's consent and con-
tribution to the crime being committed"); State v. Ainsworth, 426 S.E.2d 410, 415 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming the lower court's conviction for first degree rape on a theory of
aiding and abetting where the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to
prevent the rape of her son while in her presence).
34. 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1968).
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death constituted a crime.35 In Palmer, the court affirmed the convic-
tion of the defendant, Barbara Ann Palmer, a teenage mother, for the
involuntary manslaughter of her twenty-month-old child.36 Although
the defendant's boyfriend, Edward McCue, struck the deadly blow,
the court emphasized the opportunity Ms. Palmer had had to remove
"this poor little defenseless urchin... [from] an environment where
she was subjected to merciless, inhumane . . . brutality."37
The court held that the child's mother had a legal duty to pro-
vide for the "support, care, . . . [and] welfare" of her child.3" Al-
though there was no evidence that Ms. Palmer ever abused the child
herself, 9 the court concluded that the failure to protect her child
from the brutality of her boyfriend's "outrageous" and appalling con-
duct, often occurring while in her presence, constituted a "wanton or
reckless disregard for human life," and supported the trial judge's
conclusion of "gross and criminal negligence" on the part of Ms.
Palmer.4 °
Moreover, the court held that Ms. Palmer's negligence was the
proximate cause of her child's death.41 Although acknowledging Mr.
McCue's indisputable role in the child's death, the court noted that
"[t]o constitute the cause of the harm, it is not necessary that the de-
fendant's act be the sole reason for the realization of the harm which
has been sustained by the victim."4 2 The court concluded that Mr.
McCue's violent behavior was such that a reasonable person could
foresee that the child's life was in danger.4 Thus, Ms. Palmer's failure
to protect her child from her ultimate fate was deemed by the court to
be a "contributing cause of [the child's] unfortunate death."" The
court explained that under Maryland law, one is guilty of involuntary
manslaughter if the defendant owes someone a legal duty, fails to per-
35. Id. at 353, 164 A.2d at 474.
36. Id. at 352-53, 164 A.2d at 473-74.
37. Id. at 351-52, 164 A.2d at 473.
38. Id. at 343, 164 A.2d at 468 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1957)). Article
72A, § 1, read in relevant part: "The father and mother... [of a minor child] are jointly
and severally responsible with its support, care, nurture, welfare and education." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 72A, § 1, repealed by Act effective October 1, 1984, ch. 296, § 1, 1984 Md. Laws
1847-52; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-203(b)(1) (Supp. 1998) (containing lan-
guage similar to that found in the repealed statute).
39. See Palmer, 223 Md. at 350, 164 A.2d at 472.
40. Id. at 352, 164 A.2d at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 352-53, 164 A.2d at 474 (upholding the trial court's conclusion that there
was a "causal connection between the mother's negligence and the death").
42. Id. at 353, 164 A.2d at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 WHAR-
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form this duty, nonperformance results in that person's death, and
the defendant's failure to act constituted gross and wanton
negligence. 45
As there was no child abuse statute in existence at the time of Ms.
Palmer's conviction, the court's affirmation of Ms. Palmer's conviction
under a theory of negligent homicide sent a clear message that under
certain circumstances, criminal liability would extend to those parents
who fail to perform the legal duty owed to their child.
b. Historical Perspective of Maryland's Statutory Scope of Criminal
Liability for Child Abuse-a Continuous Expansion.-In response to
Palmer, and amid an emerging consciousness of a tragic and escalating
phenomenon known as the "Battered Child Syndrome,"46 Maryland's
General Assembly enacted a statute in 1963 to address the increasingly
pervasive issue of child abuse.47 Under this statute, it became a felony
for any parent or certain other supervising adult of a minor child
under the age of 14 years to "maliciously beat[ ], strike[ ], or other-
wise mistreat[ ]" a child to the degree that the child would "require
medical treatment."48 This statute was subsequently amended in
19644" and in 1966,50 both of which significantly augmented the origi-
45. Id. at 343, 164 A.2d at 468-69; cf Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 598, 155 A.2d 684, 689
(1959) (concluding that under the particular circumstances, the parents' failure to obtain
medical attention for their dying child did not constitute a "wanton or reckless disregard
for" the child's life and was therefore not the proximate cause of their child's death).
46. See Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 118, 389 A.2d 341, 343 (1978) (referencing a
clinical study conducted by a team of pediatricians headed by Dr. Henry C. Kempe, who
first described the Battered Child Syndrome in 1962); see alsoJames v. State 5 Md. App.
647, 650, 248 A.2d 910, 912 (1969) (recognizing the "Battered Child" syndrome as a term
of art used by the medical profession and enumerating several of the "indices of suspicion"
used by physicians to diagnose this syndrome). The court in James explained "Battered
Child" as a
clinical condition in infants who have received serious physical abuse; and that
among the indices of suspicion which are designed to aid an examining physician
in diagnosing a "battered child," . . . are (1) age usually under three years; (2)
characteristic distribution of fractures; (3) disproportionate amount of soft tissue
injury; (4) evidence that injuries occurred at different times and are in different
stages of repair; (5) cause of recent trauma doubtful; (6) suspicious family his-
tory, and (7) previous similar episodes.
47. See supra note 30 (discussing the 1963 child abuse statute); see also Bowers, 283 Md.
at 118, 389 A.2d at 274 (noting that "Maryland's initial attempt at achieving... reform in
[the area of child abuse] came in 1963 with the enactment of Chapter 743 of the Laws of
1963, then codified as § I1A of Article 27").
48. Act of April 30, 1953, ch. 743, 1963 Md. Laws 1536, 1536.
49. See Act of April 7, 1964, ch. 103, 1964 Md. Laws 300, 300 (codified at MD. CODE
ANN. art. 27, § 11A (Supp. 1964) (expanding the child abuse statute to require "physicians
to report evidence of mistreatment of children to the Maryland State Police or Police De-
partment of the County or City and relieving liability from such reporting").
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nal statute. It was not until 1973, however, that the Legislature sought
to expand the narrow scope of criminal liability provided for in the
original statute.51 The legislative purpose of this amendment was "the
protection of children who have been the subject of abuse."52 The
amendment extended the scope of the original statute's protection of
children from under fourteen years of age to under eighteen years of
age, and provided for the punishment of any parent or other supervis-
ing adult who "causes abuse" to such children.5 ' The amendment also
repealed the "maliciously beats, strikes or otherwise mistreats"'5 4 stan-
dard for child abuse, and replaced it with a new, broader, two-pro-
nged measure of "abuse" that required "[t]he sustaining of physical
injury by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a
result of a malicious act."
5 5
50. See Act of April 29, 1966, ch. 221, 1966 Md. Laws 466 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 11A (1967)). This legislation significantly expanded the child abuse statute to
increase the age of children the malicious mistreating of whom becomes a felony,
providing more comprehensive requirements for reporting said malicious con-
duct to law enforcement officers, defining terms, requiring reports, investigations
and making other general provisions to facilitate compliance with and enforce-
ment of this law regarding the assaulting of children within the state.
Id. at 466.
51. SeeAct of May 24, 1973, ch. 835, Md. Laws 1708, 1709 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973)) (defining "[a]buse" to include a two-pronged test that consists
of injuries sustained as a result of (1) "cruel or inhumane treatment" or (2) "[a] malicious
act or acts"). The statute's purpose was to
provide certain definitions in the child abuse law and to mandate the reporting of
suspected child abuse to certain agencies, and providing for cooperative efforts by
certain agencies in cases of child abuse, and extending immunity to persons who
report child abuse cases in good faith, and generally clarifying and extending the
law relating to child abuse.
Id. at 1708.
52. Id. The amendment stated:
The General Assembly hereby declares as its legislative intent and purpose the
protection of children who have been the subject of abuse by mandating the re-
porting of suspected abuse, by extending immunity to those who report in good
faith, by requiring prompt investigations of such reports and by causing immedi-
ate cooperative efforts by the responsible agencies on behalf of such children.
53. Id. at 1709. In relevant part, the statute reads:
Any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent or tempo-
rary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor child under
the age of eighteen years who causes abuse to such minor child shall be guilty of a




55. Id. at 1709-10 (stating that "'[a]buse' shall mean any [nonaccidental] physical in-
jury or injuries sustained by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result
of malicious act or acts by any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the perma-
nent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a minor child").
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In 1974, the Legislature further expanded the definition of
"abuse" by prohibiting the sexual abuse of a child, "whether physical
injuries are sustained or not. '56 The purpose of this amendment was
to "expand[ ] the definition of child abuse, [and] defin[e] sexual
abuse. 5 7 The amendment defined sexual abuse as "any act or acts
involving sexual molestation or exploitation" by a parent or other su-
pervising adult.58 The statute further elaborated on the definition of
sexual abuse by identifying several examples of sexual abuse, which
included "incest, rape, carnal knowledge, sodomy or unnatural or per-
verted sexual practices. '59 The examples identified, however, were
not intended to be exclusive examples of abuse.6 °
c. State v. Fabritz: Extending Criminal Liability for Failure to
Act in Cases of Physical Abuse.-In 1975, in the seminal case of State v.
Fabritz," the Court of Appeals was faced with the task of interpreting
the recently amended child abuse statute.62 The issue before the
court was whether, to be found guilty of felony child abuse, the defen-
dant, Virginia Fabritz, should be required to have directly inflicted the
physical injuries upon her child, rather than having aggravated them
by failing to seek timely medical assistance.6" Based on the Legisla-
ture's 1973 amendment to its original child abuse statute,64 Chief
Judge Murphy, writing for the court, broadly interpreted the statutory
definition of "abuse."
65
On October 1, 1973, Virginia Fabritz left her three-year-old
daughter, Windy, in the care of two acquaintances, Tommy and Ann
56. Act of April 30, 1974, ch. 554, 1974 Md. Laws 1887, 1889 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1974)).
57. Id. at 1887.
58. Id. at 1889.
59. 1974 Md. Laws at 1889 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b) (8) (Supp.
1974)). In 1977, the Legislature replaced the phrase "carnal knowledge" with "sexual of-
fense in any degree." Act of May 17, 1977, ch. 290, 1977 Md. Laws 1976, 1978.
60. See 1974 Md. Laws at 1889.
61. 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975).
62. Id. at 422, 348 A.2d at 279 (applying principles of construction of statutes, the
Court "consider[ed] the provisions of § 35A as they stood at the time of the alleged of-
fense"); see Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 835 Md. Laws 1708, 1709 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973)) (replacing the more limiting "maliciously beats, strikes or
otherwise mistreats" test of the original 1963 statute with a two-pronged test that defined
"[a]buse" as "physical injury or injuries sustained by a child as a result or cruel or inhu-
mane treatment or as a result of malicious act or acts").
63. See id. at 420, 348 A.2d at 277-78.
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the expanded definition of
child abuse).
65. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 423-24, 348 A.2d at 280.
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Crockett.66 Upon her return two days later, Ms. Fabritz discovered
that during her absence her daughter had been severely beaten by
Mr. Crockett.67 Because she was "too ashamed of the bruises on her
daughter's body," Ms. Fabritz put Windy to bed instead of immedi-
ately taking her daughter to the hospital.68  As the evening
progressed, Windy's condition deteriorated until she was finally taken
to the hospital, where she was subsequently pronounced dead.69 Ear-
lier in the evening, Ms. Fabritz acknowledged to a friend that she had
known that Mr. Crockett had struck her daughter.7 °
A jury in the Circuit Court for Calvert County convicted Ms.
Fabritz under the child abuse statute.71 Expert testimony presented at
trial indicated that Windy would have lived had an operation been
performed "within at least twelve hours prior to death; and that she
would have had a chance to survive if surgery had been performed up
to an hour before death."
72
The Court of Special Appeals, however, reversed thejudgment of
conviction, holding that "to be guilty under the statute, the accused
must be shown to have caused the injury, not simply aggravated it by
failure to seek assistance. '73 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari
to review the Court of Special Appeals's interpretation of the child
abuse statute. 4
The basis of the appeal was whether Windy's physical injuries suf-
fered as a result of the defendant's failure to obtain medical assistance
constituted "cruel or inhumane treatment," thereby falling within the
scope of the statute. 75 The court first looked to the legislative purpose
of the statute as embodied in section 35A and noted that it was the
goal of the statute to "protect[ ] ... children who have been the sub-
ject of abuse. ' 76 The court then compared the language used to de-
fine abuse in section 11A, with that of the replacement language used
66. See id. at 418, 358 A.2d at 277.
67. See id. at 418, 348 A.2d at 276-77. It was revealed at trial that Windy had approxi-
mately seventy bruises or contusions covering her body, ranging in size from one inch to
five inches. See id., 348 A.2d at 276.
68. Id., 348 A.2d at 277.
69. See id. at 419, 348 A.2d at 277.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 420, 348 A.2d at 277.
72. Id at 419, 348 A.2d at 277.
73. Fabritz v. State, 24 Md. App. 708, 714, 332 A.2d 324, 327 (1975).
74. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 420, 348 A.2d at 278.
75. Id. at 425, 348 A.2d at 280.
76. Id. at 423, 348 A.2d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973)).
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to define abuse in section 35A.77 It noted that the terms "maliciously
beats, strikes or otherwise mistreats... [a] minor child to such degree
as to require medical treatment" as used in section 1 A, narrowly lim-
ited criminal liability to those who, "in one form or another, . . .as-
sault[ed] a minor child. '7' However, the subsequent replacement of
those terms with the language used in section 35A(b) (7), defining
abuse as encompassing "any physical injury sustained by a child as a
result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of a malicious
act," signaled to the court the intention of the Legislature to broaden
the scope of the statute's prohibitions.79
The court concluded that by the Legislature's repeal of the more
limiting language of section 1 A, and the replacement of it with more
encompassing terms, the Legislature sought to include an act of omis-
sion as constituting "cruel or inhumane treatment."' Thus, the court
determined that an offense to the statute was committed if "physical
injury to the child resulted eitherffrom a course of conduct constituting
'cruel or inhumane treatment' or by 'malicious act or acts."' 8 ' The
court bolstered its determination by applying a dictionary definition
to the terms "physical injury" and "cause."8 2 The court found that
Virginia's failure to seek medical assistance for her daughter "caused"
her child to suffer additional "physical injury" as a result of her deteri-
orating condition and was "cruel and inhumane treatment" as con-
templated within the meaning of the statutory language as ordinarily
understood." Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the Court of Special Appeals. 4
77. Id.
78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A
(1971)) ("It would appear from its terms that the enactment was not intended to reach acts
of individuals not constituting, in one form or another, an assault on a child.").
79. Id. at 423-24, 348 A.2d at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(7) (1971 & Supp. 1975)).
80. See id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b) (7) (Supp. 1973).
81. Id. at 424, 348 A.2d at 280 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcroNARY 1164 (1961) as de-
fining injury as "an act that damages, harms or hurts.. ."; and cause as the "condition that
brings about an effect or that produces or calls forth a resultant action or state" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
83. Id. at 425-26, 348 A.2d at 281.
84. Id. at 426, 348 A.2d at 281. Ms. Fabritz's conviction was subsequently vacated on
habeas corpus in Fabritz v. Traurig, 583 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915
(1979). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the child abuse statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Fabritz because of insufficient evidence. Id. at 698. Nev-
ertheless, it accepted the statute and the court's interpretation in Fabritz as valid. Id. at 700
(noting that the Court "accept[s] the statute [MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973)]
as valid" as well as the Court of Appeals' "clear exposition of the critical words of the law").
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In his dissent, Judge O'Donnell contended that the 1973 revi-
sions of the provisions of section 35A(b) (7) were not intended by the
Legislature to supersede the common law of manslaughter.15 Rather,
the child abuse statute filled a gap and was intended to punish acts
that fell outside the ambit of common law assault, but short of man-
slaughter.8 6 Hence, its purpose was to forbid "cruel and inhumane
treatment" or "malicious act or acts" which resulted in "physical injury
or injuries" to a child, not death.8 7
Judge O'Donnell noted that, as recognized in Palmer,88 the "unin-
tentional killing of another by the omission, through gross negli-
gence, to perform a legal duty owing to him, was involuntary
manslaughter at common law."89 Consequently, if it was shown that
Virginia Fabritz, by "gross or criminal negligence," acted with a "wan-
ton or reckless disregard for human life" in failing to provide timely
medical assistance for her daughter, according to Judge O'Donnell,
she would have been subject to prosecution for common law involun-
tary manslaughter in the event of the child's death.9 °
Therefore, although Judge O'Donnell concurred with the major-
ity that an offense under the statute is committed "if physical injury to
the child resulted either, from a course of conduct constituting 'cruel
and inhumane treatment,' or by 'malicious act or acts,"' 91 he took is-
sue with the majority's application of the statute to the facts of the
case.92 He did not agree that the defendant's failure to seek medical
assistance over a period of nearly eight hours was a "course of con-
duct" that constituted "cruel or inhumane treatment."93 He pointed
out that the relationship of the terms "cruel and inhumane" with the
85. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 433, 348 A.2d at 284-85 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 433, 348 A.2d at 285 (arguing that the statute sought to "proscribe 'cruel
and inhumane treatment' or 'malicious act or acts' which directly result in 'physical injury
or injuries,"' not death (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. Id.
88. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 34, 164 A.2d 467 (1960) (concluding that a parent's legal
duty to their child made their failure to intervene on the child's behalf in cases of aggra-
vated abuse that resulted in death, a crime).
89. Fabztz, 276 Md. at 427, 348 A.2d at 281 (O'Donnell, J. dissenting) (citations omit-
ted); see also Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 596, 155 A.2d 684, 688 (1959) ("[I]t is almost
universally recognized that where the defendant owed to a deceased person a specific legal
duty, but failed to perform the same, and death resulted to the deceased because of the
non-performance of the duty, (at least under circumstances where the failure to perform
constituted gross and wanton negligence) the defendant is guilty of involuntary
manslaughter.").
90. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 429, 348 A.2d at 283 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 433-34, 348 A.2d at 285.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 434, 348 A.2d at 285.
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words "malicious act or acts" requires an element of intent to cause
the child to suffer physical injury.94 He argued that although Ms.
Fabritz may have used poor, or even negligent, judgment in her deci-
sion not to bring her child to the hospital, there was no proof of mal-
ice in her decision. 95
d. Pope v. State: Restricting the Duty to Protect a Child from
Abuse.-While the court in Fabritz interpreted the scope of the child
abuse statute to include acts of omission as well as affirmative acts, it
left unanswered the class of persons to whom the child abuse law ap-
plied.96 This question was addressed three years later in Pope v. State.9 7
In Pope, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the de-
fendant, Joyce Pope, who did not intervene when her friend, Melissa
Norris, beat her own child to death while a guest in the defendant's
home and while in the defendant's presence. 98 The court acknowl-
edged that Pope's "course of conduct" in failing to protect the child
from numerous acts of abuse by her mother, and her failure to seek
medical assistance for the child over a relatively protracted period of
time, would fall within the ambit of the child abuse statute as applied
in Fabritz.9" Nevertheless, the court found that Ms. Pope's relationship
to the victim did not place her within the class of persons covered by
the statute, thereby placing her conduct beyond the reach of the
law.100
Notwithstanding a moral duty, Maryland law does not recognize a
legal duty on the part of a person to come to the aid of another in
peril, whether that person is a stranger, adult, or child.10 1 Failure to
render aid, however, is not a complete defense for a person who falls
within the common law exceptions based upon a special relationship
94. Id.
95. Id. (arguing that the mother's failure to "promptly obtain medical assistance im-
puted to her any intent to permit the child to continue to suffer or die").
96. See Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 320, 396 A.2d 1054, 1062 (1979) (noting that "Fabritz
did not go to the class of persons to whom the statutory proscription [of child abuse]
applies"). The class of persons to whom the statute applied was left unanswered as the
defendant in Fabritz was the victim's parent, a class specifically designated in the statute. See
Fabritz, 276 Md. at 425-26, 348 A.2d at 280-81.
97. 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979).
98. Id. at 312-13, 396 A.2d at 1057-58.
99. Id. at 328, 396 A.2d at 1066.
100. Id. at 330, 396 at 1067.
101. Id. at 324, 396 at 1064; see also W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAw 183 (1972)
(arguing that "[g]enerally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when
that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself' and that "[a] moral
duty to take affirmative action is not enough to impose a legal duty to do so").
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between the parties or one who is excepted by statutory provision, 10 2
such as those provided for in Maryland's child abuse statute."' 3
In Pope, the applicable provision of the statute pertained to "any
parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent or
temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a minor
child."' 4 As Ms. Pope was not the parent, adoptive parent, or a per-
son who had "permanent or temporary care or custody" of the minor
child, the issue presented was whether Joyce Pope was a person
deemed to have "responsibility for the supervision of the minor child"
as a result of the mother and child being guests in her home.10 5 After
reviewing the legislative history and the plain meaning of the statute,
the court concluded that
[a]bsent a court order or award by some appropriate pro-
ceeding pursuant to statutory authority,.. . responsibility for
supervision of a minor child may be obtained only upon the
mutual consent, expressed or implied, by the one legally
charged with the care of the child and by the one assuming
the responsibility. 106
The court found no evidence that Ms. Pope had so assumed responsi-
bility for the child, and thus her conviction was overturned.
10 7
Judge Eldridge, concurring in part and dissenting in part, dis-
agreed with the restrictive interpretation by the majority in that "only
those persons who have been granted responsibility by a parent or
guardian" should fall within the statute's scope.108 He contended that
102. See Adams, supra note 8, at 524 (surveying judicial bases for holding parents crimi-
nally liable); Jean Peters-Baker, Punishing the Passive Parent: Ending a Cycle of Violence, 65
UMKC L. Rv. 1003, 1010 (1997) (arguing that a parent has a legal duty to render aid to
their own child). Adams notes:
Courts have held condoning parents criminally liable through a combination of
several doctrinal approaches: (1) holding that a parent has a legal duty to protect
her child; (2) holding condoning parents to a reasonable person standard; (3)
liberally interpreting existing child abuse statutes to include condoning parents;
(4) broadly construing the notion of proximate cause to include failure to seek
medical attention for one's child; and (5) construing child abuse as a general
intent crime. In addition, legislatures in several states have enacted statutes that
specifically criminalize the failure to protect a child from abuse.
103. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35(c) (Supp. 1998) (applying criminal liability for
child abuse, both physical and sexual, to any "parent or other person who has permanent
or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child, or by any house-
hold or family member").
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (b) (7) (Supp. 1979); see also Pope, 284 Md. at 317, 396
A.2d at 1060.
105. Pope, 284 Md. at 329, 396 A.2d at 1066.
106. Id. at 323, 396 A.2d at 1063.
107. Id. at 330, 396 A.2d at 1067.
108. Id. at 356, 396 A.2d at 1080 (Eldridge,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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a person should be held liable if he or she abuses a child whether or
not they assume responsibility for a child with or without the parent's
consent. 109
e. Persuasive Authority in Foreign Jurisdictions.-Extending
criminal liability to the condoning caregiver has not been limited to
Maryland courts. While other jurisdictions may utilize different ap-
proaches to attach criminal liability to a condoning caregiver, the re-
sults are the same.'11 It has been the "trend of Anglo-American law"
to "enlarg[e] the scope of criminal liability for failure to act in those
situations in which the common law or statutes impose a responsibility
for the safety and well-being of others." 'l
For example, in State v. Walden, the Supreme Court of North Car-
olina extended criminal liability to a passive parent based on a par-
ent's legal duty to protect its child. 12 Walden involved a physical
assault on defendant Aleen Walden's one-year-old son.'1 3 Although
Ms. Walden did not inflict the injuries herself, she was present when
the beatings took place and failed to intervene on her child's be-
half' 14 Ms. Walden was prosecuted and convicted under the theory
that she aided and abetted a friend, the perpetrator of the abuse, in
the commission of the assault on her child, and was thereby guilty as a
principal to the offense charged. 115 Predicated on the notion that it is
an inherent duty of parents to provide for the safety of their children,
the court affirmed the conviction, concluding that a parent's failure
to take all of the "steps reasonably possible" to prevent harm to its
child "constitutes an act of omission by the parent showing the par-
ent's consent and contribution to the crime. "116
Similarly, in State v. Williquette,1 17 relying in part on Maryland case
law," 8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court broadened the scope of their
109. Id. (noting that there is "no public policy"justification for not holding accountable
a person who assumes responsibility for a child without the parent's consent).
110. See Adams, supra note 8, at 524 (asserting that although "Courts have held condon-
ing parents criminally liable through a combination of several doctrinal approaches," that
parents who condone the abuse of their children "could potentially be reached by all of
these . . . approaches").
111. State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. 1982).
112. Id. at 786.
113. Id. at 782.
114. See id. at 782-83.
115. See id. at 783.
116. Id. at 787.
117. 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986).
118. The court discussed State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), Pope v. State,
284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979), Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960), and
the principles established therein. Id. at 153-54.
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child abuse statute to reach a condoning parent through a liberal in-
terpretation of that statute. 1 9 Petitioner, Terri Williquette, was
charged under the Wisconsin child abuse statute for failing to prevent
her husband from repeatedly "sexually abusing, beating, and other-
wise mistreating" her seven-year-old son and eight-year-old daugh-
ter.12° Although Ms. Williquette was not present during the abuse,
both children had gone to her with complaints of the abuse. 1 ' In
spite of this knowledge, she regularly left them in her husband's
care. 1
22
As in Fabritz, the Williquette court was required to determine if the
statute's language included acts of omission. 123 The court gave partic-
ular scrutiny to the statutory phrase "subjects a child to cruel maltreat-
ment." 1 24 Determining that the plain meaning of the terms does not
limit application to direct acts of commission, the court concluded
that the statute reached a person who has a duty to the child, and
exposes the child to foreseeable abuse. 125 Moreover, the court stated
that there is no criminal intent requirement for liability to attach. 126
The court reasoned that its interpretation was correct because of the
purpose of the statute, which is to "protect children from the conse-
quences of conduct" that is "abhorrent to the sensitivities of the gen-
eral public." 1
27
In the recently decided case of State v. Miranda,128 the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court determined that the live-in boyfriend of an abu-
sive mother had established a familial relationship with the victims'
mother and her children such as to assume responsibility for the wel-
fare of the children, as though "he were their father."1 29 Accordingly,
the boyfriend incurred a legal duty to protect the child from the
abuse of her mother, the breach of such duty constituting criminal
119. Id. at 154.
120. Id. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
121. See id. at 150.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 149; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
124. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wis.
STAT. § 940.201 (1985-1986)).
125. See id. at 150.
126. Id.; see also State v. Danforth, 385 N.W.2d 125, 126 (Wis. 1986) (concluding that
child abuse does not require that a person have criminal intent to cruelly maltreat a child);
State v. Killory, 243 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Wis. 1976) (stating that child abuse does not require
malice).
127. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Killory, 243 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Wis. 1976)).
128. 715 A.2d 680 (Conn. 1998).
129. Id. at 682.
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liability under the general assault statute.' 3° As in Walden, the court in
Miranda acknowledged that criminal conduct could arise not only
through affirmative acts, but also by an omission to act when there is a
legal duty to do so and the failure to act results in an injury. 13' Be-
cause, according to the court, the defendant had established a familial
relationship, he assumed under common law "the same legal duty to
protect the victim from the abuse as if he were, in fact, the victim's
guardian."'
32
Finally, North Carolina has demonstrated a willingness to extend
liability to caregivers for failure to act in cases involving sexual abuse.
In State v. Ainsworth,13 3 the issue was whether the defendant, Deborah
Ainsworth, was guilty of aiding and abetting in the first degree rape of
her twelve year old son, when he was engaged in sexual intercourse
with an adult female in the defendant's presence and the defendant
failed to take all "reasonable steps possible" to prevent the inter-
course. 134 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction relying on the Walden decision in which a
parent's failure to take all "steps reasonably possible" to prevent physi-
cal harm to their child constituted an act of omission by the parent
showing the parent's "consent and contribution to the crime.' 135
Drawing parallels to the circumstances found in Walden, the court
noted that Ms. Ainsworth was laying in the same bed as her twelve
year old child who was being raped "without uttering a single word in
his defense," in spite of their being no risk of danger for her to do
so. 136 The court concluded that the defendant's failure to prevent
her son's rape "clearly f[ell] within the Walden holding.' 311 7 Further-
more, the court acknowledged that the harm caused to the victim by
the rape was "no less severe" than the physical injuries sustained by
the child in Walden, citing the "reality ... of sexually transmitted dis-
eases and emotional damage resulting from sexual abuse . . .which




131. See id. at 686; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
132. Miranda, 715 A.2d at 689.
133. 426 S.E.2d 410 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
134. Id. at 415.
135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780,
787 (N.C. 1982)).
136. Id. (noting that in Walden, evidence was presented that although the mother was
present when her child was being beaten with a belt, she "looked on, but did not say or do
anything to stop the beating").
137. See id.
138. Id. at 416.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Degren, the Court of Appeals held
that the definition of sexual abuse, as defined in section 35C(a) (6) (i)
of the child abuse statute, 139 contemplates both an affirmative act of
directly molesting or exploiting a minor child, and a caregiver's fail-
ure to prevent the molestation or exploitation of a child.14 This
holding was an extension of the prior holdings in Fabritz and Pope, in
which the court interpreted section 35A of the child abuse statute to
include acts of omission in cases of physical abuse."'
Relying on the same method of statutory interpretation as it did
in Fabritz, the court sought to determine the Legislature's intent con-
cerning the scope of statutory liability in cases of sexual abuse.
14 2
Utilizing the "cardinal rule" of statutory construction, the court
looked at the plain meaning of the statute itself.14 3 The court ac-
knowledged that if statutory language is unambiguous, and "expresses
a definite and simple meaning," courts customarily would not look
beyond the words of the statute to determine the Legislature's in-
tent.144 The court noted, however, that although the statutory lan-
guage is a legitimate indicator of the Legislature's intent,
interpretation of the statute must also be construed reasonably with
regard to the "purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body."1 45 More-
over, interpretation of a statute must comport with logic, reason, and
common sense.
146
Looking at the plain meaning of section 35C(a) (6) (i), the court
explained that sexual abuse is defined as "any act that involves sexual
molestation or exploitation of a child." 47 At issue was the definition
139. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C(a) (6) (i) (1996).
140. Degren, 352 Md. at 425, 722 A-2d at 899.
141. See id. at 424-25, 722 A.2d at 899; see also supra notes 80 and 99.
142. Degren, 352 Md. at 417-18, 722 A.2d at 896; see also State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421-
22, 348 A.2d 275, 278-79; supra notes 76-80.
143. Degren, 352 Md. at 417-19, 722 A.2d at 895-96 ("As we often said, the starting point
for determining legislative intent is the language of the statute itself.").
144. Id. at 417, 722 A.2d at 895 (citing Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor
Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 446, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248
Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968)).
145. Id. at 417, 722 A.2d at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tracey v.
Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992)).
146. See id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 895 (observing that a statute should be construed in a
manner that provides for an interpretation that is "reasonable and consonant with logic
and common sense" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis v. State, 348 Md.
648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998))).
147. Id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 896 (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C(a)(6)(i) (1996)).
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of the word "act."148 As the term is not defined in the statute, the
court examined dictionary definitions of the word.14 Although the
collegiate dictionary definition of the word "act" seemed to require an
affirmative action, 150 the court noted that there were other interpreta-
tions of the word "act."' 1 For instance, in Black's Law Dictionary, "act"
in the context of a "criminal act" is defined as "[a] n omission or fail-
ure to act ... for [the] purpose of criminal law." '52 The court then
examined the word "act" in relation to the other terms of the provi-
sion. It noted that "act" is modified by the phrase "that involves sexual
molestation or exploitation."' Noting that the dictionary definition
of the term "involves" suggests a "broad sense of inclusion," the court
concluded that the word "act" seems to "expand the scope of the word
'act' from just the deed of molestation or exploitation into something
done by the accused that relates to the molestation or exploita-
tion. 154 As the term "act" is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation, the court looked beyond the plain meaning of the stat-
ute to determine the Legislature's intent.'55
Referencing the groundwork laid by the court in Fabritz, the court
recognized the consistent expansion of the scope of liability and appli-
cability of the child abuse statute through amendments to the original
statute. 156 Particularly significant was the General Assembly's 1973
amendment that increased the age of protection from sixteen years to
eighteen years, and repealed the restrictive language requiring overt
acts of physical abuse, substituting in its place language that would
encompass both an act or failure to act as being "cruel or inhumane
treatment or a malicious act.' ' 5 7
148. Id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 896.
149. Id. at 418-19, 722 A.2d at 896.
150. See id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 896; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
11 (10th ed. 1998) (defining "act" as "the doing of a thing: DEED"; "something done
voluntarily"; "the process of doing: ACTION.").
151. See Degren, 352 Md. at 418, 722 A.2d at 896.
152. Id. at 418-19, 722 A.2d at 896 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 25 (6th ed. 1990); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMI-
NAL LAw § 4, at 658 (3d ed. 1982) (stating that "[i]n a legislative enactment . . . if the
phrase act or omission is found, the first word is being employed in the limited sense of act
of commission; whereas if only the word 'act' is used, it is construed ordinarily to include
also forbearance or omission" (footnotes omitted)).
153. Degren, 352 Md. at 419, 722 A.2d at 896 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35(a)(6)(i) (1996)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 419-20, 722 A.2d at 896-97; see also discussion supra Part 3.b (discussing the
enactment of Maryland's child abuse statute and its expansion through amendment).
157. Id., 722 A.2d at 896; see also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing
the provisions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973)).
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The court noted that in 1974, the Legislature further expanded
the scope of the child abuse statute to include sexual abuse as within
its definition of conduct that constituted abuse. 151 Specifically, ac-
cording to the court, the amendment defined sexual abuse as any "act
or acts involving sexual molestation or exploitation." 59 Such act or
acts included, although were not limited to, "incest, rape, carnal
knowledge, sodomy or unnatural or perverted sexual practices. '160
The class of persons liable under this provision of the statute was any
"parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent or
temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision" of a
child under the age of eighteen years.' 61
The crux of Sharon Degren's argument was based on the distinc-
tion between the statutory language used to define the conduct consti-
tuting physical abuse and the language used to define the conduct
constituting sexual abuse. 6 2 In section 35C (a) (2), "Abuse" is defined:
(i) The sustaining of physical injury by a child as a result of
cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of a malicious act
by any parent or other person who has permanent or tempo-
rary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a
child, or by any household or family member, under circum-
stances that indicate that the child's health or welfare is
harmed or threatened thereby; or
(ii) Sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are
sustained or not.1
63
In section 35C(a) (6) sexual abuse is further defined as
(i) any act that involves sexual molestation or exploita-
tion of a child by a parent or other person who has
permanent or temporary care or custody or respon-
sibility for supervision of a child, or by any house-
hold or family member.
(ii) "Sexual abuse" includes, but is not limited to:
1. Incest, rape, or sexual offense in any degree;
2. Sodomy; and
158. Id. at 420, 722 A.2d at 896.
159. Id.; see also Act of April 30, 1974, ch. 554, 1974 Md. Laws 1887, 1889.
160. Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 896-97 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b) (8) (Supp. 1974)); see also 1974 Md. Laws at
1889.
161. Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 896-97 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(a) (Supp. 1974)); see also 1974 Md. Laws at 1888.
162. See Degren, 352 Md. at 420-21, 722 A.2d at 897 (noting that "[i]mplicit in peti-
tioner's argument is the notion that the Legislature failed to enact more encompassing
language, such as that used in the 1973 amendment of the definition of physical abuse").
163. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (Supp. 1996).
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3. Unnatural or perverted sexual practices.1 64
Degren argued that the scope of the definition of physical abuse
was broader than that of sexual abuse, signaling the Legislature's "in-
tent to limit what constitutes sexual abuse to affirmative deeds.' 1 6 5 In
her brief, she argued that whereas the two-pronged definition of phys-
ical abuse encompassed both "injury, producing affirmative conduct
("a malicious act") or injury-producing neglect ("cruel or inhumane
treatment")" the narrow definition of sexual abuse utilized by the Leg-
islature in its 1974 amendment demands that the term "act" be con-
strued so as to require an overt act "involv[ing] sexual molestation or
exploitation" of a child.'66 Thus, the petitioner argued that because
there was no ambiguity in the meaning of the language defining sex-
ual abuse, the lower courts erred in looking beyond the plain mean-
ing of the statutory language.'
6 7
The court, however, discounted Degren's argument as defying
"common sense, logic, and the purpose and goals" of the statute and
its subsequent amendments. 68 The court pointed out the absurdity
of such an argument by illustrating the result that would ensue if the
court accepted such an interpretation:
Under [Mrs. Degren's] theory... if [she] had sat on the
edge of the bed and watched Mr. Degren beat Jennifer, she
could have been prosecuted under the statute for her failure
to intervene. Because she sat on the bed and watched her
husband rape Jennifer . . . [she] cannot be prosecuted for
sexual abuse for failing to stop her husband because his ac-
tions were not physical abuse.
1 69
The court noted that implicit in this line of reasoning would be
the Legislature's belief that sexual abuse is somehow a less serious of-
fense than physical abuse.17 0 The court rejected this argument out-
right. 17  Citing the language in section 35C(a)(2)(ii), the court
emphasized that the Legislature was well aware of the serious nature
164. Id.
165. Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897.
166. Brief of Petitioner at 8, 14, Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999) (No.
54).
167. See id. at 10.
168. Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897.
169. Id. at 420-21, 722 A.2d at 897.
170. Id. at 421, 722 A.2d at 897 (observing that petitioner's argument that the Legisla-
ture's failure to enact more encompassing language as was used in the 1973 amendment
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of sexual abuse and consequently did not require that a victim sustain
physical injuries for a defendant to be charged with sexual abuse. 172
This, the court reasoned, exhibited the Legislature's recognition of
the "extensive emotional, psychological, or physical damage that sex-
ual abuse can cause a child.""73 Given the Legislature's awareness, the
court concluded that it was inconceivable that the Legislature would
intend to punish failure to act in cases of physical abuse but not in
cases of sexual abuse.
174
In support of its conclusion, the court referred to the North Car-
olina case of State v. Ainsworth.175 Recognizing the similarity of cir-
cumstances between the two cases, the court noted with approval the
Ainsworth court's recognition of the gravity of sexual abuse when it
declared " [w] e would be blind to both the cold reality of today's world
of sexually transmitted diseases and emotional damage resulting from
sexual abuse ... the child here was exposed to an event which could
have severe psychological repercussions."1 76
Sharon Degren further argued that the doctrine of ejusdem
generis177 supported the plain meaning interpretation of the term
"act." 7 1 She noted that while sexual abuse is defined in section
35C(a) (6) (i), section 35C(a) (6) (ii) goes on to list several examples of
sexual abuse, including "incest, rape, sexual offense in any degree,
sodomy, and unnatural or perverted sexual practices."'1 79 Therefore,
because incest, rape, sexual offense, and unnatural or perverted sex-
ual practices are all acts of commission, it follows that the broader
definition of sexual abuse is limited to acts of commission.' 80
The court, however, declined to apply the doctrine of ejusdem




175. Id. at 422, 722 A.2d at 898; see also supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text
(discussing the Ainsworth decision).
176. Degren, 352 Md. at 424, 722 A.2d at 899 (quoting State v. Ainsworth, 426 S.E.2d 410,
415 (N.C. App. 1993)).
177. The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that "where general rules in a statute
follow the designation of particular things or classes of subjects or persons, the general
words will usually be construed to include only those things or persons of the same class or
general nature as those specifically mentioned." Id. at 427, 722 A.2d at 900 (quoting Smith
v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130, 48 A.2d 754, 761-62 (1946)).
178. See id. at 426, 722 A.2d at 900.
179. Id. (citing Brief of Petitioner at 10, Degren (No. 54)).
180. See Brief of Petitioner at 11, Degren (No. 54) (arguing that the rule ejusdem generis
requires that sexual abuse be confined to acts of commission as in keeping with the exam-
ples of sexual abuse as noted in MD. ANN. CODE § 35C(a) (6) (ii) (1996)).
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The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when the fol-
lowing conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumer-
ation by specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration
suggest a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumera-
tion; (4) a general reference supplementing the enumera-
tion, usually following it; and (5) there is not clearly
manifested an intent that the general term be given a
broader meaning than the doctrine requires. It is generally
held that the rule ... is merely a rule of construction and is
only applicable where legislative intent or language expres-
sing that intent is unclear.1 81
However, the court distinguished the application of ejusdem
generis under the circumstances in the present case, noting that the
doctrine cannot be applied "to restrict the meaning of words within
narrower limits than the statute intends, so as to subvert its obvious
purpose.""1 2 The court stressed that the Legislature's use of the gen-
eral phrase-" [s] exual abuse includes, but is not limited to"-preced-
ing the list of examples, made it clear that the list is not
comprehensive.18 3 Additionally, taking into consideration the de-
clared purpose of the child abuse statute, "to protect children subject
to abuse," the court did not believe that the Legislature chose to limit
the forms of sexual abuse to only those enumerated in section
35C(a) (6) (ii)."14 To do so, the court argued, would be to "subvert...
[the statute's] obvious purpose. '185
Finally, the court found that Sharon Degren was not only guilty of
sexual abuse under the court's interpretation of that statute, but
could also be found guilty of the offense of sexual abuse based on her
own interpretation of the statute. 8 6 By her own admission, on at least
one occasion, she was aware that Jennifer and her husband were hav-
ing sexual intercourse and sat on the same bed and watched.8 7 She
acknowledged that on another occasion she witnessed Jennifer and
181. Degren, 352 Md. at 427, 722 A.2d at 900 (quoting In re Wallace W, 333 Md. at 190,
634 A.2d at 55-56 (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 47.18, at 200 (5th ed. 1992))).
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting citing Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459,
462, 124 A.2d 273, 274 (1956)).
183. Id. at 428, 722 A.2d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35(a) (6) (ii) (Supp. 1996)).
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A
(Supp. 1973)).
185. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blake, 210 Md. at 462, 124 A.2d at
274).
186. Id. at 425-26, 722 A.2d at 899.
187. See id. at 426, 722 A.2d at 899.
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Rick Dobsha engaged in sexual intercourse. 188 On both occasions,
the court concluded that she was engaged in the affirmative act of
watching her husband or Mr. Dobsha have intercourse with a minor
child." 9 By watching the rapes and failing to intervene, the court rea-
soned that she had "participated in the molestation and exploitation
of a minor by allowing sexual intercourse between Jennifer and the
two men to occur."190
4. Analysis.-In Degren, the Court of Appeals held that an adult
with responsibility for the supervision of a minor child may be guilty
of an offense defined under section 35C(a) (6) (i) of the child abuse
statute if she knowingly fails to protect the child from sexual molesta-
tion or exploitation at the hands of a third party.19 This holding is
consistent with the Maryland Legislature's declared purpose and with
the language of the original child abuse statute, as well as with its ex-
pansion of coverage through subsequent amendments. 192 Moreover,
this holding is a logical extension of prior case law and is consistent
with the national trend toward protecting abused children. The
court's decision also promotes a commendable public policy effort to
protect our most vulnerable class of citizens.
a. Consistent with Legislative Intent. -It is well recognized that
penal statutes must be strictly construed.' 93 Therefore, courts will
normally not extend culpability to cases "not plainly within the lan-
guage used."' 94 This was problematic for the Degren court as section
35C(a) (6) (i) contained no express language indicating the Legisla-
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Brackins v. State, 84 Md. App. 157, 162, 578 A.2d 300, 302 (1990)). In
Brackins, the Court of Special Appeals noted:
To be convicted of exploitation and, therefore, child abuse, threats, coercion, or
subsequent use of the fruits of the acts are not necessary. The State need only
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the parent or person having temporary or
permanent custody of a child took advantage of or unjustly or improperly used
the child for his or her own benefit.
Brackins, 84 Md. App. at 162, 578 A.2d at 302.
191. Degren, 352 Md. at 424-25, 722 A.2d at 899.
192. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the Maryland child abuse stat-
ute and subsequent amendments).
193. See, e.g., State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975) (recognizing
that it is "well settled that penal statutes must be strictly construed" (citing State v. Fleming,
173 Md. 192, 195 (1937))).
194. Id. at 422, 348 A.2d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Archer, 73 Md. 44, 57, 20 A. 172, 172 (1890)).
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ture's intent to include acts of omission within its scope.19 5 Recogniz-
ing this oversight, the court acknowledged that the Legislature "did
not utilize language as broad as .. . the 1973 amendment that ex-
panded the type of conduct culpable as physical abuse to include an
. .. omission to act" in the 1974 amendment that added "sexual
abuse" to the definition of child abuse.1 96 The court, however, prop-
erly refuted the argument that the failure to expressly reference omis-
sions to act by the Legislature reflects its intent to limit what
constitutes sexual abuse to affirmative deeds.
First, and perhaps most persuasive, was the court's common sense
approach to interpreting the language of the statute. The court
shrewdly illustrated its point by examining the implications of Ms.
Degren's theory that the prohibition against sexual abuse in section
35C(a) (2) (ii) applied only to affirmative actions. 197 The court de-
scribes two different scenarios. First, Sharon Degren sits on the edge
of her bed and watches her husband beatJennifer. 98 In this case, she
could clearly be prosecuted under the child abuse statute for her fail-
ure to intervene. 9 9 Second, Sharon Degren sits on the bed watching
her husband rapeJennifer.2 ° ° Under her interpretation of the statute,
she cannot be prosecuted for sexual abuse for failing to protect the
child because his actions did not constitute physical abuse.20 1 The
court correctly rejected this scenario as "absurd," and refused to be-
lieve this could possibly be the intent of the Legislature. 20 2
Inherent in Sharon Degren's argument, as the court noted, is the
belief that somehow the Legislature makes the distinction between
physical abuse and sexual abuse because it deems sexual abuse to be a
less serious offense. 213  In light of the scenarios like the ones
presented above, such a notion is repugnant. Upon examining this
line of reasoning, it is clear that Degren's underlying belief is that,
unlike physical abuse, sexual abuse cases involving a minor child may
involve more "gray areas" because "consensual sex" may be in-
195. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C(a) (6) (i) (Supp. 1996) (defining sexual abuse as
"any act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a child" by certain supervising
adults).
196. Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897.
197. See id. at 420-21, 722 A.2d at 897.
198. See id. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897.
199. See id. (applying the holding of State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 423-24, 348 A.2d 275,
280 (1975)).
200. See id. at 420-21, 722 A.2d at 897.
201. See id. (arguing the scope of the definition of physical abuse was broader than that
of sexual abuse); see also supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
202. Degren, 352 Md. at 421, 722 A.2d at 897.
203. See id.; see also supra notes 165-167.
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volved.2 14 Sex between a twelve-year-old child and an adult male, how-
ever, can never be consensual.2 °5  Dismissing this argument, the
Degren court properly noted "the victim was not of sufficient age to
give consent to the sexual acts performed upon her. '206 Moreover,
the court argued that evidence that the Legislature comprehends the
serious repercussions of sexual abuse can be found in its willingness to
allow prosecution for sexual abuse even when there is no evidence of
physical injuries.20 7
The court also relied upon the Legislature's consistent expansion
of the scope of the child abuse statute through subsequent amend-
ments. 20 Referencing its reasoning in Fabritz, the court deemed that
such consistent expansion of the scope of the statute was evidence of
the Legislature's growing concern with the increasing incidence of
child abuse, and comports with the declared purpose of the statute:
protection of children.20 9 The Degren court is correct in this assess-
ment. Nowhere in the legislative history of the statute is there evi-
dence that the Legislature attempted to restrict the scope of the
statute.2 1 ° In fact, following the broad interpretation of the physical
abuse provision of the statute given by the Fabritz court, the Legisla-
ture further expanded the scope of the statute in their 1974 amend-
204. Degren, 352 Md. at 421 n.10, 722 A.2d at 897 n.10 (noting that "the victim was not of
sufficient age to give consent to the sexual acts performed upon her"); see also Stacey Wina-
kur, Reach of Child Sexual Abuse Law Before Maryland's Highest Court Woman Did not Stop Hus-
band from Sexually Abusing Girl Staying With Them; Lawyer Argues Inaction Not Crimina4 DAILY
RECORD, Dec. 9, 1998, at IC ("[Assistant Public Defender John L. Kopolow, representing
Sharon Degren,] said that.., sometimes sexual abuse cases involve an underage teenager
engaged in consensual sex . . . 'I think there are more gray areas' in sexual abuse cases,
Kopolow said, which would explain why the legislature punishes failure to act in one case
but not the other.").
205. See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 463(a) (3) (1996) (having sex with a person under 14
years of age is rape in the second degree regardless of consent).
206. Degren, 352 Md. at 421 n.10, 722 A.2d at 897 n.10.
207. See id. at 421, 722 A.2d at 897 ("By clarifying that sexual abuse need not necessarily
lead to physical injuries in order to be prosecuted, the legislature recognized the extensive
emotional, psychological or physical damage that sexual abuse can cause a child.").
208. Id. at 419-20, 722 A.2d at 896; see supra notes 41-60 (describing the Maryland child
abuse statute and subsequent amendments).
209. Id., 722 A.2d at 896-97; seeAct of May 24, 1973, ch. 835, 1973 Md. Laws 1708, 1708
("The General Assembly hereby declares as the legislative intent and purpose the protec-
tion of children .... ).
210. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing the continued expansion
of the original child abuse statute through subsequent amendments); see also 1964 Md.
Laws 103; 1966 Md. Laws 221; 1967 Md. Laws 38; 1968 Md. Laws 702; 1970 Md. Laws 500;
1073 Md. Laws 656, 835; 1974 Md. Laws 372, 554; 1975 Md. Laws 219; 1977 Md. Laws 290,
504, 1979 Md. Laws 365; 1980 Md. Laws 712; 1981 Md. Laws 770; 1984 Md. Laws 296; 1990
Md. Laws 604; 1991 Md. Laws 184, 372; 1994 Md. Laws 712; 1998 Md. Laws 372, 373.
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ment.211 This amendment, among other things, broadened the
definition of "abuse" so as to include "sexual abuse."2" 2 This further
expansion of the statute on the heels of Fabritz, and subsequent
amendments thereto, could logically be construed as the Legislature
acquiescence to the court's interpretation of the statute. Thus, it can
be expected that the court will continue to interpret the Legislature's
expansion of the child abuse statute as a mandate to attach criminal
liability in cases of a caregiver's failure to act on behalf of a child in
cases of physical and sexual abuse by a third party.
b. Consistent with Prior Case Law.-The court's holding in
Degren was also a logical extension of prior case law in Maryland. The
Degren court properly recognized the decision in Fabritz as a public
policy mandate that the protection of children from abuse must be an
utmost priority.2" 3 This mandate was evidenced by the Fabritz court's
willingness to interpret broadly the child abuse statute to include an
act of omission as an offense, although it was not expressly provided
for in the statute.21 4
Furthermore, there was a clear parallel between the facts in
Degren and those in the case of Fabritz, such that the Court of Appeals
could logically extend the Fabritz principle to Degren. As the Degren
court noted, the "only real distinction [between] this case [and
Fabritz] is that Jennifer was abused sexually rather than physically." '215
The court was clearly correct.
First, in both cases there was no issue as to whether the defend-
ants fell within the class of persons covered by the statute. In Fabritz,
the defendant was the parent of the child. 6 In Degren, petitioner did
not dispute that she was responsible for the supervision ofJennifer.217
211. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing the 1974 amendment to
the Maryland child abuse statute).
212. See Act of April 30, 1974, ch. 554, 1974 Md. Laws 1887, 1889.
213. See Degren, 352 Md. at 419-20, 722 A.2d at 896; see also State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416,
423-24, 348 A.2d 275, 280 (1975) (concluding "it [is] evident that the Legislature . . .
plainly intended to broaden the area of proscribed conduct punishable in child abuse
cases").
214. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 424, 348 A.2d at 280 (interpreting the Legislature's act of repeal-
ing the "narrow measure of criminality in child abuse cases then provided in § 35A," the
Legislature "redefin[ed] the offense" to no longer "require that the injury result from a
physical assault upon the child or from any physical force initially applied by the accused
individual").
215. Degren, 352 Md. at 416, 722 A.2d at 895.
216. See Fabritz, 276 Md. at 418, 348 A.2d at 276.
217. See Degren, 352 Md. at 409 n.5, 722 A.2d at 891 n.5 ("Petitioner does not dispute
that she was a person with responsibility for the supervision ofJennifer pursuant to section
35C(b) (1).-).
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Next, in both cases the children suffered abuse at the hands of a third
party.2 1 8 Also, in both Fabritz and Degren, although there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show that either defendant had caused an overt act
of abuse against the child,219 both defendants had notice of ongoing
abuse and allowed the abuse to continue, a crucial element of the
offense charged. 220 Finally, in both Fabritz and Degren, defendants
failed to intervene on the child's behalf.
22 1
In other words, based on the above cases, liability for passive par-
ticipation in child abuse would be predicated upon a showing of (1) a
duty to the minor child; (2) the minor child's exposure to abuse; (3)
the caregiver's awareness of the continued abuse; and (4) the
caregiver's failure to intervene to prevent or stop the abuse. All four
elements were present in Fabritz and Degren.
The only significant difference between the two cases, other than
the type of abuse inflicted, was the result of the injuries sustained. In
Fabritz, the abuse resulted in death.2 22 In Degren, the injuries were not
as physically extreme, but were no less destructive.2 23 Indeed, the
Degren court rejected the notion that sexual abuse is a less serious of-
fense than physical abuse, emphasizing the intent of the Legislature to
address the "extensive emotional, psychological, or physical damage
that sexual abuse can cause a child" by not requiring physical injury as
a predicate to charging someone with child abuse.2 24 The court ap-
provingly quoted the opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
in State v. Ainsworth225 which wisely recognized that "[w] hile the threat
218. See id. at 405-08, 722 A.2d at 889-91 (describing the various incidents of sexual
abuse Jennifer endured from those entrusted with her care); Fabritz, 276 Md. at 418, 348
A.2d at 276 ("Windy was brought to the... [h]ospital ... in a badly beaten condition with
approximately seventy bruises or contusions covering her body.").
219. See Degren, 352 Md. at 426, 722 A.2d at 899 (noting that "[p]etitioner disputed [the
child's] claim that she was involved in the [sexual] act"); Fabritz, 276 Md. at 420, 348 A.2d
at 278 (noting the State's argument that "although there was no evidence that [the
mother] was the individual who beat [the child], she was fully aware of her child's beaten
condition" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
220. See Degren, 352 Md. at 425, 722 A.2d at 899 ("[P]etitioner not only knew her hus-
band was engaged in sexual intercourse with Jennifer, but sat on the same bed and
watched .... Additionally . .. petitioner was aware of and witnessed Rick and Jennifer
engaged in sexual intercourse."); Fabritz, 276 Md. at 425, 348 A.2d at 280 (noting "that
Virginia knew of Windy's severely beaten condition is manifest from the evidence").
221. SeeDegren, 352 Md. at 426, 722 A.2d at 899 ("[P]etitioner did not try to intervene or
protect the child."); Fabritz, 276 Md. at 425, 348 A.2d at 280 ("Virginia failed to seek or
obtain any medical assistance although, as the evidence heretofore outlined so plainly indi-
cates, the need therefore was obviously compelling and urgent.").
222. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 418, 348 A.2d at 276.
223. Degren, 352 Md. at 405-08, 722 A.2d at 889-91.
224. Id. at 421, 722 A.2d at 897.
225. 426 S.E.2d 410 (N.C. App. 1993).
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of physical harm, including death [is] arguably more immediate than
that here, it was no less severe .... [T] he child here was exposed to
an event which could have severe psychological repercussions requir-
ing long term treatment. "226
Moreover, this abuse would likely be the type that even Judge
O'Donnell, who dissented in Fabritz, would have agreed was within the
reach of the child abuse statute.227 Judge O'Donnell argued that the
child abuse statute was intended to punish acts that fell outside the
ambit of common law assault, but short of manslaughter. 228 Thus, ac-
cording to Judge O'Donnell, under the facts in Fabritz, the defendant
could have been prosecuted under a theory of common law man-
slaughter. 2 9 The injuries sustained by Jennifer, however, would fall
within the gap that the child abuse statute was meant to fill because
they were the result of sexual abuse. Indeed, Judge O'Donnell stated
that he could visualize "facts which might establish a continuing
'course of conduct of cruel and inhumane' treatment, resulting in
'physical injury' to a minor child. '23 ° Nonetheless, based on facts
before him in Fabritz,2 1 he did not consider the defendant's failure to
seek immediate medical attention over an eight-hour period to be a
"course of conduct" constituting "cruel and inhumane treatment. "232
Judge O'Donnell argued that the defendant may have made "a poor
and even negligent attempt at treatment," however, it was made "in
good faith.
23 3
In contrast, based on the facts in Degren, Ms. Degren could not
have made a "good faith" decision justifying her failure to stop or to
prevent the sexual abuse of Jennifer by her husband and a male
houseguest. Nor, the court concluded, was Ms. Degren in any danger
226. Degren, 352 Md. at 424, 722 A.2d at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Ainsworth, 426 S.E.2d at 416).
227. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Judge O'Donnell's dissent
in Fabritz).
228. See Fabritz, 276 Md. at 433, 348 A.2d at 285 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 434, 348 A.2d at 285.
231. Id. Justice O'Donnell explained:
There is no evidence that the appellee's negative action in failing to more
promptly obtain medical assistance imputed to her any intent to permit the child
to continue to suffer or to die. When she noticed that the child was in a semi-
conscious state, she fed her liquids to give her strength. Upon noticing a deterio-
ration in her physical condition, she called upon a friend to assist her. The child
was then bathed with alcohol, her temperature taken and she was dressed in
pajamas.
Id.
232. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Id.
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of death or imminent harm by coming to the aid of Jennifer. 234 In
her testimony, Ms. Degren stated that she did not interfere because at
times her husband could be abusive and she "was afraid that he would
hit [her] ."235 The court found, however, that "[t]here was no evi-
dence in this record of any such abuse during this or any other in-
stance. 236 It is worthwhile to note that the court implied a distinction
between those caretakers who choose not to protect their children
and should be held accountable, and those who have no power to
protect their children and should not be held criminally liable.
21 7
The court acknowledged that "[t] his Court is not blind to the unfortu-
nately all too common battered-spouse scenario in which persons with
abusive spouses decline to act or protect themselves or others for fear
of a violent retaliation by their spouses."23 8  This sentiment was
echoed in Walden.23 9 In Walden, the North Carolina Supreme Court
declared that "[it] is not to say that parents have the legal duty to
place themselves in danger of death or great bodily harm in coming
to the aid of their children."24
0
Therefore, the Degren court appears to acknowledge the availabil-
ity of a possible affirmative defense should the circumstances of a case
suggest the need for such. 24 1 This possibility should quell possible
concerns that extending liability to a spouse who fails to protect his or
her child from abuse by a third party, usually a husband, would cause
a battered spouse to be victimized twice, once by the abusing partner
and a second time by the criminal justice system.242
c. Consistent with the National Trend Toward Protecting Our
Children.-The Degren court's willingness to extend the scope of crimi-
nal liability beyond acts of commission to acts of omission in cases of
sexual abuse by supervising adults is consistent with our national pol-
icy to reduce and ultimately to prevent child abuse and neglect in
234. Degren, 352 Md. at 425 n.12, 722 A.2d at 899 n.12.
235. Id. at 406, 722 A.2d at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. Id. at 425 n.12, 722 A.2d at 899 n.12.
237. See id. (discussing the "battered-spouse scenario").
238. Id.
239. State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786 (N.C. 1982).
240. Id.
241. See Karen D. McDonald, Michigan's Efforts to Hold Women Criminally and Civilly Liable
for Failure to Protect: Implications for Battered Women, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 289, 301 (1998) ("Cur-
rently, four states have affirmative defenses to omission statutes. The Iowa, Minnesota,
Oklahoma and Texas statutes state that a women [sic] can assert an affirmative defense if
she reasonably believes that to intervene would cause her or her children greater harm.").
242. See id. at 299-303; see also Peters-Baker, supra note 102, at 1020-24 (discussing the
"Catch 22" in which many battered women are placed when considering how to react to
their children being abused by their spouse).
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America.2 4 3 Statistics on child abuse and neglect in the United States
are both shameful and alarming.2 44 Public outcry over high profile
cases, such as the Lisa Steinberg case that occurred in New York in
1987,245 highlights the public's desire to hold passive caregivers crimi-
nally liable for failing to protect their children. Perhaps, in response
to the staggering statistics and the public outcry over cases such as
Lisa's, there is a national trend in our courts to extend criminal liabil-
ity beyond the abusers to the enabler who fails to intervene on the
child's behalf.246
The bases for prosecution vary according to current state law.
Charges have been leveled through various approaches including the
following: holding that a parent has a legal duty to protect her child;
holding condoning parents to a reasonable person standard; liberally
interpreting existing child abuse statutes to include condoning par-
ents; broadly construing the notion of proximate cause to include fail-
ure to seek medical attention for one's child; and construing child
243. See Degren, 352 Md. at 424-25, 722 A.2d at 899; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 17-18 (1995) (providing a mission statement of the
U.S. Advisory Board of Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN)). NCCAN was established pur-
suant to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) (Public Law 93-247), as
amended, which requires an annual report to be provided to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. Id. at 19. The report evaluates the nation's efforts to accomplish the
purpose of CAPTA and to recommend a "national policy to reduce and ultimately prevent"
child abuse and neglect in America. Id.
244. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH
AND FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM (1999) (providing various statistics concerning
child abuse in different states). The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System
(NCANDS) is the Administration of Children, Youth and Families' (ACYF) primary data
collection, analysis, and information dissemination program on child maltreatment in the
United States. See id. at 1-1.
245. Lisa Steinberg was a six-year-old child who ultimately died as a result of a blow to
her head delivered by her adoptive father. See People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845 (N.Y.
1992). What further incensed the public was that Lisa's father's live-in companion, Hedda
Nussbaum, failed to seek medical attention for Lisa as she lay comatose on the bathroom
floor for several hours while Ms. Nussbaum freebased cocaine in the next room, knowing
of the child's condition. SeeJ. Kaye, Penal Law: Failure to Obtain Medical Care, N.Y.L.J., June
25, 1992, at 21 (describing the events leading up to Lisa Steinberg's death).
246. See Adams, supra note 8 (discussing the national trend of states holding parents
criminally liable for condoning the abuse of their children); see also supra note 33 (citing
examples of cases in which the court found criminal liability for a supervising adult's fail-
ure to prevent abuse on a child's behalf).
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abuse as a general intent crime.247 Furthermore, child abuse statutes
are in place in every state.248
Acknowledging this "modern trend in broadly recognizing and
punishing all forms of child abuse," the Degren court referenced in its
opinion the decisions of several foreign jurisdictions. 249 Of particular
relevance to the Degren court was the court's reasoning in Ainsworth,
which shared a similar fact pattern to the case sub judice. 250 In Ains-
worth, the court extended criminal liability for a parent's failure to act
to prevent the sexual abuse of their child. 251 This decision was relied,
in part, on a prior state holding in Walden, in which a supervising
adult was held criminally liable for an omission to act in a case of
physical abuse.252 This parallel in circumstances between Degren and
Ainsworth did not go unnoticed by the Degren court.25 3 Thus, consis-
tent with prior case law both within and outside of its borders, the
Degren court extended criminal liability to the passive caregiver in
cases of sexual child abuse.
5. Conclusion. -Degren v. State signals the court's willingness to
continue to give the child abuse statute broad interpretation to ex-
tend criminal liability not only to the actual abuse, but to the passive
caregiver who fails to intervene on behalf of the child in cases of physi-
cal or sexual abuse. Furthermore, the court's recognition of the bat-
tered spouse syndrome hints to the fact that, under certain
circumstances, it may be used as an affirmative defense in failure to
act cases. This, however, remains to be tested.
CATHLEEN C. OPEL
247. See Adams, supra note 8, at 524 (enumerating the various approaches the courts
and legislatures have taken to extend criminal liability to passive caregivers).
248. Id. at 528 n.49 (providing statutory cites of child abuse statutes that are in place in
all fifty states of the U.S., and the District of Columbia).
249. Degren, 352 Md. at 424, 722 A.2d at 899.
250. Id. at 421-24, 722 A.2d at 897-99; see also State v. Ainsworth, 426 S.E. 410, 415-16
(N.C. App. 1993) (holding criminally liable the victim's mother for her failure to prevent
the rape of her twelve-year-old son while she was present and watching); supra notes 133-
138.
251. Ainsworth, 426 S.E.2d at 416.
252. Id. at 415; see also Walden, 293 S.E.2d at 787 (holding that "the failure of a parent
who is present to take all steps reasonably possible to protect the parent's child from an
attack by another person constitutes an act of omission by the parent showing the parent's
consent and contribution to the crime being committed").
253. See Degren, 352 Md. at 422-24, 722 A.2d at 897-99. Indeed, the Degren court dis-





A. Traffic Stops, Consent, and Seizure: Maryland's Departure from
Modern Fourth Amendment Analysis
In Ferris v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a "stop" for
speeding on an interstate highway ended when the officer presented
the driver with a citation and that any further questioning by the of-
ficer constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 The court explained that although the suspect voluntarily
answered the officer's questions and was not ordered by the officer to
exit his vehicle, a "reasonable person would not have believed that he
was free to terminate the encounter with [the trooper]."' Therefore,
the court concluded that the suspect did not give consent to the of-
ficer's continued questioning or to the prolonged traffic stop.4 Be-
cause the initial traffic stop ended when the officer issued the citation
and the driver of the automobile did not consent to further question-
ing, the court reasoned that the officer must have had a "reasonable,
articulable suspicion" to begin the second stop and questioning that
led to the discovery of a sizeable quantity of marijuana in the car.'
The court found that the driver's bloodshot eyes and nervousness and
the absence of alcohol on his breath did not constitute a reasonable
suspicion to justify the second stop during which the contraband was
found.6
Ferris is an extension of recent Maryland case law holding police
officers to a high standard of review when the legality of a prolonged
traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion is scrutinized under the
1. 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999).
2. See id. at 373, 384, 735 A.2d at 500, 506; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth
Amendment states that the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
Id.
3. Ferris, 355 Md. at 377, 735 A.2d at 502.
4. See id. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506 (noting that the "collective coerciveness of the totality
of the circumstances" evidenced a lack of consent on the part of the suspect).
5. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)) (holding that the police officer
must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion"). After questioning both
the driver and the passenger of the car, a "gallon-sized plastic baggie" of marijuana was
found in a book bag inside the car. Id. at 364, 735 A.2d at 495.
6. See id. at 393, 735 A.2d at 511.
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Fourth Amendment.7 The court, however, departed from the gov-
erning United States Supreme Court decisions regarding consent, and
subsequent cases decided similarly could therefore be vulnerable to
review and to possible reversal by the high court.8
1. The Case.--On May 7, 1996, Peter Michael Ferris and one pas-
senger, Michael Discher, were traveling along Interstate-70 in western
Maryland, heading from Philadelphia to West Virginia University in
Morgantown, West Virginia.9 Maryland State Trooper Andrew Smith
(Trooper Smith), using a laser device, clocked Mr. Ferris's speed at
ninety-two miles per hour in a posted sixty-five miles per hour speed
limit zone.10 Trooper Smith pulled over Mr. Ferris without incident,
collected Mr. Ferris's driver's license and registration, and returned to
his patrol car to write the citation." During this encounter, Trooper
Smith stated that he noticed that Mr. Ferris's eyes were "bloodshot
and [that] he did appear a little nervous... [and] fidgety."1 2 Trooper
Smith also observed that Mr. Ferris and Mr. Discher both looked back
at the patrol car "quite frequently."1 " At this time, Deputy John C.
Martin of the Washington County Sheriffs Department arrived at the
scene of the stop and activated his emergency lights on his patrol
car.14 Deputy Martin also observed that Mr. Ferris and Mr. Discher
were "moving around in the vehicle a lot and looking around"; he
passed this observation along to Trooper Smith. 5
7. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 119 Md. App. 444, 471, 705 A.2d 82, 94 (1997) (holding
that a 25-minute period between the beginning of a traffic stop and the arrival of a drug-
sniffing dog was unreasonable); Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662, 676, 660 A.2d 1068,
1075 (1995) (concluding that the continued detention of an individual after the comple-
tion of an initial traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and was therefore
unconstitutional); Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 243, 246, 578 A.2d 816, 817 (1990) (finding
that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain a driver when the driver failed
to make eye contact with him).
8. Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that when a
suspect is not in custody, the state must show that the consent given was voluntary and this
is to be determined under the totality of the circumstances, although failure to inform
someone of his right to refuse is not dispositive-it is a factor in determining lack of con-
sent). The Attorney General of Maryland did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court in this case. Interview with the Maryland Attorney General's
Office (Dec. 16, 1999).
9. See Fernis, 355 Md. at 362, 364, 735 A.2d at 494-95.





15. Id. at 363, 735 A.2d at 494.
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After writing the citation, Trooper Smith returned to Mr. Ferris's
car, handed back Mr. Ferris's license and registration, and had Mr.
Ferris sign the citation.16 Trooper Smith then proceeded to ask
whether Mr. Ferris "would mind stepping to the back of his vehicle to
answer a couple of questions." 17 According to Trooper Smith, Mr.
Ferris stated that he "didn't mind."18 Mr. Ferris and Trooper Smith
walked around to the back of the vehicle while Deputy Martin
watched Mr. Discher, who was still seated in the car." Trooper Smith
testified at the initial suppression hearing that Mr. Ferris's eyes were
bloodshot, both Mr. Ferris and Mr. Discher appeared very nervous,
and there was no odor of alcohol on the breath of either individual."z
Trooper Smith asked Mr. Ferris whether he had smoked any
drugs before the traffic stop.2 1 Mr. Ferris replied that he had not,
even though Trooper Smith testified that Mr. Ferris grew more ner-
vous when asked this question.2 2 Trooper Smith repeated the ques-
tion to Mr. Ferris, asking if he "was sure that he hadn't smoked any
drugs."23 At this time, Trooper Smith pointed out to Mr. Ferris that
he had observed that Mr. Ferris's eyes were bloodshot, he was nervous,
and there was no odor of alcohol on his breath.24 Mr. Ferris then
admitted that he and Mr. Discher had "smoked a 'joint' in Philadel-
phia about three hours earlier."2 5 When asked whether Mr. Discher
was in possession of any controlled substance, Mr. Ferris acknowl-
edged that Mr. Discher had a "small amount of marijuana" in the
car.2 6 Confronted with this information, Mr. Discher turned over a
"small baggie" of marijuana. 27 A subsequent search of the car turned
up a "gallon-sized plastic baggie . . . containing a compressed, green
vegetable matter" substance, which was later identified as marijuana.2 8
16. See id.
17. Id. The court's account of the exchange between Trooper Smith and Mr. Ferris
noted that Trooper Smith did not inform Mr. Ferris that he was free to leave after his
citation was signed. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id. Trooper Smith explained that these factors led the officer to conduct fur-
ther questioning after issuing the citation. See id.
21. Id. at 363, 735 A.2d at 495.
22. See id.
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Mr. Ferris was charged with operating a motor vehicle in excess
of the posted speed limit,29 possession of marijuana,30 and possession
of marijuana in sufficient quantity to indicate reasonably an intent to
distribute that substance."1 Prior to trial, Mr. Ferris moved to suppress
all evidence that he claimed was obtained illegally.3 2 The trial court
denied Mr. Ferris's motion to suppress, finding that the traffic stop
did not end when he signed the citation and that Mr. Ferris had vol-
untarily answered Trooper Smith's questions. 3 Based on the totality
of the circumstances, the trial court held that there was no unreasona-
ble seizure under the Fourth Amendment.3 4
In an unpublished decision, the Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed the ruling of the trial court, concluding that the trial court's
finding that Mr. Ferris consented to the search was not clearly errone-
ous.3 5 Moreover, the intermediate appellate court held that Trooper
Smith had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a second stop
based on Mr. Ferris's outward appearance, mannerisms, and behav-
ior.3 6 In a lone dissent, Judge Thieme argued that Mr. Ferris was
seized under the Fourth Amendment, and that Trooper Smith's "re-
quest" to exit the car was "indistinguishable from a command. '3 7 He
further found that without consent, the detention of Mr. Ferris could
not be justified because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.3 1
The Court of Appeals granted Mr. Ferris's petition for writ of cer-
tiorari to consider the following questions:
(1) whether an operator of a motor vehicle is seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he is asked to
get out of his car for questioning after a traffic stop is com-
pleted, and (2) whether the Court of Special Appeals erred
in finding that the seizure of Mr. Ferris was justified by rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion. 9
2. Legal Background.-Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Ma-
ryland is well developed; however, prior to Ferris, the court had never
29. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. I § 21-801.1 (1999).
30. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287 (1999).
31. See Ferris, 355 Md. at 364, 735 A.2d at 495; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 286(a)(1) (1999).
32. See Ferris, 355 Md. at 364, 735 A.2d at 495.






39. Id. at 368, 755 A.2d at 497.
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expressly defined the confines of a "stop" stemming from a traffic vio-
lation. Moreover, it has never addressed whether information pro-
vided pursuant to an officer's questions, but after a citation was issued,
could be considered consent.4 ° Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court had yet to address the duration of a "stop" when a driver is
pulled over for a traffic violation or the validity of consent after the
duration of the initial stop has terminated. In examining Maryland
and United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
however, a disparity in reasoning with regard to these issues is appar-
ent. To examine this disparity, it is necessary to analyze Fourth
Amendment issues in traffic stops and related issues of consent.
a. Traffic Stops and Seizures of the Person-When a "Second Stop"
Occurs.--In Ferris, the Court of Appeals first addressed the question of
whether a "second stop" had occurred when the trooper began ques-
tioning Mr. Ferris after the officer had already issued a traffic cita-
tion.4' The court concluded that the resolution of this issue was
essential to determine whether the trooper needed additional justifi-
cation to "seize" Mr. Ferris for Fourth Amendment purposes.4 2
In Michigan v. Chesternut,43 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of what constitutes a seizure in the context of
determining whether a seizure occurred when an individual was
chased by police.44 In Chesternut, a police officer on a routine patrol
observed Michael Chesternut fleeing at the sight of the patrol car.45
After driving along side Chesternut for a short distance, the officer
observed him discard several packets later discovered to contain code-
ine.4 6 The Court considered whether the officer's "investigatory pur-
suit" constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.47 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, refused to adopt a bright-line rule
40. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 119 Md. App. 444, 705 A.2d 82 (1997) (holding that a 25-
minute interval between the beginning of a traffic stop and the arrival of a drug-sniffing
dog was unreasonable); Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662, 660 A.2d 1068 (1995) (holding
that continued detention of an individual after completion of an initial traffic stop was
unconstitutional because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion); Snow v. State 84 Md.
App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990) (holding that a driver's lack of eye contact with an officer
did not constitute reasonable suspicion for purposes of detention).
41. Fernis, 355 Md. at 368, 735 A.2d at 497.
42. Id.
43. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
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for whether or not a police pursuit constituted a per se seizure.18 In-
stead, he maintained that an individual has been seized when "in view
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable per-
son would have believed that he was not free to leave.""9 Blackmun
explained that while this test was "necessarily imprecise," it could be
consistently applied to various police encounters because it embodied
an objective standard, namely how a "reasonable man" would respond
to the police action at issue.5"
Applying this test to the case at hand, the Court concluded that
Chesternut had not been "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes.5"
The Court reasoned that a reasonable person would not have consid-
ered himself seized in this situation because the police did not take
any actions to hinder or to alert Chesternut, such as activating sirens,
commanding him to halt, or hindering his freedom of movement.52
In 1991, in California v. Hodari D.,53 the United States Supreme
Court clarified its seizure jurisprudence. In Hodari D. the Court held
that for a "seizure" to have occurred, there must be "either physical
force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of au-
thority."5 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, clarified the Court's
seizure test previously articulated in Chesternut.55 The Hodari D. Court
noted that the language of this test read "only if in view of all the
circumstances . . ." not "whenever, in view of all the circumstances
. "56 Therefore, the Court reasoned that although a reasonable
48. See id. at 572-73. Justice Blackmun was uncomfortable restricting the review of po-
lice conduct to "particular details of [the officer's] conduct in isolation." Id. at 573. In-
stead, he wished to formulate a test that would be "designed to assess the coercive effect of
police conduct, taken as a whole . . . ." Id.
49. Id. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
50. Id. at 573-74.
51. Id. at 574.
52. Id. at 575.
53. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
54. Id. at 626. Justice Scalia articulated his definition of seizure under the Fourth
Amendment:
The word "seizure" readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or applica-
tion of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccess-
ful .... It does not remotely apply, however, to the prospect of a policeman
yelling "Stop, in the name of the law!" at a fleeing form that continues to flee.
That is no seizure.
Id.
55. See id. at 627-28; supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (stating that the test for
determining whether a person was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is
whether, "in view of all of the circumstances.., a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave").
56. 499 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).
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person, in view of the totality of the circumstances, may not believe he
is free to leave, it does not necessarily follow that the individual has
been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.5 7 Instead, to ne-
cessitate a finding of seizure, there must be either physical force or a
submission to the assertion of authority.
5 s
Under Maryland law, a person has been seized within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment when "in view of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave. 5 9 In State v. Lemmon,6 ° the
Court of Appeals held that a suspect was seized for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes when he was pursued by a police officer.6 1 In Lemmon,
several police patrol cars responded to an all-points bulletin that there
was a narcotics offense being committed on a certain city block in
Baltimore.6 2 Upon arriving at the area specified in the bulletin, the
police approached a group of eight to ten black males.6 3 The officers
identified themselves and asked Mr. Lemmon to, "come here," where-
upon Mr. Lemmon ran away from the officers and dropped a vial con-
taining valium while running.6 4 The court concluded that Mr.
Lemmon was seized when the officer ordered him to, "come here,"
because there was "no doubt that a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave."6 5 The court based this conclu-
sion on the fact that the suspect was approached by two officers,
ordered to "come here," and was pursued when he ran.66 The court
also addressed whether reasonable suspicion warranted the officers'
seizure of Mr. Lemmon.6 7 The court determined that it would ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances to decide whether the officer
57. id,
58. See id. at 628-29.
59. See State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 372, 568 A.2d 48, 52 (1990) (citing Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).
60. 318 Md. 365 (1990), 568 A.2d 48 (1990).
61. Id. at 373-74, 568 A.2d at 53.
62. Id. at 369, 568 A.2d at 50. The dispatcher did not provide many details as to the
description of the suspect, or suspects, committing the narcotics offense. See id. The only
information provided was that there was, "a black male in the area selling narcotics." Id,
63. See id., 568 A.2d at 51.
64. Id. at 370, 568 A.2d at 51.
65. Id at 373-74, 568 A.2d at 53. The court also stated that it was not necessary for Mr.
Lemmon to be physically restrained in order for him to be considered seized for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 374-75, 568 A.2d at 53.
66. See id. at 374, 568 A.2d at 53.
67. Id. at 375-76, 568 A.2d at 54. The court looked to whether there were "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion" and whether there is "reasonable suspicion that someone is about
to commit or has just committed a crime." Id at 376, 568 A.2d at 54 (quoting Anderson v.
State, 282 Md. 701, 704-05, 387 A.2d 281 (1978)).
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had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a seizure of Mr. Lem-
mon.68 The court held that the flight of a suspect did not create rea-
sonable suspicion and that the abandonment of the drugs was
involuntary.69
Prior to the Court of Appeals decision in Ferris, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals examined the validity of prolonged traffic stops in Snow v.
State.y° The sole issue considered in Snow was whether the police of-
ficer had a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to justify detention
of a driver after issuing a traffic warning for speeding.
71
In Snow, the driver (Snow) was stopped for travelling sixty-four
miles per hour in a fifty-five-mile-per-hour zone. y2 The officer
(Trooper Paros) testified that Snow seemed nervous and would not
make eye contact with him.7 ' The trooper proceeded to collect
Snow's driver's license and ask him where he and his passenger were
headed. 74 The individuals replied that they were traveling from Phila-
delphia to Washington, D.C., to visit an acquaintance.7 5 Trooper Pa-
ros noticed three air fresheners hanging from the rear view mirror in
Snow's car, and he believed the air fresheners were a method of con-
cealing the odor of narcotics. 7 6 Trooper Paros ordered both men out
of the car, returned Snow's driver's license, issued him a written warn-
ing, and asked permission to search the car.77 Snow refused to give
permission for a search; nevertheless, Trooper Paros conducted a
drug scan using a dog.78 The officer discovered three bags of heroin
68. See id. at 379, 568 A.2d at 55.
69. Id., 568 A.2d at 56. The court considered several factors in determining that the
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Lemmon. First, the dispatcher's
source was an anonymous tip, thus casting doubt on the credibility of the source. See id.
Second, the observation of two men talking on a street corner was not enough to bring
about reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was occurring. See id. Finally, the
Baltimore city block on which the arrest took place was not "known for criminal activity."
Id.
70. 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990).
71. Id. at 246, 578 A.2d at 816 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that
an individual may be stopped for a police officer to make inquiries "where [he] observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous")).
72. Id. at 246, 578 A.2d at 817.








in an overnight bag in the rear of the car, and arrested both Mr. Snow
and his passenger.79
The court applied the Lemmon totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether in view of all of the circumstances, a reasonable
person in Snow's position would have felt free to leave.80 The court
concluded that Snow was seized when he was told by Trooper Paros to
remain by the side of the road while the dog scanned his car."1 In
analyzing whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the
seizure, the court examined six factors relevant to that determina-
tion." Ultimately, the court concluded that the facts upon which
Trooper Paros based his suspicion were insufficient to justify the
seizure.
8 3
Subsequent to Lemmon and Snow, and the Supreme Court's clari-
fication in Hodari D., the Court of Special Appeals considered whether
the continued detention of a vehicle after issuance of a traffic citation
constituted a separate and distinct stop under the Fourth Amendment
in Munafo v. State.84 In Munafo, police paced Munafo's car traveling
nineteen miles per hour in excess of the posted speed limit.8" After
stopping the vehicle, the officer, who recognized Munafo from an ear-
lier encounter, began a casual conversation and inquired whether
Munafo had any weapons or drugs in the car and whether he could
conduct a search.86 Munafo stated that he had no weapons or drugs
and that he did not consent to a search of his car.87 After verifying
Munafo's car rental agreement and issuing him a warning, the officer
"formulated a hunch" that Munafo had drugs in the car.88 A second
79. See id. at 248, 84 Md. App. at 818.
80. Id. at 249, 578 A.2d at 819 (noting that "whenever an officer restrains the freedom
of a person to walk away, he has seized that person") (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 375, 568 A.2d 48, 53 (1990))).
81. See id. at 259, 578 A.2d. at 824.
82. See id. at 254, 578 A.2d. at 821 (explaining that the six relevant variables were: "(1)
the appearance of the detainee, (2) conduct, (3) criminal record, (4) environment, (5)
police purpose, and (6) source of information" (quoting Mosley v. State, 45 Md. App. 88,
92-93, 411 A.2d 1081, 1085 (1980))).
83. See id at 260, 578 A.2d at 824 (noting that the trooper's suspicion arose from four
factors: Mr. Snow's reluctance to make eye contact; the fact that the Philadelphia-Washing-
ton corridor was a known route for drug couriers; three air fresheners were hanging in Mr.
Snow's car; and Mr. Snow did not consent to the search of his vehicle).
84. 105 Md. App. 662, 669-70, 660 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1995).
85. Id. at 666, 660 A.2d at 1070.
86. See id. at 666-67, 660 A.2d at 1070 (explaining that the officer had stopped Munafo
for the same infraction a year earlier although that stop did not result in a search).
87. See id
88. Id. at 667-68, 660 A.2d at 1070. There was some discrepancy as to whether the
officer who wrote the warning had given the license and rental agreement back to Mr.
Munafo before the inquiry into whether the suspect had drugs in the car began. See id.
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officer arrived on the scene at this time, and while the first officer
talked to Munafo, the second officer walked around to the other side
of the car where he spotted a "dark-colored substance" that appeared
to be marijuana on the console between the two front seats of the
car.
89
The court quoted Florida v. Royer, in stating that "the detention of
a person 'must be temporary and last no longer than to effectuate the
purpose of the stop."' 9° Once the purpose of the stop has been satis-
fied, the court held that "the continued detention of a vehicle and its
occupant(s) constituted a second stop, and must be independently
justified by reasonable suspicion."91
The court held that because there had been a second stop of
Munafo, that stop had to have been premised on reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.92 The court utilized the totality of circumstances
approach as formulated in Lemmon to determine whether a reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion existed in light of all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances.93 The court found that the officer's grounds for
reasonable suspicion-(1) Munafo's prior arrest for drug-related of-
fenses, and (2) that he "appeared" to be hiding something under his
arm-were not sufficient to justify his further detention.94
In 1998, the Court of Special Appeals decided two more cases
dealing with seizures in the context of a traffic stop. In Graham v.
State,95 the court decided whether an officer may detain a passenger in
a car for the length of time necessary to wait for the arrival of a drug-
sniffing dog.96 After stopping a vehicle for exceeding the posted
The substance was discovered by the second officer, who used a flashlight to see into the
passenger-side window of the car. See id. In addition to the marijuana, cocaine was also
found in the car. See id.
89. See id. at 668, 660 A.2d at 1070-71.
90. Id. at 670, 660 A.2d at 1071-72 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
91. Id. at 670, 660 A.2d at 1072. The court stated that "[o]nce [the officer] learned
that appellant's license and registration were in order, he was required to end the stop
promptly and send appellant on his way .... [H]e did not tell appellant that he was free to
leave .... [The] continued detention of appellant constituted a separate stop." Id. at 673,
660 A.2d at 1073.
92. See id. at 673, 660 A.2d at 1073 (citing Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 593, 611 A.2d
592 (1992)) (holding further that such reasonable suspicion must rise above the level of a
"mere belief or hunch").
93. See Munafo, 105 Md. App. at 674-76, 660 A.2d at 1073-75.
94. Id. at 676, 660 A.2d at 1074-75. The court seemed particularly distressed by the
officer's use of the term "hunch" to justify his reasoning for continued detention of Mr.
Munafo. Id. at 676, 660 A.2d at 1074-75 (stating that "a hunch, without more does not rise
to the level of reasonable suspicion").
95. 119 Md. App. 444, 705 A.2d 82 (1998).
96. Id. at 447, 705 A.2d at 83-84.
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speed limit, the officer questioned the driver and passenger about
where they were headed and from where they were coming.97 The
individuals gave differing accounts of their point of origin, and the
driver could not produce a valid driver's license.98 Shortly thereafter,
the trooper was informed by the police barracks that the operator's
driver's license had been suspended, and the driver was placed under
arrest.99 Graham, the passenger of the vehicle, waited approximately
twenty-five minutes until the K-9 unit arrived. 00 The drug-sniffing
dog subsequently detected the presence of narcotics in the car.10 1
When Graham was searched, approximately fifty vials of cocaine were
found on his person.10 2
Using the test formulated in Lemmon and Chesternut, the court an-
alyzed whether in view of the totality of the circumstances, a reasona-
ble person would have believed that he was free to leave in Graham's
predicament.'0 3 The court found that a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave given the circumstances surrounding Graham's
detention, and that where a stop lasts for longer than a minimal pe-
riod of time, there must be a reasonable, articulable suspicion to jus-
tify its prolonged nature."04 In addition, the majority held that the
initial purpose of the traffic stop ended upon the arrest of the driver,
and the second stop and search of the car was notjustified by reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion.
1 0 5
In Pryor v. State,'°6 the Court of Special Appeals once again held
that a twenty-five-minute roadside detention while waiting for a drug-
sniffing dog was unreasonable and violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.10 7 The court stated that an automobile stop for a
minor traffic violation should take no longer than reasonably neces-
sary to issue a citation for the violation committed. 10 8
As illustrated, prior to Ferris, the Maryland courts had held police
to the United States Supreme Court's test formulated in Chesternut
97. See id. at 448, 705 A.2d at 84.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 448-49, 705 A.2d at 84.
100. See id. at 449, 705 A.2d at 84.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 451, 705 A.2d at 86.
104. Id. at 467-68, 705 A.2d at 94. The court further held that where there was evidence
that an officer did not as diligently proceed with an investigation at the scene of a traffic
stop as he could have, the prolonged detention "will be viewed as unreasonable." Id.
105. See id.
106. 122 Md. App. 671, 716 A.2d 338 (1998).
107. Id. at 678, 716 A.2d at 342.
108. Id. at 674-75, 716 A.2d at 340.
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and articulated by the Court of Appeals in Lemmon. Specifically, if, in
view of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave, then that individual would be seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1"9 Maryland courts contin-
ued to adhere to this standard despite the Supreme Court's narrowing
of the rule in Hodari D. 10
b. The United States Supreme Court on Consent.-The Ferris
court considered a second question relating to the legality of the
seizure under the Fourth Amendment-whether Ferris's willingness
to cooperate with police in answering questions regarding alleged
drug use constituted consent."1 1 If valid consent was given to the pro-
longed detention, the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated,
and the evidence challenged by Ferris would be admissible." 2
The Supreme Court has examined issues of consent with regard
to the Fourth Amendment extensively. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,131
the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a search of an automobile
based on the purported consent of the car's driver. 1 4 In Schneckloth,
Police Officer James Rand stopped a car because one of its headlights
was not functioning and one tag light was out.11 5 Six men were in the
vehicle and only one individual, a passenger, could produce identifi-
cation." 6 The passenger, Joe Alcala, stated that the car belonged to
his brother." 7 Officer Rand asked whether he could search the car,
and Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead.""' 8 Witnesses testified that Alcala
actually assisted the officer in conducting the search of the car, open-
ing the trunk and the glove compartment. 119 During the search, Of-
ficer Rand found three stolen checks.12 0
109. See State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 374-75, 568 A.2d 48, 53-54 (1989) (articulating
the test for determining whether a seizure had occurred).
110. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (summarizing the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Hodari D.).
111. See Ferris, 355 Md. at 363-64, 735 A.2d at 494-95. The court in Ferris noted that "the
trooper testified: 'Ijust asked him if he would mind stepping to the back of his vehicle to
answer a couple of questions. He stated he didn't mind."' Id. at 363, 735 A.2d at 494.
112. See id. at 373-74, 735 A.2d at 500 (stating that if the meeting between Trooper
Smith and Mr. Ferris was a "consensual encounter," there would be no constitutional
question).
113. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
114. Id. at 219.








Faced with criminal prosecution, the defense argued that the po-
lice had an obligation to inform Alcala that he had the right to refuse
to consent to the search of his car, in addition to the state's obligation
of showing that the consent had been uncoerced. 2' The Court ruled:
While the state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the
police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly fac-
tors to be evaluated in assessing the 'voluntariness' of an ac-
cused's responses, they were not in and of themselves
determinative. 
22
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, further stated that
"[w] hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be
taken into account, the government need not establish such knowl-
edge as the sine qua non of an effective consent."123 Thus, for there
to be a valid consent, there is no prerequisite that an individual be
informed of his right to refuse consent to a search. 124 The Court held
that the question of whether consent was given voluntarily or as a re-
sult of duress or coercion would be determined by examining the to-
tality of all of the circumstances surrounding the search.1 25
The Court further held that absent duress or coercion, an indi-
vidual need not explicitly waive his Fourth Amendment rights to have
given consent voluntarily. 126 Therefore, it would not require the reci-
tation of warnings such as those given in accordance with Miranda v.
Arizona.' 27  Finally, the Court addressed noncustodial questioning
121. See id. at 221-22.
122. Id. at 227.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 234 (arguing that "[i]mplicit in all of these cases is the recognition that
knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent").
125. See id. at 227.
126. See id. at 241-43. The Court explained:
There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial
and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the
purposes behind requiring a "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights, or
in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be
extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
127. Miranda requires that before a law enforcement officer can engage in a custodial
interrogation, he must inform an individual of four rights: (1) the right to remain silent,
(2) that anything he said can and will be used against him in court, (3) the right to coun-
sel, and (4) if he could not afford counsel, an attorney would be provided by the court free
of charge. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). Even in light of the Miranda
requirements, the Schneckloth Court would not require an officer to inform an individual of
his right to refuse to consent to a search, pointing out that while coercion may be inherent
in a custodial interrogation, "there is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion present in a
search-and-seizure case." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965)).
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akin to that present in Ferris, stating that "Miranda, of course, did not
reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is
most directly analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it
assuredly did not indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed
inherently coercive."'
28
Over two decades later, the Court, in Ohio v. Robinette,'29 reaf-
firmed its commitment to the principle that law enforcement officers
need not inform an individual that he is "free to go" before his con-
sent to a search will be viewed as voluntary. 3 ' In Robinette, the Court
held that consent to search must be voluntary and that the test for
voluntariness arises from an examination of the totality of the circum-
stances. 131 Through this approach, ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote that
reasonableness may be determined by objective means.'3 2
The ability to leave freely or be "free to go" is an essential factor
in determining whether an encounter with police is a seizure.
33
Thus, while the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures "of the per-
son," including those that involve only a "brief detention short of
traditional arrest,"' 3 4 mere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure. 135 As the Court stated in Florida v. Royer, "[s]o long as a rea-
sonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about
his business,"' the encounter would be considered consensual and no
reasonable suspicion would be required. 36
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ferris v. State, the Court of Appeals
addressed the question of "whether an operator of a motor vehicle is
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he is
asked to get out of his car for questioning after a traffic stop is com-
pleted."'3 7 The court's analysis consisted of three fundamental ques-
tions: (1) Did the traffic stop end when the officer returned Ferris's
driver's license and registration, thus making the continued detention
a "second stop"; (2) If Ferris was seized, did he consent to the seizure;
128. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247.
129. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 39-40.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (holding that consent existed
where an individual felt "free to go").
134. U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980).
135. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
136. I& (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
137. Ferris, 355 Md. at 368, 735 A.2d at 497.
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and (3) If Ferris was seized, and there was no consent, did the officer
have reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the seizure.' 3 8
a. The Trooper's Questioning Constituted a "Second Stop. "--
Judge Raker began by addressing whether Ferris's entire detention
constituted a "single, continuous stop," or two separate stops, the first
consisting of the detention related to the traffic violation, and a sec-
ond stop that began after he had been issued a citation arising from
the traffic violation.'
39
After reviewing the Court of Special Appeals's decisions in Snow
v. State, Munafo v. State, and Pyor v. State, the majority concluded that
once the initial purpose of the traffic stop had been fulfilled, in this
case with the issuance of the citation, "the continued detention of the
car and its occupants amounts to a second detention" which is "consti-
tutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the con-
tinuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."' 4 ° The court con-
cluded that the initial traffic stop ended when Ferris received his cita-
tion, driver's license, and registration, and at that point, he was
"lawfully free to drive away."' 4 1
b. Mr. Ferris Did Not Consent to the Trooper's Questioning.--The
court began its analysis of the consent issue by recognizing that the
mere act of a police officer questioning an individual does not consti-
tute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 4 2 The court explained
that "even when [police] officers have no basis for suspecting criminal
involvement, they may generally ask questions of an individual 'so
long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their
request is required."'1 4 3 The court then stated that it would judge
whether the officer's questioning was consensual using the Mendenhall
test: the encounter was consensual if a "reasonable person would
have felt free to leave."' 4 4 A seizure may occur, according to the
court, through physical force or by a show of authority, combined with
submission to that authority. 4 5 In making this determination, the
138. See id. at 368, 373, 384, 735 A.2d at 497, 500, 506.
139. Id. at 369-70, 735 A.2d at 498.
140. Id. at 372, 735 A.2d at 499 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
141. Id. at 373, 735 A.2d at 500.
142. Id. at 374-75, 735 A.2d at 500-01 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).
143. Id. at 375, 735 A.2d at 501 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35).
144. Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
145. See id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26).
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court stated that it would apply the totality of the circumstances test
"with no single factor dictating whether a seizure has occurred."' 46
The court concluded that, given the factors surrounding the traf-
fic stop in Ferris and the cumulative effect such factors had on the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Ferris's position
would not have believed that he was free to terminate the encounter
with Trooper Smith.147 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
that there was a pre-existing coercive atmosphere that carried over
from the "previous stop" for speeding and that the officer failed to
inform Ferris that he was free to leave after receiving his citation.148
Additionally, the court explained that because "there were two uni-
formed officers present, the police cruiser emergency flashers re-
mained operative throughout the entire encounter, and it was 1:30
a.m. on a dark, rural interstate highway," the coercive effect of the
stop was heightened.' 49 Given the totality of the circumstances, the
court held, Ferris did not consent to be questioned by Trooper
Smith. 5 °
c. The Trooper Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion to Begin the
Second Stop.-Having concluded that Ferris was seized for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment when Trooper Smith asked him to step to the
back of his car and that he did not consent to this second stop, the
Ferris court proceeded to determine whether there was reasonable sus-
picion for Trooper Smith to begin the second stop after issuing the
citation. 15' The court began by stating that the test for determining
the existence of reasonable suspicion was "whether a reasonably pru-
146. Id. at 376, 735 A.2d at 501 (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
554).
147. Id. at 377, 735 A.2d at 502. Factors considered by the court included:
the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether
they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different loca-
tion or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he
or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was sus-
pected of a crime, whether the police retained the person's documents, and
whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would
suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave.
Id.
148. Id. at 378, 735 A.2d at 502.
149. Id. at 378-79, 735 A.2d at 503. The court gave five distinct reasons for finding that
there was no consent in this case: (1) the pre-existing seizure for speeding enhanced the
coercive nature of the second stop; (2) Ferris was never informed of his right to refuse to
answer Trooper Smith's questions; (3) Ferris was moved to the rear of his car, thus creating
a more coercive environment; (4) two uniformed officers were present; and (5) the en-
counter occurred late at night on a rural highway. See id. at 378-84, 735 A.2d at 502-06.




dent person in the officer's position would have been warranted in
believing that Ferris was involved in criminal activity that was afoot. 1 5 2
Once again, the court announced that it would examine the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion ex-
isted.'53 In its argument, the state used the following four factors to
justify its reasonable suspicion: (1) that Ferris's eyes were bloodshot;
(2) that there was no smell of alcohol in the car; (3) Ferris appeared
to be nervous; and (4) that Ferris and Mr. Discher, the passenger,
were moving around and frequently looking back toward Trooper
Smith's patrol car.
15 4
The court also stated that for reasonable suspicion to exist, the
factors contributing to the suspicion must "eliminate a substantial por-
tion of innocent travelers."' 55 In other words, when considered to-
gether, the four factors Trooper Smith cited as justification for Ferris's
questioning must be a set of characteristics that, more often than not,
will describe a situation in which criminal activity has taken place or
will take place.' 56 In applying this principle, the court concluded that
the facts surrounding the traffic stop in Ferris did not meet the level of
suspicion necessary to justify further detention of Ferris. 57 The court
explained that "[i] n the early morning hours, these factors could fit 'a
very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be
subject to virtually random seizures were the court to conclude that as
little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure."""
The court therefore held that Ferris had been seized without reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion, in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. 159
Judge Chasanow filed a dissenting opinion, in which Judge
Rodowsky joined, arguing that Ferris's answers to Trooper Smith's
152. Id. (citing Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 588, 611 A.2d 592, 595 (1992); Graham v,
State, 325 Md. 398, 407, 601 A.2d 131, 135 (1992); State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 376, 568
A.2d 48, 52 (1990)).
153. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
154. See id. at 385, 735 A.2d at 506-07.
155. Id. at 387, 735 A.2d at 507 (quoting Karnes v. Skrotski, 62 F.3d 485, 493 (3d Cir.
1995)).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 387, 735 A.2d at 507-08.
158. Id. at 387, 735 A.2d at 508 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)).
The court concluded that bloodshot eyes could merely be indicative of a tired traveler. Id.
at 387-93, 735 A.2d at 508-11. The court also reasoned that nervousness, fidgetiness, and
the fact that Ferris and Discher turned to look at the patrol car on several occasions could
be natural reactions to being stopped by a law enforcement officer, according to the court.
Id. Similarly, the court would not accept the use of a lack of alcohol smell as justification
for suspicion. Id.
159. See id. at 393, 735 A.2d at 511.
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questions were freely and voluntarily given.' 6 ° Judge Chasanow fur-
ther maintained that an appellate court should not have made a fac-
tual determination regarding consent contrary to that made by the
trial judge."' Judge Chasanow stated that when Trooper Smith issued
the citation and returned Ferris's license and registration, the suspect
was free to leave, yet voluntarily answered the trooper's questions. 6 2
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's holding that Ferris was
seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment was a predictable result
given Maryland's history of subjecting police officers to a high level of
scrutiny when deciding Fourth Amendment issues.'6 ' The Court of
Appeals, however, appears to be out of step with recent United States
Supreme Court decisions clearly defining what constitutes consent
and allowing law enforcement greater latitude during questioning of
suspects during traffic stops. 1
64
a. "Second Stops"-The Ferris Court's Adherence to Precedent.-
The Ferris court's conclusion that a second stop began when Trooper
Smith returned Ferris's driver's license and registration and then
asked him whether he would mind stepping out of the car is consis-
tent with prior Maryland cases involving traffic stops. 165 In Munafo v.
State, the Court of Special Appeals held that once the purpose for an
initial traffic stop has been fulfilled, any further detention will be con-
sidered a "second stop," required to be justified by a separate reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion. 166
Similarly, in Snow v. State, the Court of Special Appeals found that
when an officer issued a written warning to a driver, the initial pur-
pose of the stop had been fulfilled.' 67 Therefore, the constitutional
focus would lie on the subsequent detention of the individual, what
160. Id. at 395, 735 A.2d at 512 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 394, 735 A.2d at 511 (arguing that the lower court should have deferred to
the trial court's factual findings).
162. Id. at 394-95, 735 A.2d at 511-12.
163. See supra notes 70-83, 84-108 and accompanying text (analyzing recent Maryland
case law concerning traffic stops and related Fourth Amendment rights).
164. See supra notes 113-136 and accompanying text (analyzing United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence with regard to consent issues).
165. See Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662, 673, 660 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1995) (holding
that a second stop occurred when officers began a second line of questioning of a driver
after they had already issued a traffic warning).
166. Id. at 673, 660 A.2d at 1073; see also supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the court's holding in Munafo).




the Munafo court called the "second stop."' 68 While the term "second
stop" frequently appears in Maryland Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence involving traffic stops, United States Supreme Court decisions
are void of any reference to the concept of a second stop.
b. The Encounter Between Ferris and the Trooper was Consen-
sual.-The Ferris court's analysis with regard to whether Ferris had
given consent to be questioned by Trooper Smith departs significantly
from the Supreme Court's reasoning on the issue of consent. Even
though Ferris stated that "he didn't mind" stepping aside for further
questioning, 69 the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that because a
reasonable person in Ferris's position would not have felt free to ter-
minate the encounter, Ferris had not consented to the questioning.'7 0
In so concluding, the court looked to the coercive nature of the traffic
stop, including the presence of two uniformed officers and two patrol
cars with emergency lights on, the removal of Ferris to another loca-
tion (behind his car), and the failure of Trooper Smith to inform Fer-
ris that he was free to leave.17'
In contrast, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,'72 the United States Su-
preme Court firmly held that where an officer of the law seeks an
individual's consent to conduct a search or seizure, the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable; rather, the test is whether
the search was reasonable under the circumstances. 171 Justice Stewart
called a consent search "directly analogous" to investigative question-
ing of an individual outside of police custody, precisely the situation
present in Ferris.1 74 The Court went on to state clearly that the govern-
ment need not, under any circumstances, inform an individual of a
168. Id.
169. Ferris, 355 Md. at 363, 735 A.2d at 494.
170. Id. at 377-78, 735 A.2d at 502.
171. See id. at 378, 735 A.2d at 502-03. The court stated:
We find significant the following circumstances: the trooper never told Ferris he
was free to leave, . . . the trooper removed Ferris from his automobile, . . . there
were two uniformed law enforcement officers present, the police cruiser emer-
gency flashers remained operative throughout the entire encounter, and it was
1:30 a.m. on a dark, rural interstate highway.
172. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
173. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 350 (5th ed. 1996) ("[W]hen the warrant clause is inapplicable,
the basic test is reasonableness under the circumstances. And a search pursuant to volun-
tary consent is reasonable." (footnote omitted)); supra notes 113-128 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's holding in Schneckloth with respect to consent).
174. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247.
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right to refuse consent to such a search or questioning.' 75 A lack of
knowledge of this right may be a factor to be taken into account when
examining the totality of the circumstances; however, it is by no means
dispositive. 76
The Ferris court acknowledged that police are not required to in-
form citizens of their right to refuse consent or their right to leave
before consenting. 177 The court emphasized, however, that the right
to refuse consent is "one factor to be taken into account."' 78 The
court, while admitting that Trooper Smith's failure to inform Ferris of
his right to leave was not dispositive, continued to refer to the omis-
sion as a "significant factor," noting that "few motorists would feel free
... to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do
so."' 79 Based on the court's emphasis on informed consent, it is hard
to imagine a situation where consent would be considered voluntary
without an officer informing the individual that he was free to leave or
refuse consent. This type of deterrent to voluntary cooperation with
the police is exactly what the Supreme Court was attempting to avoid
in Schneckloth."8 0
In Schneckloth, an individual was asked by an officer whether he
could search the interior of his car and the individual agreed."' 1 Simi-
larly, in Ohio v. Robinette,"s2 an individual consented to a search of his
automobile, which turned up a small quantity of marijuana and
methamphetamines."'8 In both instances, the initial purpose of the
traffic stop was separate and distinct from the officer's reasoning for
the search and additional questioning, and in both cases, the Su-
175. Id. at 227 (stating that although "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one
factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as
'sine qua non' of an effective consent").
176. See id. at 249 (noting the accused's state of mind is a factor to be considered, but is
not determinative).
177. Feris, 355 Md. at 379, 735 A.2d at 503 ("We recognize that the police are not re-
quired to inform citizens that they are free to leave before getting consent to search a
motor vehicle.").
178. Id. at 380, 735 A.2d at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996)).
179. Id. at 381, 735 A.2d at 504 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984)).
180. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 ("[T]he community has a real interest in encourag-
ing consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and
prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not
wrongly charged with a criminal offense.").
181. Id. at 220.
182. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
183. Id. at 36.
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preme Court upheld the defendant's voluntary consent.'8 4 In light of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Schneckloth and Robinette, which up-
held as valid consent a physical invasion of one's possessions, suppres-
sion by the Supreme Court of similar consent involving mere
questioning of the driver of the car, as in Ferris, would seem unlikely.
The validity of this contention, however, depends on whether
Ferris was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
court in Ferris stated that "if a reasonable person would have felt free
to leave, no seizure occurred. Conversely, if a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to stay, a seizure took place."'18 5 The court
then cited several factors, including the time and place of the stop,
the officer's intimidating presence, and the failure to inform Ferris of
his right to refuse consent, as contributing to the totality of the cir-
cumstances."8 6 These circumstances combined, the court held, would
have led a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave,
therefore Mr. Ferris was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.18 7 Thus, in Ferris, the defendant could not consent because he
was not free to leave.
1 88
While the Court of Appeals may have reached a favorable result
with regard to individual civil liberty, its decision appears to run con-
trary to several United States Supreme Court opinions.
In United States v. Mendenhall,"s9 an individual was approached in
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport under suspicion of trafficking nar-
cotics.'90 She was asked to present her identification and airline
ticket. 91 After questioning the individual, the Drug Enforcement
Agency officers handed back her documents and proceeded to ask
Mendenhall whether she would accompany the agents to the airport
DEA office.' 92 Mendenhall agreed to follow the agents back to their
office and allowed them to search her person and her handbag, al-
184. Id. (explaining that the initial purpose of the traffic stop was for speeding); see
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220 (stating that the initial purpose of the traffic stop was for an
inoperative headlight and license plate light).
185. Ferris, 355 Md. at 375, 735 A.2d at 501.
186. See id. at 377, 735 A.2d at 502 (discussing the factors leading to the conclusion that
Mr. Ferris was seized).
187. See id. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506 (holding that the totality of the circumstances was a
"show of authority" such that a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the
encounter).
188. Id.
189. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
190. Id. at 547-48.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 548.
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though she was advised that she could decline the search if she so
pleased. 93
In Mendenhall, the Court held that in spite of all the circum-
stances, a reasonable person in Mendenhall's position would have felt
free to "end the conversation ... and proceed on her way.' 194 There-
fore, no seizure of Mendenhall occurred despite the agents' question-
ing and search.'" 5 Mendenhall's cooperation, the Court held, was
completely voluntary. 1 1 6 The Court stated that it "would adhere to the
view that a person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or
a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."' 7 Ac-
cording to the Court, nothing in the Constitution "prevents a police-
man from addressing questions to anyone on the streets."'9 8
Similarly, in Florida v. Royer,"9' the Court held that an individual
had been seized when he was stopped in an airport and questioned
while the officers retained possession of his driver's license and airline
ticket.2 00 In Royer, the suspect was escorted to the DEA office in the
same manner as Mendenhall. In this case, however, the agents did
not return Royer's personal effects. 20 1 Consequently, the Court held,
a reasonable person in Royer's position would not have felt free to
leave.20 2
Given the Supreme Court's holdings in Mendenhall and Royer, it
becomes clear that the Supreme Court very likely would have decided
Ferris differently than did the Court of Appeals. Presented with a situa-
tion wherein an individual was detained and issued a speeding ticket,
and then returned his driver's license and registration by the officers,
the Supreme Court would find that Ferris was free to leave after re-
ceiving his personal effects. 203 Once the initial stop had ended with
the return of Ferris's belongings, Ferris was free to leave in accor-
193. See id. at 548-49. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court recently
held that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a defendant be advised that he is
"free to go" before consent to search is deemed voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
35 (1996).
194. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 557-58.
197. Id. at 554.
198. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)).
199. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
200. Id. at 501.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 502.
203. See Ferris, 355 Md. at 394, 735 A.2d at 511 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (stating that
the officer's requests to step behind the vehicle was made after the citation was signed and
Ferris's license and registration were returned, and therefore, Ferris's answers to the of-
ficer's questions were "freely and voluntarily given").
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dance with the Supreme Court's analysis in Mendenhall and Royer. Fer-
ris's cooperation thereafter was governed by the law of consent as set
forth by the Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.2 °4
It could be argued, however, that the flashing lights of the of-
ficer's patrol car in Ferris constituted a show of authority to which Fer-
ris submitted, thereby resulting in a second seizure.20 5 Such a
contention, however, would not seem to be bolstered by the Court's
holding in California v. Hodari D.2 06 In Hodari D., the Supreme Court
held that only where there is physical force on the part of law enforce-
ment or "submission to the assertion of authority" can a seizure take
place for purposes of a Fourth Amendment analysis.2 0 7 In narrowing
the Mendenhall and Lemmon "reasonable person" test, Justice Scalia
clearly stated, in the majority opinion, that even where all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident would lead a reasonable person to
believe that he was not free to leave, it does not necessarily follow that
there has been a seizure. 2" This contradicts the court's holding in
Ferris that "if a reasonable person would have felt compelled to stay, a
seizure took place."209 The only remaining question with regard to
the validity or consent based on a Supreme Court analysis was whether
the show of authority by the police in Ferris constituted an unreasona-
ble seizure, and if so, whether Mr. Ferris submitted to the assertion of
authority.
In Hodari D., the Court plainly stated that the word "seizure" does
not "remotely apply ... to the prospect of a policeman yelling, 'Stop,
in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form ... ."210 The Court cau-
tioned that "[m] ere words will not constitute an arrest, while, on the
other hand, no actual, physical touching is essential .... There can
be no arrest without either touching or submission [to a show of au-
thority] ."211 Since there is no physical seizure in Ferris, it is necessary
204. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
205. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 (holding that a person is seized only when his free-
dom of movement is restrained by physical force or when he submits to a show of
authority).
206. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
207. Id. at 626; see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
holding in Hodari D.).
208. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628. The Court stated:
In seeking to rely upon that test here, respondent fails to read it carefully. It says
that a person has been seized 'only if,' not that he has been seized 'whenever'; it
states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure-or, more precisely,
for seizure effected through a 'show of authority.'
Id.
209. Feris, 355 Md. at 375, 735 A.2d at 501.
210. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
211. Id. at 626-27 (quoting Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 206 (1940)).
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to address the possibility that the officer's questioning amounted to a
show of authority. In the Hodari D. case, the Court would not find a
seizure where an individual was chased by police on foot and ordered
to "halt. ' 212 The seizure in Hodari D. only occurred when the suspect
was tackled by police.213
Given the Supreme Court's hesitance to label an individual
"seized" even while being pursued or questioned by police, it is very
difficult to see how, by merely asking a person if he would mind step-
ping to the back of his vehicle, Trooper Smith seized Ferris. Because
there was no show of authority on the part of Trooper Smith, his ques-
tioning did not constitute a seizure, and Ferris's responses to his ques-
tions were purely conversational. Even if a reasonable person in
Ferris's position would not have felt free to leave, under Mendenhall
and Hodari D., the Supreme Court would not likely find that Ferris
submitted to an assertion of authority by Trooper Smith constituting
an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
c. Reasonable Suspicion and the Purported Second Stop.-If the
court were to find that Ferris had given consent because he was not
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, whether or not
there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to begin the "second stop"
would be a moot issue. The Fernis court's finding that Trooper Smith
did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Ferris, however,
is consistent with past Maryland case law.2 14
In Snow v. State, the Court of Special Appeals stated that often-
times several innocent-appearing characteristics of an individual,
when taken together, may have "special significance" in determining
whether there is reasonable suspicion.215 The Snow court held that
nervousness, being a "highly subjective observation," could not justify
the officer's suspicion, as many completely innocent individuals be-
212. Id. at 629.
213. Id.
214. See Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 243, 260, 578 A.2d 816, 824 (1990) (holding that
lack of eye contact with the trooper, travel on an interstate highway, and air fresheners did
not give reasonable suspicion); Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662, 676, 660 A.2d 1068,
1074-75 (1995) (holding that a prior arrest record and the fact that Munafo seemed to be
hiding something did not give the trooper reasonable suspicion); State v. Lemmon, 318
Md. 365, 379-80, 568 A.2d 48, 56 (1990) (holding that two men talking to each other on a
street corner was not enough to form the basis for reasonable suspicion); Derricott v. State,
327 Md. 582, 592, 611 A.2d 592, 597 (1992) (holding that the use of a drug courier profile
alone could not form the basis for reasonable suspicion).
215. 84 Md. App. 243, 255, 578 A.2d 816, 822 (1990) (citing Derricott v. State, 84 Md.
App. 192, 578 A.2d 791 (1990), rev'd, 327 Md. 582, 611 A.2d 592 (1992)).
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come nervous when confronted by a police officer." 6 Similarly, in
Ferris, the Court of Appeals concluded that an individual's nervous
behavior did not constitute reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot.2 1 7 The court further found that Ferris's nervousness com-
bined with his bloodshot eyes still did not constitute a reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion of criminal activity, as bloodshot eyes may be a
mere sign of tiredness in a late-night driver.21
In United States v. Sokolow,219 the United States Supreme Court
required that for an officer to make a stop on the basis of reasonable
suspicion, the officer must have more than a mere "hunch," but some-
thing less than probable cause to make the stop. 22° Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that "the concept of reason-
able suspicion ... is not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules."' 22 ' The Court further explained that "innocent be-
havior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable
cause," and in making that determination, it is necessary to address
the "degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncrimi-
nal acts." 2 2 2 In rejecting a bright-line test for reasonable suspicion
and providing little guidance as to what factors constitute reasonable
suspicion, the Supreme Court left the determination of whether there
was sufficient suspicion to the lower courts. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals was well within its discretion to determine that there was not
reasonable, articulable suspicion to question the driver in Ferris.
5. Conclusion.-In Ferris v. State, the Court of Appeals con-
fronted several questions of criminal procedure, including whether a
second stop had occurred after a citation had been issued to a driver,
whether the driver had given consent to be questioned by the officer
about the possibility of drug use, and whether the officer had reasona-
ble suspicion to question the individual.22' All of these component
questions serve to answer the question: Was Ferris seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he was asked to step out of
his car for questioning after he had been given his citation?2 24 While
the Court of Appeals answered "yes" to the question presented, recent
216. Id
217. Ferris, 355 Md. at 387-89, 735 A.2d at 508-09.
218. See id. at 391, 735 A.2d at 510.
219. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
222. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-44).
223. Ferris, 355 Md. at 368-93, 735 A.2d at 497-511.
224. Id. at 368, 735 A.2d at 497.
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United States Supreme Court decisions provide a basis for an argu-
ment to the contrary. The Supreme Court's holdings in California v.
Hodari D. and in United States v. Mendenhall that a seizure has not oc-
curred absent physical force or a submission to an assertion of author-
ity, combined with the fact that the officer had returned Ferris's
license and registration runs contrary to the Court of Appeals' ulti-
mate conclusion that Mr. Ferris was seized when he was merely asked
to step out of his car. Additionally, when analyzed in light of
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and Ohio v. Robinette, it would appear that
there was no show of authority on the part of the police officer in
Ferris to negate the individual's voluntary agreement to answer the
trooper's questions. However, Ferris stands as the current case prece-
dent for traffic stop seizure in the State of Maryland. Therefore, it
remains likely that lower courts will carefully scrutinize any attempt by
a police officer to continue a traffic stop after an officer has issued a
citation or warning, whether or not there has been apparent consent




B. Narrowing the Required Litany of Advice for a Defendant's Jury
Trial Waiver
In State v. Bell,1 the Court of Appeals examined whether Maryland
Rule 4-246(b) 2 requires a specific in-court litany of advice with respect
to jury unanimity as a prerequisite for a defendant's waiver of a jury
trial.' The court held that Rule 4-246(b) does not require a specific
litany of advice regarding unanimity.4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court analyzed the plain meaning of the rule's language, its legis-
lative history, and relevant case law.5 The reasoning employed by the
court in determining that Rule 4-246(b) does not require such a litany
is sound, and its decision in Bell is an appropriate interpretation of the
Rule's requirements. While the Bell court did reach the correct deci-
sion, it did not however, address adequately the possible negative
ramifications of its holding. The court's determination that a defen-
dant need not be advised of the jury unanimity requirement elimi-
nates a very important assurance that the defendant will have
knowledge of a critical aspect of his or her constitutional right to a
jury trial.
1. The Case.--On September 2, 1994, Wilbur Bell was arrested
on charges of second degree rape, attempted rape, assault with intent
to rape, and assault and battery.6 Bell initially filed a demand for a
jury trial.7 By the time the case was called for trial, however, Bell had
changed his mind.' His attorney informed the court that Bell decided
1. 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998).
2. Rule 2-246(b) provides that
[a] defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the com-
mencement of trial. The court may not accept the waiver until it determines,
after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by
the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combina-
tion thereof, that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.
MD. RULE 4-246(b).
3. 351 Md. at 717-20, 720 A.2d at 315-16.
4. Id. at 730, 720 A.2d at 321 (stating that "[t]he rule no longer requires a specific in-
court litany of advice with respect to the 'unanimity' requirement for the trial court to
accept and permit the waiver, by a defendant, of his right to a jury trial" (footnote
omitted)).
5. Id. at 719-30, 720 A.2d at 317-21.
6. Id. at 711-12, 720 A.2d at 312-13. The respondent, Wilbur Bell, was charged as the
result of an attack on Ms. Pamela Collins. See Bell v. State, 118 Md. App. 64, 70-71, 701
A.2d 1183, 1186 (1997). During the attack the respondent choked, threatened and even-
tually raped Ms. Collins. See id.
7. See Bell, 351 Md. at 712, 720 A.2d at 313 (noting that on November 14, 1994, Bell
filed a demand for a jury trial).
8. See id.
1008 [VOL. 59:743
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
"to waive ajury trial and go with a Court trial."9 The judge responded
by asking defense counsel whether he had "advised Mr. Bell of the
ramifications of [waiving ajury trial]?" t ° Bell's attorney informed the
judge that he had discussed the matter with his client."' He then re-
peated it for the record. During this litany, the court specifically
asked Bell: "Do you understand if you were to have a jury trial, which
would consist of twelve people, or whether you choose to have this
member of the bench hear the case, the State would still have the
burden to prove the charges against you beyond a reasonable
doubt?"1 2 Bell answered "Yes."1 3
After Bell voluntarily relinquished his right to ajury trial, a bench
trial was conducted.14 The trial judge convicted Bell of second-degree
rape, assault and battery, attempted rape, and assault with intent to
rape.1" Bell was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment for the
second-degree rape conviction, with ten years suspended.16 The re-
maining counts were merged with the rape conviction.' 7 Bell subse-
quently appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals."
The Court of Special Appeals addressed whether Bell knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial when the trial court
failed to advise him that a jury's verdict must be unanimous in order
to render a conviction. 9 The court found that he had not knowingly
and voluntarily waived the right because Maryland Rule 4-246(b)2 ° re-
quires a defendant to be advised that a jury's verdict must be unani-
mous in order to convict.2 ' Because Bell was not advised that a jury's
verdict must be unanimous, the court vacated the convictions and re-
manded the case to the circuit court.2 2
9. Id,
10. Id.
11. Id. at 713, 720 A.2d at 313.
12. Id. at 714, 720 A.2d at 313.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 711, 720 A.2d at 312.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 711-12, 720 A.2d at 312.
17. Bell v. State, 118 Md. App. 64, 69, 701 A.2d 1183, 1186 (1997).
18. Bel4 351 Md. at 712, 720 A.2d at 312.
19. Bell v. State, 118 Md. at 69, 701 A.2d at 1186. The Court of Special Appeals also
addressed whether the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the prosecutrix,
admitting evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant, and restricting cross-ex-
amination of a State's witness. See id. at 69-70, 701 A.2d at 1186.
20. MD. RULE 4-246(b); see supra note 2 (providing text of Rule 4-246(b)).
21. Bell, 118 Md. at 81, 701 A.2d at 1191 (contending that while the language of Rule 4-
246(b) differs from its predecessor, former Rule 731, the requirements "with respect to
unanimity" are the same).
22. 1& at 70, 701 A.2d at 1186.
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Following the Court of Special Appeals's decision, the State peti-
tioned the Court of Appeals, requesting the court to consider whether
the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly held that Rule 4-246(b) re-
quires a defendant to be informed that jury unanimity is necessary to
secure a conviction. 2' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, and
reversed the Court of Special Appeals's decision.24
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland Law.-In State v. Bell, the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether, under Rule 4-246(b), a defendant can "knowingly"
waive his right to a jury trial without first being advised that a jury's
decision must be unanimous before it can convict a defendant. 25
Prior to Bell, the court had examined this same issue under the prede-
cessor of Rule 4-246(b), Maryland Rule 735. Rule 735(d) stated, in
pertinent part:
If the defendant elects to be tried by the court, the trial of
the case on its merits before the court may not proceed until
the court determines, after inquiry of the defendant on the
record, that the defendant had made his election for a court
trial with full knowledge of his right to ajury trial and that he
has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right.26
Subsection (b) of the former rule also required that the defendant
sign a form acknowledging that he had "a right to be tried by ajury of
12 persons or by the court without a jury" and that all twelve jurors
must find the defendant guilty.27
The Court of Appeals interpreted Rule 735, before it was
amended, in Countess v. State.28 In Countess, the court stated that the
language in Rule 735, directing a court to verify that a defendant
waived his right to a jury trial with "full knowledge" of that right, re-
quired a defendant to have "a basic understanding of the nature of a
jury trial. ' 29 The "basic understanding" standard would be satisfied if
the defendant knew
23. Bell, 351 Md. at 712, 720 A.2d at 313.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 717, 720 A.2d at 315. This was the first case decided by the Court of Appeals
to specifically address the unanimity requirement as interpreted under Rule 4-246(b). See
id. (explaining that "since the rule [4-246(b) ] was modified in 1981," the court had not yet
addressed "whether a defendant can 'knowingly' waive his or her right to a jury trial with-
out a specific reference to the unanimity request").
26. MD. RULE 735(j) (repealed 1984); see also Bell, 351 Md. at 715, 720 A.2d at 314
(quoting former Maryland Rule 735(j)).
27. MD. RULE 735(b) (repealed 1984); see also Bell, 351 Md. at 716, 720 A.2d at 314.
28. 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 1302 (1979).
29. Id. at 455, 408 A.2d at 1308.
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that he ha[d] the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or
by the court without a jury; that whether trial is by a jury or
by the court, his guilt must be found to be beyond a reasona-
ble doubt; that in ajury trial all 12 jurors must agree that he
is so guilty but in a court trial the judge may find So.30
Thus, the Countess court concluded that a defendant must be in-
formed of the requirement of juror unanimity for a waiver to be
valid.31
The Countess court reasoned that a waiver under 735 (d) "goes no
further than the mandates for a waiver of that right under the consti-
tutions. "32 Defense counsel urged, however, that "full knowledge cer-
tainly implies understanding of the most salient features of trial by
jury, including, at a minimum, the composition of the jury, the jury
selection process, and the unanimity requirement."3 3 The court re-
jected this argument, stating that it went "far beyond what is neces-
sary."3 4 The court interpreted the "full knowledge" requirement of
Rule 735 narrowly by mandating that a defendant must be informed
of the number of persons required to sit on a jury, that guilt must be
found beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury's verdict must be
unanimous.3 5
Soon after the Countess decision, however, Rule 735 was revised.3 6
Revised Rule 735 did not contain the "full knowledge" language or
the written waiver requirement.3 7 Eventually, Revised Rule 735 was
amended and codified as Rule 4-246."s Rule 4-246(b) mandates that
[t]he court may not accept the waiver until it determines,
after an examination of the defendant on the record in open
court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attor-
ney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the
waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.39
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id., 408 A.2d at 1307. The Supreme Court has noted that the Constitution requires
that a waiver of the right to a trial by jury must be made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 311-12 (1930)).
33. Countess, 286 Md. at 455, 408 A.2d at 1307.
34. See id. (explaining that the criteria proposed to satisfy "full knowledge" went "far
beyond what is necessary for a waiver of a jury trial to be constitutionally effective").
35. Id., 408 A.2d at 1308.
36. See Bel4 351 Md. at 716, 720 A.2d at 314 (noting that Rule 735 was revised on
November 13, 1981, and became effective January 1, 1982).
37. Id. (citing 8 Md. Reg. 1928, 1929-30 (1981)).
38. Cf Bell v. State, 118 Md. App. 64, 74, 701 A.2d 1183, 1888 (1997) (noting that Rule
4-246(b) was adopted in 1984).
39. MD. RULE 4-246(b).
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While the court first examined the unanimity requirement under
Rule 4-246(b) in Bell, it had the occasion to analyze other relevant
aspects of the rule previously.4" In Martinez v. State4' the court ad-
dressed what constituted a voluntary waiver of the right to a jury
trial.42 To begin its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited
the Supreme Court's mandates that waivers must be "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege '43 and
"not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. '44 The Court of Appeals further found that a "fixed
incantation" need not be recited to a defendant who elects to volunta-
rily waive his right to a jury trial.45 The court explained that the
"unique facts and circumstances of each case" must be analyzed to
determine whether the defendant competently and intelligently
waived his right.46 Additionally, the court noted that the defendant
must have "some knowledge of the jury trial before he is allowed to
waive it." 4 7
The court applied similar guidelines in State v. Hall.48 In Hall,
the defendant's conviction was upheld even though the trial court
failed to advise him of certain details about ajury trial.49 Specifically,
the court failed to ask the defendant if he understood what he had
been told relating to jury trials, and whether his waiver of a jury trial
was the result of coercion or physical or mental duress. 50 Based on
the specific facts of the case, the court found that constitutional due
process requirements were met and that the record adequately
40. See Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 590 A.2d 550 (1991); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 582
A.2d 507 (1990); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 252 A.2d 950 (1987); see also supra notes
41-57 and accompanying text.
41. 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987).
42. Id. at 129, 522 A.2d at 952.
43. Id. at 133, 522 A.2d at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingJohnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
44. Id. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942)).
47. Id. (citing Adams, 317 U.S. at 280; Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339 n.1, 455 A.2d
979 n.1 (1983); Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 232, 428 A.2d 1220 (1980)).
48. 321 Md. 178, 582 A.2d 507 (1990).
49. See id. at 183, 582 A.2d at 510 (finding that the trial court "could fairly be satisfied
that Hall had the requisite knowledge of the jury trial right, that the waiver was voluntary,
and that the requirements of the rule were satisfied").
50. Id. The court did inform the defendant of the number of people on a jury, the
reasonable doubt standard of guilt, and that waiver of a trial by jury would result in the
court deciding guilt or innocence. Id. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509.
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demonstrated that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to a jury trial.5
The totality of the circumstances test advanced in Hall was also
applied by the court in Tibbs v. State 2 to conclude that the defendant
did not knowingly and voluntarily relinquish his right to a jury trial.53
The Tibbs court emphasized that the defendant had not received any
of the required information concerning "the nature of a jury trial."54
Specifically, the court found that "[i] t is not sufficient that an accused
merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry, either from his lawyer
or the court, that he understood that he has a right to ajury trial, that
he knows 'what ajury trial is,' and waives that right 'freely and volunta-
rily."' 55 Although the court noted that a fixed incantation is not nec-
essary to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-246,56 it found that the
defendant's right to have "some knowledge of the jury trial right" was
clearly violated.57
Although the court examined some elements of Rule 4-246(b) in
Martinez, Hall, and Tibbs, it never directly addressed whether Rule 4-
246 mandates a defendant be informed of the jury unanimity require-
ment. In the absence of Maryland precedent, it is helpful to look to
other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Several jurisdictions
have held that a defendant need not be specifically advised of the una-
nimity requirement in order to effectively waive his right to a jury
trial.58
In People v. Fields,59 the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth
District found that when a defendant is represented by competent
counsel, the trial court does not have a duty to inform the defendant
about "'all the ins and outs' of ajury trial," the advantages and disad-
vantages of a jury trial, or the unanimity requirement before ac-
51. See id. at 183, 582 A.2d at 510 (concluding that the "constitutional due process
requirements were not transgressed").
52. 323 Md. 28, 590 A.2d 550 (1991).
53. See id. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551 ("Considering the totality of the circumstances in the
present case,. . . we hold that the record is woefully deficient to establish that Tibbs know-
ingly and voluntarily relinquished his right to a jury trial." (citation omitted)).
54. Id. (citing Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 507; Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522
A.2d 950 (1987)).
55. Id. at 32, 590 A.2d at 551.
56. See id. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551 (explaining that "no fixed litany need be followed in
complying with Maryland Rule 4-246").
57. Id. at 32, 590 A.2d at 551-52.
58. See, e.g., People v. Fields, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 702 (Ct. App. 1998); People v. Denis,
620 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (App. Div. 1994).
59. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Ct. App. 1998).
2000] 1013
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
cepting defendant's choice to waive ajury trial.6" Similarly, in People v.
Dennis,6 the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, upheld
a defendant's conviction even though the trial court did not advise
him that a conviction requires jury unanimity when he waived his
right to a jury trial.62
b. Trend in OtherJurisdictions.-In some jurisdictions, courts
have recommended that defendants be informed of the unanimity re-
quirement but have stopped short of making it mandatory. The Sixth
Circuit, in United States v. Martin,63 implored the district courts to "per-
sonally inform each defendant of the benefits and burdens ofjury tri-
als on the record prior to accepting a proffered waiver."64 It then
declined to 'join several courts which ha[d] adopted mandatory su-
pervisory rules requiring trial courts to personally interrogate defend-
ants prior to accepting ajury trial waiver."65 The court suggested that
a defendant, "[a]t a minimum," be informed that a jury is composed
of twelve people, that he may participate in the selection of jurors,
that ajury verdict must be unanimous, and, should he waive his right
to a jury trial, that a judge will decide his innocence or guilt.66
In United States v. Cochran,67 the Ninth Circuit, citing Martin, held
that a failure to follow a fixed colloquy pertaining to a defendant's
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of a jury trial did not "ipso
facto constitute reversible error."68 The court stated: "[W]e implore
district courts to inform defendants that (1) twelve members of the
community compose a jury; (2) the defendant may take part in jury
selection; (3) jury verdicts must be unanimous; and (4) the court
60. Id. at 702 (citing People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1992); People v. Tijerina, 459
P.2d 680 (Cal. 1969); People v. Lookadoo, 425 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1967); People v. Castaneda,
52 Cal. App. 3d 334, 344 (Ct. App. 1975); People v. Acosta, 18 Cal. App. 3d 895, 902 n.4
(Ct. App. 1971)).
61. 620 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div. 1994).
62. Id. at 616; see also Tucker v. Sate, 547 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1989) (noting that
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a defendant be informed of the jury
unanimity requirement); People v. James, 481 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Mich. 1992) (holding that
Michigan law does not require that a criminal defendant be informed of the unanimity
requirement).
63. 704 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1983).
64. Id. at 274.
65. Id. at 275 (citing United States v. Scott, 583 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1978); Hawkins
v. United States, 385 A.2d 744, 747 (D.C. App. Ct. 1978); Biddle v. State of Maryland, 40
Md. App. 399, 400-03, 392 A.2d 100, 101-03 (1978); Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 392
N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Mass. 1979)).
66. Id. at 274-75.
67. 770 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 853.
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alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives ajury trial."69
The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that the adoption of a rule
requiring such information be given was "unnecessary. "70
The Tenth Circuit joined the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in re-
jecting a strict litany requirement. In United States v. Robertson,71 the
Tenth Circuit declined to interpret Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 23(a) 7' as requiring any specific litany, stating that "little is
served by rigidly requiring compliance with the Rule."73 In accor-
dance with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit did, how-
ever, strongly recommend that trial courts advise defendants of the
most salient features of a jury trial.74
Finally, a fewjurisdictions have required trial courts to specifically
inform defendants of certain features of a jury trial, such as the una-
nimity requirement. 75 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Com-
monwealth v. Hughes,76 ordered that
[p] rior to accepting a defendant's waiver of his right to ajury
trial, the trial court must conduct a colloquy wherein it ap-
prises the defendant of the three essential elements of ajury
trial: that the jury would be selected from members of the
community; that the verdict must be unanimous; and that
the defendant would be allowed to participate in the selec-
tion of the jury.77
Similarly, in State v. West,78 the Supreme Court of Vermont found that
before a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial he must be ad-
dressed in open court to determine that he "understands . .. [t]hat
before the defendant can be convicted, all 12 members of the jury
69. Id. (citing Martin, 704 F.2d at 274-75).
70. Id.
71. 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1995).
72. See FED. R. CIuM. P. 23(a) (setting forth that "[c]ases required to be tried by jury
shall be so tried unless the defendant waives ajury trial in writing with the approval of the
court and the consent of the government").
73. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1431.
74. See id. at 1432 (noting the "significance of the right to a jury trial and the impor-
tance of the decision to waive that right," and explaining that a defendant "should be
informed" of the number of people composing a jury, the defendant's role in jury selec-
tion, the unanimity requirement, and that in a bench trial, the "court alone decided guilt
or innocence" (citing United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d
889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981))).
75. See, e.g., State v. West, 667 A.2d 540 (Vt. 1995); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 639 A.2d
763 (Pa. 1994); State v. Resio, 436 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1989).
76. 639 A.2d 763 (Pa. 1994).
77. Id. at 772 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 312 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1973)).
78. 667 A.2d 540 (Vt. 1995).
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must agree on defendant's guilt."79  In addition to the Supreme
Courts of Pennsylvania and Vermont, the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin has also directed trial courts to inform defendants of the unanim-
ity requirement.80
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Bell, the Court of Appeals held that
Rule 4-246(b) does not require a specific litany of advice regarding
jury unanimity.8" In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the
legislative history8 2 and plain meaning of Rule 4-246(b)"3 and case law
addressing similar issues from Maryland and other jurisdictions. s4
The court first focused on the change in language between Rule 4-
246(b) and its predecessor, Rule 735(d). 5 The Bell court noted that
the legislature, in drafting Rule 4-246(b), replaced the term "full
knowledge," found in Rule 735, with the term "knowingly and volunta-
rily."8 6 In analyzing the plain meaning of "full knowledge" and "know-
ingly and voluntarily," the court turned to the definitions found in The
Random House Dictionary Of The English Language.8 7 The dictionary de-
fines "full," in part, as "complete; entire; maximum . . . of the maxi-
mum . . . extent, volume," "knowledge" as "acquaintance with facts,
truths, or principles ... awareness, as of a fact or circumstance" and
"knowingly" as "having knowledge or information; conscious; inten-
tional; deliberate." 8 The court also examined the definitions in
Black's Law Dictionary, and found similar results.89 Given the diction-
79. Id. at 545 n.1 (quoting V.R. CRaM. P. 23(a)).
80. See State v. Resio, 436 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Wis. 1989) (stating "we direct that, from
the date of the mandate of this decision, a circuit court in a criminal case must advise the
defendant that the court cannot accept ajury verdict that is not agreed to by each member
of thejury"). Notwithstanding this directive, the court held that knowledge of the unanim-
ity requirement was not constitutionally required. Id. at 607.
81. Bell, 351 Md. at 730, 720 A.2d at 321.
82. See id. at 721-24, 720 A.2d at 317-19 (focusing on the rules of procedure recom-
mended by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure that were subse-
quently rejected by the Court of Appeals).
83. See id. at 719-21, 720 A.2d at 316-17 (examining both common dictionary and legal
dictionary definitions).
84. See id. at 724-30, 720 A.2d at 319-21 (examining relevant case law from Maryland
and cases from jurisdictions that analyzed a fixed litany required).
85. See id. at 716-17, 720 A.2d at 314-15 (noting the change in language between Rule
4-246(b) and Rule 735(d)).
86. Id. at 717-18, 720 A.2d at 315.
87. Id. at 716, 720 A.2d at 316 (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 573 (unabr. ed. 1983)).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 719-20, 720 A.2d at 316 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 672 (6th ed.
1990)). Black's defines "full" as "[a]bundantly provided, sufficient in quantity or degree,
complete, entire .... " and "knowledge" as "[a]cquaintance with fact or truth." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 872 (6th ed. 1990).
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ary meanings of the statutory language, the court concluded that "full
knowledge" required a defendant to be "apprized completely of the
jury's function at trial and his right to be tried by ajury."90 The court
contrasted this with the language of 4-246, which defines "knowingly"
as "having knowledge or information."91 The court stated that "[i]t
would seem, accordingly, that the alterations in the language of the
rule from Countess to present day would indicate this Court's intent to
replace the more stringent 'full knowledge' requirement with a more
flexible 'knowingly' made waiver requirement. '9 2 With respect to the
unanimity requirement, the court found that a defendant's knowl-
edge no longer needed to be "complete" or "entire."9"
The court next turned to the Rule's legislative history.94 Specifi-
cally, the court examined rejected amendments to Rule 735.95 The
focus of its examination was on the proposed amendment to Rule
735, which stated, in part:
The court may not accept the waiver until it determines, af-
ter an examination of the defendant... that the defendant
voluntarily waived a jury trial, understanding that . .
[b]efore a finding of guilty in a jury trial, all 12 jurors must
agree that the defendant is guilty.96
The Bell court noted that the rejection of that proposal "implies that
we wished to move away from the rigidity of the former rule 735 and
Countess."
9 7
Finally, the court reviewed relevant case law. In examining Mary-
land cases, the Bell court noted several decisions in which it addressed
90. BeI4 351 Md. at 720, 720 A.2d at 316.
91. Id. (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 793 (unabr.
ed. 1983)).
92. Id., 720 A.2d at 317.
93. Id. at 730, 720 A.2d at 321 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 672 (6th ed. 1990)).
94. Id. at 721-23, 720 A.2d at 317-18. The court, citing Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380,
614 A.2d 590 (1992), stated that "[w]hile the language of the statute is the primary source
for determining legislative intention ... it is not absolute ... [t]he court will look at the
larger context, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears."
Id. at 718, 720 A.2d at 315 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Tracey, 328 Md. at 387,
614 A.2d at 594).
95. The court cited to other cases in which they examined proposed amendments. See
Bel, 351 Md. at 721-23, 720 A.2d at 317 (discussing Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 77-83,
673 A.2d 221, 240-43 (1996); Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 150-54, 626 A.2d 946, 952-54
(1993); Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 386, 587 A.2d 1102, 1106 (1991)).
96. See id. at 723, 720 A.2d at 318 (citing Seventy-Fifth Report of the Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 2-3 & app. (Oct. 26, 1981)).
97. Id. at 724, 720 A.2d at 318; see also State v. Marsh, 337 Md. 528, 535, 654 A.2d 1318,
1321-22 (1995) (noting that the purpose of the adoption of Rule 4-246 was "to make the
Rule more flexible by eliminating the prescribed litany").
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peripheral issues relevant to the case at hand.98 In Hall it stated that,
under Rule 4-246(b), the court "need not recite any fixed incantation"
and that whether a waiver of a jury trial was valid depended on the
facts and circumstances of the case.9 9 The court continued differenti-
ating Tibbs, in which the court held the defendant's waiver was invalid,
from Bell. It found, applying the "depends upon the facts of the case"
approach, that the record in Tibbs was "woefully deficient" and did not
establish that the defendant had knowingly waived his right. ° ° The
court concluded its analysis by reviewing the relevant caselaw of other
jurisdictions. The court discussed cases that do not require a fixed
litany, cases requiring a strict litany, and cases recommending, but not
requiring, such a litany.' 1 The Bell court concluded that the number
ofjurisdictions not requiring a fixed litany in regard to jury unanimity
outweigh those that do.'0 2
4. Analysis.-In Bell, the Court of Appeals held that Rule 4-
246(b) does not require a criminal defendant to be advised of the jury
unanimity requirement.10 3 The Bell court reached this conclusion by
a thorough examination of Rule 4-246(b)'s legislative history, its plain
meaning, and case law addressing the issue. In so doing, the court
reached the proper decision based upon Rule 4-246(b). This deci-
sion, however, could remove an important safeguard in assuring the
knowing waiver of the fundamental right to a jury trial.
a. Analysis of Court's Reasoning.-The analysis conducted by
the Bell court was thorough and well reasoned. 10 4 The language once
contained in Rule 735, "full knowledge," was deleted and eventually
replaced with "knowingly." To ascertain the rational for this change,
98. See Bell, 351 Md. at 725-26, 720 A.2d at 319 (discussing Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28,
590 A.2d 550 (1991); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 582 A.2d 507 (1990)).
99. State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182-83, 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990) (citing Martinez v.
State, 309 Md. 124, 134, 522 A.2d 950, 955 (1987)).
100. See Bell, 351 Md. at 725, 720 A.2d at 319 (stating that the record failed to show that
Tibbs received any information at all concerning the nature of a jury trial).
101. Id. at 727-30, 720 A.2d at 320-21 (reviewing an extensive list of both state and fed-
eral jurisdictions and their decisions on the requirements for waiver of the right to a jury
trial).
102. Id. at 730, 720 A.2d at 321 (stating that "it appears that a majority of jurisdictions
either have no requirement that a trial court must describe jury unanimity to the defen-
dant or only recommend that they do so").
103. Id.
104. The Court of Special Appeals, in reaching the opposite conclusion, did not ex-
amine legislative intent and ignored the reasoning behind the change in language from
Rule 735 to Rule 4-246. See generally Bell v. State, 118 Md. App. 64, 77-82, 701 A.2d 1183,
1189-92 (1997) (focusing instead on case law and stating that Rule 426(b) requires no less
than its predecessor rule).
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the court turned to one of the few sources available to them-legisla-
tive intent. The Court of Appeals has given credence to the approach
of examining legislative intent through proposed, but rejected,
amendments.1 0 5 The Court of Appeals rejected the proposals for a
revised Rule 735 that would have required a mandatory colloquy spe-
cifically including the unanimity requirement. 10 6 The proposal that
was eventually adopted did not include a fixed litany requirement;
rather, it provided that a defendant's waiver must be made "know-
ingly." The rejection of the proposal requiring a defendant to be in-
formed that a jury verdict must be unanimous indicates the court's
intent to free itself from the constraints associated with a fixed
litany. 107
In addition to the support found in the legislative history, the
meaning of the express language of the rules also supports the Bell
court's decision. It is indisputable that the language changed from
Rule 735 to Rule 4-246.' °8 The term "full knowledge" was removed
and replaced with "knowingly."10 9 The Bell court concluded that this
change was designed to lessen the level of knowledge required to
waive a right to ajury trial. 110 The change in language, the court ex-
plained, indicated that the level of knowledge no longer needed to be
"complete" or "entire." '111 This is a fair interpretation of the language
based on its dictionary meanings. 1 2 The plain meaning of language
contained in a statute is crucial to that statute's interpretation. The
Bell court was therefore correct to examine such meaning and also
correct in the conclusions thus reached.
105. See NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 125, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988) (stating
that "[w]hile a committee's rejection of an amendment is clearly not an infallible indica-
tion of legislative intent, it may help our understanding of overall legislative history"); see
also Prince George's County v. Commission on Human Relations, 40 Md. App. 473, 489,
392 A.2d 105, 115 (1978) (noting that the court may "consider rejection by the General
Assembly ... as an indication of the legislative will").
106. See supra note 96.
107. See State v. Marsh, 337 Md. 528, 535, 654 A.2d 1318, 1321-22 (1995) (explaining
that the purpose of the changes to Rule 735 was to make the Rule "more flexible by elimi-
nating the prescribed litany").
108. Cf supra notes 22, 35.
109. See supra notes 33-35.
110. See Bell 351 Md. at 721, 720 A.2d at 318 (agreeing with the state that "knowingly" is
a lesser standard than "full knowledge" and only requires that a defendant possess a gen-
eral knowledge of the nature of a jury trial).
111. Id. at 730, 720 A.2d at 321 (defining statutory language by referencing dictionary
definitions).
112. The court used both a common and legal dictionary to obtain its definitions. Id. at
720-21, 720 A.2d at 316 (quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 573 (unabr. ed. 1983); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 672 (6th ed. 1980)).
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The final step in the Bell court's discussion, a review of relevant
case law, also strongly supported the court's rejection of a strict litany
requirement."13 Although Bell was the first case to address the una-
nimity requirement under Rule 4-246, other Maryland cases have ad-
dressed issues relevant to the unanimity requirement." 4 The court's
holding is consistent with post-Rule 735 decisions which have noted
that no "fixed incantation" is necessary in determining whether a de-
fendant knowingly waived his right to ajury trial.' 15 Additionally, the
court cited several cases proposing that whether a waiver has been
knowingly made should be judged on a case-by-case basis.' 16 Al-
though these decisions do not directly address the unanimity require-
ment, they demonstrate the court's general unwillingness to adopt a
fixed rule pertaining to a waiver of jury a trial.
b. Analysis Of The Implications Of The Bell Decision. -While the
Bell court's analysis is a well grounded interpretation of Rule 4-246, its
holding could potentially jeopardize protections aimed at insuring the
"knowing" waiver of jury trials. Trial by jury is fundamental to Ameri-
can criminal law. 1 7 The right is preserved by Article III, section 2 of
the Constitution which states: "[t] he trial of all crimes ... shall be by
Jury."" 8 The Sixth Amendment further provides that: "[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury."" 9 Moreover, the unanimity require-
ment is one of the hallmarks of the jury trial system as evidenced by its
113. See Bell, 351 Md. at 724-30, 720 A.2d at 320-21. The Bell court noted that some
jurisdictions require a fixed litany pertaining to unanimity. Id. (citing State v. West, 667
A.2d 540 (Vt. 1995); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 639 A.2d 763 (Pa. 1994); State v. Resio,
436 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1989)). Otherjurisdictions, however, require no fixed litany. See id.
(citing People v. Fields, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1998); People v. Denis, 620
N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1994)). Finally, the Bell court identified jurisdictions that
recommend, but do not require, a litany. Id. (citing United States v. Robertson, 45 F.2d
1423 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1983)).
114. Id. at 717, 720 A.2d at 315 (noting that the Court of Appeals had not yet addressed
whether a defendant could knowingly waive his right to a jury trial without "specific refer-
ence to the unanimity requirement during the in-court advice given to a defendant about
whether to elect a court or jury trial").
115. See Martinez v. State, 390 Md. 124, 134, 522 A.2d 950, 954 (1987) (stating that "[i] n
determining whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a
jury trial, the questioner need not recite any fixed incantation").
116. See supra notes 83-84 (citing to State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 582 A.2d 507 (1990);
Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 590 A.2d 550 (1991)).
117. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (noting thatjury trials help pre-
vent government oppression and arbitrary law enforcement).
118. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
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inclusion in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 120 Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights states: "[t] hat in all criminal prosecu-
tions, every man hath a right... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury,
without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found
guilty."' 12 ' The fundamental importance of the unanimity require-
ment has also been expressed by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
stating that "a unanimous jury verdict is a fundamental constitutional
right guaranteed to the defendant in a criminal case." 1
2 2
The establishment of the right to a jury trial, and the unanimity
requirement contained therein, is fundamental to American jurispru-
dence and therefore must be protected. Within the framework of our
system, the trial court must bear substantial responsibility for preserv-
ing that right.123 The Supreme Court has reiterated this point by not-
ing that
[t]rial by jury is the . . . preferable mode of disposing of is-
sues of fact in criminal cases .... In such cases the value and
appropriateness of a jury trial have been established by long
experience, and are not now to be denied. Not only must
the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be
jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact
finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has
such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can
become effective, the consent of government counsel and
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the
express and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the
duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged
as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre-
tion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures
from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements
thereof... 124
Trial courts make the initial determination of whether a defen-
dant has "knowingly" waived his right to ajury trial. They are in the
best position to ensure that the defendant has done so. This determi-
120. See State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 572, 375 A.2d 228, 240 (1977) (stating that "a
unanimous jury verdict is a fundamental constitutional right"); see also MD. DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 21.
121. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21.
122. State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 572, 375 A.2d 228, 240 (1977).
123. See United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the trial
level court has a responsibility to "jealously preserv[e] jury trials").
124. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); see also Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (stating that the protection provided by ajury "lies in the interposition




nation is best accomplished by a colloquy between the court and the
defendant concerning the most salient features of a jury trial. Most
jurisdictions agree that the most important aspects of a jury trial in-
clude: that the jury consists of twelve members of the community, that
the defendant may take part in the selection of the jury, and that the
jury verdict must be unanimous.'25 Conducting such a colloquy serves
several purposes, most importantly of which is to insure that waivers
are made voluntarily and knowingly. When a trial court provides this
information about the nature of a defendant's jury trial right, it helps
insure that defendants have a basic understanding of a jury trial
before they decide whether to waive that right.'26 Additionally, a trial
court is in a better position to ascertain whether a waiver, is in fact,
being offered knowingly and voluntarily if it in fact conducts a collo-
quy with the defendant.'27
Conducting an adequate colloquy also emphasizes the impor-
tance of the waiver decision to the defendant. Making such a determi-
nation on the record and in open-court requires the defendant to give
some level of consideration to the issue of waiver especially in re-
sponding to questions from the court. This special consideration is
especially important in light of the fundamental nature of the right to
a jury trial.'1 2
Finally, the importance of informing a defendant of the unanim-
ity requirement promotes judicial economy. A fixed litany that incor-
porates the most important aspects of a jury trial will, in most cases,
meet the requirements for an adequate waiver of a jury trial. 129 Re-
spectfully, it would avoid challenges to the validity of convictions on
appeal.
125. See supra note 74.
126. See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that when
defendants are informed that twelve people compose a jury, that the defendant can take
part in jury selection and that jury verdicts must be unanimous that defendants should
have a basic understanding of the jury process); see also United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d
267, 273 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that "a defendant ignorant of the nature of the jury trial
fight cannot intelligently weigh the value of the safeguard... [and] therefore should have
... some knowledge of the jury trial right before he is allowed to waive it").
127. See Martin, 704 F.2d at 272-73; see also United States v. Hunt, 413 F.2d 983, 984 (4th
Cir. 1969) (explaining that an interrogation, by the district judge, of a defendant who has
elected to waive his right to ajury trial "would provide the district judge with an additional
factual basis on which to grant or withhold his approval of the waiver").
128. See Cochran, 770 F.2d at 852 (noting that such colloquies emphasize the importance
of jury waiver).
129. See supra note 74 (outlining the most important features of a jury trial to be in-
cluded in a litany).
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5. Conclusion.-While the Bell court was accurate in its interpre-
tation of Rule 4-246(b), there are potential problems that may stem
from its decision. The right to a jury trial, and, more specifically, the
unanimity requirement are an integral part of our criminal law sys-
tem.' 30 They should therefore be afforded some protection. This
protection is not well served by random, unstructured, and inconsis-
tent colloquies with defendants. This notion was perhaps best summa-
rized by the Ninth Circuit which stated: "[t] here is, thus, every reason
for district courts to conduct a colloquy before accepting a waiver of
the right to trial by jury and no apparent reason for not doing so." 131
CHRIS W. WALLACE
130. See supra notes 117-122 (noting the right to ajury trial and the unanimity require-
ments inclusion in the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Maryland).
131. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850.
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C. Defining the Scope of the Search Incident to an Arrest Doctrine
In State v. Evans,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
conducting a search incident to an arrest that does not result in a trip
to the station house comports with both the Fourth Amendment2 and
the definition of arrest under Maryland law.' While the court was cor-
rect in reaching its conclusion that conducting a search incident to an
arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment simply because the ar-
rest did not result in a trip to the station house, the court reached this
conclusion by questionable means, never considering the meaning of
the Supreme Court's requirement that a search may only be con-
ducted pursuant to a "custodial arrest."4 But because conducting
searches incident to any probable cause-based arrests-including ar-
rests that do not result in a trip to the station house-are inherently
"reasonable," provided that the search is necessary to obtain valuable
evidence needed to prosecute the arrestee for the crime committed,
the Court of Appeals reached the proper conclusion in finding that
such searches are constitutional. With regard to the requirements of
an arrest in Maryland, the Court of Appeals in Evans eliminated the
"intent to prosecute language"5 that had traditionally been used as a
meaningless garnish to its arrest requirements.6 In so doing, the
court logically aligned Maryland's definition of arrest with that of the
Supreme Court,7 which will have the effect of allowing police officers
to investigate criminal wrongdoing more effectively, without infring-
ing upon individual privacy rights.
1. The Case.-In 1994, the Baltimore City Police Department Vi-
olent Crimes Task Force conducted an undercover operation known
1. 352 Md. 496, 723 A.2d 423 (1999).
2. "The right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 352 Md. at 530, 723 A.2d at 439; see id. at 519, 723 A.2d at 434 (finding dispositive
whether "the initial detentions of Respondents constituted lawful arrests under Maryland
law").
4. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (explaining that "it is the
fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search"); Evans, 352 Md. at 516-
19, 723 A.2d at 432-34 (discussing the requirements of a lawful search incident to an ar-
rest); see also infra notes 126-133 and accompanying text (discussing the court's failure to
analyze the purpose of the "custodial arrest" requirement).
5. Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432 (rejecting the argument "that failure of the
police to initiate the formal criminal charging process at or near the time of the initial
detention precludes a valid arrest under Maryland law").
6. See infra Part 2.e (describing the Court of Appeals's application of its arrest
requirements).
7. See infta notes 68-71 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's arrest
requirement).
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as "Operation Mid-East" to combat street-level drug transactions in
targeted Baltimore communities.' Throughout this operation, under-
cover police officers would buy as many drugs as they could within a
specific period of time to identify and to collect evidence against as
many drug dealers as possible within the targeted community.9 A
plain-clothed police officer would initiate contact with a suspected
drug dealer by attempting to purchase illegal narcotics with marked
police money.10 Once the drug transaction was completed, the officer
would transmit a description of the suspect to an "identification team"
through a body wire, whereupon the identification team would locate
and detain the suspect."1 Once detained, the identification team
would search the suspect, seize narcotics and currency found on his
person, photograph him, verify his address, 2 and then release him.
13
Suspects were not taken to the station house for booking at the
time of the detention because "information about the arrests would
leak out and endanger the future of the undercover operation. 14
Operation Mid-East was intended to "make a major impact on the
[targeted] area," and could only be effective if police executed a
"mass arrest." 5 After continuing for approximately one month, Oper-
ation Mid-East culminated in a "hit day," when task force members
returned to the targeted communities and made mass arrests of all the
individuals that they had detained for selling illegal narcotics.
16
On June 9, 1994, while taking part in Operation Mid-East as an
undercover agent, Officer Kenneth Rowell approached appellant
Dwight Evans and asked "if he was working."' 7 After Evans responded
that he had "dimes of coke," Officer Rowell produced a marked ten
dollar bill and Evans handed the officer a vial of cocaine."8 Once the
transaction was complete, Officer Rowell walked away and transmitted
8. Evans v. State, 113 Md. App. 347, 351, 688 A.2d 28, 30 (1997), rev'd, 352 Md. 496,
723 A.2d 423 (1999).
9. See Evans, 352 Md. at 500-01 n.1, 723 A.2d at 425 n.1 (quoting trial testimony of
Evans's arresting officer, who explained that "[t]he operation is designed to buy drugs, to
buy as much drugs as we can within a specific period of time").
10. Evans, 113 Md. App. at 351, 688 A.2d at 30.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 352 n.3, 688 A.2d at 31 n.3.
13. Id. at 352, 688 A.2d at 31.
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. Operation Mid-East resulted in the arrest of sixty individuals. Id.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 352-53, 688 A.2d at 31.
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a description of Evans to the technical team.1" Five to ten minutes
later, after receiving confirmation that a man fitting Evans's descrip-
tion was stopped, Officer Rowell drove past the scene of the detain-
ment and confirmed that the man in custody was in fact the individual
who sold him the cocaine.2 °
After Evans was stopped, the officers explained that they were
conducting an investigation and then photographed Evans, searched
him, and verified his identification. 2 An initial search of Evans pro-
duced $163 in currency, but the officers were unable to find any nar-
cotics22 The officers then contacted Officer Rowell to inquire about
where Evans may have hidden the narcotics, and Rowell stated that
Evans had taken the narcotics from his "rear area."23 An officer pro-
ceeded to conduct a rectal search of Evans, whereupon he recovered
nine glass vials of cocaine. 24 Evans was then given a receipt for the
seized money and released.2' At no time during the detainment did
police formally charge Evans or transport him to the station house. 26
The only formal action taken with regard to the detainment of Evans
was that officers followed an internal police procedure of filling out
an "Investigated and Released" form. 27
On July 5, 1994, twenty-six days after being detained and
searched by the police, Evans was indicted by the Grand Jury for Balti-
more City on three counts: distribution of cocaine, possession of co-
19. Id. at 353, 688 A.2d at 31. The technical team was "on hand to videotape the trans-
action and to maintain communication with the officer throughout the operation." Id. at
352, 688 A.2d at 31.
20. Id. at 353, 688 A.2d at 31.
21. Id. The police called Evans's father, who came to the area to confirm his son's
identity. Evans, 352 Md. at 502, 723 A.2d at 426. It is important to note, for the purpose of
later discussion, that the trial court found that "[Evans] was not free to go until [the po-
lice] secured his identification." Id. at 503, 723 A.2d at 426 (first alteration in original).
22. Evans, 113 Md. App. at 353, 688 A.2d at 31.
23. Id.
24. Id, The legality of conducting a body cavity search in this circumstance was not
considered by the Court of Special Appeals because Evans's motion to suppress the seized
drugs did not mention or allude to the rectal search. Id. at 353 n.6, 688 A.2d at 31 n.6
(citing Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-41 (1990); Trusty v. State,
308 Md. 658, 760-72, 521 A.2d 749 (1987)).
25. Evans, 352 Md. at 502, 723 A.2d at 425-26.
26. Id. at 502, 723 A.2d at 426. At the suppression hearing, however, Officer Dobbins
stated that at the time of the detention, the police intended to "seize the drugs and the
money [and] to come back later as an impact on that area and to make mass arrests." Id. at
520 n.17, 723 A.2d at 435 n.17 (alteration in original).
27. Id. at 502, 723 A.2d at 426. Officer Dobbins, a member of the technical team,
testified that an "Investigated and Released" form was the alternative to taking a suspect to
the police station and processing formal charges. Id. at 502 n.2, 723 A.2d at 426 n.2.
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caine with an intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine.28 Evans
filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence seized by the police,
claiming the search that produced the evidence was unlawful because
he was never placed under arrest.29
Denying Evans's motion to suppress, the trial court found that
the search of Evans was incident to a valid arrest.3 ° In reaching this
conclusion, Judge Prevas, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
stated that "the word 'arrest' is a word of art... because... [Evans]
was not free to go until [the police] secured his identification . . . it
really was, in fact, an arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes."31 Ev-
ans was subsequently convicted of distribution of cocaine and posses-
sion of cocaine with an intent to distribute and sentenced to fourteen
years in prison for the distribution charge and five years for possession
with an intent to distribute.3
2
A divided Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, holding that the detention of Evans
did not constitute an arrest, and that the search conducted by police
incident to the detention was unconstitutional. Stating that the U.S.
Supreme Court's discussions of what constitutes an arrest under the
warrantless search incident to an arrest doctrine have been
"skimpy," 4 the Court of Special Appeals turned to Maryland case law
to determine whether the detention of Evans constituted an arrest.35
28. See id. at 502, 723 A.2d at 426. These offenses are violations of Maryland Code,
Article 27, §§ 286-287. Id
29. See id. at 502-03, 723 A.2d at 426 (describing the relevant pre-trial motions and the
circuit court's rulings thereon).
30. Evans, 113 Md. App. at 354, 688 A.2d at 32. In the alternative, the court found that
"in the event that [the detainment of Evans] wasn't an arrest.., it was a detention for the
purpose of getting the evanescent evidence ... which would have been gone if [the of-
ficers] had at that time decided to get an arrest warrant and arrest him some time later."
Id. at 355, 688 A.2d at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 354, 688 A.2d at 32. Judge Prevas continued, stating that "[flor Fourth
Amendment purposes, its [sic] not necessary that [Evans] be taken to the District Court
Commissioner, given a Statement of Charges, and sent to a commissioner for processing
for bail in order for it to be an arrest." Id.
32. Evans, 352 Md. at 503, 723 A.2d at 426.
33. Evans, 113 Md. App. at 363-64, 688 A.2d at 36; id. at 369, 688 A.2d at 39. The Court
of Special Appeals also determined that the search could not be justified using the "evanes-
cent evidence" exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 368-69, 688 A.2d at 38-39.
34. Id. at 357, 688 A.2d at 33.
35. Id. at 359, 688 A.2d at 34. The Court of Special Appeals did state, though, that the
Supreme Court "insist[s] not only on the fact of a formal arrest as the indispensable predi-
cate for a search incident to lawful arrest but also insist[s] that the arrest be 'custodial' in
nature and not simply a processing .a the scene of the arrest." Id. at 357, 688 A.2d at 33.
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After discussing the requirements for arrest under Maryland law, 6 the
Court of Special Appeals concluded that because the officers involved
in Operation Mid-East lacked "any intention . . . to arrest the appel-
lant"3 7 and because the officers failed to communicate to Evans that
he had been placed under arrest, the detention of Evans did not con-
stitute an arrest under Maryland law.38 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the search, which yielded the money and drugs, was
illegal.39
The Court of Appeals granted the State petition for certiorari to
consider (1) "whether the police officers' encounters with Evans ...
constituted an arrest under the law of Maryland" and, if necessary, (2)
"whether the officers' search[ ] of Evans . . . [was] justifiable under
the 'search incident to arrest' exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment."
40
2. Legal Background.-While the Supreme Court has found that
states are free to develop their own search and seizure laws to meet
the needs of local law enforcement, such laws must fall within the con-
36. See id. at 359-65, 688 A.2d at 34-37 (discussing Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 350
A.2d 130 (1976); McChan v. State, 238 Md. 149, 207 A.2d 632 (1965); Cornish v. State, 215
Md. 64, 137 A.2d 170 (1957); Anderson v. State, 78 Md. App. 471, 553 A.2d 1296 (1989)).
37. Evans, 113 Md. App. at 361 n.7, 688 A.2d at 35 n.7.
38. Id. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that what is required for an arrest
under Maryland law is "1) on the part of the arresting officer an actual subjective intent to
arrest the suspect and 2) some communication of that fact to the suspect." Id. Dissenting,
Judge Sonner took issue with this conclusion, stating that the analysis of Evans's appeal
should be limited to a determination of whether, at the time Evans was detained, the police
had "the necessary probable cause to permit them to arrest and to make a reasonable
search, or whether the search was justified by some other exception to the warrant require-
ment." Id. at 376, 688 A.2d at 43 (SonnerJ., dissenting). But even following the majority's
logic, Sonner believed that the outcome of this case was incorrect because "[n]o one can
seriously contend that [Evans] was not 'arrested' by the police when he was stopped and
detained and then subjected to two searches." Id. at 376, 688 A.2d at 42.
This statement is at odds, however, with the testimony of officer Wanda Dobbins, who
stated on cross-examination that "the police did not intend to arrest the appellant and,
indeed, did not arrest him." Id. at 361, 688 A.2d at 35. But see supra note 26 (noting other
portions of Officer Dobbins's testimony in which she explained that the intent of the po-
lice was to make mass arrests in the near future).
39. 113 Md. App. at 369, 688 A.2d at 39.
40. Evans, 352 Md. at 511, 723 A.2d at 430. The Court of Appeals did not consider
whether the Evans search was justified under the evanescent evidence exception to the
warrant requirement. Id at 508 n.8, 723 A.2d at 429 n.8. In granting certiorari, the Court
of Appeals combined State v. Evans with State v. Sykes-Bey, stating that "both Respondents'
cases [are] based upon the central question of what constitutes an arrest under Maryland
law." Id. at 499-500, 723 A.2d at 424. The facts of Sykes-Bey are quite similar to those of
Evans. Because the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Sykes-Bey was unpublished, a
full explanation of the facts and proceedings involved in this matter can be found in the
Evans opinion. Id. at 503-06, 723 A.2d at 426-27.
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fines of the Fourth Amendment.4" Therefore, an analysis of state
search and seizure laws requires the consideration of two issues: (1)
does the state law comport with Fourth Amendment standards articu-
lated by the Supreme Court, and, if so, (2) does the search or seizure
comport with state law.
4 2
a. Fourth Amendment Search Incident to an Arrest Require-
ments. -
(1) Creating the Right to Search Incident to an Arrest. -The Su-
preme Court defined the permissible scope of a search incident to an
arrest in Chimel v. California,4" where it held that when an arrest is
made, an officer may conduct a search incident to the arrest to re-
move weapons and to seize evidence of the crime.44 The right of of-
ficers to search incident to an arrest, the Court found, was based on
the need "to remove any weapons that [an arrestee] might seek to use
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . [and to] seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment
41. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (noting that state-enacted standards
governing search and seizure may not "trench[ ] upon Fourth Amendment rights"); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (explaining that "[t]he States are not. . . precluded
from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures").
42. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 61 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967) ("Just
as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under [the Fourth Amend-
ment], so may a search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitution-
ally reasonable one.")).
43. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). While Chimel clarified the permissible scope of searches con-
ducted incident to an arrest, the Court had recognized the constitutionality of a search
incident to an arrest since 1914, but the "decisions of [the] Court bearing upon that ques-
tion [had] been far from consistent." Id, at 755; see, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 63 (1950) ("It is not disputed that there may be reasonable searches, incident to
an arrest, without a search warrant."); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948)
("A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been
considered to be a strictly limited right ... [t]he mere fact that there is a valid arrest does
not ipsofacto legalize a search or seizure without a warrant."); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947) ("Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest is a practice of an-
cient origin and has long been an integral part of the law-enforcement procedures of the
United States and of the individual states." (footnotes omitted)); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) ("The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime ... is not to be
doubted." (citations omitted)); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) ("When a
man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be
seized and held as evidence in the prosecution" (citations omitted)); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (acknowledging that there exists a "right on the part of the
Government always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of
the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime"
(citations omitted)).
44. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
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or destruction. 4 5 Reiterating a limitation placed on the search inci-
dent to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement in Preston v.
United States,46 the Court stated that the justification for a search inci-
dent to an arrest is "absent where a search is remote in time or place
from the arrest.
47
(2) The "Reasonableness" Standard. -Until Tery v. Ohio,4 8 the
Supreme Court treated seizures and arrests as one in the same for
Fourth Amendment purposes.49 But in Tery, the Court found a dif-
ference between the two,5" and while defining what constitutes a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment,5" the Court never defined
what constitutes an arrest. Instead, the Court avoided deciding this
matter by holding that to determine whether a search or seizure is
unreasonable, courts should consider "whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
45. Id. at 763. The Court did not hold that the need to remove weapons and to seize
evidence of a crime was sufficient tojustify a search incident to a detention where there is
probable cause to make an arrest, but at least one state has cited Chimel as justifying such
police actions. In the 1989 case of Vermont v. Greenslit, 599 A.2d 672 (Vt. 1989), the Su-
preme Court of Vermont held:
[I]nasmuch as there was probable cause for defendant's arrest, a search of defen-
dant's person incidental thereto was constitutional under the doctrine enunci-
ated in Chimel v. California, which allows such a search in order to prevent the
destruction or concealment of evidence. The argument that defendant was not
formally taken into custody and transported to the police station is of no avail,
since it is the existence of probable cause for the arrest which brings the search
within constitutional limits, not merely the act of taking an individual into
custody.
Greenslit, 599 A.2d at 674 (citing Sibron, 392 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring), which
found that the prosecution "has met its total burden" upon its showing of probable cause
to arrest prior to a search). For a further discussion of this theory, as articulated by Justice
Harlan, see infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Sibron).
46. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
47. Chime 395 U.S. at 764 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Preston, 376
U.S. at 367).
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
49. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) ("Prior to Tery v. Ohio. . . . any
restraint on the person amounting to a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
was invalid unless justified by probable cause." (citations omitted)).
50. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs
'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecu-
tion for crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology."). Implicit in the Court's recognition
of the "stop and frisk" as a valid method of police protection is its acceptance of the idea
that some Fourth Amendment seizures may not reach the level of an "arrest." See id.
51. See id. ("[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."); see also id. at 19 n.16 ("Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.").
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scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.,5 2 Reasonableness, the Court found, must be determined by
balancing the government's need to search against the invasion that
the search entails.53
(3) Defining what Triggers the Search Incident to an Arrest Doc-
trine.-In Sibron v. New York,54 the Court held that when an officer
seizes a suspect and "curtail [s] his freedom of movement on the basis
of probable cause," a valid arrest has been made, and the officer has
the authority to search the suspect." While the Court recognized that
"[i] t is a question of fact precisely when, in each case, the arrest took
place," it found that once a suspect has been seized, an officer has
"the authority to search [the suspect]," to seize weapons, and prevent
the destruction of evidence of a crime.56 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan clarified the Court's handling of the search incident to
arrest doctrine, stating that although
the fruits of a search may not be used to justify an arrest to
which it is incident,. . . [i]f the prosecution shows probable
cause to arrest prior to a search of a man's person, it has met
its total burden. There is no case in which a defendant may
validly say, '[a] lthough the officer had a right to arrest me at
the moment when he seized me and searched my person,
the search is invalid because he did not in fact arrest me un-
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id. at 20-21 (stating that "there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
[or seizure] entails'" (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))); see also infra note 60 (discussing United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973), and its reiteration of the Court's reasonableness standard). The Court
further stated that in justifying the intrusion, an officer "must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, rea-
sonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (footnote omitted). This balancing
of interests, the Court stated, must be conducted by a judge, who can determine whether
"the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Id. at 21-22
(citations omitted).
54. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
55. Id. at 67. Because Sibron was decided on the same day as Terry, this statement is
quite important. The statement indicated that regardless of the newly recognized seizure
versus arrest dichotomy, curtailing the movement of a suspect on the basis of probable
cause to arrest constitutes an arrest. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959), in which the Court stated that when police officers
"interrupted ... two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest . . . was
complete." Id. at 103.
56. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 67.
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til afterwards . . . . [A]n officer who does have probable
cause may of course seize and search immediately. 57
The Court created a new twist in its search incident to an arrest
doctrine in United States v. Robinson,58 where it seemingly limited the
right of a police officer to conduct a search incident to an arrest to
circumstances where a "lawful custodial arrest" occurred.59 The Robin-
son Court recognized that a search incident to a noncustodial arrest or
a search incident to the issuance of a notice of violation may be an
issue for consideration, but it explicitly refused to consider whether
this would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment.6" By ex-
pressly adopting a standard whereby only those searches conducted
incident to "custodial arrests" were constitutional, and by refusing to
consider whether searches incident to noncustodial arrests violated
the Fourth Amendment, the Court continued to be elusive in articu-
57. Id. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring). A similar position on this issue was espoused by
Justice Traynor, former justice on the Supreme Court of California, who stated:
if [an] officer is entitled to make an arrest on the basis of information available to
him before he searches, and as an incident to that arrest is entitled to make a
reasonable search of the person arrested ... there is nothing unreasonable in his
conduct if he makes the search before instead of after the arrest. In fact, if the
person searched is innocent and the search convinces the officer that his reasona-
ble belief to the contrary is erroneous, it is to the advantage of the person
searched not to be arrested.
People v. Simon, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (Cal. 1955) (en banc).
58. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
59. Id. at 235 (emphasis added) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful,
a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."). While never explicitly
defining what constitutes a "custodial" arrest, the Court justified its holding by stating that
[i]t is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case
of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting
contact resulting from the typical Teny-type stop. This is an adequate basis for
treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
Id at 234-35. In Gustafson v. f7orida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), decided on the same day as
Robinson, the Court further clarified its search incident to arrest doctrine by stating that
police officers have the absolute right to conduct a search incident to an arrest regardless
of whether police regulations require an officer to make an arrest for a given crime. See
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265 ("Though the officer here was not required to take the peti-
tioner into custody by police regulations as he was in Robinson ... [i]t is sufficient that the
officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the
arrest and placed the petitioner in custody.").
60. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 n.6. The Court stated that
[t]he opinion of the Court of Appeals also discussed its understanding of the law
where the police officer makes what the court characterized as 'a routine traffic
stop' . . . . Since in this case the officer did make a full-custody arrest of the
violator, we do not reach the question discussed by the Court of Appeals.
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lating precisely when an officer has the ability to conduct a search
incident to an arrest.
But while choosing to defer the consideration of whether officers
could conduct searches incident to noncustodial arrests, the Court
may have provided two glimpses into its views regarding the constitu-
tionality of these searches. First, the Court continued to stand behind
its previous statements that the justification for allowing police to con-
duct a search incident to a custodial arrest "rests quite as much on the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does
on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial."61
Presumably, this would be the standard used to judge searches inci-
dent to noncustodial, as well as custodial arrests. Second, the Court
also hinted, through its citation of Judge Cardozo's expansive reading
of the search incident to an arrest doctrine in People v. Chiagles,6 2 that
it might be willing to extend the reach of the search incident to an
arrest doctrine beyond mere custodial arrests.63 In Chiagles, Judge
Cardozo wrote:
Search of the person is unlawful when the seizure of the
body is a trespass, and the purpose of the search is to dis-
cover grounds as yet unknown for arrest or accusation... [a]
search ... becomes lawful when grounds for arrest and accu-
sation have been discovered, and the law is in the act of sub-
jecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion.64
Seven years after deciding Robinson, the Court extended the
reach of its search incident to an arrest doctrine in Rawlings v. Ken-
61. Id. at 234 (citing Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960)).
62. 142 N.E. 583 (N.Y. 1923).
63. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 232.
64. Chiagles, 142 N.E. at 584; see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at 232 (quoting Chiagles). At
least one jurisdiction has interpreted Robinson to mean that a trip to the station house is
not a required element of an arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes to justify conducting
a search incident to an arrest. See People v. Bland, 884 P.2d 312, 321 (Colo. 1994) (en
banc) (explaining that "in the context of a non-custodial arrest, the arresting officer is
entited... [to] search for instrumentalities or evidence of the specific crime for which the
officer had probable cause to make the arrest"). Professor LaFave similarly states that
"[t]he need to search for evidence ... is not related at all to the need for or fact of
continued custody of the arrestee, and thus under the better view such a search is no less
lawful when incident to an arrest not of a 'custodial' nature." 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 5.2(h), at 99 (3d ed. 1996). The Supreme Court itself seemed willing to
allow searches incident to "noncustodial" arrests, stating, in dicta, that "[a]n arrested per-
son is not invariably taken to a police station or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the
police station, that is no more than a continuation of the custody inherent in the arrest
status." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983).
20001 1033
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:743
tucky65 by stating that the search incident to an arrest doctrine could
be applied to cases where a search was conducted by an officer prior to
making a formal arrest.66  In reaching this conclusion, the Court
stated that when an officer has probable cause to place a suspect
under arrest and "[w] here the formal arrest followed quickly on the
heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not be-
lieve it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest
rather than vice versa. '67 Rawlings indicated the Court's willingness to
break from the strict "custodial arrest" requirement of Robinson, and
demonstrated that the Court would be willing to bend the formal
rules of the search incident to an arrest doctrine, provided that proba-
ble cause to arrest exists prior to the initiation of a search.
Finally, in California v. Hodari D.,6" the Court began to clearly de-
fine the requirements of an arrest, stating that an arrest requires "ei-
ther physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the
assertion of authority."6 9 The Court again demonstrated the differing
requirements for arrest and seizure, however, stating that a seizure
requires "not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the ani-
mate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it within
physical control. ... [while an arrest only requires] the mere grasping
or application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it
succeeded in subduing the arrestee . 70 While Hodari D. certainly
65. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
66. Id. at 111.
67. Id. (citations omitted). Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, Maryland courts
used the Rawlings decision to justify loosening state search incident to arrest requirements.
Compare Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 515, 350 A.2d 130, 132 (1976) (stating that "[i]t is
axiomatic that when the State seeks to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, it must
show that the arrest was lawfully made prior to the search"), with Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642,
668, 537 A.2d 235, 247-48 (1988) (explaining that conducting a search prior to formal
arrest does not prevent analyzing the search under the principles governing searches inci-
dent to a valid arrest, because at the time of the search there was probable cause to make
the arrest).
68. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
69. Id. at 626. The majority further stated that
[m]ere words will not constitute an arrest, while, on the other hand, no actual,
physical touching is essential. The apparent inconsistency in the two parts of this
statement is explained by the fact that an assertion of authority and purpose to
arrest followed by submission of the arrestee constitutes an arrest. There can be
no arrest without either touching or submission.
Id. at 626-27 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perkins,
The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REV. 201, 206 (1940)).
70. Id. at 624. In reaching this conclusion, the majority cited a search and seizure
treatise, which states that
[t]here can be constructive detention, which will constitute an arrest, although
the party is never actually brought within the physical control of the party making
an arrest. This is accomplished by merely touching, however slightly, the body of
1034
2000] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 1035
provides the first clear definition of how the Court would define an
arrest, the lingering and mysterious "custodial arrest" requirement of
Robinson precluded courts from merely applying the Hodari D. arrest
definition to determine whether an officer had the Fourth Amend-
ment right to conduct a search incident to an arrest.
(4) Eliminating the Arrest Requirement from the Search Incident to
an Arrest Doctrine?.-In Cupp v. Murphy,7 1 the Court cited the Chimel
search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement as
support for its decision to allow police officers to conduct limited
searches incident to a detention when the search is limited to finding
"highly evanescent evidence. ' 72 The Court stated that when there is a
detainment but no formal arrest, a suspect is "sufficiently apprised of
his suspected role in the crime to motivate him to attempt to destroy
what evidence he could without attracting further attention."7' The
rationale of Chimel, therefore, justified the Court's determination that,
in some instances, a mere detention could trigger the right to conduct
a "very limited search necessary to preserve .. .highly evanescent evi-
dence. ' 74 Although the Court never defined what constitutes "highly
evanescent evidence," it found that "considering the existence of
probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken incident to the
station house detention, and the ready destructibility of the evidence,"
the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.75
the accused, by the party making the arrest and for that purpose, although he
does not succeed in stopping or holding him even for an instant ....
Id. at 625 (citing A. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930)).
71. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
72. Id at 295-96. While the Court admitted that Chimel merely recognizes an exception
to the warrant requirement to allow searches incident to valid arrests, it justified the broad
reading of this case by stating that Chimel stands for the principal that "the scope of a
warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search from
the warrant requirement." Id. at 295 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 296.
74. Id. In Cupp, a murder suspect refused to consent to the taking of fingernail scrap-
ings in connection with a murder investigation. Id. After refusing the scrapings, the sus-
pect "put his hands behind his back and appeared to rub them together. He then put his
hands in his pockets, and a 'metallic sound, such as keys or change rattling' was heard." Id.
Subsequently, "[u]nder protest and without a warrant, the police proceeded to trace the
samples, which turned out to contain traces of skin and blood cells, and fabric from the
victim's nightgown." Id. at 292.
75. Id. Professors LaFave and Israel stated that many lower court cases support a
broader but sound rule:
[A] warrantless search is proper if the officer had probable cause to believe that a
crime had been committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of the
crime would be found and that an immediate, warrantless search was necessary in
order to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence.
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b. Maryland's Arrest Requirements.--The Court of Appeals
first defined what constitutes an arrest in Cornish v. State,76 where it
stated that "this Court has built a working definition of an arrest-the
detention of a known or suspected offender for the purpose of prose-
cuting him for a crime. ' 77 A detention, the court stated, occurs only
"when there is a touching by the arrestor, although some cases have
found a detention where there was no touching but the offender,
upon being told that he was under arrest, submitted. '7'  Therefore,
the analysis developed by the court in 1957 indicated that when deter-
mining what constitutes an arrest, a Maryland court must consider:
(1) whether an officer detained a known or suspected offender, and
(2) whether the officer detained the offender for the purpose of pros-
ecuting him for a crime. But after articulating this definition, the
court never considered whether the arrest was made for the purpose
of prosecuting the offender for a crime.
In the cases of Barnhard v. State,79 Little v. State,s ° Bouldin v. State,81
and McChan v. State,82 the Court of Appeals applied the exact same
definition of arrest as it applied in Cornish.83 But while each of these
WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5(d), at 178 (2d ed. 1992).
Since the 1973 decision, Maryland courts have used Cupp to broaden the rights of Mary-
land police officers searching for "highly evanescent" evidence. In Franklin v. State, 18 Md.
App. 651, 308 A.2d 752 (1973), for example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found
that the seizure of the boxer shorts of a rape suspect to test for seminal stains was valid,
provided that there was probable cause to arrest. Franklin, 18 Md. App. at 668, 308 A.2d at
763. Referring to this as the "search incident to a detention, based upon probable cause
but not amounting to arrest, for readily destructible evidence" exception to the warrant
requirement, id. at 666, the court found that even though the temporary detention
amounted to less than a formal arrest, the seizure of the suspect's boxer shorts were valid.
Id. at 668-69, 308 A.2d 763. The Cupp exception was also used by the Court of Special
Appeals in Anderson v. State, 78 Md. App. 471, 553 A.2d 1296 (1989), where it found that
"[t]he only exemption from the requirement that the probable cause for arrest be consum-
mated by an actual arrest is the case where extraordinary steps have to be taken to prevent
the destruction of 'highly evanescent evidence.'" Anderson, 78 Md. App. at 481 n.1, 553
A.2d at 1301 n.1 (citations omitted); see also Venner v. State, 30 Md. App. 599, 625, 354
A.2d 483, 497-98 (1976) (citing Cupp as a case that upheld the validity of a search involving
a "borderline intrusion into the body"); Mills v. State, 28 Md. App. 300, 307, 345 A.2d 127,
131-32 (1975) (noting that blood tests to determine blood type do not fall within the ex-
ception to the warrant requirement for "highly evanescent evidence").
76. 215 Md. 64, 137 A.2d 170 (1957).
77. Id. at 67-68, 137 A.2d at 172.
78. Id. at 68, 137 A.2d at 172.
79. 325 Md. 602, 602 A.2d 701 (1992).
80. 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984).
81. 276 Md. 511, 350 A.2d 130 (1976).
82. 238 Md. 149, 207 A.2d 632 (1965).
83. See Barnhard, 325 Md. at 611, 602 A.2d at 705 (applying the Cornish definition of
arrest); Little, 300 Md. at 509-10, 479 A.2d at 915 (same); Bouldin, 276 Md. at 516, 350 A.2d
at 133 (same); McChan, 238 Md. at 157, 207 A.2d at 638 (same).
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cases reiterated the court's statement in Cornish that "[a] n arrest has
been defined as 'the detention of a known or suspected offender for
the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime,"'' 4 none of these cases
considered whether an intent to prosecute existed at the time of ar-
rest. Each case limited its consideration of whether a valid arrest had
been made to the determination of whether a police officer detained
a known or suspected offender.8 5
Beginning with Bouldin, the Court of Appeals began to discuss
alternative definitions of arrest, but it would always attach these alter-
native definitions to its traditional definition of arrest, as articulated in
Cornish and McChan.s6 Although the Court of Appeals continued to
give passing acknowledgment to the traditional intent to prosecute
language, Bouldin opened the door for a covert rewriting of what con-
stitutes an arrest under Maryland law. This intent to rewrite the defi-
nition of arrest is best demonstrated in Morton v. State, 7 decided only
three years after Bouldin, where the Court of Appeals seemed to latch
onto its alternative definitions of arrest, as articulated in Bouldin, stat-
ing that "an arrest is the taking, seizing or detaining of the person of
another, inter alia, by any act that indicates an intention to take him
into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the
84. See supra note 83.
85. See Barnhard, 325 Md. at 611-12, 602 A.2d at 706 (focusing on the defendant's in-
tent to submit when determining whether an arrest had been made); Little, 300 Md. at 511,
479 A.2d at 916 (finding that the brief detention of a motorist at a sobriety checkpoint is
not at arrest); Bouldin, 276 Md. at 519, 350 A.2d at 135 (concluding that an unconscious
person was not "arrested" where the police did not "show the requisite police restraint or
control"); McChan, 238 Md. at 157, 207 A.2d at 638 (focusing on the physical elements in
defining arrest).
86. In Bouldin, for example, prior to reiterating Maryland's traditional definition of
arrest, as articulated in Cornish and McChan, the court stated:
It is generally recognized that an arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the
person of another (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that
indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual
control and will of the person making the arrest; or (3) by the consent of the
person to be arrested.
276 Md. at 515-16, 350 A.2d at 133 (citing 5 AM.JUR. 2D Arrest § 1 (1962)). Further compli-
cating matters, the court also stated that "[i]t is said that four elements must ordinarily
coalesce to constitute a legal arrest: (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under a real or pretended
authority; (3) accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person; and (4) which is un-
derstood by the person arrested." I& at 516, 350 A.2d at 133 (citing 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 42
(1975); CREAMER, THE LAw OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURu ch. 3, at 49 (1968)). Although
neither of these definitions incorporated an intent to prosecute requirement, after putting
forth these two general definitions of arrest, the court reverted back to the traditional
definition of arrest, as applied in Cornish and McChan. See id.
87. 284 Md. 526, 397 A.2d 1385 (1979).
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person making the arrest."" Therefore, as of 1979, the court had
gone from including intent to prosecute language, but never enforc-
ing the requirement, to eliminating the intent to prosecute language
altogether.
After the court decided Morton, it brought back the intent to
prosecute language in Little v. State9 and Barnhard v. State,90 and again
coupled the traditional intent to prosecute language with the other
definitions of arrest articulated in Bouldin.9 ' But as the court had
done since its development of the traditional definition of arrest in
Cornish, it never actually applied the intent to prosecute language to
the cases under its consideration.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In State v. Evans,9 2 the Court of Ap-
peals considered two issues: (1) whether the police encounter with
Evans constituted an arrest under Maryland law and (2) whether the
search of Evans was justifiable under the search incident to arrest ex-
ception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." The
Court of Appeals first held that the detention of Evans constituted a
valid arrest under Maryland law.94 Defining what constitutes an arrest
in Maryland, Judge Raker, writing for the court, stated that while at
least five Maryland cases have stated that an arrest requires the deten-
tion of "a known or suspected offender for the purposes of prosecuting him
for a crime,"9 this language is merely "gratuitous,"96 and the Court of
Appeals has "never held that a valid arrest in Maryland requires of the
arresting officer an intent to prosecute the arrestee for the crime be-
lieved to have been committed."97 Instead, the court held that to exe-
88. Id. at 530, 397 A.2d at 1388. This effectively eliminated the dejure intent to prose-
cute requirement, which had never actually been enforced since its creation in Cornish.
89. 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984).
90. 325 Md. 602, 602 A.2d 701 (1992).
91. See id. at 611, 602 A.2d at 705 (discussing the components of an arrest and indicat-
ing that the intent to prosecute is one of those components); Little, 300 Md. at 509-10, 479
A.2d at 915 (same).
92. 352 Md. 496, 723 A.2d 423 (1999).
93. Id. at 511, 723 A.2d at 430.
94. Id. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432.
95. Id. at 513, 723 A.2d at 431 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 516, 350 A.2d 130, 133 (1976)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 514, 723 A.2d at 431. Interestingly, the court explained that the intent to
prosecute language, which originally appeared in Cornish, was derived from "an uncited
source." Id. at 513 n.13, 723 A.2d at 431 n.13. Because the intent to prosecute language
was taken from this uncited source, David Kauffman's The Law of Arrest in Maryland, the
court stated that "[t]his proposition, and its recitation, are thus of questionable pedigree."
Id. (citing David Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. REv. 125 (1941)). The
court further supported its decision to eliminate the intent to prosecute language by point-
1038 [VOL. 59:743
2000] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 1039
cute a lawful arrest in Maryland "a police officer must have probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony and must either
physically restrain the suspect or otherwise subject the suspect to his
or her custody and control."98 Applying this definition of arrest to the
case at hand, the court found that because the "identification team"
had probable cause to arrest Evans and because they subjected him to
police custody and control, the initial detention constituted a valid
arrest under Maryland law. 99
The Court of Appeals next considered whether its definition of
an arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment and the search inci-
dent to an arrest doctrine, as defined by the Supreme Court.' 00 Ex-
ploring the limitations placed on the search incident to an arrest
doctrine by the Supreme Court, the court found that because the pur-
pose of creating the search incident to an arrest doctrine was to allow
an arresting officer to remove weapons on the arrestee and search for
evidence to prevent its concealment and destruction, °1 "the sole pre-
requisite for application of the 'search incident to lawful arrest' excep-
tion is the existence of a lawful arrest."'0 2 The court initially stated
that the validity of an arrest is determined by state law1' and that
Maryland has "long recognized the right of a police officer to make a
full search of an arrestee incident to that arrest."'0 4 Therefore, "Mary-
ing out that in Maryland, police officers ordinarily have no authority to prosecute, and that
police cannot make the determination of whether to prosecute or not. Id. at 514 n.14, 723
A.2d at 431 n.14.
98. Id. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432. In so holding, the court also rejected the argument that
"failure of the police to initiate the formal criminal charging process at or near the time of
the initial detention precludes a valid arrest under Maryland law," stating that "formally
charging a suspect is not a sine qua non to a lawful arrest in Maryland." Id.
99. See id. ("It is thus beyond question that the initial detentions of Respondents rose to
the level of either a physical restraint or a subjugation to police custody and control.").
While discussing what constitutes an arrest under Maryland law, the Court of Appeals sup-
ported its application of the search incident to an arrest doctrine to a nonformal or "non-
custodial" arrest by citing United States v. Hernandez, 825 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1987), where the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[a] custodial arrest based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the fourth amendment whether the arrest is de facto or for-
mal." 352 Md. at 515-16, 723 A.2d at 432 (quoting Hernandez, 825 F.2d at 852).
100. Id. at 519-20, 723 A.2d at 434-35.
101. Id. at 517, 723 A.2d at 433.
102. Id. at 518, 723 A.2d at 433. While recognizing that the standard articulated in
Robinson required a "custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause" before allowing
an officer to conduct a search incident to an arrest, the court chose to follow the Supreme
Court's opinion in Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), where it stated that "[t]he fact
of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search." Evans, 352 Md. at 518, 723 A.2d at
433 (quoting DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 35).
103. Id. at 518, 723 A.2d at 433 (citations omitted).
104. Id.
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land law should be dispositive of the search incident issue."1 5 But the
court hedged its statement a bit, admitting that " [d]espite the robust
proclamations we earlier quoted from Robinson and DeFillippo... what
suffices as an arrest under the law of this State may not incorporate
the necessary justifications and requirements under the Fourth
Amendment."10' 6 The Court of Appeals then considered the Supreme
Court's decision in Knowles v. Iowa,' ° 7 where the Court rejected the
idea that probable cause to arrest, without more, is sufficient to justify
using the warrantless search incident to an arrest exception to the
warrant requirement."0 8 Rejecting any analogies between Evans and
Knowles, the Court of Appeals stated that the Supreme Court refused
to extend the search incident to an arrest exception to the issuance of
a citation in Knowles because (1) the Supreme Court, in Knowles,
found no need to disarm a suspect or preserve evidence when no ar-
rest was going to be made and (2) because in Knowles there was no
actual arrest.10 ' The case at hand differs from Knowles, the court
found, because of the "inherent danger of drug enforcement"11 and
the "threat to valuable evidence" present at the time of arrest."1 Fur-
ther, "adopting the requirement of formal processing of detained sus-
pects as a constitutional prerequisite to a valid arrest would not be in
concert with the principles espoused by the Fourth Amendment."' 12
The court then held that the "failure of the Baltimore City Police to
subject Evans ... to the formal criminal charging process at the time
105. Id. at 519, 723 A.2d at 434. The court noted, in passing, that "Maryland law...
coincide[s] with the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest," as expressed in
Chimel v. California. Id. at 518, 723 A.2d at 434.
106. Id. at 519-20, 723 A.2d at 434.
107. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
108. Evans, 352 Md. at 520, 723 A.2d at 434-35; see also Knowles, 525 U.S. 113, 115-16
(1998) (rejecting the Iowa Supreme Court's decision that "so long as the arresting officer
had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been a custodial
arrest").
109. Evans, 352 Md. at 520-22, 723 A.2d at 435-36. The Court of Appeals recognized
that because the second justification for the search incident rule is
"the need to discover and preserve evidence . . . necessary to prosecute [the]
offense;" . .. it might be argued that a prerequisite to a constitutionally permissi-
ble search incident is the existence of an intent by the arresting officers to prose-
cute. If such be the case, the requirement was fulfilled in the present case[ ].
Id. at 520 n.17, 723 A.2d at 435 n.17 (first two alterations in original) (quoting Knowles, 525
U.S. at 118).
110. Id. at 522, 723 A.2d at 435. Although the officers did not transport Evans to the
station house, "the arrest itself [is] fraught with danger for the police officers involved." Id.
at 523, 723 A.2d at 436.
111. Id. at 523, 723 A.2d at 436. The Court of Appeals stated that "it is indisputable that
had [Evans] simply been released after [his] identification was secured, the police would
have lost valuable evidence of the crimes for which [he was] arrested." Id.
112. Id. at 528, 723 A.2d at 438.
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4. Analysis.-By holding that police may conduct a search inci-
dent to the arrest of a suspect who is not taken to the station house for
booking, the Court of Appeals pushed the Supreme Court's search
incident to an arrest doctrine to its brink. In so doing, however, the
Court of Appeals logically extended an established exception to the
warrant requirement to include a police practice that is, in most cases,
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 4 Additionally, in consid-
ering what constitutes an arrest under Maryland law, the Court of Ap-
peals formally eliminated an element of arrest that had never been
followed since the court first defined "arrest" in 1957.115 In so doing,
the court aligned Maryland's arrest requirements with those adopted
by the Supreme Court.
To determine whether the Court of Appeals was justified in
reaching its conclusions, three questions must be answered: (1) did
the detainment of Evans constitute an arrest under the Fourth
Amendment; (2) what did the Supreme Court mean when it stated
that searches may only be made incident to "custodial" arrests-and
along the same line, did the seizure of Evans amount to a custodial
arrest; and (3) did the seizure of Evans constitute a valid arrest under
Maryland law.
a. Defining "Arrest" Under the Fourth Amendment.-The Court
of Appeals was correct in determining that the detainment of Evans
constituted an arrest under the Fourth Amendment as defined in
Sibron v. New York116 and California v. Hodari D.1 17 First, in Sibron, the
Court defined the precise point when an officer's engagement with a
suspect reaches the point of an arrest, stating that "[w] hen the police-
man grabbed Peters by the collar, he abruptly 'seized' him and cur-
tailed his freedom of movement on the basis of probable cause to
believe that he was engaged in criminal activity .... At that point he
had the authority to search Peters."' Following the Sibron logic, the
113. Id. at 530, 723 A.2d at 439.
114. See supra Part 2.b (discussing the Supreme Court's "reasonableness" standard for
search incident to an arrest).
115. See supra Part 2.e (discussing Maryland's arrest requirements).
116. 392 U.S. 40 (1968); see also supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (summarizing
the Court's Sibron decision).
117. 499 U.S. 621 (1991); see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (summariz-
ing the Court's Hodari D. decision).
118. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 67.
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only issue for consideration in the Evans case, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, was whether Evans was seized by the police officers, thus
curtailing his freedom of movement and giving the officers the au-
thority to conduct a search. Because there is no doubt that the police
detainment of Evans constituted a seizure and that the seizure was
made based on probable cause, it 9 the court accurately concluded that
the detainment constituted a valid arrest under the Court's Sibron
logic.
Evans's detainment also constituted an arrest under the defini-
tion of arrest articulated by the Court in California v. Hodari D."2 ° In
Hodari D., the Court stated that an arrest requires "either physical force
.. or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority. 1 2 '
The Court continued to state that "[in] ere words will not constitute an
arrest, while, on the other hand, no actual, physical touching is essen-
tial.' 1 22 Under this definition, the Court of Appeals was well within its
right to find that the detention of Evans constituted an arrest under
the Fourth Amendment. Any police detainment requires either (1)
the exertion of physical force by police officers in order to ensure that
the detainee does not flee, or (2) submission of the detainee to the
authority of the police. 121 While the record does not state whether
there was an exertion of physical force or a submission by Evans, the
record indicates that the seizure of Evans "was a detention and the
Defendant was not free to go until [the police] secured his identifica-
tion.'1 24 Because Evans was detained by police, and because this de-
tainment would have required either the exertion of physical force by
members of the identification team, or a submission by Evans to the
119. See Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432 ("It is thus beyond question that the
initial detentions of Respondents rose to the level of either a physical restraint or a subju-
gation to police custody and control."). Even the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged
this fact, stating that "[the State] argues that when the police stopped the appellant, photo-
graphed him, searched him, and interrogated him that evening, there was, for Fourth
Amendment purposes, a seizure of the person. We completely agree." Evans v. State, 113
Md. App. 347, 356, 688 A.2d 28, 33 (1997).
120. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
121. Id. at 626 (alterations in original). The Court defined seizure as "a laying on of
hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately
unsuccessful." Id.
122. Id. (quoting Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 206 (1940)).
123. See Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432 (requiring either physical restraint or
police custody and control to constitute a lawful arrest).
124. Joint Record Extract at E.44, State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496, 723 A.2d 423 (1999) (No.
28).
1042 [VOL. 59:743
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
search itself, the detention constituted an arrest under the Fourth
Amendment. 125
b. Application of the "Custodial Arrest" Requirement to the Search
Incident to an Arrest Doctrine.-While the Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged that police officers gain the right to conduct a search incident
to an arrest from Chimel v. California,'2 6 it pointed out that the thresh-
old that must be met prior to conducting a search incident to an ar-
rest was clarified in United States v. Robinson.127 In Robinson, the Court
stated that "[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based upon probable cause
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intru-
sion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no addi-
tional justification."128 The Court of Appeals attempted to ignore the
"custodial" requirement of Robinson and justified this by citing Michi-
gan v. DeFillippo,'29 where the Court stated that "[t]he fact of a lawful
arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search." l" ° This resolution of the
"custodial" quagmire is a bit hasty for two reasons. First, the Court's
statement in DeFillippo was intended to clarify its assertion that the va-
lidity of a search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether
the arrested person possesses weapons or evidence.' Second, this
statement could not be intended to eliminate the "custodial" require-
ment of Robinson, because Robinson was cited as authority for the state-
ment itself.13 2 Therefore, a more thorough inquiry must be made
into the Court's intent in requiring a custodial arrest.'3 3
125. Although the detention fulfilled Fourth Amendment requirements for an arrest, it
did not necessarily meet Maryland's definition of arrest. See infra notes 156-166 and accom-
panying text (discussing the court's application of the Maryland arrest requirements in
Evans).
126. 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing
Chimeo.
127. Evans, 352 Md. at 517-18, 723 A.2d at 433.
128. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (emphasis added).
129. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
130. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 35; see Evans, 352 Md. at 518, 723 A.2d at 433 (quoting
DeFiltipo).
131. See DeFiltipo, 443 U.S. at 35 ("The constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest
does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses
weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.").
132. See id. (citing Robinson as support for the Court's statement).
133. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals of Maryland went no further in its analysis of
Robinson than recognizing that the term "custodial" is attached to the term "arrest" for the
purposes of applying the search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant require-
ment. See Evans, 352 Md. at 517-18, 723 A.2d at 433. After acknowledging that the Su-
preme Court developed a bright-line rule in Robinson for determining the reasonableness
of searches conducted incident to arrests, see id. at 517, 723 A.2d at 433, and after quoting
the Court's statement that "[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based upon probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment," id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at
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Rather than passing on this issue altogether, it would have been
much more responsible and would have made for better jurispru-
dence, had the Court of Appeals looked to the history of the search
incident to an arrest doctrine to determine the meaning of the term
"custodial arrest" before reaching its conclusion that the Baltimore
City Police Department Violent Crimes Task Force had the right to
conduct a full search incident to a noncustodial arrest. But unlike
grade school math, where students are required to demonstrate how
they arrived at their answer to get full credit, the Court of Appeals can
receive full credit for reaching the correct result, even though it did
so without applying the proper analysis.
In analyzing this question, the court should have made an inquiry
into the constitutional permissibility of a search incident to a noncus-
todial arrest by considering the Supreme Court's justification for al-
lowing searches incident to custodial arrests. In explaining the need
to search a suspect prior to taking him into custody, the Court has
stated that
the danger to [a police] officer is far greater in the case of
the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect
into custody and transporting him to the police station than
in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from
the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for treat-
ing all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search
justification.'3 4
Considering the definition of "custodial" in the context of this
statement requires courts to determine what impact the word "and"
should play in the phrase "taking of a suspect into custody and trans-
porting him to the police station." '135 This passage could reinforce the
notion that a custodial arrest only requires that an actual arrest be
made, because the Court's allusion to transporting an arrestee to the
police station could be considered to be separate from the act of mak-
ing a custodial arrest.1 36 But because the Court stated that the danger
235), the Court of Appeals concluded that "[iut might thus be stated that the sole prerequi-
site for application of the 'search incident to lawful arrest' exception is the existence of a
lawful arrest." Id. at 518, 723 A.2d at 433.
134. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 234 n.5. In this footnote, the Robinson Court noted that "[d]anger to the
police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty." Id. Thus, the Court conceded that the danger may occur well before trans-
port to the police station. This interpretation of "custodial" was reinforced by the Court in
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), where it stated that "[a]n arrested person is not
invariably taken to a police station or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station,
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to an officer is increased due to the "extended exposure" of a custo-
dial arrest, the Court likely believed that the right to conduct a search
incident to an arrest stems from the inherent danger an officer is ex-
posed to when transporting an arrestee to the station house.'3 7
The next logical step in interpreting the meaning of "custodial
arrest," applying the Robinson justifications for allowing police to con-
duct searches incident to valid arrests, also does not resolve the issue
of whether the search in Evans was permissible. The Supreme Court
based the search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant re-
quirement on "the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody... [and] the need to preserve evidence on his person for
later use at trial.' 38 Contrary to the Court of Appeals's finding that
the search of Evans met these two justifications, 31 the search itself
only met one of the two justifications for conducting a search incident
to an arrest. The Court of Appeals was certainly correct in finding
that the search of Evans was justified by the need to preserve evidence,
because once Officer Rowell purchased drugs from Evans and con-
firmed his identity, there was clearly a need to obtain and preserve the
illegal narcotics and marked money on Evans's person as evidence for
later prosecution, 4° But it does not follow that simply because there
is an inherent danger in drug enforcement, the need to disarm a sus-
pect to take him into custody is automatically triggered. For as the
Court noted in Robinson, the danger to police officers inherent in cus-
todial arrests rises from taking the suspect into custody and transport-
that is no more than a continuation of the custody inherent in the arrest status." Lafayette,
462 U.S. at 645. But if this definition of custodial arrest is correct, then conceivably every
arrest would constitute a custodial arrest and there would have been no need for the Robin-
son Court to even use the term "custodial" in the context of defining when a search inci-
dent to an arrest is permissible.
137. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35. In Robinson, the Court stated:
It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case
of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting
contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for
treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
Id.
138. Id. at 234; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (explaining that
the search incident to an arrest is aimed at protecting officer safety and preventing the
destruction of evidence).
139. The court stated that "the arrest[ ] of Evans ... for drug trafficking incorporated
both of the historical justifications for conducting a full search incident: the safety of the
arresting officers as well as the need to discover and preserve evidence." Evans, 352 Md. at
522, 723 A.2d at 435.
140. As the Court of Appeals stated, the prosecution of Evans would have been severely
weakened "without recovery of the marked money and additional drugs." Id. at 523, 723
A.2d at 436.
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ing him to the station house, rather than from simply dealing with a
criminal element. 14 1 If the danger to police officers stems from the
prolonged exposure to a suspect once a custodial arrest is made, as
the Court states in Robinson, the fact that the suspect was not taken to
the police station for questioning or booking would seem to be quite
relevant to the determination of whether the second justification for
allowing a search incident to an arrest applies to this case.' 4 2
Although an analysis of the justifications for conducting a search
incident to an arrest does not lead to a clear answer, the Supreme
Court's decision in Cupp v. Murphy143 supports the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to
conduct searches incident to noncustodial arrests. 14 4 In Cupp, the
Court extended the search incident to an arrest doctrine beyond the
scope of Chimel to include searches incident to mere detentions, in
certain circumstances.' 45 The Court stated that because Chimel is
based on the premise that it is "reasonable for a police officer to ex-
pect the arrestee to use any weapons he may have and to attempt to
destroy any incriminating evidence then in his possession, ' 46 the
search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement can
be extended beyond arrests to include searches incident to detentions
when the search is intended to "preserve . . . highly evanescent evi-
dence."' 47 Therefore, even if the Court intended in Chimel and in
141. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-25. In Tery v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court deter-
mined that when an officer reasonably believes that a person with whom he is dealing may
be armed and dangerous, the officer has a right to conduct a "carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. It would seem, therefore, that for mere street en-
counters, where there is no long-term custody involved-when the arrestee is not taken to
the station house for booking or questioning-a Terry-stop-and-frisk would suffice to en-
sure officer safety. But even if the Court of Appeals was determined to conclude that the
"need to disarm the suspect" justification of Robinson must be met to uphold the search of
Evans, the court would have been better served basing the right to conduct a full search
based on the extended detainment of Evans, rather than on the inherent danger in polic-
ing for drug offenses, since the inherent danger of policing was the Court's justification for
allowing the lesser Terry-stop-and-frisk. See id. at 22-27 (discussing officer-safety as ajustifi-
cation for the stop-and-frisk).
142. But see Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983) (suggesting that custody arises
from the arrest status, and not necessarily from the trip to the station house).
143. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
144. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing Cupp).
145. See Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296 (finding that a limited search incident to a defendant's
voluntary detention is constitutionally permissible, based on the need to preserve evanes-
cent evidence).
146. Id. at 295.
147. Id. at 296. The Court reached this conclusion even though Chimel limited the
search incident to an arrest doctrine to include only those searches that are conducted
incident to valid arrests. Chime 395 U.S. at 762-63. Implicit in the Court's Cupp decision is
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Robinson to limit the search incident to an arrest doctrine to those
arrests where the suspect is taken to the station house, the Court
demonstrated in Cupp that the arrest requirement of the search inci-
dent to an arrest doctrine may not be followed rigorously when a pros-
ecutor can demonstrate that a police search was reasonable.
Determining whether a search and seizure is reasonable, the
Court has stated, requires an inquiry into "whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."' 48 The Court has also stated that to determine reasonableness,
a court should balance "the need to search [or seize] against the inva-
sion which the search [or seizure] entails."'149
If the Court of Appeals had applied this balancing test in Evans,
many factors would weigh heavily in favor of the need to conduct the
search incident to Evans's noncustodial arrests. As Officer Rowell
stated, the practice of searching drug dealers without making a "for-
mal" arrest and going through the traditional booking process was
implemented by the police force "to protect the integrity of the ongo-
ing undercover operation,"150 which would allow the police to make a
greater impact on the drug trade in individual communities.' The
practice of making noncustodial arrests based on probable cause was a
tactic undertaken by the Baltimore Police Department for the legiti-
mate and reasonable purpose of attempting to ensure that their sting
operation was not recognized in the targeted community. Further,
both sides admit that the police had probable cause to arrest Evans. 1
52
Because the police had probable cause and because they limited the
the idea that searches that do not fit the exact holding of Chimel may still be valid, provided
that they meet the illusive "reasonableness" standard. See Cupp, 412 U.S. at 295 (explaining
that "[t] he basis for [the Chimel] exception is that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
a police officer to expect the arrestee to use any weapons he may have and to attempt to
destroy any incriminating evidence then in his possession" (emphasis added)). See generally
infta notes 148-149 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's interpretation of the
"reasonableness" standard).
148. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
149. Id. at 21 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). In weighing these interests, a
judge should ask whether the "facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was
appropriate." Id. at 21-22.
150. Evans, 352 Md. at 500, 723 A.2d at 425.
151. See id. at 500 n.1, 723 A.2d at 425 n.1 (noting that the goal of the operation was "to
make an impact in the area").
152. See id. at 508, 723 A.2d at 429 ("Although he concedes the police had sufficient
probable cause to arrest him at the time of theJune 9, 1994 incident, Evans argues that the
police did not in fact execute such an arrest pursuant to Maryland law.").
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search to those items needed for prosecution-the drugs and the
marked money-it was reasonable for the Court of Appeals to find
that the police interest in obtaining the evidence needed to try to con-
vict Evans is greater than the privacy interests of the drug dealer.
Reaching an alternative conclusion would require the court to con-
clude that a probable cause-based search incident to a noncustodial
arrest somehow intrudes more on the rights of the arrestee than a
probable-caused based search that results in a formal arrest and a trip
to the station house. The Court of Appeals countered this illogical
argument quite effectively, quoting Judge Sonner's dissent for the
Court of Special Appeals:
Requiring the police to charge every person they detain and
search forwards no valid public interest, much less any of the
values that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is
meant to protect. The violations of privacy or detention and
search will already have occurred .... The Fourth Amend-
ment protection against illegal searches and seizures and the
privacy interest that the exclusionary rule is believed by some
to protect will not, in any way, be serviced by attaching a fur-
ther requirement that the police lodge a formal charge after
they have searched. 53
The only argument that could be made against allowing police to
conduct searches incident to noncustodial arrests is that the privacy
rights of suspects are violated when they are searched incident to non-
custodial arrests. But this argument is not persuasive, because in or-
der to conduct a search incident to a noncustodial arrest, police must
still have probable cause to arrest. The only difference between a
search incident to an arrest and a search incident to a noncustodial
arrest is that in the latter case, the individual is not taken directly to
the station house for booking, and is instead released. Because it
would be unreasonable to argue that an individual's privacy rights
may be violated when a probable cause-based search does not result in
the individual being immediately booked and placed in jail, no indi-
vidual privacy rights are at risk when police are permitted to conduct
searches incident to noncustodial arrests.
Upon considering the totality of the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence regarding the justification of the search incident to an arrest
doctrine, notwithstanding the Court's ambiguous use of "custodial" in
Robinson, it was reasonable for the Court of Appeals to find that the
153. Id. at 528, 723 A.2d at 438-39 (quoting Evans v. State, 113 Md. App. 347, 378, 688
A.2d 28, 44 (1997) (Sonner, J., dissenting)).
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Fourth Amendment does not prevent police officers from conducting
searches incident to "noncustodial" arrests. While the Court of Ap-
peals failed to analyze the meaning of the term "custodial arrest," and
blindly adopted the view that "custodial arrest" and "arrest" are synon-
ymous for purposes of applying the search incident to an arrest doc-
trine, the fact that one of the two justifications for conducting a search
incident to an arrest is present in noncustodial arrests supported the
court's conclusion.
154
There may be certain circumstances, however, where a search in-
cident to a noncustodial arrest is not appropriate. If an arrest is made
that does not result in a trip to the station house, and the arresting
officer does not need to search the arrestee to obtain evidence of the
crime, then neither of the justifications for conducting a search inci-
dent to an arrest are present.155 It is difficult to imagine many scena-
rios where this would occur, but it is worth noting that when neither
of the Robinson justifications are met, police should not have the au-
thority to conduct a search incident to a noncustodial arrest.
c. Defining Arrest Under Maryland Law.-Eliminating the in-
tent to prosecute language from Maryland's definition of arrest, while
running counter to the express language traditionally used by the
court in defining what constitutes an arrest, fully comports with the de
facto application of Maryland arrest law throughout the last forty-two
years.156 The court was correct when it stated in Evans that despite its
history of using the intent to prosecute language, "neither [Bouldin]
nor any other case decided by th[e] Court has rested upon the deter-
mination that an intent to prosecute is a prerequisite to a valid
arrest."1
57
Eliminating this language from Maryland's arrest requirements
was proper not only because the language had been ignored by the
court, but also because it is impractical to apply. As the court cor-
rectly pointed out in Evans, police officers in Maryland have no au-
thority to prosecute. 5 ' Because the "commencement of a Maryland
154. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text (discussing the court's application
of the two requirements to Evans).
155. See supra notes 134-138, 146-147 (discussing the justifications for conducting a
search incident to an arrest).
156. See supra Part 2.e (discussing the court's failure to adhere to the intent to prosecute
language).
157. Evans, 352 Md. at 514, 723 A.2d at 431.
158. See id. at 514 n.14, 723 A.2d at 431 n.14 (citing MD. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 9 and MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOVT §§ 9-1202 to -1207) (stating that prosecutorial authority lies with
the Attorney General, the State's Attorneys, and the State Prosecutor).
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prosecution lies in activities outside the scope of police authority, ei-
ther with the courts ... or with prosecutors,"'159 the intent to prose-
cute language was wholly unreasonable from its inception. The Court
of Appeals's decision to eliminate the de jure intent to prosecute lan-
guage was also wise because it virtually aligned Maryland's definition
of arrest with that of the Supreme Court. 6 ° Making this change to
the definition of arrest will allow Maryland police officers to take
greater advantage of the search incident to an arrest exception to the
warrant requirement, since they will not be forced to meet a higher
arrest threshold under Maryland law than they are required to meet
under the Fourth Amendment. Another benefit of altering the tradi-
tional definition of arrest is that the requirement of physically re-
straining a suspect or somehow subjecting a suspect to police custody
or control is more objective than the vague intent to prosecute lan-
guage traditionally used by the court. Furthermore, the new test will
allow determinations of when an arrest occurs to be made by the
courts, rather than by the subjective intent of individual police of-
ficers. Because there are a number of reasons that an officer may de-
cide to arrest an individual without taking him to the station house for
booking or taking affirmative steps that could be associated with an
intent to prosecute,1 6 requiring an intent to prosecute would unnec-
essarily prevent officers from conducting searches based on probable
cause and pursuant to valid arrests.
Had the court decided not to alter the definition of arrest, it still
could have held that the detainment of Evans constituted a valid ar-
rest under the old definition of arrest. 162 Because the new standard of
159. Id. (citations omitted).
160. See supra notes 68-70 (discussing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), in
which the Court articulated its definition of arrest).
161. While it has already been demonstrated that an officer cannot possess an intent to
prosecute when he has no authority to prosecute, there are also many instances where an
officer, who has the authority to make a custodial arrest and a full search incident to the
arrest, may decide that it would be in the best interests of law enforcement to only make a
noncustodial arrest. The case at hand demonstrates one of the best justifications for al-
lowing an officer to conduct a search based on a noncustodial arrest, where an officer
arrests a suspect, but does not take him to the station house for booking. Professor LaFave
has stated that an officer may choose to delay an arrest: (1) to conceal the identity of an
informant, (2) to conceal another investigation, or (3) to prevent the dispersal of criminal
activity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
220-25 (FrankJ. Remington ed. 1965) (discussing examples of situations in which a person
known to have committed a crime is not arrested in order to effectuate some other law
enforcement purpose). In these circumstances, a court that follows the intent to prosecute
language could, hypothetically, improperly correlate the noncustodial arrest with a lack of
intent to prosecute.
162. See supra Part 2.e (discussing Maryland's pre-Evans arrest requirement).
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arrest only requires that a police officer "have probable cause to be-
lieve the suspect has committed a felony and ... either physically re-
strain the suspect or otherwise subject the suspect to his or her
custody and control"'63 it is clear from the record that the police of-
ficers engaged in Operation Mid-East had met this standard with re-
gard to their detention and search of Evans. t64 Although the old
definition of arrest required another element, "the detention of a
known or suspected offender for the purpose of prosecuting him for a
crime,"165 the Court of Appeals stated that an intent to prosecute actu-
ally existed at the time of Evans's arrest. 166 Therefore, while the elimi-
nation of one of the required elements of an arrest will certainly have
a positive impact on policing by liberalizing the arrest requirement in
Maryland, made no impact on the outcome of this case.
5. Conclusion.-Regardless of the shortcomings of the Court of
Appeals's opinion in State v. Evans, the court ultimately made the
proper decision regarding whether the detainment of Evans consti-
tuted a valid arrest under the Fourth Amendment and the laws of Ma-
ryland. While the Supreme Court has been elusive in defining the
meaning of a custodial arrest, it has given an expansive reading to the
search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement. It
is logical to conclude, therefore, that the only required element for a
search incident to an arrest is that an actual arrest be made based on
probable cause prior to or following quickly after the issuance of a
valid arrest, provided that one of the Robinson justifications for con-
ducting a search incident to an arrest is present.
The court also wisely made the decision to eliminate the intent to
prosecute language from Maryland's arrest requirements. The intent
to prosecute language had never actually been applied by the court,
and had only been used as a meaningless garnish to its general arrest
requirements. The court's decision to align Maryland's definition of
arrest with the standard of arrest articulated by the Supreme Court
163. Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432.
164. See id. at 501-02, 723 A.2d 425-26 (discussing Evans's detention and search).
165. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting that the court applied this
definition of arrest in many cases over the span of twenty-seven years).
166. Evans, 352 Md. at 520 n.17, 723 A.2d at 435 n.17. The court stated that "it might be
argued that a prerequisite to a constitutionally permissible search incident is the existence
of an intent by the arresting officers to prosecute. If such be the case, the requirement was
fulfilled in the present case[ I." Id. The court reached this conclusion based on the testi-
mony of Officer Dobbins, who stated that the purpose of delaying the formal arrests of
drug offenders in Operation Mid-East was to keep the operation quiet in the communities
which were being policed, so the officers could make arrests "in a mass sweep" at a later
date. Id.
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will benefit police officers by allowing them to do their jobs more ef-
fectively. Furthermore, it will benefit the courts by allowing them to
use an objective standard of reviewing police practices, without in-
fringing on the rights of citizens, who remain immune from searches
that are not based on probable cause to arrest and that are not accom-
panied by a valid custodial or noncustodial arrest.
HAROLD B. WALTHER
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
VIII. EDUCATION LAW
A. The Application of Public Records Laws
Kirwan v. The Diamondback' involved the interpretation of two
public information statutes: the Maryland Public Information Act
(MPIA)2 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA)3 . In Kirwan, the Court of Appeals held that records con-
cerning National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violations by
members of a university basketball team were disclosable to the uni-
versity's newspaper under MPIA4 and FERPA.5 These Acts provide for
the disclosure of certain "public records" and provide confidentiality
for others.6 One aspect of the disclosure determination is the weigh-
ing of the private and public interests involved.7 The Kirwan court,
however, failed both to consider plausible alternative interpretations
of MPIA and FERPA and to acknowledge that a "balancing of inter-
ests" is required under the acts. Also, the University of Maryland
failed to make several strong arguments for its position under both
MPIA and FERPA. Therefore, the Kirwan decision unnecessarily
weakened the value of these laws in protecting confidential records.
This Note will focus on the varied statutory interpretations of the Acts,
the "balancing of interests" tests applied, and the Kirwan court's fail-
ure to acknowledge this broad history.
1. The Case.-The University of Maryland, College Park campus,
began corresponding with the NCAA in February 1996 regarding a
student-athlete's violations of NCAA rules.' The student-athlete, a
member of the men's basketball team, had accepted money from a
former coach to pay campus parking tickets.9 As a result, the NCAA
suspended the student for three games.10
This incident, as well as others involving the men's basketball
team, became the subject of an investigation by The Diamondback, a
1. 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 196 (1998).
2. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-611 to -628 (1997).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994).
4. See Kirwan, 352 Md. at 89, 721 A.2d at 203.
5. Id. at 94, 721 A.2d at 206.
6. See infra notes 34-59 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the MPIA
and FERPA).
7. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (describing the "balancing of interests"
test applied by the courts in making a determination regarding disclosure of records).





College Park campus newspaper. 1 The other incidents investigated
involved allegations that some of the student-athletes on the basket-
ball team were parking illegally on campus and were "receiving prefer-
ential treatment from the University with respect to the parking
violation fines imposed." 2 The newspaper also investigated allega-
tions that Coach Gary Williams was parking illegally on campus.' 3
As part of its investigation, the newspaper requested records sev-
eral times from the University pursuant to the MPIA. 14 The newspa-
per requested copies of the correspondence between the University
and the NCAA concerning the suspension of the student-athlete, as
well as records concerning the parking violations of the team mem-
bers and Coach Williams. 5
The University refused to disclose these records. 16 It contended
that the records concerning Coach Williams were "personnel records"
under the MPLA and were therefore exempt from disclosure. 7 In ad-
dition, it argued that the parking tickets were "financial records,"
which are also exempt from disclosure under the MPIA.18 Finally, the
University claimed that any records concerning the student-athletes
were "educational records" protected from disclosure by FERPA.' 9
The Diamondback brought an action in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County requesting disclosure of the records and at-
torney fees.2 ° The case was decided on summary judgment, granting
the paper's request for the records but denying the request for attor-
ney fees.2 ' The University appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
and the newspaper filed a cross-appeal.22 The Court of Appeals issued








16. See id. at 80, 721 A.2d at 198.
17. See id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-616(h) (1997) (stating the exemp-
tion for personnel records).





23. See id. (citing Kirwan v. Diamondback, 346 Md. 372, 697 A.2d 112 (1997)).
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2. Legal Background.-The Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)24 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) ,25 also known as the Buckley Amendment, are public infor-
mation laws that govern the disclosure of public records. 26 The pur-
pose of FERPA is to maintain the confidentiality of educational
records, and therefore disclosure of educational records is generally
limited to students and their parents with some exceptions. 21 The de-
termination of what constitutes "educational records," however, has
created controversy within the courts. 28 In contrast, under the federal
FOIA, and state versions of the Act, disclosure of public records is
presumed. 9 Secrecy of public records is discouraged under FOIA,
unless there are legitimate public or private interests that outweigh
disclosure.3 ° Courts apply a "balancing of interests" test to determine
whether these interests outweigh disclosure."' In addition, some
courts advocate for the partial disclosure of records in certain in-
stances.3 2 The courts have also disagreed on whether NCAA records
are subject to disclosure under FOIA, and whether a university's
records concerning intercollegiate athletic conferences are "educa-
tional," and therefore disclosable in limited circumstances under
FERPA.33
a. The Public Records Laws and Their "Balancing of Interests"
Tests.-FOIA gives the public the right to access information held by
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1995).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 123 2g (1994).
26. See Kirwan, 352 Md. at 80, 90, 721 A.2d at 198, 204.
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1994); see also infra note 53 and accompanying text
(describing the statute's restrictions on release of records to third parties without parental
consent).
28. See infra Part 2.b (discussing how courts have interpreted "educational records"
under FERPA).
29. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that reviewing courts have consist-
ently found a presumption in favor of disclosure of public records under FOIA and narrow
exemptions from disclosure).
30. See infta notes 37-43 and accompanying text (describing the application of the "bal-
ancing of interests" test).
31. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test, which
involved balancing the public and state interests favoring disclosure or confidentiality
against the private interests involved).
32. See infra notes 109-124 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which courts
have discussed disclosing only the statistics from certain records to keep students' identify-
ing information confidential).
33. See infra notes 129-149 and accompanying text (discussing whether the NCAA is a
public or governmental body subject to public records laws such as FOIA and whether they
fall within the definition of "educational" under FERPA).
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federal agencies. 34 State versions of the Act afford access to informa-
tion from state and local government agencies.35 For both the federal
and all state FOIA and public records laws, courts consistently find
"both a presumption in favor of disclosure of public records and a
narrow construction of exemptions from disclosure."36 The majority
of courts apply a "balancing of interests" test to determine whether
disclosure of certain information is permissible. This balancing test
weighs the public and state interests involved. 8 Thus, a document
may be withheld if either the state or public interests in confidentiality
outweighs disclosure,39 or the record may be provided if the public's
interest favors disclosure. Some courts argue that the state may have a
"legitimate interest" in keeping the records "confidential," or the pub-
lic's interest might be "best served" by keeping them confidential.4"
Other court opinions suggest that " [t] he legitimate interest in nondis-
closure may be based upon public policies of privacy, confidentiality,
or the best interest of the state in carrying out its legitimate activi-
ties."41 As an example, Exemption 6 under the federal FOIA "pro-
vides that FOLA disclosure requirements do not apply to 'personnel
34. See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 UB. LAW
65, 65 (1996) (stating that the FOIA was adopted in 1966 "for the express purpose of
increasing disclosure of government records" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Cox v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978)).
35. See id. (noting that after the passage of the FOIA, "each of the fifty states not al-
ready having an open records statute adopted its own version of the FOIA").
36. Id. at 66. State public records laws "universally favor[ I openness, and the burden is
on the public body withholding the record to prove that the record falls into an exempted
category." Id. at 79. The Maryland Public Information Act has been similarly construed.
See A.S. Abell Publ'g Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983)). The
Mezzanote court noted:
[T]he provisions of the Public Information Act reflect the legislative intent that
citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public infor-
mation concerning the operation of their government. Accordingly, [the provi-
sions of the statute] must be liberally construed . . .in order to effectuate the
Public Information Act's broad remedial purpose.
37. See Nowadzky, supra note 34, at 79; see also, e.g., Child Protection Group v. Cline,
350 S.E.2d 541, 543 (W.Va. 1986) (considering the "value of the public interest" as a factor
in determining whether public disclosure is appropriate).
38. See Nowadzky, supra note 34, at 79.
39. See id.
40. Id. (citing Black-Panther Party v. Kehoe, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114 (Ct. App. 1974)
(finding that the public's interest in providing "accused licensees with copies of consumer
complaints" did not "outweigh the public's interest in encouraging complaints by provi-
sional assurances of confidentiality")).
41. Id. (citing Carlson v. Pima County, 687 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that
the limitations on open disclosure "are based on the conflict between the public's right to
openness in government, and important public policy considerations relating to protec-
tion of either the confidentiality of information, privacy ... or a concern about disclosure
detrimental to the best interests of the state")).
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and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'. 2 Disclo-
sure is determined by balancing individual privacy rights against the
public's interest to know.4 3
The MPIA has a similar "unwarranted invasion" of privacy provi-
sion.44 The MPIA entitles the public to disclosure, "unless an unwar-
ranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result."45
Maryland deals with confidential records differently than most other
states, because the MPIA divides confidential information into "re-
quired denials" and "permissible denials."46 It has been suggested
that "[d]enials of inspection are required when the public record is
privileged or confidential by definition, or when allowing inspection
would be contrary to a state statute, a federal statute or regulation,
rules of the court of appeals, or a court order."'4 7
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act4" is a federal stat-
ute which provides protections to personal privacy of students and
their parents.4" As in the analysis of records under FOIA, courts apply
a balancing of interests test in determining what material is protected
by FERPA.5 0 Whereas FOJA has a presumption in favor of disclosure,
this is not necessarily the case with FERPA. t FERPA was enacted to
protect the privacy of students and their parents, and it conditions
42. 37A AM. JuR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts § 249 (1994) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (6) (1994)).
43. See id.
44. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-612(b) (1997) [hereinafter MPIA].
45. Id.
46. Nowadzky, supra note 34, at 90. Sections 10-615 through 10-617 of the MPIA delin-
eate those public records required to be nondisclosable, and section 10-618 deals with
permissible denials." See MPIA §§ 10-615 to 10-618. Section 10-616 deals with "personnel
records," and section 10-617 discusses "financial information." MPIA §§ 10-616, 10-617.
Section 10-618(a)-(g) includes those records for which it is permissible to deny disclosure,
if inspection "would be contrary to the public interest." MPIA § 10-618. These records
include "interagency or intra-agency letter[s] or memorandla] that would not be available
by law to a private party in litigation with the unit," "examination information," "details of a
research project," "a real estate appraisal," "records of investigations" conducted by speci-
fied officials and certain other "investigatory file[s]." Id.
47. Nowadzky, supra note 34, at 90.
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-99.67 (1996). FERPA is also
referred to as the "Buckley Amendment" and is part of the General Education Provisions
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1235 (1994).
49. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) (20 US.C.A. §12 3 2g), 112 A.L.R. FED. 1,
15 (1993).
50. See, e.g., Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Board of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 260-62 (Ga.
1993) (finding that documents involving violations of University regulations are not the
type of documents that FERPA sought to protect from disclosure).
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (1) (A).
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receipt of federal funding by educational institutions on their compli-
ance with procedures relating to the maintenance of educational
records.52 One scholar has summarized FERPA as follows: "These
procedures are generally designed to insure that the parents of stu-
dents may obtain access to the students' educational records and may
challenge the contents of such records, and, on the other hand, to
restrict the release of students' educational records to third parties
without the parents' consent."53
Universities and other educational institutions have raised FERPA
as a bar to disclosing information that would otherwise be disclosed
under a state or federal FOIA.54 "Records" are defined broadly in the
statute55 to include "those records, files, documents and other materi-
als which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii)
are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person
acting for such agency or institution."56 Employee records are not
covered by FERPA, nor are records created and maintained for law
enforcement purposes by a law enforcement unit within a university.58
52. See U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (1) (A). FERPA provides that
[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educa-
tional agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively
prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school
of such agency or at such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and
review the education records of their children.
Furthermore, the statute provides that "whenever a student has attained eighteen years of
age, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, the permission or consent
required of and the rights accorded to the parents of the student shall thereafter only be
required of and accorded to the student." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d).
53. Theuman, supra note 49, at 15 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1), § 1232g(a)(2),
§ 1232g(b) (2)).
54. See id. at 16. Thurman discusses that FERPA is intended to allow for parental access
to student records, though intended to restrict access of those records to other third par-
ties, who might otherwise have had access under FOIA.
55. See Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute
Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 617, 624 (1997) (noting that "any recorded information that is
created or maintained by a school, school employee, or a person 'acting for' a school, that
is directly related to a particular student, is a record for Buckley Amendment purposes").
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (4) (A).
57. See Daggett, supra note 55, at 623.
58. See id. at 626-27. The law enforcement exception "was created for campus police
records at colleges and universities." Id. at 627. Certain psychological evaluations of
schoolchildren are "educational records." See Theuman, supra note 49, at 16. Teacher
evaluations, however, have been held not subject to FERPA, nor an individual's lawsuit
against a school district, nor records maintained by intercollegiate athletic associations,
nor college testing programs. See id. Furthermore, the release of students' names, ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, and similar information "has been held not to violate FERPA
where the institutions involved have designated such records as 'directory information.'"
Id. at 17; see also infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing FERPA's provision for
"directory information").
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The issue of whether FERPA covers crime reports in its general cate-
gory of "educational records," and what constitutes educational
records, however, has invited much debate.5 9
b. Applying the FERPA and FOIA Balancing of Interests Tests.-
In Red & Black Publishing Co. v. Board of Regents,6 ° the Supreme Court
of Georgia balanced interests under both FERPA and the state open
records acts.6 1 The court held that the University of Georgia student
newspaper had a right of access to the records and the proceedings of
the university's student Organization Court.6 2 The Georgia court
ruled that the records concerning the students were not "education
records" within the meaning of FERPA.6 3 The court argued that "the
records are not of the type the Buckley Amendment is intended to
protect, i.e., those relating to individual student academic perform-
ance, financial aid, or scholastic probation."64
In addition, the court held that the records and proceedings were
"public" under the Georgia Open Records Act6 5 and Open Meetings
Act.6 6 The purpose of Georgia's Open Records Act is to "encourage
public access" to "public records," so that "the public can evaluate the
expenditure of public funds and the efficient and proper functioning
of its institutions, but also to foster confidence in government through
openness to the public."6 7 In light of this presumption in favor of
disclosing such public records and meetings, the court concluded that
though "openness in sensitive proceedings is sometimes unpleasant,
59. See, e.g., Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 48-50
(D.N.H. 1994) (interpreting "educational records" under FERPA to include juvenile court
records maintained by the district attorney); Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Board of Regents,
427 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (Ga. 1993) (finding that records regarding violations of university
regulations are not "educational records" under FERPA); see also infra notes 60-64 and 70-
73 (describing the holdings of Red & Black Publishing Co. and Belanger).
60. 427 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1993).
61. Id. at 260-62.
62. See id. at 261-62.
63. Id. at 261.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 260.
66. See id. at 263. According to the court,
[t]he Organization Court hears and adjudicates cases involving alleged University
rule and regulation violations on the part of fraternities and sororities .... Hear-
ings of the Organization Court are closed to the public at the request of the
defendant organization. Specific University regulations pertaining to student or-
ganizations include prohibitions against: damage to property, disorderly conduct,
alcohol and drug misuse, unauthorized entry, gambling, and hazing.
Id. at 260.




difficult, and occasionally harmful, . . . the policy of this state is that
the public's business must be open."68 The court explained that this
policy "protect[s] against potential abuse," and "maintain[s] the pub-
lic's confidence in its officials. 69
In contrast, in Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire School District7 °
the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
held that school district records relating to a student's juvenile court
proceedings and maintained by a district attorney, were "education
records," which a parent was entitled to access. 7 ' The court ruled that
the records were "educational" because they directly affected the stu-
dent's "education and residential placement."72 The court supported
a broad interpretation of FERPA, finding that the files maintained by
the attorney for the District fell within FERPA's definition of "educa-
tion records," because they were "records, files, documents, and other
materials which ... contain information directly related to a student"
and are "maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a
person acting for such agency or institution. 73
Similarly, the court in Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University74
held that FERPA did not bar disclosure to a private individual of a
copy of a University computer tape, which contained the names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers, and other items of information of students
enrolled at the University.75 The Michigan Court of Appeals, how-
ever, held that the tape was exempt from release under the privacy
provision of the State's FOIA.7 6
Under FERPA, "directory information" can be released if the edu-
cational institution gives public notice of the type of information to be
published, informs students and parents of their right to forbid disclo-
sure, and the time period within which a student or parent must act to
forbid disclosure. 77 To release "personally identifiable information,"
the educational institution must obtain written consent from the par-
ent or student over eighteen years of age.78 The University complied
68. Id. at 263.
69. Id. (citing Athens Observer, 263 S.E.2d at 130-31).
70. 856 F. Supp. 40 (D.N.H. 1994).
71. Id. at 50.
72. Id. The court concluded that "[his problems with the court system, along with his
educational disabilities, had a direct bearing on his educational and residential place-
ment." Id.
73. Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(1) (4) (A)).
74. 294 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
75. Id. at 233.
76. Id. at 236.
77. Id. at 232 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 99.37).
78. Id. at 231-32 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 99.31).
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with the directory information requirement and therefore did not vio-
late FERPA.79
Although FERPA would permit disclosure of the tape, the court
refused disclosure under the state FOIA.8° Under the Michigan
FOIA, information is exempt from disclosure if it is of "a personal
nature where the public disclosure of the information would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy."8" The
plaintiff wanted the directory information to compile a mailing list for
its commercial enterprise of political campaign mailing. 2 The court
ruled that the plaintiffs interest in compiling this information did not
outweigh students' privacy interests, because the plaintiff had other
means of disseminating political information without obtaining the
directory information. 3 The court held that to allow disclosure
would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy, because the public in-
terest in releasing the information did not outweigh the harm to the
people involved. 4 The court concluded that "[t]o override constitu-
tional privacy interests, a countervailing state interest must exist and
be compelling at the point where those interests collide."85
In DTH Publishing Co. v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,86
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that disclosure of infor-
mation contained in recordings of closed court proceedings was not
appropriate.87 In DTH, a newspaper brought suit against a university
and its undergraduate court alleging that closure of student discipli-
nary proceedings by the court violated FERPA and the Open Meetings
Law.88 The court ruled that the undergraduate court was a "public
body" under the Open Meetings Law.89 The court further held that
79. See id. at 232-33.
80. Id. at 233, 236.
81. Id. at 233 (citing MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.243).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 235.
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid &
Assocs., Inc. v. Florida, 360 So. 2d 83, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
86. 496 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
87. Id. at 16.
88. Id. at 10.
89. Id. at 11. "Public body" under the Open Meetings Law
means any elected or appointed authority, board, commission, committee, coun-
cil, or other body of the State, or of one or more counties, cities, school adminis-
trative units, constituent institutions of The University of North Carolina, or other
political subdivisions or public corporations in the State that ... exercises or is
authorized to exercise a legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative,
or advisory function.
Id. at 10 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10 (1996)).
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FERPA rendered the student information discussed in the undergrad-
uate court "privileged and confidential" under the Open Meetings
Law.90 The court explained that FERPA withholds federal aid if an
educational institution has a "policy or practice of releasing educa-
tional records, or personally identifiable information contained in ed-
ucational records, to anyone other than certain enumerated persons
and entities without the consent of the student's parents or the stu-
dent, if the student is eighteen years or older.""1 Furthermore, the
court concluded that FERPA "clearly expresses the federal policy that
student education records should not be widely disseminated to the
public and, except in certain enumerated circumstances, should not
be released without proper consent."92
c. Applying the MPIA Balancing of Interests Tests.-Maryland
cases employ a similar balancing of interests. In Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore v. Burke,93 the City of Baltimore (City) initiated litigation
against a newspaper for permission to continue refusing to disclose
requested documents relating to the design and construction of im-
provements to the Patapsco Waste Water Treatment Plant.94 The
Court of Special Appeals held that the disclosure of these documents
did not result in substantial injury to the public interest, and therefore
documents were released to the newspaper.95 Section 10-619 of the
MPIA permits temporary denial of inspection of public records
"[w] henever ... the official custodian believes that inspection would
cause substantial injury to the public interest. "96 The City argued that
disclosure would do "substantial injury to the public interest because
it would result in the loss of a strategic advantage in the City's defense
of [other] claims which are presently in arbitration."97 The court held
that disclosure was permitted because "the tactical disadvantage which
the city may suffer in resolving the pending ... claims because of the
disclosure is insufficient to establish 'a substantial injury to the public
interest' permitting the denial of inspection pursuant to section 10-
619. "98
90. Id. at 12.
91. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b), (d) (1997)).
92. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b), (d)).
93. 67 Md. App. 147, 506 A.2d 683 (1986).
94. Id. at 149-50, 506 A.2d at 684-85.
95. Id. at 155, 506 A.2d at 687.
96. Id. at 152, 506 A.2d at 686 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T, § 10-619
(1985)).
97. Id. at 153, 506 A.2d at 686.
98. Id. at 155, 506 A.2d at 687.
1062 [VOL. 59:743
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
The court also supported the newspaper's request for a fee waiver
in obtaining those documents. 99 A fee waiver is granted under the
MPIA if "[a] fter consideration of the ability of the applicant to pay the
fee and other relevant factors, the official custodian determines that
the waiver would be in the public interest."100 The "other relevant
factors" in this case included
the health hazard created by the discharge of inadequately
treated sewage into the Patapsco River, the importance of
public exposure of the delayed and extremely costly im-
provements to the... Treatment Plant, and the danger that
imposing a fee for information upon a newspaper publisher
might have a chilling effect on free exercise of freedom of
the press. 10'
In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Maryland Committee Against
the Gun Ban,' °2 a political committee requested permission to inspect
reports of investigation by the Internal Investigation Division of the
City police department regarding the conduct of police officers dur-
ing service of a subpoena duces tecum on the committee.1"' The Court
of Appeals held that the committee was not a "person in interest"
within the meaning of the MPIA, because it was not the subject of the
investigation.'0 4 Furthermore, the court ruled that the denial of in-
spection was justified on the grounds of public interest.' °5 Under
MPIA § 10-618(f) (1), "a custodian may deny inspection of... records
of investigations conducted by ... a police department,"106 and denial
is permissible under § 10-618(a) "if a custodian believes that inspec-
tion of a part of a public record by the applicant would be contrary to
the public interest."1°7 The court concluded that the public has an
interest in the confidentiality of investigations of police officers, and
disclosure is allowed only if the purpose of disclosure is the defense of
an officer.'0 8
99. Id. at 157, 506 A.2d at 688.
100. Id. at 156, 506 A.2d at 688 (quoting MPIA § 10-621 (d) (2)).
101. Id. at 157, 506 A.2d at 688.
102. 329 Md. 78, 617 A.2d 1040 (1993).
103. Id. at 80, 617 A.2d at 1041.
104. Id. at 90, 617 A.2d at 1045.
105. See id. at 95, 617 A.2d at 1048 (noting that "fairness to the investigated officers and
the avoidance of needless publicity to the cooperating witnesses, with possible inhibiting
effects on future investigations, justify on public interest grounds the custodian's denial of
inspection to one other than a person in interest").
106. MPIA § 10-618(f)(1).
107. MPIA § 10-618(a).
108. See Maryland Comm., 329 Md. at 95, 617 A.2d at 1048.
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d. Partial Disclosure of Records.-In Miami Student v. Miami
University,"°9 the student newspaper sought records of student discipli-
nary proceedings to develop a database and to track student crime
trends on campus.11 The University released the records, but deleted
from the records the identity, sex, and age of the accused students,
and the date, time, and location of the disciplinary incidents.1 11 The
newspaper filed suit, requesting that the records be fully disclosed,
with only the redaction of the names and Social Security numbers (or
identification numbers) of the accused students. 12 The Supreme
Court of Ohio held that these records were not "education records" as
defined by FERPA." 3 Furthermore, the majority ordered the disclo-
sure of the general location of the incident, the age and sex of the
student, the nature of the offense, and the type of penalty imposed."1 4
The court stated that "[b]y deleting relevant data . . . respondents
have denied students at Miami University as well as the general public
the right to obtain invaluable information, including when and where
alleged offenses took place and how guilty offenders were pun-
ished.""' The court determined that the disclosure of these statistics
is essential for student safety and thus outweighed the interests in con-
fidentiality and privacy.' 
16
The dissent disagreed with this holding." 7 The dissent argued
that FERPA requires the deletion of "personally identifiable informa-
tion," which includes the name of the student or student's family
member and "information that would make the student's identity eas-
ily traceable.""' The majority cited Red & Black for the authority that
disciplinary records are not educational and therefore not subject to
FERPA." 9 The dissent, however, argued that Red &Blackwas decided
before the 1995 amendments to FERPA's regulations.1 20 According to
the dissent, these amendments provided that disciplinary records were
always considered education records.' 2 ' The dissent concluded that
the "courts must give due deference to an administrative interpreta-
109. 680 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1997).
110. Id. at 957.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 959.
114. Id. at 959-60.
115. Id. at 959.
116. Id.
117. Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 960 (Lundberg, Stratton, JJ., dissenting).
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 34 C.F.R. 99.3 (1997)).
119. Id. at 959.
120. Id. at 961 (Lundberg, Stratton, JJ., dissenting).
121. Id.
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tion formulated by an agency which has accumulated substantial ex-
pertise, and to which Congress has delegated the responsibility of
implementing the congressional command.
122
The DTH court distinguished its holding from Miami Student, ex-
plaining that the Ohio Supreme Court "ordered the release of essen-
tially statistical information regarding disciplinary proceedings," and
not identifiable information about a student which would jeopardize
the student's privacy. 12' The DTH court explained that it did not fol-
low Miami Student because "in this case . . .it is undisputed that the
identity of the student would not be protected if the meeting was
open."'
24
Also, the DTH court contended that there is no "tradition of ac-
cess" for the public to the proceedings of the Undergraduate
Court.12 5 The court conceded that there is a "strong presumption"
that civil proceedings be open to the public.1 26 The DTH court ex-
plained, however, the university court's powers "are not derivative of
our judiciary system nor are they limited by the necessary safeguards
protecting a citizen in our court system."1 27 Furthermore, the court
determined that the Undergraduate Court's disciplinary proceedings
have not been "historically open to the public as have traditional civil
and criminal trials." 1
28
e. NCAA Cases and the Public's Interest.-A part of the discus-
sion regarding private and public interests is the issue of whether the
NCAA is a public, or governmental body subject to public records
laws. 12' Requests for information from colleges and universities con-
122. Id. at 962.
123. DTH Publ'g Corp. v. University of North Carolina, 496 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998); see supra notes 86-92 (discussing the DTH court's finding that disclosure of university
court proceedings was inappropriate).
124. 496 S.E.2d at 12-13. The DTH court maintained that it would be impossible to
conduct a student disciplinary hearing without revealing confidential student records
which are covered by FERPA. Id. at 13. The court stated further that "[g]iven the breadth
of FERPA's definition of 'education records' and based on the stipulated facts, the student
records at issue in this appeal are protected as 'education records' under FERPA and are
'privileged or confidential pursuant to the law . .. of the United States' under N.C.G.S.
§ 143-318.11(a)(1)." Id.
125. See id. at 15. The court determined that "there is no record evidence that UNC
disciplinary proceedings ... have been historically open to the public as have traditional
civil and criminal trials." Id.
126. Id. at 13.
127. Id. at 15.
128. Id.
129. See generally Marc A. Eichler, Note, Public Records-National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion and Southwest Conference are not covered by State Freedom of Information Act, 1 SETON HALL J.
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cerning violations of NCAA rules and regulations have been the
source of litigation recently under public open records laws and pub-
lic information acts.1 30 The source of many NCAA violations in recent
years has been the cash payments or other non-cash forms of compen-
sation to student athletes, sometimes by school personnel.1 3 1 Activi-
ties that are less clearly "violations" have occurred as well, including
the provision of fringe benefits, such as access to free off-campus
housing, to student athletes by university personnel. 13 2 The media,
and other members of the public, have used federal and state open
records laws to force disclosure of intercollegiate athletic association
information concerning these infractions, by claiming that these as-
sociations' investigations constitute "public records.
13 3
In NCAA v. Tarkanian,13 4 the Supreme Court held that a univer-
sity's compliance with NCAA sanctions against the school's basketball
coach did not transform the Association's conduct into state action.1 35
The Court held, therefore, that the NCAA could not be held liable for
civil rights violations under § 1983.16 In the same year, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Kneeland v. National Collegiate Association,'3 v ruled that the
NCAA and the Southwest Athletic Conference were not governmental
bodies subject to the Texas Open Records Act.13 8 State courts, how-
ever, have reached different results under state versions of the FOIA
regarding other intercollegiate athletic conferences. In Arkansas Ga-
SPORT L. 149, 149 (1991) (examining court decisions that have addressed the applicability
of open records laws to the NCAA).
130. See Dr. Michael D. Akers et al., Federal and State Open Records Laws: Their Effects on the
Internal Auditors of Colleges and Universities, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 161, 163 (1993) (stating that
"[w]ith public pressure for more disclosure, the potential exists for legislatures and courts
to encourage the public and the media to use the Federal and State Open Records Laws to
gain further access to the audit reports of college and university athletic departments pre-
pared by internal auditors"); see also Susan Oberlander, Scandal-Plagued SMU Requires Players
to Take Course on Issues in Sports, CHRON. HITHER EDUC., May 10, 1989, at A33 (discussing a
course on issues in sports required of athletes in the wake of NCAA violations by athletes at
Southern Methodist University).
131. See Akers et al., supra note 130, at 161-62.
132. See id. at 162.
133. See id. at 163; see also Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State College, 620 S.W.2d
258 (Ark. 1981) (holding that the Arkansas Intercollegiate Athletic Conference's records
were public because they are a "voluntary association of publicly supported educational
institutions"); Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 350
S.E.2d 23, 24-25 (Ga. 1986) (finding that records of the University of Georgia Athletic
Association was disclosable to a newspaper under the Georgia Open Records Act).
134. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
135. Id. at 199.
136. See id. at 182.
137. 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988).
138. See id. at 231.
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zette Co. v. Southern State College,"' the court found that the Arkansas
Intercollegiate Athletic Conference was partially publicly funded, and
therefore information concerning the amounts of money awarded by
member universities to student athletes each year was disclosable
under the state FOJA. 14 ° Also, the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon
Telegraph Publishing Co. v. Board of Regents of the University System of Geor-
gia' held that university athletic association reports containing infor-
mation about the income and expenses of the school's athletic
programs were public records.1
4 2
There are compelling arguments on both sides of the question of
when the NCAA should be subject to state open records laws and
therefore disclose its records. The NCAA is comprised of state funded
universities and has almost exclusive control over "the administration
of collegiate athletics."' 4 3 Furthermore, it has been argued that pub-
licly exposing NCAA violations would encourage compliance with
NCAA rules and discourage similar violations. 1 44 For these reasons, it
should be treated as a public body. The NCAA, however, has a "gag
rule" that prohibits NCAA enforcement staff from releasing informa-
tion about violations before the matter in question is resolved. 1 45 The
NCAA contends that this "gag rule" allows it to protect the academic
integrity of its university members against suits brought by groups re-
questing information about current investigations. 14 6 According to
the NCAA, the premature disclosure of information "would destroy
the confidential nature critical to the enforcement process."' 4 7 Also,
the NCAA relies on witness testimony and cooperation in its investiga-
tions, but lacks subpoena and contempt powers, and therefore relies
on the confidentiality of witness testimony to carry effectively through
its enforcement duties. 1 48 Some argue, therefore, that witness partici-
pation might be damaged if the NCAA could not guarantee confiden-
tiality for its witnesses. 49 Therefore, the NCAA believes records
should not be released if the interest in privacy outweighs the public
benefit of disclosure.
139. 620 S.W.2d 258 (Ark. 1981).
140. Id. at 259.
141. 350 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. 1986).
142. Id. at 24-25.
143. Eichler, supra note 129, at 158.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 159-60.
146. See id. at 159.
147. Id.




3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Kirwan, the Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether the MPIA or the FERPA permitted disclosure of the
information requested by The Diamondback, and whether the trial
judge erred in refusing to award attorney fees to the newspaper. 150
First, the court discussed the "general presumption in favor of disclo-
sure of government or public documents" under the MPIA. 51  Ac-
cording to the court, MPIA provides for the public's broad right to
government information and contains a broad definition of "public
record." 1
5 2
Second, the court addressed the University's argument that the
documents relating to Coach Williams's parking tickets were "person-
nel records" under the MPIA. 153  Under the MPIA, "personnel
records" are exempt from disclosure and include applications for em-
ployment, performance ratings, and scholastic achievement informa-
tion. 154 The court determined that although this list was not intended
by the Legislature to be exhaustive, this list "reflect[s] a legislative in-
tent that 'personnel records' mean those documents that directly per-
tain to employment and an employee's ability to perform a job.' 55
The court found that the parking tickets did not reflect on Coach
Williams's status as an employee or on his ability to perform his job,
and therefore did not fall within the "personnel records"
exemption.
56
Furthermore, the court rejected the University's argument that if
parking tickets are issued by campus police and handled by University
departments, they "somehow become personnel records.' 1 57  The
150. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 79, 721 A.2d at 198.
151. Id. at 80, 721 A.2d at 199.
152. Id. at 80-81, 721 A.2d at 199 (citing MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-612(b)).
Section 10-612(a)-(b) provides:
(a) General right to information.-All persons are entitled to have access to in-
formation about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials
and employees. (b) General construction.-To carry out the right set forth in
subsection (a) of this section, unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a
person in interest would result, this Part III of this subtitle shall be construed in
favor of permitting inspection of a public record, with the least cost and least
delay to the person or governmental unit that requests the inspection.
MPIA § 10-612(a)-(b).
153. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 82, 721 A.2d at 199-200.
154. See id. at 82, 721 A.2d at 200 (citing MPIA § 10-616(i)). Section 10-616(i) of MPIA
provides that "a custodian shall deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual,
including an application, performance rating, or scholastic achievement information."
MPIA § 10-616(i).
155. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 82-83, 721 A.2d at 200.
156. Id. at 83-84, 721 A.2d at 200-01.
157. Id. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200.
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court noted that "a parking ticket received by anyone else at his or her
place of employment would ordinarily not be considered a personnel
record. A parking ticket is simply a document charging a very minor
misdemeanor." ' According to the court, parking tickets did not fit
within the common-sense meaning of "personnel records." '59
Next, the court rejected the University's argument that the
records concerning the students' and Coach Williams's parking tickets
were "financial" information as defined in the MPIA, and therefore
exempt from disclosure under the statute. 6 ' The University argued
that failing to pay a parking ticket was a "financial matter" concerning
the University.' 6 ' The court, however, found that parking tickets did
not fall within the legislative intent of the exemption.' 62 According to
the court, parking tickets are not "assets, income, liabilities, net worth,
bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness,"
which are the exempted categories within the financial information
section. 163 Parking tickets are not "record[s] of indebtedness," noted
the court; rather, they are "citation[s] charging a misdemeanor," ac-
cording to the Maryland Code.' 6 4 The court determined that parking
tickets are governed by the Maryland Code, even if they result from a
university's on-campus parking violation.' 65 Furthermore, through-
out the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code, parking viola-




160. Id. at 87, 721 A.2d at 202. Section 10-617 of the MPIA states in pertinent part:
"Unless otherwise provided by law .... a custodian shall deny inspection of the part of a
public record that contains information about the finances of an individual, including as-
sets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or credit
worthiness." MPIA § 10-617(f) (2).
161. See Kirwan, 352 Md. at 85, 721 A.2d at 201.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting MPIA § 10-617).
164. Id. at 85, 721 A.2d at 201 (citing MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOVT §§ 26-201 to -204
(1997)).
165. Id. at 86, 721 A.2d at 201-02. According to the court, "[tihe recipient of the park-
ing ticket can either pay the fine to the University or elect to stand trial in the District
Court of Maryland." Id., 721 A.2d at 201. Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he basic
nature of the parking citation is not changed because the University normally does not
report students or employees for violations of the parking regulations or failure to pay
fines for violations of parking regulations; the University has the right to do so. Similarly,
the nature of the parking ticket is not changed because the University collects the fine
itself as it is authorized to do by § 26-203." Id., 721 A.2d at 202.
166. See id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. §§ 26-305(a)(1)(i), 26-305(a)(3)(i), 26-
305(c)(2), 26-305(e) (YEAR)); see also Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 279-80, 412 A.2d 396,
400 (1980) (acknowledging an earlier court's ruling that "the term debt does not include
fines or penalties levied against one who has been adjudged in violation of the public
law"); Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 564, 87 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1913) (ruling that the mone-
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In addition, the University contended that disclosure of the docu-
ments would be against the public interest and therefore in violation
of the MPIA. 16 7 The University argued that the Act allows "permissi-
ble denials" if the disclosure would be against the public's interest.1"'
According to the University, the disclosure of the records was contrary
to the public interest because it would have a "chilling effect" on the
reporting of violations by the University to the NCAA, and it would
discourage students from reporting violations.169 The court rejected
this public interest argument, stating that these records did not fall
within any of the "permissible denials" categories in the MPIA. 170
The University further asserted that disclosure would be "an un-
warranted invasion of privacy," because it would be humiliating for
the student-athletes and their families. 17 The court responded that if
an adult commits a criminal offense, "it is doubtful that any 'invasion
of privacy' occasioned by an accurate newspaper report of the matter
is 'unwarranted.' 172 Furthermore, the court contended that the un-
warranted invasion of privacy exemption applies only if the records
are covered under the Act.173 The court already determined that
these records were not "personnel" or "financial," and therefore were
not covered by the Act. 41 7
The court next discussed the University's arguments under
FERPA. 175 FERPA provides that federal funds will be withheld from
any university that has a "policy or practice of permitting the release
of education records.' 1 6 Education records are defined under the
Act as "those records . . . which (i) contain information directly re-
lated to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency
or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution. "177
The court reviewed the legislative history of this broad definition of
education records and determined that it showed "an intent to stop
the widespread dissemination of education records" to those other
tary penalty authorized by statute for "operating a motor vehicle without a license" is a fine
and not a debt).
167. See Kirwan, 352 Md. 87-88, 721 A.2d at 202 (citing MPIA § 10-618).
168. See id. at 88, 721 A.2d at 202-03; see also supra notes 46-47 (discussing "required"
versus "permissible" denials under the MPIA).
169. See Kirwan, 352 Md. at 88, 721 A.2d at 202.
170. Id. at 88, 721 A.2d at 203.
171. Id. (citing MPIA § 10-612).
172. Id. at 88-89, 721 A.2d at 203.
173. Id. at 89, 721 A.2d at 203.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 89-90, 721 A.2d at 203-04 (quoting FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (4) (A).
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than students and their parents.1 7 8 According to the court, Congress
was also concerned "with the systematic violation of students' pri-
vacy."' 179 The court concluded that the statute was not intended to
preclude release of any document containing the name of a student;
rather, it was intended to keep confidential "those aspects of a stu-
dent's educational life that relate to academic matters or status as a
student."
18 0
The court cited several cases that ruled that records similar to
those in Kirwan were not "educational records."'' In Red & Black
Publishing v. Board of Regents,l" 2 the Supreme Court of Georgia held
that records from a student court which imposed disciplinary penal-
ties on sororities and fraternities were not educational under
FERPA. as3 The Georgia court argued that the records did not relate
to individual academic performance, financial aid, or scholastic pro-
bation.1"4 Following Red & Black, the court in Kirwan concluded that
the requested records were not "educational" because they did not fit
these criteria.'8 5 The Kirwan court also discussed the Supreme Court
of Ohio's opinion in The Miami Student v. Miami University,"8 6 which
held that records of a university disciplinary board are not education
records as defined in FERPA.'1 7 According to the court in Miami Stu-
dent as cited by Kirwan, the records "are nonacademic in nature" and
"do not contain educationally related information, such as grades or
other academic data, and are unrelated to academic performance, fi-
nancial aid, or scholastic performance." "8
The court also cited Bauer v. Kincaid,89 a United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri case, which held that cam-
pus criminal investigations and incident reports maintained by a uni-
versity department were not education records.'90 In Kirwan, both
the University and the court relied on Belanger v. Nashua,19' a New
178. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 90, 721 A.2d at 204.
179. Id. (citing Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 72, 602 A.2d 1247, 1256 (1992) (finding that
the FERPA exemption for disclosure in compliance with a judicial order "does not mean
that a student's privacy or confidentiality interest is automatically overridden").
180. Id. at 91, 721 A.2d at 204.
181. Id. at 91-94, 721 A.2d at 204-06.
182. 427 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1993).
183. Id. at 261.
184. Id.
185. Kirvan, 352 Md. at 94, 721 A.2d at 206.
186. 680 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1997).
187. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 92, 721 A.2d at 205 (citing Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 959).
188. Id. (quoting Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 959).
189. 759 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
190. Id. at 591.
191. 856 F. Supp. 40 (D.N.H. 1994).
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Hampshire case which discussed Bauer.19 2 The Belanger court held
that records requested by the parent of a sixteen-year-old education-
ally disabled student, concerning a juvenile court order that placed
this student in a residential education facility, were educational under
FERPA.'93 The Kirwan court noted that the Belanger court distin-
guished Bauer by arguing that the records in Bauer "were not the 'type
of information created in the natural course of an individual's status
as a student,"' and were therefore excluded from FERPA.'94 Also, the
Belanger court argued that the plaintiff in Bauer was not a party who
was permitted access to education records under FERPA (plaintiff was
not the student or the student's parent), whereas, in Belanger, the per-
son seeking access was the student's parent. 95 The Kirwan court
agreed that the records in Belanger were "clearly education records,
directly concerned with which school and education plan would be
best for the student.
'1 96
The court claimed, however, that the facts of the present case
were more similar to cases such as Miami Student and Red & Black. a9 7
Therefore, the court held that records of parking tickets or correspon-
dence between the NCAA and the University accepting a loan to pay
for the tickets were not educational records under FERPA.198
The court also held that the trial court was correct in declining to
award counsel fees to The Diamondback.'99 According to MPIA § 10-
623(f), counsel fees may be awarded "[ilf the court determines that
the complainant has substantially prevailed. ' 20 0 Because The Diamond-
back "substantially prevailed," the court needed only to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award attor-
ney's fees. 20 1 Upon balancing the public benefit of the disclosure
against the University's interest in withholding the information, the
court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding
not to award counsel fees, because the University's refusal to disclose
192. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 93, 721 A.2d at 205.
193. Id. (citing Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 50).
194. Id. at 93-94, 721 A.2d at 205 (quoting Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 50 (quoting Bauer,
759 F. Supp. at 590)).
195. See id. at 94, 721 A.2d at 205 (citing Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 50).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 93-94, 721 A.2d at 205-06.
198. Id. at 94, 721 A.2d at 206.
199. See id. at 97, 721 A.2d at 207.
200. MPIA § 10-623(0.
201. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 96, 721 A.2d at 206.
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the information was not entirely unwarranted in light of the broad
definition of "education records" in FERPA.21 2
4. Analysis.-
a. What is Missing in Kirwan: Alternative Arguments under
FERPA and MPIA.-In Kirwan, both the University and the Court of
Appeals failed to consider several key arguments. First, the University
did not advance the proper arguments to show that the definition of
"educational" in FERPA covered the correspondence or that the cor-
respondence was a personnel record under the MPIA. The records
should have been found "educational" because of FERPA's broad defi-
nition of "educational," case law that considers disciplinary records
similar to this correspondence to be "educational," and the nature of
a student-athlete's educational environment. 203 Both the University
and the court failed to acknowledge the possible breadth of FERPA
and the numerous arguments to be made in favor of finding that the
records were educational records. The court acknowledgecd briefly, as
an aside at the end of the case, that FERPA could be read broadly to
encompass these records as educational, but failed to acknowledge
relevant case law and arguments for this.2°4 Furthermore, the corre-
spondence between the University and the NCAA, as opposed to the
tickets received by the coach, could be classified as "personnel"
records, because the correspondence directly related to the coach's
status as a school employee. 0 5
Second, the Court of Appeals did not properly balance the inter-
ests at stake in analyzing a request under MPIA, as it failed to consider
certain policy concerns. These oversights by both the University and
the court resulted in a failure to acknowledge the point of the balanc-
ing tests of both FERPA and MPIA. According to relevant case law
and interpretations of the statutes, there are strong arguments to be
made that disclosure of the correspondence was against both public
and private interests.
202. Id. at 96-97, 721 A.2d at 207. Furthermore, the court noted that there was no pre-
cedent in Maryland case law, nor much case law elsewhere, concerning the specific issues
in Kirwan. Id.
203. See infra notes 206-221 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why FERPA
should cover the records involved in Kirwan).
204. Kinan, 352 Md. at 96-97, 721 A.2d at 207.
205. See infta notes 222-225 and accompanying text (discussing that the correspondence
concerning the violations could be considered "personnel records" because they relate to
Coach Williams' status and actions as a school employee).
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b. Correspondence Records are "Educational" under the FERPA.-
The language of the FERPA requires a finding that the records in
Kirwan are educational records. FERPA defines "educational records"
as those which "contain information directly related to a student" and
which are "maintained by an educational agency or institution."2 6 In
Kirwan, the correspondence concerned, and therefore was "directly
related to," the suspension of a student-athlete and was maintained by
an "educational agency," the University.20 7 Towards the end of the
court's decision, the court acknowledged that FERPA could be read
broadly in this manner;20 8 however, it does not elaborate on this inter-
pretation. The Kirwan court did rely on one court's opinion that held
that a narrow interpretation of the statutory language was inappropri-
ate, and therefore, it was not necessary for a court to look beyond the
plain meaning of the statute to find that records were educational.20 9
Kirwan is distinguishable from other cases that have held that
records similar to this correspondence are not educational. In Miami
Student v. Miami University,"' ° the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
records of the University Disciplinary Board, dealing with infractions
by students, were not "education records" as defined by FERPA.211
The Miami Student dissent, however, argued that the disciplinary
records were education records212 and cited caselaw illustrating the
broad nature of FERPA.213 Also, the Kirwan court failed to mention
that the Miami Student court did not require the full disclosure of the
records, but rather only required disclosure of general information
about the incident and the student perpetrator.214
206. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (4) (A) (1994).
207. See Kirwan, 352 Md. at 79, 721 A.2d at 198. The Diamondback requested "copies of all
correspondence between the University and the NCAA involving the student-athlete who
was suspended and any other related correspondence during February 1996." Id.
208. Id. at 96, 721 A.2d at 207.
209. Id. at 93, 721 A.2d at 205 (citing Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire Sch. Dist, 856
F. Supp. 40, 50 (D.N.H. 1994)). The Belangercourt stated that "[t]he plain meaning of the
statutory language [of FERPA] reveals that Congress intended for the definition to be
broad in its scope." Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 48.
210. 680 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1997).
211. Id. at 959.
212. Id. at 960 (Lundberg, Stratton, JJ., dissenting). In 1995, Congress passed an amend-
ment to regulations implementing FERPA, which laid out a clear definition of "law en-
forcement records." See id. at 961 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 99.8). The dissent noted that in the
amendment the "Secretary of Education clarified that disciplinary records were always in-
cluded as education records under FERPA."
213. Id. at 961.
214. Id. at 959. The court ordered that
Miami University may delete from the UDB records the student's name, Social
Security Number, and student identification number. The exact date and time of
the alleged incident may also be deleted, since this constitutes other information
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The Kirwan court found that the Belanger case was distinguishable
from Kirwan.21 5 In doing so, the court again failed to allow for the
possibility of a broader interpretation of FERPA. The Belanger court
argued that educational records should be the "type of information
created in the natural course of an individual's status as a student.
216
The Kirwan court argued that "[t]he records involved in the Belanger
case were clearly education records, directly concerned with which
school and education plan would be best for the student."217 The Kir-
wan court failed, however, to take this argument one step further to
cover all student records that become part of the student's educa-
tional experience.
The University could have made the argument to disclose only a
certain amount of information, as in the court's decision in Miami
Student.218 In addition, the Kirwan court could have relied on DTH
Publishing, a case in which the court held that to allow an open disci-
plinary proceeding would jeopardize the privacy of individual students
and therefore the University's Undergraduate Court was allowed to
hold disciplinary proceedings in closed session. 21' The court, borrow-
ing the parties' stipulations that it "is impossible to hold a student
disciplinary hearing without divulging student records as defined
under FERPA or personally identifiable information contained
therein," held that the records were confidential educational records
under FERPA.221 In Kirwan, the newspaper requested the University
to release information about an individual student that was identifi-
that may lead to the identity of the student. The university must disclose, how-
ever, the general location of the incident, the age and sex of the student (which
does not identify the student), the nature of the offense, and the type of discipli-
nary penalty imposed.
Id. at 959-60.
215. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 94, 721 A.2d at 205-06.
216. Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 50 (D.N.H. 1994)
(quoting Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 590 (W.D. Mo. 1991)); see supra notes 190-196
(examining the Kirwan court's discussion of Belanger).
217. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 94, 721 A.2d at 205. The Belangercourt had properly concluded
that "the records maintained by the District, from whatever source they may have been
obtained, have a direct bearing on his placement and educational plan." Belanger, 856 F.
Supp. at 50.
218. See Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 959; see supra note 214 (describing the court's
decision to allow for partial disclosure).
219. DTH Publ'g v. University of N.C., 496 S.E.2d 8, 16 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
220. Id. at 13. FERPA provides that an educational institution will be denied funding if
the education records or any personally identifiable information contained in the record
other than directory information is disclosed to any third parties without the written con-
sent of the student's parents, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1), or the written consent of the stu-
dent where the student attends a postsecondary education institution, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(d). See Connoisseur Communication of Flint v. University of Mich., 584 N.W.2d
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able to that student.221 The University could have argued, in the alter-
native, for the release of only non-identifiable information about the
student. Of course, there is still the concern that a prominent basket-
ball player may be easily identifiable even if the minimum amount of
information is released about him.
c. Correspondence "Personnel" Records Under MPIA. -The Uni-
versity argued that records of parking tickets received by Coach Wil-
liams were personnel records and therefore nondisclosable under the
MPIA.2 22 The University, however, failed to make the argument that
the correspondence between the NCAA and the University involving
the suspension was directly related to the personnel file of the coach.
The Court of Appeals easily could have found that the correspon-
dence fell within the part of MPIA limiting public access to personnel
records.
According to the court in Kirwan, the legislative intent for the
meaning of "personnel records" includes those records that "directly
pertain to employment and an employee's ability to perform ajob.'223
Furthermore, "the common meaning of a personnel record is 'a re-
cord that identifies an employee, is kept by the employer, and related
to matters like hiring, firing, promotion, discipline, or dismissal of the
employee.' ' 2 24 Under this definition, it could be argued that the cor-
respondence concerning the payment of these tickets and the result-
ing violations of NCAA rules are directly related to Coach Williams's
status as an employee, because the violations and resulting suspension
concern his conduct in his role as a school employee. 225
d. Disclosure and the Public Interest.-The court's "balancing
of interests" involved an examination of whether or not the disclosure
of the records was an "unwarranted invasion of privacy," as defined
647, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a "Student-Athlete Automobile Information
Sheet" was an education record precluded from disclosure without consent under FERPA).
221. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 79, 721 A.2d at 198.
222. See id. at 82, 721 A.2d at 199-200.
223. Id. at 83, 721 A.2d at 200.
224. Id. at 84, 721 A.2d at 201 (citing 78 Att'y Gen. Op. 297 (1993), which cites Michi-
gan Prof'l Employees Soc'y v. DNR, 482 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Mich. App. 1992)); see also Provi-
dence Journal v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I. 1990) (stating that personnel records
include "employment history, qualifications, job classifications, status within the civil ser-
vice system .... work schedule .... and overtime history").
225. The basis for the NCAA investigations in Kinwan was the acceptance by a student-
athlete of money from a former coach to pay the student's parking tickets, Coach Wil-
liams's parking violations, and the preferential treatment shown to the basketball team in
terms of parking fines imposed. See Kirwan, 352 Md. at 79, 721 A.2d at 198.
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under the MPIA.2 26 An analysis under the MPIA, however, generally
invites a balancing of other interests also.2 27 The court should have
considered other factors to determine whether the invasion of privacy
was "unwarranted." The confidentiality of these records is not "unwar-
ranted" when one balances the effect on the students and their educa-
tional experience, the effect on the NCAA investigation, the level of
public safety at risk, and the tradition of access to such records. Fur-
thermore, the records should not have been released under FERPA
because they were not released to the entitled persons under that
Act.
2 28
In Kirwan, the court argued that the unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy was not even a consideration because the records did not fall
under the "personnel" or "financial" categories within MPIA, which
are "required denials" for disclosure under MPIA.2 29 Even if the
records did not fall under "required denials," however, there are nu-
merous reasons that disclosure is "unwarranted."
The court contended that this invasion of privacy is not "unwar-
ranted" because it is appropriate to disclose publicly records of an
adult's violations, and that the "extreme embarrassment" of the stu-
dents is outweighed by the need to disclose the violations. 23" The
court, however, did not consider the detrimental effect such publicity
would have on the students' educational experience. It is possible
that such publicity would affect the academic achievement, social in-
teraction, and athletic experience of the students involved.
Furthermore, the court failed to consider the effect its holding
would have on the NCAA investigation. In Maryland Committee Against
the Gun Ban,2 1 the Court of Appeals ruled that the release of records
would damage the confidentiality of investigations of police of-
ficers.23 2 Similarly, disclosing the information about the NCAA inves-
226. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 88, 721 A.2d at 203.
227. See, e.g., Child Protection Group v. Cline, 350 S.E.2d 541, 543 (W. Va. 1986) (apply-
ing a five-factor test to the issue of disclosure of information, including the level of invasion
of privacy, the extent of the public interest, the expectation of confidentiality, the availabil-
ity of the information from other sources, and the ability to craft relief to limit the privacy
invasion).
228. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1) (describing those to whom disclosure would be permit-
ted without consent).
229. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 89, 721 A.2d at 203; see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text
(discussing "required" and "permissible" denials under the MPIA).
230. Kirwan, 352 Md. at 88, 721 A.2d at 203.
231. 329 Md. 78, 617 A.2d 1040 (1993).
232. Id. at 97, 617 A.2d at 1049.
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tigation before it is completed could impact negatively the
enforcement and investigation process.233
In addition, in balancing the public's interest in safety against the
necessity for disclosure, the court should have looked at the risk to
public safety involved. In Miami Student, the information released
concerned crime statistics on campus. 234 These records differed from
those in Kirwan because of the nature of the offenses; the Miami Stu-
dent records included criminal offenses such as physical and sexual
assaults, "which may or may not be turned over to local law enforce-
ment agencies. "235 Public safety was clearly at issue in Miami Student,
thus requiring disclosure, whereas NCAA violations, though serious,
do not endanger the public safety in this way. Similarly, in Burke, the
disclosure and the fee waiver were permitted partly because of the
public health hazards involved.23 6 In Kirwan, no such compelling
public interest in safety was implicated. It appears that the Kirwan
court ignored precedent by failing to weigh these other interests.
Another consideration the court failed to acknowledge was the
"tradition of access" to the requested records. Some cases, such as the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Kneeland, have held that the NCAA is not a
governmental body and, therefore, its records are not open to the
public.23 7 Other courts, however, have found intercollegiate athletic
conferences to be partially publicly funded and, therefore, subject to
open records laws.238 Furthermore, access to a university's records
has been denied by some courts, partly on the basis that there is no
233. See supra notes 143-149 (discussing the detrimental effect that releasing NCAA
records could have on the investigatory and enforcement process of the NCAA).
234. Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 680 N.E.2d 956, 957 (Ohio 1997); see also supra
notes 110-116 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion in
Miami Student).
235. Miami Student, 680 N.E. 2d at 959. As explained by the court, "the University Disci-
plinary Board adjudicates cases involving infractions of student rules and regulations, such
as underage drinking, but may also hear criminal matters, including physical and sexual
assault offenses, which may or may not be turned over to local law enforcement agencies."
Id.
236. Mayor of Baltimore v. Burke, 67 Md. App. 147, 157, 506 A.2d 683, 688 (1986)
(finding that the health hazards associated with a sewage treatment plant weighed in favor
of disclosure).
237. See Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 850 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir.
1988); see also supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text (discussing the Kneeland court's
holding).
238. See, e.g., Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 350
S.E.2d 23, 24-25 (Ga. 1986) (finding that documents belonging to the University of Geor-
gia Athletic Association constituted public records disclosable under the Open Records
Act).
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"tradition of access" to such records. 2 9 A university disciplinary body
and the NCAA are not judicial bodies that are comparable to the
court system. 24" Thus, they do not have the same "tradition of access"
as do civil courts, and the necessary safeguards, such as due process,
may not be available.2 41
The court also incorrectly interpreted FERPA. The court not
only failed to find that the records are educational, but it also failed to
mention that the records could not be released to the newspaper even
if FERPA applied. The newspaper is not a party to whom records
under FERPA can be released without consent: a student or the stu-
dent's parent.24 2 Thus, the newspaper is a third-party with no right of
access to education records. The Belanger court discusses this by ex-
plaining that "[t] he intent of FERPA is to protect not only the privacy
of students, but to ensure that parents have access to their children's
education records that are used to make crucial decisions about their
children's future."
243
The Kirwan court argued that the release of these documents was
not an "unwarranted invasion of privacy" as set forth in MPIA.244 As
argued above, however, the release of actual names and identifiable
information is "unwarranted,"2 45 for it is not necessary for the newspa-
per to have access to the full records, but rather, only to have access to
certain information. The court in Kirwan could redact all but the
most basic information concerning the student-athletes. This would
preserve the anonymity of the students, thereby avoiding the "invasion
of privacy" concerns. The public's interest in these records extends
only so far; it is not necessary for the public to know the specific
names of the students or even the specifics of the situation. The goal
of deterring future NCAA violations would not be affected by releas-
ing only minimal information, because the public would still know
that the suspension and the investigation occurred. Basketball players
at a large university are very identifiable, and therefore it might be
239. DTH Publ'g Corp. v. University of North Carolina, 496 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) (contrasting the university court, to which there is no tradition of access, with civil
and criminal trials which have historically been open to the public).
240. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text (describing the tradition of access
afforded to civil and criminal proceedings).
241. See DTH, 496 S.E.2d at 15.
242. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (1) (A) (1994). Section 1232g(b)(1) sets forth those enti-
ties to whom information may be disclosed without consent, and a school newspaper is not
included among them. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1) (A)-().
243. Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 52 (D.N.H. 1994).
244. Kinwan, 352 Md. at 89, 721 A.2d at 203.
245. Id.
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difficult to release the minimum amount of information that will not
identify the individuals.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals in Kirwan failed to recog-
nize certain case law and statutory interpretations regarding FERPA
and state and federal FOIA statutes. Similarly, the University of Mary-
land failed to make stronger arguments under both FERPA and
MPIA. As a result, the records requested by The Diamondback are mis-
characterized, and important arguments concerning public and pri-
vate interests are not acknowledged in the Kinran opinion. The
court's opinion, while following some federal and state precedent,
does not explore these alternative arguments under MPIA and
FERPA.
TONI A. ROTH
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
IX. EVIDENCE
A. An Arbitrary Denial of Defendants' Right to Compulsory Process and
Due Process of Law Through the Per Se Exclusion of the Hypnotically
Enhanced Testimony of Defense Witnesses
In Burral v. State,' the Court of Appeals considered whether the
per se exclusion of hypnotically enhanced testimony by a defense wit-
ness in a state criminal trial infringed on the defendant's constitu-
tional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 The
court answered in the negative, holding that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process did not entitle him to pre-
sent the testimony of a witness whose memory was hypnotically en-
hanced.3 In reaching its conclusion, the court narrowly interpreted
the Supreme Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas4 and stated that any
constitutional protection granted to the defendant in presenting hyp-
notically enhanced testimony as part of the defense was restricted to
the testimony of the defendant in a criminal trial.5 The court sup-
ported its holding by emphasizing that hypnosis as a memory en-
hancer was not accepted in the relevant scientific community and thus
failed to satisfy the Frye standard.6 In the same breath, the court af-
1. 352 Md. 707, 724 A.2d 65 (1999).
2. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in hisfavo, and to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Fourteenth Amendment, section one,
states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
3. Burra4 352 Md. at 741, 724 A.2d at 81.
4. 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (holding that Arkansas's per se rule excluding all post-hyp-
nosis testimony infringed impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his own
behalf); see also infra notes 119-130 (discussing the holding in Rock v. Arkansas).
5. Burral 352 Md. at 730, 724 A.2d at 76 (referring to the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Rock v. Arkansas that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments give the defendant
in a criminal trial the constitutional right to present his own hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony as part of his defense); see also infra notes 119-130 (discussing the holding in Rock v.
Arkansas).
6. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing a standard
to evaluate the admissibility of scientific evidence testimony based on reliability of the evi-
dence in the relevant scientific community); see also Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391
A.2d 364, 372 (1978) (adopting the Frye standard in Maryland to govern the admissibility of
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firmed the use of hypnosis as a valid and acceptable tool for police
investigations. 7 In so ruling, the court denied the defendant his fun-
damental rights guaranteed under both the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Furthermore, the majority allowed the State, in the
early part of its investigation, to expose a potential defense witness to
hypnosis and, as a result, eliminated the possibility of using that wit-
ness's testimony as part of the defense.
1. The Case.-In the early morning of February 27, 1989, Jeffrey
Fiddler's body was found in a ditch next to Interstate 81 in Penn-
sylvania, just over the Pennsylvania/Maryland border.' The medical
examiner determined that the cause of death was a stab wound to the
chest, causing heavy bleeding and that it was likely that death oc-
curred within a half-hour of the injury.9 Based in part on the fact that
there was very little blood in the area where the body was found, the
Pennsylvania police determined that the death had occurred else-
where and that the body had been moved after death.10
After a preliminary investigation, the Pennsylvania authorities
concluded that the crime had probably been committed in Maryland,
and the Hagerstown police forcejoined the Pennsylvania police in the
investigation.11 Initially, the investigators' primary suspect was Robert
Schell, and in August 1989, Schell was arrested. 2 Schell was soon re-
leased when Jimmy Fiddler, the victim's brother, exonerated him.1"
Later in the investigation, the Hagerstown police learned that the de-
fendant, Lewis William Burral, had met with Jeffrey Fiddler and Eddie
and Willie Stouffer in Clear Spring, Maryland, on the night of the
murder.14 The men met at the home of Willie Stouffer's girlfriend
and drove into the mountains.' 5 While in the mountains, according
to one of Burral's inconsistent statements to the police, Eddie Stouffer
expert opinion evidence based on scientific technique); Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480, 494
n.10, 663 A.2d 1289, 1295-96 n.10 (1995) (reaffirming the Frye/Reed standard despite the
Supreme Court's holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-
87 (1993), that the Frye test was superceded by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
7. Burral 352 Md. at 740, 724 A.2d at 81.
8. See id. at 709, 724 A.2d at 65-66.
9. See Burral v. State, 118 Md. App. 288, 291, 702 A.2d 781, 782 (1997), affd by Burral
v. State, 352 Md. 707, 724 A.2d 65 (1999).
10. See Burra4 352 Md. at 709, 724 A.2d at 66.
11. See id. The victim was a resident of Hagerstown, Maryland. See id.
12. See id. at 710, 724 A.2d at 66.
13. See id. at 710-11, 724 A.2d at 66.
14. See Burral, 118 Md. App. at 292, 702 A.2d at 783 (noting that this was just one of
several versions of the events occurring the night of the murder encountered by the police
during their investigation).
15. See id. at 295, 702 A.2d at 784.
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stabbed Jeffrey Fiddler.16 Then, Burral and Stouffer put the body in
the back of the car, and soon after, dumped the body into the ditch
where it was discovered the next day.' 7
Burral was arrested for the murder in September 1995.18 The
issue of hypnotically enhanced testimony arose at trial when the de-
fendant attempted to introduce the testimony of Lisa Wallech, the vic-
tim's girlfriend at the time he was killed.19 The trial court excluded
the testimony.2z Wallech's post-hypnotic account of the evening was
important to the defense because it placed responsibility for the mur-
der on Schell and not on Burral. z1 In addition, Wallech's account
directly contradicted the testimony of Jimmy Fiddler, a witness for the
State. 2 Jimmy Fiddler testified that on the evening of his brother's
murder, he, Schell, and several others, including Lisa Wallech, gath-
ered at Schell's home. 3 At some point in the evening, Jimmy and
Schell got into an argument.24 According to Jimmy, he attempted to
leave, but Schell followed him, and the two got into a wrestling match
in front of the house.2 5 Jimmy stated that his brother, Jeffrey, was not
there that evening and had not been involved in any fight with
Schell.26
The police in the beginning of the investigation interviewed Wal-
lech, and on August 25, 1999, she gave a written statement to a police
detective named Johnson, generally confirming the account given by
Jimmy Fiddler and by Schell.27 Wallech stated that she, Schell, Jimmy,
and a few other people, not including Jeffrey, were at Schell's apart-
ment "partying" and drinking beginning at 7:30 in the evening. 2
Sometime between 2:30 to 3:00 am, Wallech stated that she sawJimmy
and Schell fighting outside. 29 At the time that Wallech gave that state-
ment, Schell was the primary suspect and had already been arrested.30
Detective Johnson asked Wallech repeatedly if she was sure that the
16. See Burral 352 Md. at 711, 724 A.2d at 67.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 713, 724 A.2d at 67.
20. See id. at 716, 724 A.2d at 69.
21. See id. at 715, 724 A.2d at 69.
22. See id. at 714-15, 724 A.2d at 68-69.











fight had occurred between fimmy Fiddler and Schell, and not be-
tween Schell and Jeffrey Fiddler. Wallech confirmed that the fight
was between Jimmy and Schell, and stated that she could "almost
swear it."32 Detective Johnson repeatedly pressed her on this point,
and when still unconvinced, Detective Johnson arranged for Ms. Wal-
lech to be hypnotized.33
On September 15, 1989, Maryland State Police Sergeant Dan Sei-
ler conducted the scheduled hypnosis session with Lisa Wallech.34
During the hypnosis session, Sergeant Seiler obtained a different ver-
sion of the events occurring on February 26, 1989, and February 27,
1989. a  Under hypnosis, Wallech recalled and was "positive" that the
fight that she had witnessed on the night of the murder was between
Schell and Jeffrey and not between Schell and Jimmy.36 She also re-
called that during the fight, she saw Schell hit Jeffrey with a knife and
that Jeffrey's back and hands were slashed. Wallech stated that she
had consumed "at least 12 to 13 beers" that evening and was unable,
prior to the hypnosis, to remember the fight because she had been
"under the influence of alcohol."3 8
When Burral called Wallech as a witness at trial, the State ob-
jected to any testimony beyond what Wallech had told the police prior
to the hypnosis.39 Wallech identified the August 25, 1989 pre-hypno-
sis statement that she had given to the police and confirmed that it
accurately recorded what she had said at the time.4" She also identi-
fied the post-hypnosis statement given on September 16, 1989.4' After
hearing the argument, the trial court "determined that Wallech's
memory as to who was fighting with Schell was inextricably tied to the
hypnosis and that any testimony as to that matter would therefore be
inadmissible."42
31. See id. at 714, 724 A.2d at 68.
32. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 714-15, 724 A.2d at 68.
37. See id. at 715, 724 A.2d at 68. According to Wallech, "the fight was not just a wres-
fling match or fistfight." Id.; see also supra note 25 (referring to Jimmy Fiddler's statement
that the fight was a wrestling match).
38. Burral, 352 Md. at 715, 724 A.2d at 68-69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. See id., 724 A.2d at 69.
40. See id. at 715-16, 724 A.2d at 69.
41. See id. at 716, 724 A.2d at 69.
42. Id.
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Based on the evidence presented, Burral was convicted of second-
degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for thirty years.43 The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed that judgment,44 and the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the court erred in af-
firming the exclusion of Wallech's hypnotically enhanced testimony.45
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause and the Na-
ture of Fundamental Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.-In Gideon v. Wainwright,46 the United States Supreme Court
recognized that defendants in criminal state trials had certain funda-
mental rights, stating that provisions of the Bill of Rights that are
"'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' [are] made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."47 In Gideon, the Supreme
Court reviewed whether an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion in a state court had a constitutional right to have counsel ap-
pointed for him.48  The Court answered in the affirmative,
43. See id.
44. See Burral v. State, 118 Md. App. 288, 293, 702 A.2d 781, 783 (1997).
45. See Burra4 352 Md. at 716, 724 A.2d at 69.
46. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47. Id. at 342 (affirming the general assumption in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473
(1942), that "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right
... " but overruling Betts's ultimate holding that the Constitution does not guarantee the
assistance of counsel); seeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.02B,
at 44 (1997) ("[A] right is fundamental if: it is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty; a 'fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without [it]'; it is 'at
the base of all our civil and political institutions'; its denial would 'offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking people'; or it
is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice'; or conduct in derogation of the right
'shocks the conscience.'").
48. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338 (granting certiorari to determine whether the Court's
holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), should be reconsidered). In Betts, the defen-
dant was indicted for robbery, and due to lack of funds, was unable to obtain the assistance
of counsel. Betts, 316 U.S. at 457. Betts asked the court to appoint counsel for him, but his
request was denied, and he was later found guilty by the Maryland state court. See id.
While serving his sentence, he filed "a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he
had been deprived of the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. The United States Supreme Court awarded
the writ of habeas corpus but ultimately held that the assistance of counsel was not a funda-
mental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 473.
The Gideon Court recognized that the facts in Gideon bore a remarkable similarity to
those in Betts, and acknowledged that if Betts's holding was left standing, Gideon's claim
would have to be denied. Id. at 339. The Court stated:
Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable,
we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject
Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel.
Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL. 59:743
characterizing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a
fundamental right and applying the Sixth Amendment to the states
through incorporation into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
49
In Washington v. Texas,50 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor [in a criminal trial
was] . . . applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'" In Washington, the criminal defendant was denied the use of
the eyewitness testimony of a co-conspirator because a state statute
made such testimony inadmissible and was subsequently convicted.52
The Supreme Court reversed.53 Chief Justice Warren delivered the
opinion of the Court, stating that "l[t] he right to offer the testimony of
witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain
terms the right to present a defense." 54 The Court explained that like
other rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 55 the accused had
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense and that
this right was a fundamental element of due process of law.56 The
Id.
49. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-45; see also supra note 2 (providing the text of the Sixth
Amendment). All the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment after Gideon, have subse-
quently been held to be fundamental. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
(right to trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (right to compulsory
process and right to public trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967)
(right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (right to confront wit-
nesses); see also Jennie L. Caissie, Passing the Victims' Rights Amendment: A Nation's March
Toward a More Perfect Union, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIrV. CONFINEMENT 647, 661 (1998).
According to Caissie,
[t] he Warren Court, in addressing which fundamental rights are owed to criminal
defendants in both state and federal courts, expanded the defendant's rights, by
incorporating them into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court made
the Bill of Rights a reality for all defendants in criminal proceedings. In doing so,
the Court safeguarded the fundamental rights of the individual, from the dangers
posed by both the federal and state governments.
Id. at 661 (footnotes omitted).
50. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
51. See id. at 14-15.
52. See id. at 19. The two Texas statutes at issue "provided... that persons charged or
convicted as coparticipants in the same crime could not testify for one another," although
they could testify for the State. Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
53. See id. at 23.
54. Id. at 19.
55. See id. (referring to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause); see also supra
note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of all clauses within the Sixth
Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
56. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19 ("Just as an accused has the right to confront the prose-
cution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to pre-
sent his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of law.").
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Court also commented that it was difficult to see how arbitrary rules
preventing whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying,
based on a presumption that they were not credible, could be consti-
tutional.57 Therefore, the Court concluded that the petitioner had
been "denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor because the State had arbitrarily denied him the
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally
capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the
defense.""8
The Supreme Court affirmed its recognition of the applicability
of the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process clause to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Chambers v. Mississippi.59 In
Chambers, the trial court had applied Mississippi hearsay rules to ex-
clude vital portions of the testimony of three key defense witnesses.6 °
After the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.6" The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the exclusion of critical evidence under the hearsay rule,62
coupled with the state's refusal to permit the defendant to cross-ex-
57. Id. at 22. The Court stated:
In light of the common-law history, and in view of the [Court's] recognition ...
that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part to make the testimony of a defen-
dant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court, it could hardly be argued that a
State would not violate the clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as
a matter of procedural law. It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less
violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from
testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.
Id.
58. Id. at 23. The Court explained that the framers of the Constitution did not intend
to give a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses, and then refuse to
allow the witness to present her testimony. See id.
59. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
60. Id. at 292-93.
61. Id. at 285; see also Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971) (affirming
Chambers's conviction).
62. See id. at 298.
The hearsay rule . . . is ... grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are tradi-
tionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they
are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker
with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-
examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility
may be assessed by the jury.
Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
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amine a witness, denied him a fair trial in accordance with traditional
and fundamental standards of due process. 63
The Chambers Court noted that the hearsay comments involved
were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circum-
stances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability.64
The Court concluded by emphasizing the importance of the compul-
sory process clause, stating that "[f]ew rights are more fundamental
than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense,"65 and
that "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment
of guilt are implicated,"66 a state evidentiary rule, in this case, the
hearsay rule, "may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends
of justice."67
One year later, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon,6"
issued another decision discussing compulsory process and due pro-
cess rights as related to the availability of evidence. In Nixon, the
Court recognized that the right to the production of all evidence at a
criminal trial was constitutionally based and that " [t] he Sixth Amend-
ment explicitly confer[red] upon every defendant in a criminal trial
the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' and to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."69 The Court
emphasized that "[t] he very integrity of the judicial system . . .de-
pend [s] on full disclosure of all the facts .... To ensure that justice is
done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by
the prosecution or by the defense."7 The Court also addressed the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process and emphasized that for
63. See id. at 302 ("We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled
with the State's refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial
in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process.").
64. See id. at 300 (noting that the declarant's confessions were made spontaneously and
shortly after the murder had occurred, that each hearsay statement was corroborated by
other evidence in the case, including multiple independent confessions, and that the con-
fession in this case was self-incriminating and against the declarant's own interest).
65. Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 418 U.S. 683 (1973). In Nixon, the President of the United States was issued a
subpoena duces tecum to compel production of tape recordings and documents contain-
ing important information, which were unavailable from any other source. See id. at 686.
The President challenged the subpoena, claiming that he had a privilege against disclosure
of confidential communications. See id. at 688.
69. Id. at 711.
70. Id. at 709.
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the courts to protect effectively this guarantee, it was essential that all
relevant and admissible evidence be produced.71
b. Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony.-In the last thirty years,
courts and scholars have struggled to resolve whether hypnotically en-
hanced testimony should be admitted in criminal trials.72 While some
courts were loath to keep out a possible means of discovering the
truth, other courts feared that hypnosis would produce unreliable re-
sults and serve as a potential tool for fabrication of testimony. 73 In
addressing this dilemma, courts have taken a number of approaches
to control the presentation of hypnotically enhanced testimony in
criminal trials.74
71. See id. at 711 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to
vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and ad-
missible evidence be produced."); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NowAK, TREA-
TISE ON CONST. L. § 18.41, at 799 & n.3 (3d ed. 1999) ("The due process clause of the fifth
amendment, like the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, guarantees a de-
fendant a fair process . . . ").
72. See, e.g., Francis P. Kuplicki, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments-A Constitutional
Paradigm for Determining the Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 78J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOcV 853 (1988) (arguing that hypnotically enhanced testimony offered by the
defense in criminal trials should generally be admitted and that hypnotically refreshed
testimony offered by the prosecution should generally be excluded); Gary M. Shaw, The
Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 6-13
(1991) (reviewing the history of hypnotically enhanced testimony in criminal trials and
concluding that it should never be admissible).
73. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702-03, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044-45 (1983) (find-
ing hypnotically enhanced testimony too unreliable, and thus, inadmissible); Harding v.
State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246-47, 246 A.2d 302, 311-12 (1969) (allowing the use of hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony and permitting the trier of fact to evaluate its credibility).
74. The various perceptions of the value of hypnotically enhanced testimony are most
clearly illustrated by state evidentiary rulings issued prior to the Supreme Court's holding
in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding Arkansas's per se rule excluding all post-
hypnotic testimony unconstitutional because it "infring[ed] impermissibly on the right of a
defendant to testify on his own behalf"). Courts took five different positions with respect
to testimony based on hypnotically enhanced memory. First, courts have admitted the
testimony and allowed the trier of fact to evaluate its admissibility. See, e.g., Harding v.
State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1969) (stating that a witness's varying testi-
mony after being exposed to hypnosis "concerns the question of the weight of the evidence
which the trier of facts ... must decide"). Second, courts have excluded all hypnotically
enhanced testimony due to its unreliability. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377
(Cal. 1982) (holding that the "testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the
purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters
relating to those events" due to its unreliability). Third, courts have admitted testimony
based on hypnotically enhanced recollections provided that certain safeguards were em-
ployed to assure that the testimony was not improperly influenced by the hypnosis. See,
e.g., State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (N.J. 1981) (admitting hypnotically enhanced testimony
in a criminal trial but allowing the opponent the opportunity to challenge the reliability of
the particular procedures followed in the particular case as long as the opponent does not
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In the early stages of this debate, Maryland courts addressed the
issue of hypnotically enhanced testimony in terms of its weight or
credibility as a result of that enhancement rather than focusing on its
admissibility.7 1 In Harding v. State,76 the Court of Special Appeals held
that, although the victim had given inconsistent accounts before and
after her hypnosis, this variation and the exposure to the hypnosis
itself affected only the credibility of her testimony and not its admissi-
bility.7 7 The court based its decision on the following factors: the
hypnotic procedure did not contain any improper suggestions; the
hypnotist was trained and experienced; and the jury had been prop-
erly informed of the use of hypnosis. 7' The court also emphasized
that modern medical science had recognized the ability of hypnosis to
restore the memory lost by painful events and therefore could serve as
a useful tool in recovering this type of memory.7 9
attempt to prove the general unreliability of hypnosis). Fourth, courts have allowed the
admission of testimony based on and consistent with the witness's recollections recorded
prior to the hypnosis. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044
(1983) (finding that a person should "be permitted to testify in court in accord with state-
ments which it clearly can be demonstrated he made prior to hypnosis"). Fifth, courts have
determined whether in view of the totality of circumstances, the proposed testimony is
sufficiently reliable to merit admission. See, e.g., State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho
1984) (adopting a rule with respect to hypnotically enhanced testimony in which "[t]rial
judges should . . .apply a 'totality of the circumstances' test and make a determination
whether, in view of all the circumstances, the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to
merit admission"); see also Burral, 352 Md. at 716-29, 724 A.2d at 69-76 (discussing the
aforementioned approaches that courts used in addressing the use of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony).
75. See Burral, 352 Md. at 718, 724 A.2d at 70 (noting that the first approach to hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony was inaugurated in Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246
A.2d 302, 306 (1969), which stated "that the fact that a witness's memory was hypnotically
enhanced goes only to the weight or credibility of the testimony based on that enhance-
ment, not to its admissibility").
76. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1969).
77. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306 ("The fact that... [the victim] has told different stories
or had achieved her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of
weight of the evidence which the trier of facts... must decide." (citing Borman v. State, 1
Md. App. 276, 229 A.2d 440 (1967); Carroll v. State, 3 Md. App. 50, 237 A.2d 535 (1968);
Thompson v. State, 4 Md. App. 31, 240 A.2d 780 (1968))).
78. See id. at 246, 246 A.2d at 312.
79. See id. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311-12. At the time the court decided Harding, Maryland
had not yet adopted the Frye standard for evaluating evidence based on novel scientific
techniques. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Fye decision);
infra note 107 (discussing Maryland's adoption of the Frye standard in Reed v. State); infra
note 93 (discussing Maryland's reaffirmation of the Frye standard despite the Supreme
Court's holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.); see also infra note 87 and
accompanying text (discussing Daubert).
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The Harding approach was increasingly criticized as the psychol-
ogy of memory and the use of hypnosis in a forensic setting ° became
better understood."1 The primary reason for the rejection of the Har-
ding approach was the recognition that hypnosis was a scientific tech-
nique that should be subjected to the standard for evaluating
scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States.82
In Frye, the defendant offered the testimony of an expert witness
as to the result of a deception test given to the defendant. 83 The de-
fense asserted that blood pressure was influenced by a change in the
emotions of the witness and that increases in the systolic blood pres-
sure stemmed from nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch
of the autonomic nervous system.84 The theory was based on the idea
that "truth is spontaneous and comes without conscious effort, while
the utterance of a falsehood requires conscious effort, which is re-
80. See WHITNEY S. HIBBARD & RAYMOND W. WORRING, FoRENSIc HYPNOSIS (1981) (dis-
cussing the use of 'forensic hypnosis' in a forensic setting).
81. See Burra4 352 Md. at 720, 724 A.2d at 71 (articulating that the rejection of Har-
ding's liberal admissibility approach came with the "recognition that hypnosis was, indeed,
a scientific technique that should be subjected to the Frye standard."); see infra notes 83-94
(discussing the Frye standard and its origination); see also Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent
Problems in the Use of PreTrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. Rsv. 313, 323
(1980) (arguing that the Harding decision might have come out differently if the courts
had taken into account the more 'current' understanding of the use of hypnosis in a legal
setting). Diamond stated:
Perhaps if the Harding trial and appellate courts had been presented a more accu-
rate description of the nature of hypnosis and the extreme vulnerability of the
subject to suggestion, they might have been less disposed to admit the evidence,
and the subsequent trend of the law might have been different.
Id.
Diamond criticized the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony throughout his article.
See generally id. (discussing the problems associated with hypnotically enhanced testimony).
He argued that "once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of enhanc-
ing memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is rendered effectively
incompetent to testify." Id. at 314. In rejecting Harding, the courts often referred to Dia-
mond's article, in addition to the writings of several other authors. See Burral, 352 Md. at
71, 724 A.2d at 720 (noting the courts' reference to Diamond's article); State v. Collins,
296 Md. 670, 695-97, 464 A.2d 1028, 1041-42 (1983) (referring and quoting numerous
excerpts from Dr. Diamond's article in support of its holding that hypnotically enhanced
testimony should not be admitted).
82. 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the basis of expert testimony must
be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community to be admissible); see also Burra,
352 Md. at 720, 724 A.2d at 71 ("The principal basis for the rejection of a liberal admissibil-
ity approach was the recognition that hypnosis was, indeed, a scientific technique that
should be subjected to the Frye standard."); Collins, 296 Md. at 678, 464 A.2d at 1032-33
(stating that "[t]he majority of courts which have considered hypnosis as it affects testi-
mony of a witness have applied the test laid down in Frye v. United States... although they
may not in every instance have referred to Frye.").
83. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
84. See id.
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flected in the blood pressure.""5 The court held that in admitting ex-
pert testimony, the principle from which the testimony was deduced
must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.8 6
The court reasoned that Fye's deception test had not gained enough
scientific recognition, and therefore, was inadmissible.8 7
In Reed v. State,8 Maryland adopted the Frye standard, stating that
"[t]estimony based on a technique which is found to have gained
'general acceptance in the scientific community' may be admitted into
evidence. '89 The issue in Reed was whether voice identification testi-
mony based on the analysis of spectrograms ('voiceprints') could be
admitted in a criminal trial.9" The court classified the voiceprint anal-
ysis as "expert testimony based on the application of new scientific
techniques," and recognized that before the court would admit such
testimony, reliability of the testimony needed to be demonstrated. 9'
Because the "reliability of a scientific technique or process does not
vary according to the circumstances of each case," the court stated
that "considerations of uniformity and consistency of decision-making
require that a legal standard or test be articulated by which the relia-
bility of a process may be established."92 Accordingly, the court
adopted the Frye standard, and held that 'voiceprint' analysis had not
85. See id. at 1014.
86. See id.
87. See id. (explaining that "the systolic blood pressure deception test [had] not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among the physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made").
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court revisited Frye to deter-
mine whether Frye's 'general acceptance' test for the admissibility of scientific evidence was
till valid. 509 U.S. 579, 585-87 (1993). The Court found "that the Frye test was superseded
by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. at 587. Finding the Frye test unnec-
essarily rigid, Daubert offered in its place a flexible, non-inclusive inquiry under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, which required trial judges to consider: (1) a technique's know or
potential error rate; (2) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (3)
whether it has been subject to peer review and publication; and (4) its general acceptance.
Id. at 593-94. The Court emphasized that Rule 702 was intended to be flexible, and that
the "overarching subject [of the inquiry] is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission." Id. at
594-95. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
88. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
89. Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372 (citation omitted).
90. See id. at 375-76, 391 A.2d at 364-65.
91. Id. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367.
92. Id. at 380-81, 391 A.2d at 367-68.
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achieved the general acceptance in the scientific community as re-
quired by Fye.
93
A New Jersey case, State v. Hurd,9 4 illustrates one of the ways in
which courts have approached the issue of hypnotically enhanced tes-
timony in the wake of Frye. In Hurd, the Supreme Court of NewJersey
held that to be admissible, hypnotically enhanced testimony must sat-
isfy the Frye standard for admissibility of scientific evidence.95 Accord-
ing to the Hurd court, hypnotically enhanced testimony would be
admissible only if there was a "sufficient scientific basis to produce
uniform and reasonably reliable results and contribute materially to
the ascertainment of truth."9 6 The court addressed the risk of the
subject's vulnerability to suggestion during hypnosis, but nonetheless
determined that a per se rule of inadmissibility was unnecessarily
broad and might result in the exclusion of evidence at least as trust-
worthy as other eyewitness testimony.97 The court concluded that
hypnotically enhanced testimony was admissible in a criminal trial
where the trial court finds that the use of hypnosis in the particular
case is reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to
normal human memory. 98 However, because the court also recog-
nized that if improperly used, hypnosis could produce extremely un-
reliable results, it adopted several specific safeguards, requiring proof
93. See id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377; see also Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480, 494 n.10, 663
A.2d 1289, 1295-96 n.10 (1995) (responding to the Supreme Court's Daubert decision by
reaffirming the Fye-Reed standard). The court in Hutton supported its decision by
explaining:
[O] n July 1, 1994, this Court adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence patterned after
the federal rules. Our counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is Md. R.
Evid. 5-702. As a committee note makes clear, however, the adoption of the Rules
"is not intended to overrule Reed ... and other cases adopting the principles
enunciated in Frye .... The required scientific foundation for the admission of
novel scientific techniques or principles is left to development through case law."
Id. Md. Rule of Evidence 5-702 states:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the
court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact in issue. In making
that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the ap-
propriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a
sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
See also supra note 87 (setting forth the text of FED. R. EVID. 702).
94. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
95. See id. at 91.
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384, 389
(N.J. 1967)).
97. Id. at 94. The court also noted that research on the reliability of ordinary eyewit-
ness testimony had revealed shortcomings similar to those present in hypnotically en-
hanced testimony. Id.
98. Id. at 95.
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of the hypnotist's competency and the recording of statements both
before and after the hypnosis. 99
After the Hurd decision, many courts adopted the same safe-
guards enunciated by the New Jersey court, while others developed
similar safeguards to control the admissibility of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony. I10 A number of courts have determined, however,
that such procedural safeguards could not overcome the inherent un-
reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony and that case-by-case de-
terminations would be too burdensome.' Therefore, these courts
concluded that hypnotically enhanced testimony was per se inadmissi-
ble, or only admissible if the information conveyed in the testimony
was known prior to the hypnotic session."0 2
Maryland was one of the jurisdictions that chose to follow this
latter approach. In 1983, in State v. Collins,'1 3 the Maryland Court of
Appeals overruled Harding v. State,1"4 and changed its position with
regard to hypnotically enhanced testimony.'0 5 The Collins court re-
99. See id. at 96-97. The complete list of requirements imposed by the court as a condi-
tion of the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony are: (1) an experienced psy-
chiatrist or psychologist must conduct the session; (2) the hypnotist must be independent
of defense or prosecution; (3) information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement per-
sonnel of the defense must be recorded; (4) the hypnotist must obtain a statement of facts
from the subject prior to hypnosis; (5) all contacts between the hypnotist and subject must
be recorded; and (6) only the hypnotist and subject may be present during the hypnotic
session. Id.
100. See, e.g., State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 253-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting
Hurd safeguards); State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W. 2d. 386, 394 n.23 (Wis. 1983) (adopting
Hurd safeguards).
101. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1294 (Ariz. 1982) (supple-
mental opinion) (rejecting procedural safeguards such as those adopted in Hurd and stat-
ing that "the case-by-case determination under a set of safeguards will consume too much
in the way of judicial resources"); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1365-66 (Cal. 1982)
(declining to adopt a set of safeguards similar to those adopted in Hurd, reasoning that
such requirements may not "forestall each of the dangers at which they are directed," that
"certain dangers are not ever addressed by the Hurd requirements," and expressing "grave
doubts that [the safeguards] could be administered in practice without injecting undue
delay and confusion into the judicial process").
102. See, e.g., Collins, 644 P.2d at 1294-95 (holding that the rule against admitting hyp-
notically enhanced testimony was one of per se inadmissibility, but that "[a] witness will be
permitted to testify with regard to those matters which he or she was able to recall and
relate prior to hypnosis"); Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1383-84 (stating that hypnotically enhanced
testimony could never be admitted under the Frye test due to its unreliability); see also infra
notes 105-108 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Collins, 296 Md.. 670, 464 A.2d
1028 (1983), which reached a similar conclusion).
103. 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
104. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Harding decision).
105. See Collins, 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044 (1983) ("We are not satisfied that
hypnotically enhanced testimony meets the Frye-Reed test.").
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fused to adopt safeguards like those used in Hurd,106 holding instead
that hypnotically enhanced testimony was inadmissible in criminal tri-
als because of its failure to satisfy the Frye/Reed test. 0 7 The court re-
jected the possibility that the Hurd safeguards would effectively
eliminate the dangers of unreliable testimony, and added that "even if
requirements could be devised that were adequate in theory, [the
court] would have grave doubts that they could be administered with-
out injecting undue delay and confusion into the judicial process." 108
As a third alternative, a number of courts developed a "totality of
the circumstances" test to determine whether the trial testimony of a
previously hypnotized witness was reliable. This approach was first
enunciated in State v. Iwakiri.109 The Supreme Court of Idaho held
that in determining the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony, the circumstances surrounding the hypnotic session should be
examined in light of suggested safeguards.' 10 If in considering the
totality of the circumstances, it appeared that the testimony was suffi-
ciently reliable, then the testimony would be admitted."' In reaching
its decision, the court noted that a per se rule of admissibility would in
some circumstances allow for admission of unreliable testimony, while
a per se rule of inadmissibility would in some circumstances exclude
reliable testimony." 2 According to the court, exclusion of reliable tes-
timony would thwart the truth-seeking function of the judicial sys-
106. See id. at 700, 464 A.2d at 1043-44 (declining to follow the procedures outlined in
Hurd for the reasons explained in Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1365-66).
107. See id. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044 ("We are not satisfied that hypnotically enhanced
testimony meets the Frye-Reed test.").
108. Collins, 296 Md. at 701, 464 A.2d at 1044 (quoting Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1366).
109. 682 P.2d 571 (Idaho 1984).
110. Id. at 578 (stating that " [t]rial judges should ... apply a 'totality of the circum-
stances' test and make a determination whether, in view of all the circumstances, the pro-
posed testimony is sufficiently reliable to merit admission").
111. See id. (expressing the need for "some method of determining the admissibility of
[hypnotically enhanced testimony] that will protect against the dangers of hypnosis... and
yet allow for the receipt of the benefit of memory recall which hypnosis can produce").
112. See id. at 577. The court stated:
a per se rule of admissibility would in some circumstances allow for the admission
of unreliable testimony, an undesirable result in our judicial system, when [the
court] strive[s] to reach verdicts based only on reliable testimony. On the other
hand, a per se rule of inadmissibility.., would, in some circumstances, disallow




tem."'3 Consequently, the court found that the issue rested on witness
competency rather than on admissibility. 14
The Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Romero1 15 also
adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine the reliabil-
ity of hypnotically enhanced testimony.'16 The court commented that
a "per se rule of inadmissibility, even if limited to posthypnotic recollec-
tions, [was] unnecessarily broad and might well result in the exclusion
of testimony that [has] adequate indicia of trustworthiness and would
be helpful to the trier of fact."'1 7 As a result, the court held "that trial
courts must make an individualized inquiry in each case to determine
whether the trial testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized will
be sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission."11
In 1987, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of hypnotically
enhanced testimony in Rock v. Arkansas.l t9 In Rock, the question
before the Court was whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to testify could be restricted "by a state rule that ex-
clude [d] her post-hypnosis testimony."1 2 ° The majority, reflecting on
the history of constitutional challenges to state rules that interfered
with the right of the defendant to offer testimony, commented that
"[j]ust as a state rule may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to
exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand, it also may
not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand,
but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony."' 21 The
Court acknowledged that although the defendant did not have an ab-
solute right to present relevant testimony, states could not restrict the
defendant's right to testify in a way that was arbitrary or unrelated to
the purposes that the restrictions were designed to serve. 1 22 The
Court then pointed out that a per se rule of inadmissibility of post-
113. See id.; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that inclusion of unre-
liable testimony was an undesirable result but exclusion of reliable testimony thwarts the
entire judicial process).
114. See id. at 575 ("The basic issue presented is one of competency of a hypnotized wit-
ness." (emphasis added)).
115. 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1987).
116. See id. at 1017 (stating that in determining the admissibility of hypnotically en-
hanced testimony "the trial court should consider the totality of circumstances bearing on
the issues of reliability" and listing various factors to be determined).
117. Id. at 1015.
118. Id. at 1016.
119. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
120. Id. at 53.
121. Id. at 55.
122. Id. at 55-56 ("In applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the
interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional
right to testify.").
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hypnosis testimony prevented the trial court from ever considering
the reliability of the testimony.123 More telling, it "[would] operate [ I]
to the detriment of any defendant who undergoes hypnosis, without
regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it took
place, or any independent verification of the information it
produced.' '
24
As an alternative to a per se rule of inadmissibility, the Court dis-
cussed the possibility of safeguards, which could be used to reduce
some of the inaccuracies that stem from hypnosis, and the use of cor-
roboration to support the hypnotically enhanced testimony.' 25 The
Court concluded that a state's legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence did not justify the per se exclusion of testimony that may be
reliable in an individual case. 126 Therefore, the Court held that Ar-
kansas's per se rule excluding all post-hypnotic testimony "infring[ed]
impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his own
behalf.1'
2 7
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by three
other justices, argued that there was "no justification in the Constitu-
tion" for the Court's ruling.' 21 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that
both the individual's right to due process and to compulsory process
were not absolute and "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommo-
date other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."' 29 The
dissent concluded that where scientific understanding remained un-
available, the Court should defer to the states in the implementation
of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. 130
123. Id. at 56.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 60 (noting that "[t]he inaccuracies that the process [of hypnosis] introduces
can be reduced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the use of procedural safeguards").
126. Id. at 61 ("Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary re-
striction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the
validity of all post-hypnosis recollections.").
127. Id. at 62. The Court clarified that the opinion in Rock did not involve the admissi-
bility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants, and
the Court stressed that it was not expressing an opinion on the issue outside a criminal
context. Id. at 58 n.15 ("This case does not involve the admissibility of testimony of previ-
ously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express no opinion on
that issue.").
128. Id. at 63 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
129. Id. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (citing Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967))).
130. Id. at 65 ("[T]his deference would be at its highest in an area such as this [hypno-
sis], where, as the Court concedes, 'scientific understanding . . . is still in its infancy.'"
(quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 61)).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Burral v. State, the Court of Appeals
held that the defendant's rights to compulsory process and to due
process of law did not entitle him to present the hypnotically en-
hanced testimony of a defense witness.1"1 Writing for the majority,
Judge Wilner began by summarizing the court's past holdings with
respect to hypnotically enhanced testimony.132 The court first dis-
cussed State v. Collins, where it concluded that hypnotically enhanced
testimony did not meet the test of reliability enunciated in Reed v.
State, and thus, was inadmissible. 1
33
The court then addressed the Supreme Court's decision in Rock
v. Arkansas.134 When comparing Maryland's precedent regarding hyp-
notically enhanced testimony to the Supreme Court's holding in Rock,
the majority opted for a narrow reading of Rock. The Court con-
cluded that a per se rule excluding a defense witness's hypnotically
enhanced testimony was constitutional because Rock's holding was lim-
ited to the defendant, and did not apply to the testimony of a defense
witness. 3
5
The court reached its decision by initially laying out a detailed
history of the role that hypnosis has played in criminal trials.131 In
addressing Collins, the majority noted that at the time Collins was de-
cided, the prevailing rule governing the admissibility of expert opin-
ion evidence based on scientific technique was the Frye standard,
adopted by Maryland in Reed v. State.137 The majority also noted that
the Collins court had specifically adopted the Frye/Reed standard as the
131. 352 Md. at 741, 724 A.2d at 82.
132. Id. at 708-09, 724 A.2d at 65.
133. Burral 352 Md. at 708, 724 A.2d at 65; see also supra notes 105-108 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the decision in State v. Collins).
134. Burral, 352 Md. at 708, 729-33, 724 A.2d at 65, 76-78; see also supra notes 119-130
and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Rock v. Arkansas).
135. Id. at 740-41, 724 A.2d at 81-82. The court stated:
The Rock Court's reference to the right of compulsory process can be given
proper effect without extending it beyond what we believe was intended .... If
the high court believes that the right of compulsory process precludes ... [the
per se exclusion of hypnotically enhanced] . . . testimony of other defense wit-
nesses, it will, in due time, inform us of that belief.
Id.
136. See id. at 715-34, 724 A.2d at 69-78 (discussing the different approaches for admis-
sion of testimony based on hypnotically enhanced memory that courts have used over the
last thirty years); see also supra notes 76-130 and accompanying text (explaining the differ-
ent approaches that courts used with respect to the admission of hypnotically enhanced
testimony).
137. See Burral, 352 Md. at 717, 724 A.2d at 70 (citing Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391
A.2d 364 (1978)).
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basis for evaluation of testimony when a witness has been
hypnotized. 1
38
After laying out the historical context of hypnosis in criminal tri-
als, the court proceeded to address Burral's contention that the deci-
sion in Rock necessarily applied to defense witnesses and was not just
limited to the defendant. 139 The court first emphasized that Maryland
would continue to adhere to the Frye/Reed standard as a general stan-
dard, as well as the standard applicable to hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony. 140 Upon reviewing the record in the case14 1 and independent
scientific evidence,' 142 the court concluded that hypnosis as a memory
enhancer still failed to meet the requirements of admissibility under
the Fye/Reed standard. 4 3
In harmonizing this finding with the Supreme Court's holding in
Rock, the Burral court characterized Rock as an exception to the "pre-
dominant rule that testimony based on hypnotically enhanced recol-
lections is not admissible," but found no constitutional mandate
requiring it to extend that exception to other defense witnesses. 1 44
The court then addressed the bases of Burral's proposed extension of
Rock to defense witnesses-the Supreme Court's reference to the
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process in Rock and the Cham-
bers v. Mississippi decision.' 4 5 The court dismissed Burral's argument,
pointing to the Supreme Court's "clear intent to limit its holding to
testifying defendants," and noted that the "right to compulsory pro-
cess [was] a Constitutional source of a defendant's right to testify," and
a right "that did not exist at common law."' 4 6
138. See id. (stating that "we commenced our discussion in Collins by adopting... [the
Fye standard] specifically 'as the basis for evaluation of testimony where a witness has been
hypnotized'" (quoting State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034 (1983))).
139. See id. at 737, 724 A.2d at 80 ("The choice that faces us, then, is whether to extend
Rock beyond the limited scope given it by the Supreme Court itself.").
140. See id. at 738, 724 A.2d at 80 ("We have not been asked in this case to abandon Frye/
Reed, either as a general standard or ... as the standard applicable to hypnotically-en-
hanced memory, and we therefore shall not do so.").
141. See id. at 738, 724 A.2d at 80 ("There is nothing in the record of this case to indicate
that hypnosis as a memory enhancer has gained general acceptance in the relevant scien-
tific community since . . . [the Collins decision].').
142. See id. at 738-40, 724 A.2d at 80-81 (referring to the evidence against the use of
hypnosis in criminal trials as "overwhelming and largely uncontradicted").
143. See id. at 739-40, 724 A.2d at 81 ("[W]e find no justification to depart, as a matter of
common law, from the approach we took in Collins.").
144. Id. at 740, 724 A.2d at 81.
145. See id. at 734, 724 A.2d at 78; see also supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the Chambers decision).
146. Id. at 740, 724 A.2d at 81 (emphasis added).
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The court explained that Rock was an 'unusual' case because the
defendant there was the only live witness to what had occurred, and
thus, the only person able to tell her story. 14 7 The court stated that
extending the exception for defendants granted in Rock to defense
witnesses in criminal trials simply because of Rock's reference to com-
pulsory process would "preclud[e] a State from enforcing neutral and
well-founded rules of evidence against defense witnesses. '  This, the
court emphasized, would have profound and negative implications,
"well beyond what was at issue in Rock."' 49 The court therefore con-
cluded that the Supreme Court's reference to the right of compulsory
process in Rock could be given proper effect without extending it be-
yond what the court believed was intended-to serve as one of three
sources of the right of a defendant to testify in his or her own defense
after being exposed to hypnosis.
150
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Chasanow, joined by Chief Judge
Bell, asserted that the majority had misapplied the cited cases and arti-
147. Id. In Rock, Vickie Rock shot and killed her husband in the course of an argument
and was charged with manslaughter. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987). When
she was unable to remember precise details of the shooting, her attorney suggested that
she undergo hypnosis. See id. at 46. Rock underwent hypnosis, and afterwards, was able to
remember that at the time of the incident, she had her thumb on the hammer of the gun,
but had not held her finger on the trigger. See id. at 47. She also remembered that the
gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during the scuffle. See id. This
fight occurred in the privacy of the trailer that Vickie owned. See id. at 47 n.2.
148. Burra 352 Md. at 740-41, 724 A.2d at 81.
149. Id. at 741, 724 A.2d at 81-82. The Burral court speculated as to some of the possible
implications:
Would the testimony of a defense witness, who, by reason of tender age or mental
disability is unable to understand an oath and is incompetent for that reason,
nonetheless be admissible as a Constitutional imperative? Is a defense witness no
longer subject to the hearsay rule? . . . Federal Rule of Evidence 605 and its
Maryland counterpart, Rule 5-605, provide that the judge presiding at a trial may
not testify in that trial as a witness. Would those rules apply if the judge is called
as a defense witness?
Id
150. Id. at 741, 724 A.2d at 82. In Rock, the Supreme Court established that a defendant
had a constitutional right to testify on his own behalf based on three provisions of the
Constitution: The defendant's Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process; Fifth
Amendment right to testify (or not testify) in one's own defense, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee of the right to be heard. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-52.
The Court stated:
The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several
provisions of the Constitution .... The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due pro-
cess of law include a right to be heard and to offer testimony.... The right to
testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment .... The right to testify is also a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against compelled testimony.
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cles concerning hypnosis to create a "rigid, inflexible, illogical, and
probably unconstitutional per se rule of exclusion precluding a defen-
dant from calling a witness or questioning the witness because the
State interrogated that witness under hypnosis."151
Judge Chasanow stated that while statements made by a person
after exposure to hypnosis were suspect and should generally not be
admitted without safeguards, the instant case was distinguishable be-
cause the party objecting to the defense witness's post-hypnotic testi-
mony was the same party who subjected the witness to the hypnosis. 52
Judge Chasanow argued that if the State, without the consent of the
defendant, has subjected a witness to something that may have im-
paired her memory, the State should then attack the witness's credibil-
ity or use her cross-examination instead of insisting that the witness be
disqualified.1"
The dissent then pointed out that Lisa Wallech's testimony could
have been exculpatory evidence for the defendant and that the de-
scriptive detail elicited from the hypnotic session was strongly corrob-
orated by the victim's injuries.154 The application of a per se rule
precluding the defense from calling an exculpatory eyewitness be-
cause the State chose to have her hypnotized by a State investigative
hypnotist denied the defendant due process of law. 55
Judge Chasanow asserted that although the court's per se inad-
missibility test seemed to suggest that post-hypnotic recall could never
be reliable enough to be admissible in evidence, this notion was ex-
pressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Rock.156 The dissent further
argued that the court's analysis of Rock ignored the vast amount of
historical and constitutional protection for the defendant's right to
call witnesses. 57
151. Burra4 352 Md. at 742, 724 A.2d at 82 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 744-45, 724 A.2d at 83.
155. See id. at 745, 724 A.2d at 84 ("To apply a per se rule precluding the defense from
calling this exculpatory eyewitness because the State chose to have her hypnotized by a
State investigative hypnotist denies the defendant due process of law.").
156. Id. at 749, 724 A.2d at 85 (stating that the court's "view was rejected by the Supreme
Court on constitutional grounds in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987)").
157. Id. Judge Chasanow emphasized that the defendant had more historical and con-
stitutional protection for the right to call witnesses than to testify himself. Id. Chasanow
stressed the Rock Court's recognition that "[a ] t common law criminal defendants were pre-
cluded from testifying because of the possible untrustworthiness of a party's testimony." Id.
(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987)). Chasanow also pointed out that the
Constitution did not contain an express provision granting a defendant the right to testify,
while there was an express provision in the Sixth Amendment granting a defendant the
right to call witnesses in his favor. Id, at 749, 724 A.2d at 86 (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 52).
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Judge Eldridge, in a separate dissenting opinion, stated that he
would reverse and remand for a new trial for the reasons set forth in
that portion of Judge Chasanow's opinion dealing with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Rock v. Arkansas.158
4. Analysis.-The Burral court's limited reading of both Rock
and the right of compulsory process reflects the court's determination
to exclude hypnotically enhanced testimony to the extent possible
post-Rock. Ultimately, this restrictive holding compromises a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process of law. In reaching its conclu-
sion to exclude such testimony, the court extracted the bottom line
holding of Rock,'59 but ignored much of the reasoning that the Su-
preme Court used in reaching its holding. 6° Through this selective
reasoning, the Burral court found that the defense witness's testimony
did not demand constitutional protection under Rock and could be
excluded under a per se rule. 6' In this way, the court was able to
maintain the applicability of the Frye/Reed standard to hypnotically en-
hanced testimony of a defense witness and arbitrarily exclude such
testimony without regard to the circumstances of the particular
case. 1
62
In addition, the Burral court casually dismissed the historical sig-
nificance and plain language of the compulsory process clause-the
right of the accused to put on a defense through the testimony of
witnesses. As a result, the Burral court gives the State an unfair advan-
tage by affirming the use of hypnosis for the State's investigation, and
by arbitrarily denying the defendant from using witnesses subjected by
the State to hypnosis based on a per se rule of inadmissibility.
a. Narrow Reading of Rock and the Problems with the Per Se Inad-
missability of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony.-In Rock, the Supreme
Court reasoned that hypnotically enhanced testimony could be suffi-
ciently reliable, and thus, a per se exclusion of such testimony would
arbitrarily restrict a defendant's right to testify on his own behalf in
Moreover, the Rock Court "recognized that a defendant's right to testify [was] derived from
the defendant's right to call witnesses." Id. (analyzing Rock, 483 U.S. at 52).
158. See id. at 753, 724 A.2d at 88 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
159. See supra note 119 (discussing Rock's holding).
160. See supra notes 121-127 (discussing the Court's reasoning in Rock).
161. See Burra 352 Md. at 81, 724 A.2d at 740.
162. See id. at 65, 724 A.2d at 708 (discussing the per se rule as set forth in previous
cases: "The exclusion of hypnotically-enhanced testimony was stated in the form of a per
se exclusion; it did not depend on who the witness was, who called the witness to testify; or
the circumstances of the case." (citations omitted)).
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violation of the Constitution.163 While the final holding addressed
the defendant's right to testify, the major thrust of the Rock Court's ar-
gument concerned the arbitrary nature of the per se inadmissibility
rule, and the fact that this rule unfairly precludes the jury from ever
considering testimony which is material to the accused's defense.164
For both the defendant and the defense witness, this arbitrariness
presents several crucial problems. First, in some cases, the hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony could be very reliable, but the application of
a per se rule nevertheless precludes the court from ever considering
the validity of such testimony. 165 Second, the per se rule does not
consider who subjects the witness to hypnosis and thus gives the State
enormous power to preclude a witness from ever serving as an excul-
patory witness for the defense. As Judge Chasanow argued in his dis-
sent, "precluding the defense from calling an exculpatory eyewitness
because the State chose to have . . . [the witness] hypnotized" consti-
tutes a denial of the defendant's right to due process.166
Although the opinion in Rock expressly focused on the defen-
dant's right to present her own testimony to the court,167 the arbitrary
nature of the per se inadmissibility rule has an equal effect on a defen-
dant when it is applied to a defense witness. 168 The Supreme Court
has held that a defendant's right to tell his own story necessarily in-
cludes testimony by defense witnesses. In Washington v. Texas, for ex-
ample, the Court described the defendant's right to compel witness's
testimony as "in plain terms .... the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecu-
tion's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." '169 Neverthe-
163. Id. at 61. In relevant part, the Court stated that the "[w]holesale inadmissibility of a
defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of
clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections." Id,;
see also supra notes 119-130 (discussing Rock v. Arkansas).
164. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (noting that a State cannot "apply a rule of evidence that
permits a witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testi-
mony"); see also Shaw, supra note 72, at 63 ("The major thrust of Rock is that hypnotically
enhanced recall can be made sufficiently reliable that a per se exclusion of it is arbitrary.").
165. See State v. Iwakii, 682 P.2d 57 (Idaho 1984) ("[A] per se rule of inadmissibility...
would, in some circumstances, disallow reliable testimony, thus thwarting the truthseeking
function of our judicial system.").
166. See Burra4 352 Md. at 745, 724 A.2d at 83-84 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
167. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 53; see also supra notes 119-130 (discussing Rock).
168. See Shaw, supra note 72, at 63-64 (noting that the Court's reasoning in Rock would
apply to defense witnesses as well as to defendants because it is based on the Compulsory
Process Clause which "is equally applicable to any witnesses testifying on behalf of the
defendant" and because "there is nothing unique about a defendant as a witness that
makes such use more reliable for the defendant than any other defense witness").
169. 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (emphasis added).
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less, the Burral Court qualified this component of the Rock Court's
reasoning by associating it only with the "right of a defendant to testify
in his or her own defense,"'170 and refusing to apply the reasoning to
other defense witnesses.
1 71
The Supreme Court has also expressed the heightened impor-
tance of presenting a defense as a whole, which includes both the de-
fendant's right to tell his story, as well as allowing defense witnesses to
testify.17 In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court stated that "[f]ew rights
are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense"'173 and that "the right of an accused in a criminal
trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront and...
call witnesses on one's own behalf have long been recognized as essen-
tial to due process." 174
A historical examination of the background of the defendant's
right to present witness testimony illustrates that this right, coupled
with the defendant's right to testify, is a fundamental right guaranteed
under the due process clause. 175 Both rights are premised on the ac-
cused's interest in presenting a defense, having either witnesses testify
to relevant facts for the defense or having the defendant testify to his
version of the story.' 76
The Burral court failed to uphold these rights, recognized by the
Supreme Court, in order to maintain the application of the Frye stan-
dard to hypnotically enhanced testimony.177 The court reflected in
detail on the development of the per se rule of inadmissibility for hyp-
170. See Burral, 352 Md. at 82, 724 A.2d at 741; see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 58 n.15 (stating
that the case did "not involve the admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized wit-
nesses other than criminal defendants" and that the Court "express[ed] no opinion on
that issue").
171. Burral, 352 Md. at 736, 724 A.2d at 79 ("There is no doubt but that Rock itself was
carefully confined to the testimony of the defendant. That is apparent not only from the
footnote added by the Court but from the overall text of the majority opinion."); see also
supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the footnote in which the Supreme
Court supposedly limits its holding in Rock).
172. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
173. Id. (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 294.
175. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967). ChiefJustice Warren, in Washing-
ton v. Texas, described the right to compel a witness's testimony as one of "the most basic
ingredients of due process of law." Id.
176. See supra notes 173-175 (discussing the Court's historical recognition of the defen-
dant's right to present a defense as derived from defense witness testimony).
177. See Burral, 352 Md. at 738, 724 A.2d at 80 ("We have not been asked in this case to
abandon Frye/Reed, either as a general standard or, other than as a byproduct of extending
the Constitutional exception enunciated in Rock to all defense witnesses, as the standard
applicable to hypnotically-enhanced memory, and we therefore shall not do so.").
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notically enhanced testimony, emphasizing the inherent faults that
are prevalent in testimony derived from hypnotic recall. 7 ' The court
then concluded that hypnosis was still considered unreliable by a ma-
jority of the courts and among the relevant scientific community, and
thus, even post-Rock, failed to satisfy the Fye/Reed standard. 79 How-
ever, as Judge Chasanow pointed out in his dissent, the court, in its
determination to maintain the per se inadmissibility rule, implied that
post-hypnotic recall could never be considered reliable enough to be
admissible in evidence. 8 ° This logic ignores the Supreme Court's
statement in Rock that "there is no scientific evidence that hypnotically
enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the
traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a de-
fendant from presenting her post-hypnotic version for the events for
which she is on trial."'81 As Judge Chasanow contends, if it is uncon-
stitutional to exclude per se a defendant's post-hypnotic testimony on
grounds of presumed unreliability, then it should be equally unconsti-
tutional to apply the same per se rule of inadmissibility to a defense
witness's testimony.1 82
The Burral court also emphasized that the Supreme Court's reli-
ance on the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process in reach-
ing its holding was only one of three sources cited by the Court to
justify its holding,183 and that due to the 'unusual' circumstances of
the facts in Rock, 84 it would be unsound to extend the compulsory
process reasoning to "preclud[e] a State from enforcing neutral and
well-founded rules of evidence against defense witnesses in a criminal
case."
1 8 5
178. See id. at 739, 724 A.2d at 80 (noting that "'any increase in accurate memories
during hypnosis is accompanied by an increase in inaccurate memories,' that 'hypnosis
may compromise the subject's ability to distinguish memory from imagination or fantasy,'
and that 'when hypnotic... techniques are used to interrogate, subjects later report being
more certain of the content, even when it is inaccurate.'" (quoting 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 12-2.2.3 (1997))).
179. See id. at 739-40, 724 A.2d at 80.
180. See id. at 749, 724 A.2d at 85-86 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
181. See id. (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
182. See id. at 86, 724 A.2d at 749 ("If, as the Supreme Court held in Rock, there can be
no per se rule excluding a defendant's post-hypnotic testimony, then there should be no per
se rule excluding a defense witness's post-hypnotic testimony.")
183. See Burral 325 Md. at 741, 724 A.2d at 82.
184. The Burral court described the 'unusual' circumstances by stating that "the rule
barring testimony based on hypnotically-enhanced memory precluded the defendant, her-
self, who was the only live witness to what had occurred, from presenting a defense, from
telling her story." Id. at 740, 724 A.2d at 81.
185. Id. at 74041, 724 A.2d at 81.
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There are several problems with this general assertion. First, the
fact that the right to compulsory process was only one of three bases
for the Supreme Court's holding in Rock does not detract from the
legitimacy of this Constitutional right. The Supreme Court in Rock
arrived at its conclusion that a defendant has a right to testify even
after exposure to hypnosis by analyzing the scope of a defendant's
right to call witnesses. 8 6 The Rock Court stated that "a defendant's
opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses [was] in-
complete if he [could] not present himself as a witness."187 When the
Rock Court recognized and protected the accused's right to present
his own version of events through testimony, it was asserted as a com-
ponent of the defendant's right to compulsory process, and not as a
mutually exclusive right.' 88 It is illogical to misconstrue the Supreme
Court's previously cited words to mean that a defendant's opportunity to
conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is complete if he may present him-
self as a witness, but not present other witnesses. 8 9 In short, the Burral
court turned the Supreme Court's logic on its head. The Supreme
Court in Rock began its analysis with the proposition that the right to
testify was a fundamental part of the larger right to call witnesses. 90
The Burral court concluded, to the contrary, that the larger right to
call witnesses generally was satisfied merely if the defendant himself
testifies.1 9 '
b. Plain Language of the Sixth Amendment. -Although the Bur-
ral court characterized the right to compulsory process as only "a con-
stitutional source of a defendant's right to testify,"' 92 the Sixth
Amendment's express language states that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
186. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 ("A defendant's opportunity to conduct his own defense by
calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness.").
187. Id.
188. See id. at 52 ("Logically included in the accused's right to call witnesses whose testi-
mony is 'material and favorable to his defense is a right to testify himself....") (citations
omitted).
189. Burral, 352 Md at 749-50, 724 A.2d at 86 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the Supreme Court in Rock recognized that a defendant's right to testify may be derived
from the defendant's constitutional right to call witnesses" and therefore concluding that
"there is little justification for saying that the Constitution precludes a state from adopting
a per se rule barring a defendant's right to offer post-hypnotic testimony but the Constitu-
tion does not preclude a state from adopting a per se rule barring defense witness's post-
hypnotic testimony").
190. Rock, 482 U.S. at 52 (recognizing that a defendant's right to compulsory process "by
calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness").
191. Burral 352 Md. at 741, 724 A.2d at 82 (stating that "[tihe Rock Court's reference to
the right of compulsory process can be given proper effect" without extending its holding
regarding the admission of hypnotically-enhanced testimony to defense witnesses).
192. Id. at 740, 724 A.2d at 81 (emphasis added).
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tions, the accused.., shall have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor. . . ." Although the Supreme Court applied the
compulsory process clause only to a defendant's right to testify in
Rock, it is illogical to limit the compulsory process clause of the Sixth
Amendment to a defendant's right to testify.' 94 More telling, there is
no express provision in the Constitution granting the defendant the
right to testify, while the Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses.1 9 5 The purpose and historical
meaning of the compulsory process clause have stronger roots in our
constitutional history than the Burral court would like to admit. 9 6
c. Misuse of Hypnosis to Disqualify Witnesses.-Most disturbing
is the Burral court's dismissal of the possibility that the State could
quite easily and unilaterally disqualify defense witnesses by subjecting
them to hypnosis.197 The Court of Appeals has stated in both the Col-
lins and Burral decisions that while hypnosis is too unreliable to admit
as testimony, it is an acceptable tool for police to use as part of their
investigations.19 ' This fact is striking in light of the fact that the court
in Rock emphasized an unwillingness to endorse the use of hypnosis as
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added); see also supra note 2 (stating, in full, the
text of the Sixth Amendment).
194. See Burral, 352 Md. at 86, 724 A.2d at 749 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) ("There is...
far more historical and constitutional protection for the defendant's right to call witnesses
than for the defendant's right to testify.").
195. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (stating in full the text of the Sixth Amend-
ment); see also Rock, 484 U.S. at 52. The Court in Rock stated:
The right to testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, which grants a defendant the right to call "witnesses in his favor,"
.... Logically included in the accused's right to call witnesses whose testimony is
"material and favorable to his defense," is a right to testify himself, should he
decide it is in his favor to do so.
Id. (citations omitted).
196. See generally David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory On
Expert Services For Indigent Defendants, 83J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 503 (1992) (argu-
ing that the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process is essential for the courts to be able to
fulfill their truth seeking function); see also Lisa Graver, Note, The Current Value Of Compul-
sory Process: Can A Defendant Compel The Admission Of Favorable Scientific Testimony ?, 48 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 865, 868-74 (1998) (discussing the historical roots and scope of the Sixth
Amendment's compulsory process clause).
197. See Burral, 352 Md. at 741 n.9, 724 A.2d at 81 n.9 (recognizing the argument that
the State may subject known defense witnesses to hypnosis to render their testimony inad-
missible, but noting that this did not occur in the present case and therefore the court
.need not decide in this case what an appropriate response would be to that situation").
198. See id. ("Hypnosis is a valid and accepted technique for use in police investiga-
tions."); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (1983) ("We are not satis-
fied that hypnotically enhanced testimony meets the Frye-Reed test. This does not mean
that it is impermissible to use hypnosis for investigative purposes.").
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an investigative tool without some limitations. 9 9 The Burral court
overlooks this important qualification in its analysis.
Additionally, as Judge Chasanow argued in his dissent, the use of
improper motives on the State's side could easily bar the witness's hyp-
notically enhanced testimony when it proved to be unfavorable to the
State. 20 0 Yet, the majority chose not to address the merits of this argu-
ment because there was no evidence of malicious intent on the part of
the State in Burral.2 1 The emphasis on malicious intent, however, is
misplaced. By the court affirming the use of hypnosis as an investiga-
tive tool, the court opens the door to the possibility that defendants
will lose potential exculpatory witnesses in the early stages of the case
through no fault of their own. Such an occurrence makes it highly
unlikely that a defendant will receive a fair trial in accordance with his
constitutional right to due process of law.20 2
d. Solutions.-Although hypnosis can produce inaccuracies
in an individual's testimony, the Supreme Court in Rock expressly rec-
ognized that the threat of such inaccuracies could not compel the per
se exclusion of the testimony. °20  Instead, the Rock Court encouraged
the use of procedural safeguards to minimize these potential inaccura-
cies. 204 For example, the use of a neutral psychologist or psychiatrist
with training in forensic hypnosis would minimize the potential unde-
199. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) ("We are not now prepared to endorse
without qualifications the use of hypnosis as an investigative tool.").
200. See Burral, 352 Md. at 752, 724 A.2d at 87 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). According to
Chasanow,
[t] here is no basis for ruling out the possibility that this State agent was afraid that
the witness's initial foggy memory might in time be naturally revived in a way not
helpful to the State, and the purpose of the hypnotic session was to assure that it
would be revived in a way the State agents desired. If so, the State could omit any
mention of the hypnosis, or if they did not like what the hypnotically revived
memory revealed, the State could disclose the hypnosis and preclude the witness's
post-hypnotic testimony.
Id.
201. See id. at 740 n.9., 724 A.2d at 81 n.9 (dismissing Judge Chasanow's concern regard-
ing the ease with which the State could exercise ill motives by stating that there was noth-
ing in the record to suggest that the State acted improperly).
202. See id. at 745, 724 A.2d at 83-84 (Chasanow,J., dissenting) ("To apply a per se rule
precluding the defense from calling exculpatory witnesses because the State chose to have
her hypnotized by a State investigative hypnotist denies the defendant due process of law.")
203. Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 ("A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence
does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.").
204. See id. (suggesting that hypnosis be performed by a specially trained psychologist/
psychiatrist unrelated to the investigation; that the hypnosis be performed in a neutral
setting; that all interrogations are taped or recorded on video; that witnesses are cross-
examined for inconsistencies; that the jury be educated on the strengths and weaknesses of
hypnosis; and that corroborating evidence be used).
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sirable effects on the testimony.2 °5 Additionally, using a neutral figure
in conducting the hypnosis sessions would serve to mitigate the effect
of the free reign that the State presently has in eliminating potential
defense witnesses by exposing them to hypnosis. 20 6 Also, the use of
corroborating evidence can reduce the risks associated with hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony.207 Applying a per se rule of inadmissibility
when other evidence demonstrates the accuracy of the testimony
highlights the complete arbitrariness of the per se rule. To apply arbi-
trary evidentiary rules for the supposed purpose of supporting a
State's interest in maintaining uniform rules disregards the essential
truth-seeking function of the courts. 20 8
5. Conclusion.--The court's decision in Burral v. State denies the
defendant his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. While the use of
hypnotically enhanced testimony presents problems of unreliability,
the Supreme Court has previously held that at least with respect to a
defendant's right to testify, such problems cannot supersede the de-
fendant's fundamental right to present a defense. This reasoning log-
ically extends to barring the application of a per se rule of
inadmissibility to the testimony of defense witnesses who have been
exposed to hypnosis. The Burral court's disregard for such fundamen-
tal rights ultimately compromises the truth-seeking function of the
courts.
ALYSA N. ZELTZER
205. See id. at 60 ("One set of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to be performed
only by a psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its use and who is independent
of the investigation. These procedures reduce the possibility that biases will be communi-
cated to the hypersuggestive subject by the hypnotist." (citation omitted)).
206. See supra notes 200-201 (addressing Judge Chasanow's concern that the majority's
decision in Burral gives the State unlimited power to expose potential defense witnesses to
hypnosis during the investigation stage and thus, eliminate the use of their testimony by
the defense).
207. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 ("Certain information recalled as a result of hypnosis may
be verified as highly accurate by corroborating evidence.").
208. See supra notes 112-113 (discussing the point made in State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571





A. Narrowing the Scope of the Best Interests of the Child Standard
In Giffin v. Crane,1 the Court of Appeals considered whether, in a
child custody proceeding, the court is permitted to consider the sex of
either parent as a factor in determining which parent is the appropri-
ate residential custodian.2 The court held that the Maryland Equal
Rights Amendment3 prohibited an award of custody to a mother
based on a finding that she would be a better custodian because a
female child of a certain age had a specific psychological need to be
with her same-sex parent.4 Through the court's misinterpretation of
the facts of the case, and an overzealous application of Equal Rights
Amendment jurisprudence, the court inadvertently restricted the
scope of the best interests of the child standard5 by prohibiting the
consideration of any special relationship that exists between a same-
sex parent and a child. Consequently, the court's decision is inconsis-
tent with the primary purpose of child custody proceedings-to pro-
mote the child's best interest.6
1. The Case.-James M. Giffin (Giffin), and Donna L. Crane
(Crane), separated in 1992 after twelve years of marriage.7 They have
two daughters, Emily Stoughton, born December 22, 1982, and Sarah
Ellen, born June 26, 1988.8 After filing for divorce, the parties mutu-
ally entered into a written agreement, settling the issues of custody
and visitation, which were incorporated in the divorce decree.9 The
1. 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1997).
2. Id. at 143, 716 A.2d at 1034.
3. MD. CONST. art. 46. Article 46 states that "[e] quality of rights under the law shall
not be abridged or denied because of sex." Id.
4. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040.
5. See discussion infra Part 3.a (discussing the best interests of the child standard).
6. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 145, 716 A.2d at 1035 (recognizing that in a custody case "the
[trial] court's exercise of discretion must be guided, first and foremost, by what it believes
would promote the child's best interest, which, in custody disputes, is in transcendent
importance").
7. See id. at 135, 716 A.2d at 1030.
8. See id. During the separation, the children remained in the marital home with
their father. See id. The mother lived close by and maintained regular visitation for one
year, at which time she moved to Kentucky. See id. Both parties filed for divorce in the
Circuit Court of Montgomery County on the ground of voluntary separation in excess of
one year. See id. In addition, both parties sought custody of the children, child support,
and attorney's fees. See id.
9. See id. at 135-36, 716 A.2d at 1030-31. The relevant provisions of the custody decree
stated:
1.1 The Husband shall have sole physical custody of the minor children, and
the parties shall share their joint legal custody. The parties will attempt to agree
on a mutually acceptable visitation schedule consistent with the activities and
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agreement provided for both Giffin and Crane to have joint legal cus-
tody, while Giffin would retain sole physical custody of both
children.10
The agreement also included a provision providing that a mutu-
ally agreeable mental health professional may review the residential
status of the children, at the expense of the requesting party.11 Such a
review was conducted at the request of Crane.12 After conducting a
review of the status of the children, the mental health professional
recommended that physical custody of the children be changed from
Giffin to Crane.13 As a result of Giffin's failure to accept this
schedules of the children, but if they cannot agree, the Wife's access to the chil-
dren shall be according to the schedule provided in paragraph 1.5 ....
1.3 Neither party shall unilaterally make any substantial decisions affecting
the welfare of the children or enter into any contracts regarding such decisions
without prior consultation with the other party ....
Id. at 135 n.1, 716 A.2d at 1031 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
10. See id. at 136, 716 A.2d at 1031.
11. See id. Section 1.4 of the divorce/custody agreement provides:
Either party shall have the right at his or her expense after contribution by
all available insurance to request a comprehensive review of the residential status
of the children by Dr. Mary Donahue or another mental health professional
agreed by the parties. The purpose of this review will be determined by Dr. Dona-
hue's using professional standards and her discretion. It is anticipated by the
husband that as part of this review Dr. Donahue will consult with teachers and
others who have knowledge of the children and their needs. The parties agree
that Dr. Donahue will meet with the children within 30 days after the signing of
this agreement so as to have a basis of information and that she may make inquiry
of the court appointed attorney or others as she sees fit. The parties shall divide
the uninsured costs of the first meetings within 30 days.
The wife desires that Dr. Donahue conduct a review of the children's resi-
dential status in 1995. The parties agree that thereafter each will be entitled to
request such a review on not more than an annual basis; the parent requesting
the review shall be responsible for the payment therefor.
Id. at 136-37, 716 A.2d at 1031 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
12. See id. at 137, 716 A.2d at 1031.
13. See id. Subsequent to her 1995 review, Dr. Donahue stated in a letter, dated August
16, 1995, to the parties and their counsel as follows:
Dear Parties:
At the request of Ms. Valtri, I am clarifying what I believe is in Emily Giffin's
best interests based on two individual sessions with her and onejoint session with
her father.
By way of background, I first met Emily in April of 1994. At that time, she
expressed both comfort and satisfaction with the living arrangements in place for
her. Basically, she spent the academic year with her father in Maryland and the
majority of the summer in Kentucky with her mother.
In the course of the 94-95 school year, Emily began to experience the need
to have more time with her mother. This was somewhat compounded by her
school situation. In the fall of 1994, she moved from elementary school to middle
school. The behavior of a sizable percentage of the student body in this school
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recommendation, Crane filed a petition for modification of child cus-
tody. 1
4
During the hearing on Crane's petition, the trial court heard tes-
timony from more than twenty witnesses and numerous exhibits were
received, including private investigators' reports.15 The trial court de-
cided to grant Crane's petition and ordered that the custody of the
children be transferred to Crane. 6 In so deciding, the court
explained:
[t]here is no question... in this case that both parents are
caring parents, loving parents. There is no doubt by looking
at the record that the father, with whom the children have
resided this past period of time, is a parent who can attend to
all of their physical needs relevant to growing up in a healthy
physical situation.'
7
The trial court, however, placed great weight on the testimony of the
older daughter, Emily, who explained that she was better able to com-
has resulted in Emily's feeling somewhat overwhelmed and vulnerable. Her
school life was therefore less satisfactory than it had been in the past.
However, the overriding need I discerned in Emily was the opportunity to
know her mother better. Ms. Valtri's work and living situation have changed dra-
matically since she relocated to Kentucky. From having a job when married to
Mr. Giffin which required many hours at work and travel away from home, she
now finds herself able to be at home as a full time mother. Emily, developmen-
tally an early adolescent, appears to need to be provided with an opportunity to
bond with her mother in a way that was unavailable in the past.
It is not that her father has failed her is some way as a parent. It is rather that
she has an emotional need to be with her mother which was not previously the
case. Psycho-dynamically, if Emily perceives that it is her father that has pre-
vented her from finding out the true nature of her relationship with her mother,
it is not unlikely that over time, she will come to resent him, should this occur,
the positive nature of her current relationship with her father will most likely be
damaged.
Mr. Giffen [sic] has raised with me the advisability of Ms. Valtri's relocating
back to the Maryland area given that she is no longer employed and her hus-
band's employment is primarily located in Maryland. It is usually preferable for
any children of divorce to have their parents living in a reasonable proximity to
one another. Such would be the case for this family. However, regardless of
where Ms. Valtri resides, I believe Emily needs the opportunity to reside with [the
respondent] during this coming academic year and her father the following sum-
mer. There are no guarantees. This arrangement may work for Emily and it may
not work for her. It remains to be seen. Should it not work, it should be under-
stood that she can return to her present schedule.
Id. at 136 n.2, 716 A.2d at 1031 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
14. See id at 138, 716 A.2d at 1032. Crane also requested a modification of child sup-
port. See id.
15. See id. at 139, 716 A.2d at 1032.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 139-40, 716 A.2d at 1032-33.
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municate with her mother.18 This testimony led the trial court to con-
clude that:
the best interests of the children and the material change of
circumstances, as exemplified by the reaching an age where
Emily at the very least exemplifies a need for a female hand,
causes the Court to come to the conclusion that the children
should reside with their mother.'
9
Giffin appealed the custody modification to the Court of Special
Appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in considering the gen-
der of the parents as a factor in its determination of custody.2 ° The
Court of Special Appeals disagreed with Giffin, and in an unreported
opinion, held that gender was a permissible factor to be considered in
this residential custody case.2 1 The Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari to resolve whether parental gender is an appropriate factor to be
considered in a residential custody case.
2 2
2. Legal Background.-
a. Best Interests of the Child.-Under early English common
law, a father had an absolute right to the custody of his children, re-
gardless of any consideration as to their welfare. 23 As early as 1878,
however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the best inter-
ests of the child to be the paramount consideration in a child custody
dispute. 24 Despite the court's acknowledgment of the need to deter-
mine the child's best interest, in early decisions, the courts continued
to recognize that the father had a special interest in the custody of his
minor children. 25 This interest was recognized because of the father's
18. See id. at 140, 716 A.2d at 1033.
19. Id. at 140-41, 716 A.2d at 1033. The trial court also stated that "a girl child having
particular need for her mother" was "a necessary factor" in its decision. Id. at 140, 716 A.2d
at 1033.
20. See id. at 141, 716 A.2d at 1033.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 143, 716 A.2d at 1034.
23. See McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 4, 382 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1978).
24. See Hill v. Hill, 49 Md. 450, 458 (1878) (stating that "the welfare of the child is
certainly the primary objective to be obtained"); see also Note, Best Interests of the Child:
Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD. L. REv. 641, 641 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter Child Cus-
tody Disputes] ("The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the child's interests as the para-
mount concern as least as early as 1878." (discussing Hill, 49 Md. at 458)).
25. See, e.g., Montgomery County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 414-
15, 381 A.2d 1154, 1160-61 (1978) (acknowledging the common law entitlement of the
father to his offspring); Child Custody Disputes, supra note 24, at 641 n.2; see also Carter v.
Carter, 156 Md. 500, 505, 144 A. 490, 492 (1929) (recognizing that in the case of divorce or
of separation, where a custody dispute arises, "the right of the father is ordinarily superior
to that of the mother").
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traditional responsibility for the financial support and discipline of his
children.26 Even under the common law approach, where the chil-
dren were basically viewed as chattel of the father,2 7 the courts main-
tained a right to intervene when necessary for the protection of the
child.2"
In 1929, fathers definitively lost their absolute right to custody of
their children in Maryland when the Maryland Legislature enacted
article 72A, section 1, which provides, in pertinent part:
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of
their minor child and are equally charged with its care, nur-
ture, welfare and education. They shall have equal powers
and duties, and neither parent has any right superior to the
right of the other concerning the child's custody.2 9
Despite the clear language of the statute, the Court of Appeals contin-
ued to refer, in several cases, to a father's "natural right" to custody.3"
26. See Caner, 156 Md. at 505, 144 A. at 492 ("[T]he primary right to custody of the
children is in the father, since it is his duty to provide for his children's protection, mainte-
nance, and education."); Boggs v. Boggs, 138 Md. 422, 429, 114 A. 474, 477 (1921) (recog-
nizing that the primary liability for support of a child at common law is imposed on the
father); McAndrew, 39 Md. App. at 4, 382 A.2d at 1083 (discussing the father's "preeminent
right" to custody under common law based on the father's responsibility for support and
discipline of his minor children); Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 414-15, 381 A-2d at 1160-61 (dis-
cussing the colonial courts' fusion of the father's right to custody with his duty to support
his children); see also Child Custody Disputes, supra note 24, at 641 n.2 (discussing the "patria
potestas doctrine-the right of the father to the custody and services of his children").
27. See John W. Ester, Maryland Custody Law-Fully Committed To The Child's Best Inter-
ests?, 41 MD. L. REv. 225, 228 (1982) (stating that, under the common law rule, "[slince the
welfare of the child was irrelevant, the courts might more accurately have spoken of the
father's absolute right to possession of a thing, rather than custody of a child").
28. See McAndrew, 39 Md. App. at 4, 382 A.2d at 1083 (acknowledging colonial courts'
reservation of a right to interfere with a father's right to custody of his children if he failed
to care for them properly); Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 414-15, 381 A.2d at 1160-61 (discussing
the government's authority to appoint a guardian for a child if the child's father failed to
execute his duties).
29. Act of April 11, 1929, ch. 561, 1929 Md. Laws 1361, § 1.
30. See Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 362, 50 A.2d 128, 130 (1946) (articulating that
while "the natural right to custody of children is in the father, the courts in this state are
primarily concerned in all custody cases with the welfare of the infant"); Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 381, 18 A.2d 199, 200 (1941) (discussing the argument put forth by the
appellee that "the natural right to custody of children is in the father" and stating "there
are numerous decisions in this state to sustain that view"); see also Child Custody Disputes,
supra note 24, at 642 n.2 (stating that "[a]lthough the clear import of the statute was that
the father's custody rights were not to be deemed superior to those of the mother, the
Court of Appeals continued in several cases to speak of the father's 'natural right' to the
custody of his children").
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The Court of Appeals finally recognized the abolishment of the
paternal preference doctrine in 1943.31 Children were no longer
viewed as property, and the courts began to exercise their equity pow-
ers32 "with the paramount purpose in view of securing the welfare and
promoting the best interest of the children."33 In leaving behind the
common law paternal preference doctrine, the Maryland court began
to develop the notion that the best interests of the child would best be
served by granting custody to the mother.34 This notion, commonly
known as the maternal preference doctrine
is simply a recognition by the law, as well as by the common-
ality of man, of the universal verity that the maternal tie is so
primordial that it should not lightly be severed or attenu-
ated. The appreciation of this visceral bond between mother
31. See Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 52-53, 31 A.2d 634, 636-37 (1943) (recog-
nizing implicitly that the paternal preference doctrine had been legislatively eliminated);
see also Child Custody Disputes, supra note 24, at 642 n.2 (same).
32. Maryland courts of equity were granted jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
by statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 3-602 (Supp. 1977). The broad statute
reads in part:
(a) Jurisdiction of courts of equity.- A court of equity has jurisdiction over the cus-
tody, guardianship, legitimization, maintenance, visitation and support of a child.
In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:
(1) Direct who shall have the custody or guardianship of a child;
(2) Determine the legitimacy of a child....
(3) Decide who shall be charged with the support and maintenance of a
child, pendente lite or permanently;
(4) Determine who shall have visitation rights to a child; or
(5) From time to time set aside or modify its decree or order concerning the
child.
Id. § 3-602(a).
33. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977) (quoting Burns v.
Bines, 189 Md. 157, 162, 55 A.2d 487 (1947) (quoting in turn Bainard v. Godfrey, 157 Md.
264, 267, 145 A. 614 (1929))); see also Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 56, 475 A.2d 1180, 1183
(1984) (explaining that the best interests of the child are of "transcendent importance"
(quoting Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123, 128, 460 A.2d 49 (1983); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md.
172, 175, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977))); Butler v. Perry, 210 Md. 332, 342, 123 A.2d 453, 458
(1956) (explaining that the welfare of the child is the "controlling test"); Young v. Weaver,
185 Md. 328, 331, 44 A.2d 748, 749 (1945) (calling the child's best interests the "sole
question"); Piotrowski, 179 Md. at 381, 18 A.2d at 201 (characterizing the best interests of
the child as the "paramount consideration").
34. See McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 4, 382 A.2d 1081, 1085 (1978) (recog-
nizing that after abandoning the paternal preference doctrine, Maryland adopted the ma-
ternal preference doctrine, which suggested that "the interests of young children,
particularly females, ordinarily [are] best served when they are placed in the custody of
their mother"); see also Ester, supra note 27, at 229 (stating that "when the paternal prefer-
ence rule began to disappear, the Court of Appeals was developing a 'maternal preference'
doctrine" (citation omitted)).
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and child will always be placed upon the balance scales and,
all else being equal or nearly so, will tilt them.
35
In McAndrew v. McAndrew,3 6 however, the Court of Special Ap-
peals determined that the maternal preference doctrine had been
abolished by the 1974 amendment to article 72A, section 1 of the Ma-
ryland Code,37 which explicitly states that "in any custody proceeding,
neither parent shall be given preference solely because of his or her
sex."38  The court reasoned that at the time this amendment was
passed, the only parental preference doctrine in existence was the ma-
35. Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 538 (1972); see also
Ester, supra note 27, at 229-33 (discussing the maternal preference doctrine).
36. 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978).
37. See id. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1086 ("[W]e conclude that .. . the maternal preference
doctrine has been abolished by statute in child custody cases.").
38. Act of April 9, 1974, ch. 181, 1974 Md. Laws 806 (codified as amended at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 72, § 1 (1978)). As originally enacted by ch. 561 of the 1929 Laws of Maryland,
Article 72A, "Parent and Child," stated that
[t]he father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child and
are equally charged with its care, nurture, welfare and education. They shall have
equal powers and duties, and neither parent has any right superior to the right of
the other concerning the child's custody .... Where the parents live apart, the
court may award the guardianship of the child to either of them.
Act of April 11, 1929, ch. 561, 1929 Md. Laws 1361, § 1 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE art.
72A, § 1 (Supp. 1929)). In 1974, article 72A was amended to read "Where the parents live
apart, the court may award the guardianship of the child to either of them[.] BUT, IN
ANY CUSTODY PROCEEDING, NEITHER PARENT SHALL BE GIVEN PREFERENCE
SOLELY BECAUSE OF HIS OR HER SEX." 1974 Md. Laws at 806. Article 72A, was super-
seded by the Family Law Article, § 5-203 of the 1984 Maryland Code, which states:
Natural guardianship; powers and duties of parents; award of custody to parent
(a) Natural guardianship.-
(1) The parents are the joint natural guardians of their minor child.
(2) A parent is the sole natural guardian of the minor child if the other
parent:
(i) dies;
(ii) abandons the family; or
(iii) is incapable of acting as a parent.
(b) Powers and duties of parents.-The parents of a minor child:
(1) are jointly and severally responsible for the child's support, care, nur-
ture, welfare, and education; and
(2) have the same powers and duties in relation to the child.
(c) If one or both parents of a minor child is an unemancipated minor, the par-
ents of that minor are jointly and severally responsible for any child support
for a grandchild that is a recipient of temporary cash assistance to the extent
that the minor parent has insufficient financial resources to fulfill the child
support responsibility of the minor parent.
(d) Award of custody to parent.-
(1) If the parents live apart, a court may award custody of a minor child to
either parent or joint custody to both parents.
(2) Neither parent is presumed to have any right to custody that is superior
to the fight of the other parent.
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ternal preference doctrine. 9 Therefore, it was the maternal prefer-
ence that the General Assembly intended to abolish.4" The court
noted, however, that the abolishment of the maternal preference doc-
trine was not meant to infer that in determining the best interests of
the child, the court might not consider "the biological and psychologi-
cal differences between the parents ... to the extent that they bear
upon their ability to provide the care needed by the child at the
time."41
Six years later, in Elza v. Elza,4 2 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Court of Special Appeals's abolition of the maternal preference doc-
trine in custody cases.4" Finding the reasoning of the Court of Special
Appeals in McAndrew persuasive, the Court of Appeals upheld the abo-
lition of the maternal preference doctrine because it permitted cus-
tody to be awarded to the mother "solely on the basis of ... sex."4 4
Instead, the court concluded that determining a child's best interests
requires an examination of the "biological and psychological differ-
ences between the parents, the needs of the particular child, and the
relationship of each parent to the child ....
At present, the best interests of the child standard is deemed to
be controlling in Maryland law.4 6 In resolving a custody dispute, there
is one and only one applicable standard for the court to apply "'[t] he
best interest of the child.' . . . The development and application of
this standard shows that the standard itself is one of the 'Eternal
Truths' of family law."47
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-203 (1984). The wording of the 1974 amendment to article
72A was not included in § 5-203 because it was "deemed unnecessary in light of the Mary-
land Equal Rights Amendment." Giffin, 351 Md. at 142 n.5, 716 A.2d at 1034 n.5.
39. See McAndrew, 38 Md. App. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1086 (recognizing that in 1974 when
article 72A, § 1 was amended, "[t]here was no preference of either spouse in a custody
proceeding, based on sex, other than the maternal preference").
40. See id. (stating that it was the "maternal preference, being the only sex based prefer-
ence when established in law, that the General Assembly intended to abolish").
41. Id. at 8-9, 382 A.2d at 1086.
42. 300 Md. 51, 475 A.2d 1180 (1984).
43. See id. at 59, 475 A.2d at 1184 (holding that the maternal preference doctrine was
legislatively abolished in Maryland).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 145, 716 A.2d 1029, 1035 (1997) (recognizing
that the courts "must be guided first and foremost by what it believes would promote the
child's best interest"); Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 56, 475 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1984) (stating that
"[t]his Court has stated numerous times.... [that] the chancellor must be guided by what
he believes would promote the child's best interests").
47. JOHN F. FADER II, DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 1, ch.3, at 8 (1996).
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b. Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment.-Article 46 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides that,
"[e] quality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied
because of sex."4 8 The Court of Appeals has considered the scope of
the ERA in a number of cases.
In State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn,49 the court considered
whether a statute that prohibited cosmetologists from rendering ser-
vices to male patrons, which they could lawfully render to female pa-
trons, violated the ERA.5 ° The court concluded that the statute did
not constitute discrimination based on sex under the ERA because the
statute applied to male as well as to female cosmetologists and
barbers."'
In 1977, the Court of Appeals again examined the ERA in Rand v.
Rand.52 Rand involved a constitutional challenge to the continued ap-
plication of the common law rule that a father is primarily liable for
the financial support of his children. 3 In a unanimous decision, the
court determined that the adoption of the ERA in Maryland was "in-
tended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity of
sex-based classifications."54 The Rand court further determined that
the language of the ERA could "only mean that [under the law] sex is
not a factor. ' 55 Thus, the court held that "the mandate of the ERA"
required that "the parental obligation for child support . . . [be]
shared by both parents."56
In arriving at its decision, the Rand court examined a wide array
of state interpretations of their respective ERAs, which ranged from
48. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 46 (1981). Article 46, also known as the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), was adopted in 1972 upon direct popular vote. See Awilda R. Mar-
quez, Comment, Comparable Worth and the Maryland ERA, 47 MD. L. REV. 1129, 1162 (1988).
49. 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973).
50. See id. at 498, 312 A.2d at 217-18. The statute in question restricted cosmetologists,
generally women, to shampooing and cutting women's hair, while barbers, usually men,
were authorized to cut both women's and men's hair. See id. at 498-99, 312 A.2d at 218.
51. See id. at 505-07, 312 A.2d at 221-22 (discussing and adopting the appellant's posi-
tion that "this is not a case of sex discrimination because... the statute does not discrimi-
nate against cosmetologists of either sex; nor . . .is there discrimination based on sex
between barbers").
52. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
53. See id. at 511, 374 A.2d at 902. Although earlier decisions allowed a court to take a
mother's earnings into account, this was the first time that the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether the ERA required that a court do so. See id. at 511, 374 A.2d at 902 (citing
Groner v. Davis, 260 Md. 471, 272 A.2d 621 (1971); Melson v. Melson, 151 Md. 196, 134 A.
136 (1926)).
54. Id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 905.
55. Id. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903.
56. Id. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905.
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permissive to absolute.57 In choosing to adopt an absolute standard of
review for Maryland's ERA, the court emphasized its determination
that sex-based classifications were strictly prohibited.5"
Following Rand, the Court of Appeals had several occasions to
apply the absolute standard of review to cases involving gender dis-
crimination.5" In these cases, sex-based classifications were continu-
ally struck down as violative of the ERA.6" It was not until 1985, in the
case of Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum,61 that the court began to
stray from the application of an absolute standard of review in cases
involving Maryland's ERA.6 2
In Burning Tree, the court considered whether a facially neutral
statute,63 which granted tax deferrals to private country clubs in re-
turn for guarantees that open spaces on club property would be pre-
served, violated the ERA.64 The statute at issue, enacted in 1965,
authorized the State Department of Assessment and Taxation to grant
private country clubs a property tax deferral in exchange for a ten-
year commitment to preserve its open spaces by not developing or
selling its land.65 In 1974, the General Assembly amended the statute
to include an antidiscrimination provision, but exempted application
of that provision to any club whose "primary purpose" was to serve or
57. See id. at 512-16, 374 A.2d at 902-05. At the time of the Rand decision, Illinois,
Texas, and Louisiana had adopted a permissive test for sex-based classifications under their
respective ERAs, which allowed for the continuation of a sexually discriminatory practice if
it could be justified by a compelling state interest. See id. at 514-15, 374 A.2d at 904 (citing
Illinois v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Louisiana v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La.
1975); Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)). On the other
hand, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Colorado had adopted an absolute test for sex-based
classifications, which does not permit gender discrimination for any reason. See id. at 512-
13, 374 A.2d at 903 (citing Colorado v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (Colo. 1976); Darrin v.
Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975); Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Penn.
1974)).
58. Id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05 ("Like the Supreme Court of Washington . . . we
believe that the 'broad, sweeping, and mandatory language' of the [Equal Rights] amend-
ment is cogent evidence that the people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights
for men and women." (citation omitted)).
59. See Marquez, supra note 48, at 1167 and cases cited therein (discussing cases in
which the Court of Appeals applied the absolute standard of ERA review).
60. See id. (discussing cases in which the Court of Appeals struck down sex-based classi-
fications, applying the absolute standard of review).
61. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
62. See Marquez, supra note 48, at 1168-74 (discussing the Burning Tree court's "split
into two factions on its interpretation of the Maryland ERA[,]" as it circumvented the ap-
plication of the absolute standard against sex-based classifications set forth in Rand).
63. Burning Tree was the first case to explore the application of Maryland's ERA to a
facially neutral law or state action. See id. at 1167-68.
64. Burning Tree, 305 Md. at 56, 501 A.2d at 818.
65. See id. at 56-57, 501 A.2d at 818-19.
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benefit members of a particular sex.66 As a result, Burning Tree Club,
a private golf club, was permitted the tax deferral, while barring wo-
men from membership.67
Although the court unanimously agreed that the "primary pur-
pose" provision of the 1974 amendment violated the Maryland ERA, a
majority could not agree on the correct standard to apply to facially
neutral laws under the ERA. The faction led by Chief Judge Murphy
suggested that the absolute standard set forth in Rand would apply
only if the challenged law imposed a burden or benefit on one sex,
but not on the other.68 Thus, protection under the ERA would only
be triggered if the law in question absolutely forbade the determina-
tion of rights based solely on gender; such protection would not come
into play if both sexes theoretically had equal protection under the
law.69
The other faction, led by Judge Eldridge, argued that even when
a statute does not draw gender-based classifications on its face, it is
appropriate to scrutinize the actual facts to determine if there exists a
discriminatory purpose or impact.70 If gender discrimination is found
to be present, Judge Eldridge would apply an "at least strict scrutiny
standard."' Under this standard of review, gender-based classifica-
66. See id. at 57-58, 501 A.2d at 819.
67. See id. at 58-59, 501 A.2d at 819-20.
68. See id. at 70-71, 501 A.2d at 825-26 (noting that governmental actions are invalid
under the ERA when they "impose[ ] a burden on one sex, but not the other, or grant a
benefit to one but not the other").
69. See id. at 70, 501 A.2d at 825 (discussing how the statute in question did not violate
the ERA because in theory all clubs, "whether comprised of all men, all women, or of
mixed membership" had access to the tax benefit). Chief Judge Murphy argued that the
statute at issue in Burning Tree did not constitute a "denial or abridgment of equal rights
under the law as between men and women" because the tax benefit granted by the statute
was available to all single sex clubs that met the statutory requirements. Id. at 70-71, 501
A.2d at 825-26.
70. See id. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Eldridge argued that the statute in Burning Tree did not provide equal protec-
tion to men and to women because the "sole purpose of the [statute] was to allow Burning
Tree to continue discrimination against women and still receive the state subsidy." Id. at
100, 501 A.2d at 840. Judge Eldridge reached this conclusion because at the time the
statute at issue was passed, Burning Tree was "the only entity to which the [statute] was
applicable." Id.
71. Id. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840 (stating that "the ERA renders sex-based classifications
suspect and subject to at least strict scrutiny," but noting that "because of the inherent
differences between the sexes, some sex-based classifications may be justified after such
scrutiny").
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tions are not always prohibited; such classifications may be justified if
a compelling state interest is demonstrated.7 2
Although the court has had several opportunities to decide both
custody cases and ERA cases, Gffin v. Crane was the court's first oppor-
tunity to apply directly ERA jurisprudence to a case involving consid-
eration of gender as a factor in determining the residential custody of
a child.73
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Giffin v. Crane, the Court of Ap-
peals held that in determining the best interests of a child in a custody
proceeding, it is improper to consider a particular child's need to be
with her same-sex parent because such a consideration constitutes a
violation of the ERA.74 In reaching this conclusion, Chief Judge Bell,
writing for the majority, began by reiterating the well-established "best
interests" standard, explaining that in determining which parent
should be awarded custody of a minor child, "[t] he court's exercise of
discretion must be guided first, and foremost, by what it believes
would promote the child's best interest. . . ."" Against this backdrop,
the court turned to a discussion of Maryland's ERA.7 6 The court
noted that the mandate of the ERA generally prohibits the considera-
tion of sex in determining legal rights of any person through the
grant of a benefit to or an imposition of a burden on one sex but not
on the other.77
The petitioner argued that "the sex of the parent is not a legiti-
mate consideration in child custody cases."78 Conversely, the respon-
dent argued that precedent does not forbid the consideration of sex,
so long as the court is examining the biological and psychological dif-
ferences between parents. 79
72. See id. at 96, 501 A.2d at 839 (stating that "classifications based on sex are suspect,
that they are subject to at least strict scrutiny, and that the burden is upon those attempting
to justify such classifications to demonstrate a compelling state interest").
73. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 151, 716 A.2d at 1038. In Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 475 A.2d
1180 (1984), while deciding a custody case, the Court of Appeals noted that the provision
that was before the court was the same provision that was at issue in Rand; however, neither
party raised an ERA claim, and thus, the court could not rule on the impact of the ERA on
custody. See id. at 54 n.1, 475 A.2d 1181 n.1.
74. Giffin, 351 Md. at 155; 716 A.2d at 1040.
75. Id. at 145, 716 A.2d at 1035 (citing Elza, 300 Md. at 60, 475 A.2d at 1183; Kemp v.
Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 170, 411 A.2d 1028, 1031 (1980); Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 534,
408 A.2d 1030, 1033 (1979); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174-75, 372 A.2d 582, 585
(1977); Krebs v. Krebs, 255 Md. 264, 266, 257 A.2d 428, 429 (1969)).
76. See id. at 146, 716 A.2d at 1035-36.
77. See id. at 148-49, 716 A.2d at 1037.
78. Id. at 141, 716 A.2d at 1033.
79. See id. at 141-42, 716 A.2d at 1033-34 (citing Elza, 300 Md. 51, 475 A.2d 1180).
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The court accepted the petitioner's argument, and in so doing,
placed child custody disputes within the sphere protected by the
ERA." ° In so holding, the Court of Appeals determined that it was
unambiguously clear that the trial court had relied upon impermissi-
ble considerations of gender in arriving at its decision."
Next, as a threshold matter, the majority considered whether the
trial court used gender as a determining factor in its custody decision,
and determined that it had, in fact, done so. 2 Despite the fact that
the trial court's decision focused on Emily's testimony that she could
"more easily communicate with her mother,"8 3 the Court of Appeals
concluded that no specific evidence of a communication problem be-
tween Emily and her father had been presented. 4 While the court
recognized that the ability of a child to communicate better with one
parent than the other may be a reason to modify a custody agreement,
the court felt as though the trial court had, instead, based its decision
on the testimony of one of the experts who testified that a girl child
has a particular need for her mother and a female hand. 5 To sup-
port its position, the Court of Appeals pointed to the language in the
trial court's opinion in which the trial court recognized that both par-
ents were loving and caring parents and that the father had done an
exceptional job raising the children up to this point, but finding that
Emily "had reached an age where [she] at the very least exemplifies a
need for female hand. 8 6
The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the trial court's
decision "could not have been the product of testimony about the par-
80. See id. at 147-48, 716 A.2d at 1036-37 (taking note of the petitioner's argument that
"the chancellor did not conduct an individualized examination of the evidence .... He
merely said a girl needs her mother").
81. See id. at 147, 716 A.2d at 1036 (stating that "when one considers the trial court's
explanation of its decision, it is clear, unambiguously, that the court was relying on the
respondent's gender as the decisive basis for modifying the custody order").
82. See id. at 146-47, 716 A.2d at 1036 ("When one considered the trial court's explana-
tion of its decision, it is clear that the [trial] court was relying on ... gender as the decisive
basis for modifying the custody order.").
83. See id. at 146, 716 A.2d at 1036.
84. See id. at 147, 716 A.2d at 1036 ("[A]s the [trial] court itself acknowledged, there
was no specific or particularized testimony or information concerning the nature of the
communication problem . . ").
85. See id. (recognizing that the ability to communicate better with one parent rather
than the other "may be cause to award custody to that parent, [but] that is not what oc-
curred in this case .... [Rather] the trial court was persuaded by the testimony of one of
the experts that [Emily] was a girl who has a particular need for her mother and for a
female hand").
86. Id. at 146-47, 716 A.2d at 1036.
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ticular child and her needs and relationship with the parties,""7 but
was instead based solely on the gender of her parents.
88
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Raker and Karwacki,
Judge McAuliffe argued that the majority had misinterpreted the re-
cord and that the trial judge did not use an impermissible considera-
tion of gender to arrive at his decision. 89 The dissent maintained that
... the oral opinion of the [trial court] ... is perhaps inele-
gant and lacking in as complete a discussion of the rationale
for the decision as may have been desired, but viewed in the
context of the testimony and of prior statements of the [trial
court], it is clear to me that the references to gender related
to appropriate considerations.9 °
In support of his position, Judge McAuliffe reasoned that the wit-
nesses were not saying that an adolescent daughter is always better
able to communicate with her mother, but rather the witnesses were
referring to this specific mother and daughter.9 Judge McAuliffe also
noted that this relationship was hardly atypical between a same-sex
parent and child.92
4. Analysis.-In Giffin v. Crane, the Court of Appeals's misinter-
pretation of the facts, coupled with an overzealous application of ERA
jurisprudence, resulted in a decision that has restricted the scope of
the best interests of the child standard by prohibiting the considera-
tion of any special relationship that exists between a same-sex parent
and child. Giffin can be viewed as a collision between two lines of
Maryland jurisprudence: child custody (applying best interests of the
child standard) and equal rights under the ERA.93 The decision, how-
ever, represents an inappropriate application of both precedents. In
holding that a maternal award of custody based on the specific and
particular need of a female child of a certain age to be with her same-
sex parent violates Maryland's ERA,94 the Giffin decision is at odds
87. Id. at 147, 716 A.2d at 1036.
88. See id. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040.
89. See id. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 155-56, 716 A.2d at 1040.
91. See id. at 156, 716 A.2d at 1040-41 (stating that the witnesses were discussing "the
context of this mother and this daughter, and not some stereotypical figures").
92. See id., 716 A.2d at 1041.
93. See id. at 151, 716 A.2d at 1038 (acknowledging that the "court has not had the
occasion to address the issue this case presents, [however] our cases since the adoption of
the Equal Rights Amendment and the legislature's action in enacting the family law article
make clear what the proper result should be").
94. See id. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040.
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with the fundamental purpose of a child custody proceeding-to pro-
tect the best interests of the child.95
a. The Court's Reliance on Maryland Custody Law.-The Court
of Appeals in Giffin properly recognized Elza v. Elza96 for its preceden-
tial value, because Elza addressed the consideration of a parent's gen-
der in the context of a custody dispute.97 The court failed, however,
to apply properly the Elza decision. The Giffin court claimed support
from Elza, stating,
[t]he trial court erred,.., in the instant case; it assumed that
the respondent [Crane] necessarily would be a better custo-
dian solely because she has a female hand, and that a girl
child of a certain age has a particular and specific need to be
with her same sex parent. In so doing, as in Elza, the trial
court applied an invalid legal principle. A review of the re-
cord ... reveals, again, much as in the case of Elza, that, but
for the trial court's perception of the need for a female hand
for a girl child of Emily's age, that it believed each parent
would be a proper and fit custodian.98
The court's analogy is flawed because careful analysis reveals that the
facts of Giffin are distinguishable from those of Elza in two ways.
First, as Judge McAuliffe argued in his dissent, the trial court in
Giffin did not base its decision on a maternal preference or presump-
tion based on gender.99 The trial court did not presume that Crane
would be the better custodian because an adolescent daughter always
has a psychological need to be with her mother. 100 Rather, the lower
court's decision was based on the specific psychological need of this
particular daughter to be with her mother.10 1 Furthermore, the lower
court's assessment of this particular daughter's need was supported by
95. See supra note 33 (recognizing the best interests of the child as the most important
consideration in child custody proceedings).
96. 300 Md. 51, 475 A.2d 1180 (1984).
97. See id. at 53, 475 A.2d at 1181. In Elza, the Court of Appeals recognized the abroga-
tion of the maternal preference doctrine, which was used as a "tie-breaker" when the court
was confronted with two equally fit parents. Id. at 58-59, 475 A.2d at 1184 (citing McAn-
drew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1977)).
98. Giffin, 351 Md. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040.
99. Id. at 156, 716 A.2d at 1041 (McAuliffe,J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial court's
decision in Giffin was "a far cry from establishing a preference or presumption based on
gender").
100. See id ("What is important to understand in this case is that the witnesses were not
saying that an adolescent daughter is always better able to communicate with her mother
... or that there is always an emotional need of a daughter to be with her mother.").
101. See id.; supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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her testimony that she could communicate better with her mother, 0 2
as well as the testimony of expert witnesses, who in discussing Emily's
specific need, noted that this situation is hardly atypical and often oc-
curs between a child of Emily's age and their same-sex parent.1
0 3
This is in contrast to Elza, where custody of a five-year old child
was awarded to the mother simply because the child was female. 104 In
Elza, unlike Giffin, there was no testimony of the specific child's psy-
chological need to be with her mother. In fact, the chancellor stated,
"I can't find anything wrong with either mother or father .... They
are apparently both devoted to the child."'0 5 The chancellor went on
to conclude that "[b]oth parties being equal here, I can't find that
either party is not entitled to have the child. I suppose I am old fash-
ion in one sense... but it still seems to me that if it's a five-year-old...
all other factors being equal ... that in that case, the child should go
102. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 140-41, 716 A.2d at 1033 (noting that "Emily expressed the
conclusion that she was more able to communicate with her mother"); see also id. at 156-58,
716 A.2d at 1040-42 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) (discussing Emily's testimony to the effect
that she could communicate readily with her mother about matters of concern to her that
she could not discuss with her father).
103. See id. at 156, 716 A.2d at 1040-41 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting); supra note 92 and
accompanying text. One of the experts to whom the court is referring is Dr. Joseph Poi-
ier, expert witness for Giffin, who testified in relevant part as follows:
Q: In comparison, mother was much warmer, I think you testified to?
A: In [Emily's] perception, yes.
Q: Okay.
A: Now, again, that may be of that mother/daughter attachment thing, too. I
mean, I did not find Mr. Giffin emotionally detached.
Q: And that is because [Emily] perceives him as being more emotionally aloof, to
use those same words?
A: I would not characterize it that way. I could not tell you if [Emily] is more
comfortable with the mom. That may be explainable just in terms of that special-
ized relationship she has. You know, I mean, If [sic] I can look at my own kids,
when my kids were adolescents, they were much more comfortable going to my
wife. There is a developmental thing there and it's not really necessarily a posi-
tive or a negative characterization against or on behalf of either parenting figure.
Q: But the literature clearly recognizes the significance of that developmental
factor that you were just taking about-
A: Oh, yes.
Q: -and the identification with the same sex parent is pretty common with
someone this age; correct?
A: And again, as I have already testified, it is something that ebbs and flows, yes.
Id. at 144, 716 A.2d at 1035 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted).
104. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 56, 475 A.2d 1180, 1182 (1984) (concluding "that the
trial court erroneously relied on the maternal preference presumption as the basis for his
award of custody of the minor child to the mother").
105. Id. at 55, 475 A.2d at 1182.
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with the mother . .1.0."6 Thus, Giffin can clearly be distinguished
from Elza because while the trial court in Giffin did acknowledge that
"both parents are caring parents, loving parents," the trial court did
not proclaim both parents equal. 10 7 Rather, the trial court recognized
that Emily had a special ability to communicate with her mother, an
ability she had lacked with her father, and therefore should reside
with her mother.10 8
Secondly, the trial court in Giffin did not employ gender consid-
erations as a tiebreaker, as the trial court did in Elza. In Giffin, the
chancellor stated that both parents were "caring parents, loving par-
ents," and that the father "is a parent who can attend to all of [the
children's] physical needs relevant to growing up in a healthy physical
situation."1 °9 The trial court, however, did not claim that both par-
ents were equally fit, as the trial court did in Elza.11° The Gffin court
failed to recognize that not only were Emily's physical needs at issue in
the instant case, but her psychological needs were relevant as well. 1 '
While the trial court concluded that Giffin and Crane were both fully
qualified to care for Emily's physical needs, the testimony elicited sug-
gested that Crane was better able to satisfy Emily's psychological
needs. 112
As evidenced by the testimony of Dr. Mary Donahue, Emily's
need was "a major emotional need to be with her mom" that was
based on "a psychological issue and the need to bond with her mother
psychologically based on where she was in the development issues. " ' 13
Emily expressed a desire to live with her mother because she felt as
106. Id.
107. Giffin, 351 Md. at 139, 716 A.2d at 1032.
108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the trial court's decisions).
109. Giffin, 351 Md. at 139-40, 716 A.2d at 1032 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted).
110. See Elza, 300 Md. at 60, 475 A.2d at 1184 (noting that although "the [trial court]
believed each parent would be a proper and fit custodian" the trial court "granted custody
to Mrs. Elza because 'it's a five year old . . . all other factors being equal . . . that in that
case, the child should go with the mother."').
111. In stating that the father could "attend to all of [the children's] physical needs,"
one can logically presume that the trial court was referring to Giffin's ability to clothe and
provide food and shelter for Emily and her sister. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 140, 716 A.2d at
1032. A consideration of which parent Emily can more readily communicate with, how-
ever, has nothing to do with her physical requirements. Rather, psychological need is at
issue. See Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442, 446 (1960) (discussing factors to be
considered to determine which potential custodian is better suited to promote the child's
best interests); Ester, supra note 27, at 239-41 (discussing the "psychological parent").
112. Giffin, 351 Md. at 156-57, 716 A.2d at 1041 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) (discussing
the trial judge's reasoning and testimony provided to demonstrate Crane's ability to satisfy
Emily's emotional needs).
113. Id. at 156, 716 A.2d at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
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though she could more readily talk with her mother about her con-
cerns because "when there is a disagreement of sorts, [with her fa-
ther] it requires a total examination and exhaustive study as to what is
happening and so on." '1 14 Dr. Joseph Poirier also testified that Emily
characterized "her father as being more emotionally aloof than her
mother, who was much warmer"1 5 and that "it's clear from the con-
versation [Emily has] had with me that she talks with her mother
about a variety of things that are important to her, and I do not be-
lieve she shares those same things with her dad."' 16 Dr. Donahue fur-
ther added that "I think it's in a child's best interest to be with the
parent with whom they feel most comfortable sharing their lives, the
problems in their lives, or whatever are the things that are going on
day to day." '117
It is clear from the testimonies of Emily, Dr. Donahue, and Dr.
Poirier that only Crane could fulfill Emily's psychological needs at this
stage of her life. Thus, the majority court in Giffin was incorrect in
deciding that the trial court deemed both parents equally fit and
proper."' Therefore, the trial court did not use gender as a
tiebreaker to decide between two equally capable parents.
Moreover, it is significant to note that the court in Elza appeared
to recognize that the consideration of biological and psychological
differences between parents in a custody decision would not violate
the rule against awarding custody based solely on gender.1 19 Al-
though the Elza decision did not involve an ERA challenge, the court
there did note that the legislative provision (article 72A) used to chal-
lenge the gender-based custody decision in Elza was the same one
used in Rand.1 20 This determination is significant because Rand in-
volved a challenge under both article 72A and the ERA.12 1 In decid-
ing that the obligation for child support is shared by both parents, the
114. Id. at 157, 716 A.2d at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
115. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 157-58, 716 A.2d at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted).
118. As the dissent noted, "the oral opinion of the [trial judge], delivered from the
bench after six days of trial, is perhaps inelegant and lacking in as complete a discussion of
the rationale for the decision as may have been desired," but there is no indication that the
trial court meant to deem both parents equally qualified to provide Emily with everything
she needs physically and emotionally. Id. at 155-56, 716 A.2d at 1040.
119. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 59, 475 A.2d 1180, 1184 (1984) (noting that a determi-
nation of a child's best interests "require[s] an evolution of biological and psychological
differences between the parents").
120. See id. at 54 n.1, 475 A.2d at 1182 n.1; see also supra note 38 (setting forth the text of
article 72A).
121. See Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 509, 374 A.2d 900, 901 (1977).
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Rand court noted that both the ERA and article 72A compelled this
result. 122 Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the ERA and article 72A
contain similar mandates when applied to child custody and to sup-
port proceedings, and that while the court in Elza recognized this sim-
ilarly, it still felt that consideration of biological and psychological
differences between parents were permissible. Unfortunately, the Gif-
fin court disregarded this connection, as well seemingly dismissing
Elza's suggestion that gender, on some level, is a permissible consider-
ation in child custody proceedings.' 23
b. Analysis of ERA Standard of Review Adopted.-The second
flaw in the Court of Appeals's decision in Giffin is its failure to address
properly the impact of Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum.124 In Burning
Tree, the court examined a claim that a facially neutral statute, which
provided private country clubs with a tax deferral, violated the ERA.1 25
In a complex discussion, the court in Burning Tree set forth two com-
peting standards of review to be applied to facially neutral state ac-
tions or laws under the ERA. 1 26 Although the court cites bits and
pieces of Burning Tree, it fails to consider fully the impact of Burning
Tree.127 Because Giffin involved the application of a facially neutral
standard, the best interests of the child, it was incumbent on the
Court of Appeals in Giffin to evaluate closely the impact of the Burning
Tree decision.
122. See id. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905 (concluding that the mandate of the ERA as well as
the "clear import of the language of Art. 72A" requires that the parental obligation for
child support be shared by both parents); see also Giffin, 351 Md. at 154, 716 A.2d at 1040
(noting that in 1984, the Maryland legislature deleted the language in article 72A that was
found decisive in Elza and Rand because it was "unnecessary in light of the [ERA]").
123. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040 (deciding that the trial court had erred
in assuming a parent was a better custodian because her daughter had a "particular and
specific need to be with her same sex parent"). But see id. at 156, 716 A.2d at 1040 (McAu-
liffe, J., dissenting) ("I do not understand the majority to hold that consideration of gen-
der is always inappropriate in a custody case."). It is interesting to note that in its
discussion of Elza, the Giffin court characterized Elza's interpretation of article 72A as "ex-
press[ing] the intent of the General Assembly to eradicate sex as a factor in child custody
proceedings." Id. at 152, 716 A.2d at 1039 (emphasis added). The Elza court, however, was
never so categorical in its decision. Instead, it emphasized that custody awards could not
be made solely on the basis of a parent's sex. See Elza, 300 Md. at 59, 475 A.2d at 1184
(holding "that the maternal preference doctrine is abolished . . . because it permits an
award of custody to be made solely on the basis of the mother's sex").
124. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
125. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Burning
Tree case).
126. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (setting forth the standards of review
enunciated in Burning Tree).
127. Burning Tree, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (setting forth two standards of ERA review).
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Essentially, the Giffin court had two options under the Burning
Tree decision. The Giffin court could have chosen to apply the test set
forth by Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree, in which the absolute
standard as enunciated in Rand would apply only if the challenged law
or action imposed a burden or benefit on one sex but not on the
other. 128 Under this analysis, the examination of a special relation-
ship that often exists between a same-sex parent and child, when done
in pursuance of determining the child's best interests, is equally avail-
able to both sexes. 129 Thus, protection under the ERA would not
have been triggered in Giffin because, theoretically, both sexes were
accorded equal treatment under the law.13
Alternatively, the Giffin court could have applied Judge Eldridge's
analysis in Burning Tree, which would apply the ERA not only to gen-
der-based classifications per se, but would also inquire into the dis-
criminatory impact or purpose of gender-neutral laws as well.13'
Where gender discrimination is found, Judge Eldridge would apply an
"at least strict scrutiny standard." 3 2 Under this standard of review,
even if the Giffin court found that the consideration of the special
relationship between mother and daughter did constitute a gender-
based classification, such a classification could still be justified if a
compelling state interest is demonstrated. 3' The Giffin court could
have found the necessary substantial justification for the classification
in the special nature of child custody proceeding in which the deter-
mination of a child's best interests is the paramount consideration,
superseding the interests of the parents.'34 In addition, the court
could have found support for substantial justification in the Elza deci-
128. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the test proposed by Chief
Judge Murphy).
129. It is plausible to imagine that a scenario similar to the one in Giffin could occur
involving an award of custody based on a special relationship between a father and son.
130. Compare Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1997), with Burning Tree, 305
Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817. In Burning Tree, ChiefJudge Murphy determined that the statute in
question did not violate the ERA because the tax benefit was available to all private clubs,
'whether comprised of all men, all women, or of mixed membership." 305 Md. at 70, 501
A.2d at 825. Similarly in Giffin, the examination of a special relationship between a parent
and a child was available to all relationships be it between a mother and a child or between
a father and a child. Giffin, 351 Md. at 156-58, 716 A.2d at 1040-42 (discussing Emily's
relationship with both her parents). Analogizing Burning Tree and Giffin, evidences that
the consideration of a special relationship between a same-sex parent and child is not
limited to one sex, and therefore, does not grant a benefit to one sex but not the other.
131. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining Judge Eldridge's position on
the standard of review to be applied to a facially neutral law challenged under the ERA).
132. See supra notes 70-72.
133. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
134. See discussion supra Part 3.a (discussing the best interests of the child standard and
its paramount importance in child custody proceedings).
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sion, which recognized the need to consider the biological and psy-
chological differences between parents and the special relationships
stemming therefrom when making custody decisions. 13 5
c. Application of ERA Standard is at Odds with the Best Interests
Standard.--Maryland cases demand that the determining factor in a
child custody case is the best interests of the child.'1 6 This policy is
paramount to all other considerations, with the rights of the parents
being subordinate in relation to the question of the child's best inter-
est.13 7 Indeed, the Giffin court acknowledged this fundamental
truth.1 38 Yet the court failed to accord this principle its proper weight
by placing the concerns of the adversarial parties-the parents-
ahead of the interests of the child by focusing on the rights of the
parents under the ERA rather than the welfare of the child.
Understandably, it is almost second nature to consider custody
disputes in terms of adversaries' rights, especially for judges who deal
with disputes over such rights on a daily basis. 139 In deciding a cus-
tody dispute, however, judges must consider that it is not the rights of
the warring parties that are at issue; it is the well-being of the child.140
In limiting the factors that may be considered in a best interests analy-
sis based on the ERA, the Giffin court does injustice to the deeply
rooted tradition of placing the best interests standard at the center of
a child custody proceeding.
5. Conclusion.--In Gffin v. Crane, the Court of Appeals held that
the sex of either parent may not be considered in the determination
of a child's best interests in a custody proceeding. Through the
court's misinterpretation of the facts of the case, and an overzealous
135. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 60, 475 A.2d 1180, 1185 (1977) (discussing the court's
recognition of the need to consider biological and psychological differences between par-
ents in light of the Rand decision).
136. See supra note 33.
137. See, e.g., Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 22, 161 A. 269, 271 (1932) (stating
"[w]hen the custody of children is the question... the best interest of the children is the
paramount fact. Rights of father and mother sink into insignificance before that."); see also
Ester, supra note 27, at 227 (noting that "Maryland cases have insisted that the determining
factor [in custody cases] must always be the child's best 'interests"' (citation omitted)).
138. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 133, at 716 A.2d at 1035 (stating that the court is to be
"guided first, and foremost, by what it believes would promote the child's best interest,
which in custody disputes, is of transcendent importance").
139. See Ester, supra note 27, at 227 (pointing out that "[i]t may be tempting to think of
custody disputes in terms of 'rights' and 'obligations', particularly for lawyers and judges
who are likely to feel comfortable ... with the process of analyzing a problem in terms of
adversaries' rights" (citation omitted)).
140. See id. (stating that "[t]he court's ultimate purpose is not to secure an adult's rights,
but to further a child's welfare").
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application of Equal Rights Amendment jurisprudence, the court re-
stricted the scope of the best interests of the child standard by prohib-
iting the consideration of any special relationship that exists between
a same-sex parent and a child. Consequently, the court's decision is
inconsistent with the best interests standard.
JENNIFER A. MATTHEWS
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
B. Extending the Application of the Best Interests of the Child and Actual
Harm Standard to Custody and Visitation Disputes Involving
Homosexual Parents
In Boswell v. Boswell,1 the Court of Appeals identified the applica-
ble standard for evaluating the extent of parental visitation restric-
tions in the presence of nonmarital, homosexual partners.2 The court
stated that the applicable standard in all visitation disputes would be
"the best interests of the child, with visitation being restricted only
upon a showing of actual or potential harm to the child resulting from
contact with the non-marital partner."3 Applying this standard to the
facts of the case, the court did not find that the children suffered any
actual harm as a result of the presence of Mr. Boswell's homosexual
partner during visitation periods.4 Therefore, the court determined
that requiring Mr. Boswell's partner to be absent during visitation pe-
riods was improper.5 The court relied on Maryland case law involving
custody and visitation requests of heterosexual parents to evaluate a
homosexual father's visitation rights in the presence of a nonmarital
partner.' Accordingly, Boswell can be read to require that trial courts
apply the best interests of the child and actual harm standard not only
to cases involving a homosexual parent's visitation rights but also to
cases involving a homosexual parent's request for custody. With its
holding in Boswell, the court extended the application of the best in-
terests of the child and actual harm standard to all custody and visita-
tion disputes, thus broadening the ability of homosexual parents to
gain both custody and visitation of their children. In clarifying the
standard for these disputes, the court expressed its disapproval of the
trial court's use of value preferences when making its determinations.7
To combat similar improper influence, the Boswell court emphasized
that trial courts must make factual findings demonstrating actual or
likely harm to deny visitation rights to a parent when a nonmarital
partner is present under the best interests of the child standard.'
1. 352 Md. 204, 721 A.2d 662 (1998).
2. Id. at 209, 721 A.2d at 664.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 238, 721 A.2d at 678.
5. Id. at 209, 721 A.2d at 664.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 238, 721 A.2d at 678-79 (noting that, in previous cases, the Court of Appeals
had "overturned the power of a trial court to use [a] blanket disapproval of a non-marital
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1. The Case.-In May 1986, Robert Boswell and Kimberly Bos-
well were married.9 During their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Boswell had
two children, a son Ryan, born in 1988, and a daughter Amanda, born
in 1991.1° In August 1994, after Mr. Boswell told his wife that he was
homosexual, the parties separated.1 ' After the separation, Mr. Bos-
well began an intimate relationship with Robert Donathan, and in
February 1995, Mr. Boswell began living with Mr. Donathan. 2 Ms.
Boswell filed an initial complaint for divorce on October 5, 1994.1'
On January 20, 1995, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
ordered visitation between Mr. Boswell and his children each Wednes-
day evening and every other weekend. 4 On April 1, 1996, Mr. Bos-
well moved for recusal of Judge Rushworth because of statements he
made indicating a predisposition to limit Mr. Boswell's visitation and
to permit no contact between the children and Mr. Boswell's partner,
Mr. Donathan.15 The court denied the motion. 6 On April 5, 1996,
after a five-day trial, the court awarded sole custody to Ms. Boswell and
severely limited Mr. Boswell's visitation rights.' 7 The trial court's or-
der prohibited any overnight visitation and prohibited visitation with
the children in the presence of Mr. Donathan or "anyone having ho-
mosexual tendencies or such persuasions, male or female, or with any-
one that the father may be living with in a non-marital relationship." 8
On August 22, 1996, pursuant to a second request by Mr. Boswell's
counsel, Judge Rushworth recused himself from further proceedings
in the case. 9 Mr. Boswell then appealed to the Court of Special Ap-





14. See id. In accordance with the visitation order, visitation occurred with Mr.
Donathan present. SeeBoswell v. Boswell, 118 Md. App. 1, 12, 701 A.2d 1153, 1158 (1997).
At trial, Mr. Boswell testified that at first, he and Mr. Donathan slept in the same bedroom
when the children came for visitation. See id. When it was revealed that this was upsetting
Ryan, Mr. Boswell testified that he and Mr. Donathan began sleeping in separate bedrooms
during visitation. See id. Mr. Boswell testified that he and Mr. Donathan agreed that Mr.
Donathan would not take an active role in disciplining the children; Mr. Donathan would
play with the children during visitation and participate in activities with appellant and the
children at those times. See id.
15. See Boswell 352 Md. at 210, 721 A.2d at 665.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 210-11, 721 A.2d at 665. The court limited Mr. Boswell's visits with his
children to every other Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., and every Wednesday from
3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on school days and from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on nonschool days.
See id. at 211, 721 A.2d at 665.
18. Id. at 211, 721 A.2d at 665.
19. See id. at 212, 721 A.2d at 666.
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peals, claiming that the trial court had failed to make any findings of
fact upon which it based its visitation order.2"
On October 29, 1997, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the
judgment of the circuit court, including the prohibition against over-
night visitation, and remanded this issue to the trial court.21 In addi-
tion, the court vacated the prohibition against visitation in the
presence of any nonmarital partner or any homosexual, without re-
mand.22 Ms. Boswell filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Stay
on November 12, 1997, alleging that the Court of Special Appeals er-
roneously applied an actual harm standard rather than the best inter-
ests of the child standard. 23 The Court of Special Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration and Stay on December 5, 1997, maintain-
ing that it had applied the correct standard. 24 The Court of Appeals
granted Ms. Boswell's petition for certiorari, which challenged only
that portion of the Court of Special Appeals's order vacating the pro-
hibition on visitation in the presence of Mr. Donathan.25
2. Legal Background.-
a. Best Interests of the Child Standard.-The United States Su-
preme Court has long held that a parent has a fundamental right to
raise his or her children.26 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,2 7 the Court ad-
dressed an Oklahoma statute mandating that a vasectomy be per-
formed on any person convicted two or more times for crimes
"amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude."2 In finding the
statute unconstitutional, the Court explained that the ability to pro-
20. See id. at 213, 721 A.2d at 666.
21. Boswell v. Boswell, 118 Md. App. 1, 11, 701 A.2d 1153, 1157-58 (1997).
22. Id. The Court of Special Appeals held that there was no evidentiary basis for the
trial court to conclude that the relationship between Mr. Boswell and Mr. Donathan was
harmful to the children. Id. at 11, 701 A.2d at 1158. The intermediate appellate court
vacated the prohibition of any visitation of the children by the father in the presence of
any homosexual based on the failure to show harm to the children that would result from
such contact. Id.
23. See Boswell, 352 Md. at 213, 721 A.2d at 666.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 214, 721 A.2d at 666.
26. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that caring for a
family is a private realm into which states cannot enter); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy
Names, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925) (maintaining a parent's authority to school his or her
children at home by striking down a state statute requiring attendance at public school);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a statute disallow-
ing parents to teach their children in languages other than English).
27. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
28. Id. at 536.
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duce and raise children involves one of man's basic civil rights. 29
Thirty years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder" the Court recognized par-
ents' fundamental right to care for their children.31 In Yoder, the
Court held that the state of Wisconsin could not compel Amish par-
ents to send their children to school once they had finished the
eighth grade.3 2
Maryland has followed the Supreme Court in recognizing the
fundamental right of a parent to raise his or her children. In Carter v.
Carter,3" the Court of Appeals stated:
It is the rule of the common law that parents have the natu-
ral right to the custody of their children, and that, as be-
tween the mother and father, the primary right to the
custody of the children is in the father, since it is his duty to
provide for his children's protection, maintenance, and
education.34
The court clarified that although the right of the father is usually su-
perior to that of the mother, "this rule must yield to the paramount
consideration of what will be for the best interest of the children and
most conducive to their welfare.""5 Similarly, in In re Adoption No.
10941,36 the court stated that the right of a parent to raise his child is
"recognized by constitutional principles, common law and statute,
[and] is so fundamental that it may not be taken away unless clearly
justified."37
Although the factors that have been taken into consideration
when deciding what is best for a child in custody and visitation dis-
putes have changed over the years,3" the Court of Appeals has long
29. See id. at 541 ("We are dealing here with legislation which involves the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race.").
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 234.
33. 156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929).
34. Id. at 505, 144 A. at 492.
35. See id. Note, however, that Maryland has since entirely disposed of the notion that
fathers have a superior right to the custody of their children. See, e.g., Ross v. Hoffman, 280
Md. 172, 176-77, 372 A.2d 582, 586 (1977) (holding that the common law concept that the
primary right to custody was in the father has been abrogated but that there still exists a
superior right to custody of a parent over anyone else).
36. 335 Md. 99, 642 A.2d 201 (1994).
37. Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at 208.
38. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the reversal of the presump-
tion of unfitness on the part of an adulterous parent following Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119,
372 A.2d 231 (1977)).
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applied the best interests of the child standard. In Pangle v. Pangley a
dispute regarding the custody of a divorced couple's only daughter,
the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he primary concern in cases of
this nature is to make such an award of the custody of the child as will
promote its highest welfare."4 ° Ten years later, in Carter v. Carter,41 the
Court of Appeals similarly based its grant of custody to a child's father
on the best interests of the child standard.42 The court explained that
because the father had married again, and could provide the child
with a safe, comfortable home, "the child's material welfare will best
be promoted by his remaining in his father's custody." 43 Because the
court was unsure as to the fitness of the mother to raise her child,4 4 it
decided it would be in the boy's best interests to remain with his
father.45
In Hild v. Hild,46 the Court of Appeals clarified the best interests
standard by outlining several factors to be used in determining what is
in the best interests of a child:
[T] he fitness of the persons seeking custody, the adaptability
of the prospective custodian to the task, the age, sex and
health of the child, the physical, spiritual and moral well-be-
ing of the child, the environment and surroundings in which
the child will be reared, the influences likely to be exerted
on the child, and, if he or she is old enough to make a ra-
tional choice, the preference of the child.47
The court stressed that while these factors were to be considered in
deciding what is in the best interests and welfare of a child, the most
important consideration must still be the overall well being of the
child.48 In Taylor v. Taylor,49 the Court of Appeals relied on factors
similar to the ones it articulated in Hild when considering a petition
39. 134 Md. 166, 106 A. 337 (1919).
40. Id. at 170, 106 A. at 338.
41. 156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929).
42. Id. at 505, 144 A. at 492 (stating that the "paramount consideration" would be
"what will be for the best interest of the children and most conducive to their welfare").
43. Id. at 506, 144 A. at 492. The custody of the eight-year-old child had been divided
between the parents. See id. at 502, 144 A. at 492. Mr. Carter appealed that decree and was
seeking to obtain the exclusive guardianship and custody of the child. See id.
44. Mr. Carter alleged that Mrs. Carter secretly took the child from him in New York,
in an attempt to relocate in Canada. See id. at 506-07, 144 A. at 493.
45. See id. at 507, 144 A. at 493.
46. 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960).
47. Id. at 357, 157 A.2d at 446 (citing 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.01 (2d
ed. 1945)).
48. Id.
49. 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986).
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forjoint custody of two minor children.5 ° The court recognized, how-
ever, that while a list of specific criteria is helpful, "none has talis-
manic qualities, and . . . no single list of criteria will satisfy the
demands of every case.""
b. Combining the Best Interests of the Child Standard with the
Showing of Actual or Potential Harm to the Children.-When the best in-
terests of the child standard is used to limit custody or visitation based
on the presence of a nonmarital partner, Maryland courts also require
a showing of actual harm resulting from contact with the nonmarital
partner. In Swain v. Swain,52 the Court of Special Appeals stated that
"adultery is relevant only insofar as it actually affects a child's wel-
fare."5" The intermediate appellate court instructed the lower court
to consider only the harmful effects of the adultery on the children,
not the adultery itself.54 Similarly, in Robinson v. Robinson,55 the Court
of Appeals upheld the lower court's grant of custody to an adulterous
wife, basing its decision, in part, on the fact that there was no evidence
that the adulterous conduct had any adverse effect on the child.56
Therefore, only when actual or potential harm from contact with the
parent can be proven, will a Maryland court deny custody and limit
visitation.
c. Application of the Best Interests and Actual Harm Standards to
the Custody and Visitation of a Heterosexual Parent.-In Davis v. Davis,57
the Court of Appeals eliminated the use of a per se rule whereby
courts presumed the unfitness of an adulterous parent seeking cus-
tody of his or her children.5" Prior to Davis, Maryland courts regularly
awarded custody of a child to a parent when it could be proven that
the other parent had been involved in an adulterous affair.59 In Davis,
however, the court stated that "whereas the fact of adultery may be a
50. Id. at 307-11, 508 A.2d at 972-74 (discussing factors to be considered including the
willingness of parents to share custody, the fitness of parents, the age and number of chil-
dren, and the financial status of the parents).
51. Id. at 303, 508 A.2d at 970.
52. 43 Md. App. 622, 406 A.2d 680 (1979).
53. Id. at 629, 406 A.2d at 683 (1979).
54. Id., 406 A.2d at 684.
55. 328 Md. 507, 615 A.2d 1190 (1992).
56. Id. at 519-20, 615 A.2d at 1196.
57. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231 (1977).
58. Id. at 131-32, 372 A.2d at 237.
59. See, e.g., Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 360, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (1960) (stating that the
presumption against awarding the custody of a son to a mother who was guilty of commit-
ting adultery was not overcome); Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, 169-70, 106 A. 337, 338
(1919) (awarding custody to the father based on the unfitness of the adulterous mother).
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relevant consideration in child custody awards, no presumption of un-
fitness on the part of the adulterous parent arises from it."'60 In af-
firming the Court of Special Appeals's grant of custody to the girl's
mother, the Court of Appeals noted that although Ms. Davis had en-
gaged in an adulterous relationship in the past, there was no reason to
believe that her conduct ever had a negative effect on her daughter.61
Following the Davis decision, the Court of Special Appeals, in
Draper v. Draper,62 reversed a trial court decision on the basis that the
court had improperly applied a presumption of unfitness based on
the mother's adultery. 63 The court also found that the chancellor had
failed to take into consideration other pertinent factors in making its
decision64 and instead, focused on the prior sexual conduct of the
mother.65 The court remanded the case to the trial court, instructing
it to abandon the presumption of unfitness on the part of the adulter-
ous mother.
66
Exposure of a child to a parent's sexual relationship outside of
marriage also does not automatically preclude that parent from gain-
ing custody in Maryland. The Court of Appeals, in Robinson v. Robin-
son,67 upheld a trial court's decision that although the mother was
engaged in a sexual relationship outside of marriage, the best inter-
ests of the child would be served by granting custody of the child to
her.6" Ms. Robinson's boyfriend frequently stayed overnight at her
home, and thus, her son was exposed to their living arrangement.69
Mr. Robinson argued that "this amoral atmosphere [was] not in the
child's best interest and that it should [have tipped] the scale in favor
of his getting custody. ' 70 The court found, however, that other fac-
tors, such as "custodial continuity, stability and ... frequent interac-
60. 280 Md. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
61. See id. at 131, 372 A.2d at 237.
62. 39 Md. App. 73, 382 A.2d 1095 (1978).
63. See id. at 79, 382 A.2d at 1098.
64. The court noted that the child appeared to be
a happy, normal, and healthy little girl; that the environment and living condi-
tions at the home of her grandparents where she resided with her natural mother
were entirely proper and adequate; that the mother was, at that time, a full-time
mother and that the maternal grandmother was available to care for her should
the natural mother obtain employment.
Id.
65. Id. ("We believe it quite clear.. . that.., the lower court applied a presumption of
unfitness on the basis of the wife's prior immoral conduct.").
66. Id. at 79-80, 382 A.2d at 1098.
67. 328 Md. 507, 615 A.2d 1190 (1992).
68. Id. at 520, 615 A.2d at 1196-97.
69. See id. at 511, 615 A.2d at 1192.
70. Id.
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tion in an extended family create an advantage to custody with the
wife."7" The Court of Appeals, applying the best interests of the child
standard, concluded that the trial court's findings were supported suf-
ficiently by evidence, and thus, the award of custody to the mother was
justified.7 2
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied the same best interests
of the child and actual harm standards to cases involving a heterosex-
ual parent seeking custody of his or her child. For example, the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals, in Schwantes v. Schwantes,73 required that the
trial court identify an adverse effect on the children before denying
custody to a parent based on a nonmarital relationship. 74  In
Schwantes, the trial court found both parents fit to raise their three
children, but awarded custody to the mother on the condition that
she terminate her relationship with her current boyfriend.75  The
Court of Appeals found that because no actual harm to the children
had been established, "the trial court had no authority to condition
the custody award on her termination of that relationship. '76 Simi-
larly, in Draper v. Draper,77 a Florida trial court conditioned the award
of custody to a mother on not allowing her boyfriend to be in the
presence of her children or at their home.78 Because the court or-
dered this restriction without any finding of actual harm to the chil-
dren, the appellate court concluded that the trial court's decision was
an abuse of discretion and therefore removed the condition from the
custody award.79
Maryland courts have applied the best interests of the child and
actual harm standards to both custody and visitation disputes.8s
71. Id. at 512-13, 615 A.2d at 1193.
72. Id. at 519-20, 615 A.2d at 1196-97.
73. 360 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
74. Id. at 77 ("[W]e can conceive of no valid interest which would be served by requir-
ing a parent to terminate a personal relationship, as a condition of custody, without some
showing that the relationship has an adverse affect on the children.").
75. Id. at 70.
76. Id. at 78.
77. 403 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
78. See id. at 989.
79. Id. at 989-90; see also Smith v. Smith, 396 So. 2d 252, 253-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that the trial court erred in ruling that a mother could not have any unre-
lated men visit while her children were present because the court failed to make the re-
quired finding that such male visitors would adversely affect the children).
80. See, e.g., Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 703 n.7, 655 A.2d 901, 908 n.7 (1995)
(noting that "visitation, which is considered to be a form of temporary custody, and cus-
tody determinations are generally governed by the same principles"); cf Skeens v. Paterno,
60 Md. App. 48, 61, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (1984) (stating that "under the circumstances, the
ultimate test for custody and visitation is the best interests of the child" (emphasis added)).
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Therefore, in determining visitation rights, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals has concluded that the best interests of the child and
actual harm standards must be the ultimate test.81 In John 0. v. Jane
0.,82 the trial court limited overnight visitation of the father because
his thirteen-year-old son reported that he had "touched him in an in-
appropriate manner during one of the child's previous overnight vis-
its."8s 3 Additional testimony suggested that Mr. 0 had not taken
significant interest in his son prior to the divorce proceedings. 8 4 Ex-
amining all of the factors together, the court concluded that the best
interests of the child would be achieved by refusing to allow overnight
visitation by Mr. 0 with his son.85 Following the same reasoning, the
Court of Special Appeals, in Hanke v. Hanke,s6 refused to grant a fa-
ther overnight visitation rights because it was not in the best interests
of the child.8" A report by the Department of Social Services recom-
mended that visitation be supervised, and that Mr. Hanke never be
left alone with the child.88 This report was based on an accusation of
sexual abuse by the child filed by Ms. Hanke, and the child's account
of inappropriate touching by her father.89 Based on these findings,
and the fact that "the ultimate test for custody and visitation is the best
interests of the child," the court found that overnight visitation by the
father should not be permitted. 90
The Court of Special Appeals also applied the best interests of the
child and actual harm standards to a situation of domestic abuse in
Painter v. Painter.9' The trial court found that Mr. Painter exhibited
violent behavior towards Mrs. Painter and their children.92 It further
explained that the atmosphere of violence in the household caused
their son, Daniel, to experience emotional instability.9" Based on
81. See Painter v. Painter, 113 Md. App. 504, 521, 688 A.2d 479, 487 (1997) (finding
that the husband's severe domestic abuse justified limits on visitation); John 0. v. Jane 0.,
90 Md. App. 406, 435, 601 A.2d 149, 163 (1992) (abrogated on other grounds) (finding
that the evidence supported the trial court's refusal to allow overnight visitation); Hanke v.
Hanke, 94 Md. App. 65, 71-72, 615 A.2d 1205, 1209 (1992) (finding that overnight visita-
tion was not in the best interests of the child).
82. 90 Md. App. 406, 601 A.2d 149 (1992).
83. Id. at 410-11, 601 A.2d at 151.
84. See id. at 431, 601 A.2d at 161.
85. Id.
86. 94 Md. App. 65, 615 A.2d 1205 (1992).
87. Id. at 66, 615 A.2d at 1206.
88. See id. at 66-67, 615 A.2d at 1206.
89. See id. at 66, 615 A.2d at 1206.
90. Id. at 71-72, 615 A.2d at 1209.
91. 113 Md. App. 504, 518, 688 A.2d 479, 485-86 (1997).
92. See id. at 509, 688 A.2d at 481.
93. Id. at 519, 688 A.2d at 486.
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these findings, the trial court felt that it would be in Daniel's best
interests to deny visitation and any further contact between Mr.
Painter and his son.9 4 Given the evidence of abuse, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of visitation.9 5
The awarding of visitation in other jurisdictions has also been
governed by the best interests of the child and actual harm standard.
In Florida, an appellate court reversed a trial court's decision to re-
strict a mother's visitation to times when she was not in the presence
of her boyfriend.9 6 The court noted that "[w]ithout competent and
substantial evidence of the detrimental effect on the children caused
by her lover's presence during the mother's visits, the limitation im-
posed by the trial court cannot stand."9 " Similarly, in Moreau v.
Moreau,9" the Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that restricting a fa-
ther's visitation to times when no unrelated adult woman was present
was improper as the evidence did not indicate that such female com-
pany had an adverse effect on the children.9 9
d. Application of the Best Interests and Actual Harm Standards to
the Custody and Visitation of a Homosexual Parent.-
(1) Granting Custody to a Homosexual Parent.--Maryland has
not yet decided a custody dispute in which a homosexual parent
sought custody of his or her child. In other jurisdictions, however,
courts generally apply a best interests of the child standard coupled
with a required showing of actual or potential harm to the child in
custody disputes involving the presence of the nonmarital partner. 0 0
In M.A.B. v. RB.,O' the New York Supreme Court approved a grant of
custody to a homosexual father.'0 2 The court recognized that in deal-
ing with custody disputes, the main concern is the child's best inter-
94. See id.
95. See id. at 521, 688 A.2d at 487.
96. See Trylko v. Trylko, 392 So. 2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
97. Id. at 1035-36.
98. 422 So. 2d 734 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
99. Id. at 736 ("There is nothing in this record to indicate that visiting anywhere with
their father would be injurious to these children."); see also Harrington v. Harrington, 648
So. 2d 543, 547 (Miss. 1994) (holding that the fact that the father was living with a woman
did not warrant disallowing overnight visitation).
100. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that the
mother's homosexual relationship did not preclude a grant of custody to her); Nadler v.
Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam) (holding that the
lower court had failed in its duty to determine what was in the best interests of the child
when it held, as a matter of law, that the mother was unfit to have custody based on the fact
that she was a homosexual).
101. 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
102. Id. at 970.
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ests. °3 After reviewing relevant case law, the court found that "it is
impermissible as a matter of law to decide the question of custody on
the basis of the father's sexual orientation. "104 Similarly, in In re
Jacinta M.,1°5 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico required direct evi-
dence that exposure of a child to her brother's homosexuality was not
in the child's best interests before it would deny the brother custody
of the child.' 6 Because there was no evidence in the record that the
brother was unfit to care for his younger sister, the court found that it
was in the best interests of the child to remain with her brother.'0 7
In evaluating the grant of custody to a homosexual parent, other
jurisdictions have disallowed consideration of possible embarrassment
resulting from the parent's sexual orientation as a factor in its deter-
mination. For example, in S.N.E. v. R.L.B.,' 8 the Supreme Court of
Alaska remanded a trial court custody decision because the trial court
had relied too heavily on the fact that the mother was a lesbian in
granting custody to the father."0 9 The court stated that "it is imper-
missible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to
Mother's status as a lesbian.""' Additionally, the Alaska court found
no evidence of actual harm to the child because he was being raised
by a lesbian mother."' In M.P. v. S.P.,1" 2 the Superior Court of New
Jersey reached a similar conclusion in reversing a lower court's grant
of custody to a heterosexual father instead of a homosexual
mother." 3 The Superior Court determined that the trial court had
erroneously based its decision on its belief that the mother's lesbian
103. Id. at 969.
104. Id.
105. 764 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
106. Id. at 1330 (citing D.H. v.J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that
homosexuality, standing alone without evidence of any adverse effect upon welfare of chil-
dren, would not render a wife unfit as a matter of law to have custody); Guinan v. Guinan,
477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (stating that a parent's sexual indiscretions should
be a consideration in a custody dispute only if they are shown to adversely affect the child's
welfare); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that in
custody contests, the sexual lifestyle of a parent may properly be considered in determin-
ing what is best for children, but its consideration must be limited to its present or reasona-
bly predictable effect on the children's welfare)).
107. In rejacinta M., 764 P.2d at 1330.
108. 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
109. Id. at 878-80 (stating that the father's argument that the case did not involve "sex-
ual preference discrimination issues . . . [was] not supported by the record, which [was]
replete with evidence that [the] mother is a lesbian").
110. Id. at 879.
111. Id.
112. 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
113. Id. at 1263.
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status would be embarrassing to the children, instead of on factors
pertaining to the best interests of the children.1 14
(2) Granting Visitation to a Homosexual Parent. -The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland was confronted with the issue of homo-
sexual parental visitation rights for the first time in North v. North.115
The trial court, in North, granted the father certain visitation rights, 1 6
but denied his request for overnight visitation with his children."17
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the trial court
had improperly denied overnight visitation to Mr. North.118 The in-
termediate appellate court found that the restriction on overnight visi-
tation was not supported by the evidence admitted during the trial."l
Therefore, the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion
in denying overnight visitation, while allowing visitation during the
day even though there was no evidence that Mr. North "was more
likely to expose the children to 'events or functions' espousing a ho-
mosexual lifestyle on Friday or Saturday evening than during the
afternoon."
120
In other jurisdictions, courts have refused to allow visitation to be
restricted on the basis of a parent's homosexuality alone.1 2' For ex-
ample, the California Court of Appeals overturned a lower court's or-
114. Id. at 1260-61 ("The only conclusion to be drawn is... that the custody order was
modified for the sole reason that [the mother] is a homosexual and without regard to the
welfare of the children.").
115. 102 Md. App. 1, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994).
116. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County allowed Mr. North unsupervised visi-
tation from 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on alternating Saturdays and from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00
p.m. on alternating Sundays. See id. at 3, 648 A.2d at 1026-27.
117. See id. at 3, 648 A.2d at 1027.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 14-15, 648 A.2d at 1032. The court concluded that the trial court had not
based its decision on any finding of unfitness based on Mr. North's homosexual status;
rather, the circuit court focused on the potential harm to the children that could arise
from the visitation. Id. at 15, 648 A.2d at 1032. The Court of Special Appeals stated that
"[t]he disqualifying factor was not Mr. North's HIV status so much as the perceived harm
arising from exposure of the children to his 'homosexual lifestyle."' Id. at 11, 648 A.2d at
1030.
120. Id. at 16, 648 A.2d at 1033.
121. See In the Interest of R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ga. 1996) (allowing unsupervised
visitation between a homosexual father and his son, stating that "the primary consideration
in determining custody and visitation issues is not the sexual mores or behavior of the
parent, but whether the child will somehow be harmed by the conduct of the parent");
Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that visitation could
not be restricted based on mother's homosexual relationship); Conkel v. Conkel, 509
N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a homosexual father could not be
denied overnight visitation with his children based solely on his homosexuality, without
evidence that the children would be harmed by the visitation).
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der prohibiting a homosexual father from having overnight visitation
with his son while any homosexual was present in Birdsall v. Birdsall.
122
The Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Birdsall's son experienced
no present harm as a result of his father's homosexuality.' 23 The
court recognized that under the best interests of the child standard,
visitation could be restricted only upon a showing of actual harm to
the child.124 Thus, "in the absence of any indication of harm," the
court concluded that the restraining order was unreasonable and va-
cated it.1 2
5
The Court of Appeals of Oregon came to an identical conclusion
in In re Marriage of Ashling,1 26 finding that the lower court had errone-
ously defined the provisions of the mother's visitation with her three
children. 127 The trial court directed that visitation be "limited to such
times and places that [the mother] does not have with her, in her
home, or around the children any lesbians."28 The Court of Appeals
eliminated this restriction, concluding that the mother's sexuality had
not been proven to have a harmful effect on her children.' 29
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Boswell, the Court of Appeals was
asked to clarify the standard a court should apply in determining the
extent of restrictions on parental visitation of children in the presence
of a homosexual nonmarital partner. t3 ° The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the Court of Special Appeals' judgment and clarified that the
correct standard to be applied in disputes involving both homosexual
and heterosexual nonmarital relationships "is the best interests of the
child, with visitation being restricted only upon a showing of actual or
122. 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291 (Ct. App. 1988).
123. Id. at 290 ("After reviewing this record, we conclude the evidence of detriment to
the child is insufficient to support restricted visitation with the father.").
124. Id. (noting that "an affirmative showing of harm or likely harm to the child is neces-
sary in order to restrict parent custody or visitation").
125. Id. at 291. The restraining order prohibited Mr. Birdsall from "exercis[ing] over-
night visitation . . . in the presence of anyone known to be homosexual." Id.
126. 599 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
127. Id. at 476.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also In re the Marriage of Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652, 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that the trial court erred in conditioning the homosexual father's visitation with
his children on "not practic[ing] homosexuality in the sense of exhibiting, or participating
in displays of affection .. .with a partner 'guest,' or significant other [in the presence of
his children]"); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the lower
court erred in its order prohibiting the homosexual mother from visiting her son if her
female partner was present); In re the Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492, 493 (Iowa 1990)
(holding that the trial court erred in restricting a homosexual father's visitation to times
when "no unrelated adult' was present").
130. Boswell 352 Md. at 209, 721 A.2d at 664.
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potential harm to the child resulting from contact with the
nonmarital partner." 13' The court stressed that the best interests of
the child was "'of transcendent importance' and the 'sole question' in
familial disputes; indeed, it is 'therefore not considered as one of
many factors, but as the objective to which virtually all other factors
speak.' ' 13 2 Although the court recognized that parents have a funda-
mental right to raise their children, it noted that in custody and visita-
tion disputes, the best interests of the child may outweigh the parent's
right.13
3
The court then reviewed Maryland case law establishing that the
best interests of the child must be the ultimate test for granting cus-
tody to a parent. 13 4 The court also reiterated that, following Davis v.
Davis, there is no longer a presumption that an adulterous parent is
unfit to have custody of his or her children.135 Furthermore, in Bos-
well, the court clarified that "these best interest factors also apply to
visitation, as well as any other proceeding where the best interest of
the child is at issue.
1 36
The court next addressed the connection between the best inter-
ests of the child standard and the requirement to show actual harm.
1 37
The court explained that the proper test to be used is "a best interests
of the child standard concurrently with adverse impact, granting the
modification or restriction only upon a showing of actual emotional
or physical harm to the child."1 3' The court clarified the test by stat-
ing that "in restricting visitation, actual or potential harm is a compo-
nent of the best interests standard and not a separate and distinct
standard . .1.3.9
Next, the Court of Appeals emphasized the requirement of show-
ing a nexus between the harm suffered by the child and the contact
131. Id.
132. Id. at 219, 721 A.2d at 669 (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d
964, 970 (1986)).
133. Id. The court explained that according to the United States Supreme Court, a
parent has a fundamental right to the care and custody of his or her children. Id. at 217-
18, 721 A.2d at 668 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 267 U.S. 390 (1923)).
134. Id. at 218-25, 721 A.2d at 669-72; see also supra Part 2.c (discussing custody grants to
heterosexual parents).
135. Id. at 224, 721 A.2d at 671.
136. Id. at 222, 721 A.2d at 670-71.
137. Id. at 225-28, 721 A.2d at 672-74.
138. Id. at 225, 721 A.2d at 672.
139. Id. at 228, 721 A.2d at 673.
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with the nonmarital partner.' 40 According to the Boswell court, if a
trial court were to find evidence of an adverse impact, it must also find
a nexus between that harm and the contact with the nonmarital part-
ner before restricting a parent's custody or visitation rights.' The
court stated that "[i]f no clear, direct connection is found, then the
non-custodial parent's visitation rights cannot be restricted."'
' 42
Clarifying that the actual harm and nexus tests apply equally to
heterosexuals and homosexuals, the court then applied the standard
to the situation involving Mr. and Mrs. Boswell.' 43 The court found
that neither Ryan nor Amanda suffered any actual or potential harm
as a result of their contact with Mr. Donathan, their father's part-
ner.144 The court noted that no party in the case had requested that
Mr. Boswell's visitation be restricted; rather, the trial court took it
upon itself to impose the restrictions because of "its own biases and
belief that Mr. Boswell's relationship with Mr. Donathan was 'inappro-
priate.'''141 Pursuant to Davis, the court explained that the power of a
trial court to base custody or visitation determinations on its own dis-
dain for a nonmarital relationship was improper. 146 Therefore, be-
cause the trial court had made no factual findings of any actual harm
to the children, the Court of Appeals held that the Court of Special
Appeals was correct in vacating the visitation order prohibiting visita-
tion in the presence of Mr. Donathan.' 47 In vacating the visitation
order, the court explained that "it has not been shown to be in Ryan
and Amanda's best interests to curtail visitation so as to restrict Mr.
Donathan from their lives."' 48
4. Analysis.-In Boswell, the Court of Appeals articulated, for the
first time, the full standard to be applied by trial judges when evaluat-
ing custody and visitation rights. 149 The Boswell court found that a
140. Id. at 236-38, 721 A.2d at 677-79.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
143. Id. at 238-40, 721 A.2d at 678-80 (stating that "the... approach we outline today
regarding visitation restrictions in the presence of non-marital partners applies to both
heterosexual and homosexual relationships").
144. Id. at 238, 721 A.2d at 678 ("[W]e find no clear, direct connection between the
presence of [Mr. Boswell's partner] and actual or potential harm to either [child] that
justifies restricting Mr. Boswell's parental visitation.").
145. Id.
146. Id. at 238, 721 A.2d at 679; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing
the elimination of the presumption of unfitness of an adulterous parent by the Davis
court).
147. Id. at 239, 721 A.2d at 679.
148. Id.
149. 352 Md. 204, 225, 721 A.2d 662, 672 (1998).
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parent's visitation rights with his or her child could not be restricted
on the basis of the parent's homosexuality or the presence of a
nonmarital homosexual partner in the home. 151 As a case of first im-
pression, the court, in reaching its conclusion, relied on Maryland
case law involving custody and visitation disputes where the presence
of a nonmarital heterosexual partner was at issue. 151 In fact, the court
concluded that the applicable standard for visitation disputes involv-
ing homosexual parents and the presence of nonmarital homosexual
partners was identical to the standard used in custody and visitation
disputes involving heterosexual parents. 152 Because one standard-
best interests of the child plus actual harm-is applied to heterosex-
ual custody and visitation disputes, the identical standard will apply to
visitation disputes, as held in Boswell, as well as to custody disputes
involving homosexuals. Thus, Boswell can be read to require that trial
courts apply the best interests/actual harm standard not only to visita-
tion disputes involving a homosexual parent, but also to custody dis-
putes involving a homosexual parent. More importantly, the court's
articulation of a broad, factual standard requiring proof of actual
harm to a child will limit the discretion of trial courts and obviate
instances of improper bias against homosexual parents.
a. The Broad Application of the Best Interests of the Child Stan-
dard Demonstrates that the Sexuality of a Parent is Not an Issue. -The Bos-
well court stated that the standard it applied, best interests/actual
harm, "applies to both heterosexual and homosexual relation-
ships."15 In rejecting the presumption that exposure to a homosex-
ual relationship was harmful to a child, the court discussed cases in
150. Id. at 240, 721 A.2d at 679.
151. Id. at 225-28, 721 A.2d at 672-74 (discussing Robinson v. Robinson, 378 Md. 507,
615 A.2d 1190 (1992); Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 521 A.2d 320 (1987); Swain v. Swain,
43 Md. App. 622, 406 A.2d 680 (1979); Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231 (1977);
North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994)). While the Boswell court discussed
the North decision, in which a father sought to have a visitation order denying him over-
night visitation with his children based on his homosexuality overturned, the North deci-
sion did not directly address the issue at hand in Boswell. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 648 A.2d
1025. The North court based its decision solely on the fact that the restriction imposed was
illogical, not because a showing of actual harm to the children was required. Id. at 12-16,
648 A.2d at 1031-33 (stating that there was no reason to believe that Mr. North was more
likely to expose the children to his lifestyle at night than during the afternoon, and that
"[t]his, and this alone, is what convinces us that the court abused its discretion").




which adultery had been improperly used against a parent by a trial
court in deciding on custody or visitation.'
54
The Boswell court also relied on Maryland case law applying the
best interests of the child standard to visitation disputes involving
heterosexuals to extend the application of the same standard to dis-
putes involving a homosexual parent.155 In reviewing these cases, the
court noted that "when a court does make a finding of actual or po-
tential harm based on evidence and not presumption, visitation with
the parent can be legitimately restricted or denied."15  While these
cases involved custody and visitation disputes, the Boswell court ex-
pressly recognized the extension of their reasoning to the Boswell case
and its application of a common standard when it stated, "the actual
harm . . . approach we outline today regarding visitation restrictions
applies to both heterosexual and homosexual relationships." 15' The
court's opinion thus solidified the notion that any sexual conduct of
parents, homosexual or heterosexual, is only relevant to the extent it
is proven harmful to a child's well-being.1 5
The court's reasoning with regard to visitation rights could apply
equally to cases involving custody rights. The court acknowledged this
when it stated, " [w] e also want to reiterate that the case law discussed
in this opinion concerning custody determinations, and the principles
governing such situations, are equally applicable to visitation proceed-
ings."'1 59 The court's application of a broad standard to all family dis-
putes, regardless of whether the dispute is over visitation or custody
and regardless of whether the parent is homosexual or heterosexual,
demonstrates that sexuality of a parent outside of marriage is not a
presumptively negative factor in determining what is best for a child.
In solidifying the connection between the best interests of the
child standard and the required showing of actual harm before re-
stricting custody or visitation rights, the Boswell court also properly
joined other jurisdictions in rejecting negative presumptions about a
154. Id. at 225-27, 721 A.2d at 672-73. Specifically, the Boswell court cited to Davis,
Draper, and Swain, and explained that in these cases trial courts had erred in awarding
custody to the father of the children based on a presumption of unfitness due to the
mother's adultery. See id.
155. Id. at 221, 721 A.2d at 670.
156. Id. at 227-28, 721 A.2d at 673.
157. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
158. See id. at 237-38, 721 A.2d at 678 ("The only relevance that a parent's sexual con-
duct or lifestyle has in the context of a visitation proceeding of this type is where that
conduct or lifestyle is clearly shown to be detrimental to the children's emotional and/or
physical well-being.").
159. Id. at 236, 721 A.2d at 677.
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homosexual person's fitness as a parent. 160  Courts from Alaska to
New York have instructed trial judges to ignore the issue of sexuality
in custody and visitation disputes unless actual harm to the children
can be shown as a result of the presence of a homosexual parent or
the parent's nonmarital partner.1 61 In Boswell, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the same broad approach, reflecting a trend of ac-
ceptance and tolerance with regard to nontraditional relationships
and a recognition of their importance to children of divorce.
b. Instructing Trial Courts to Avoid Basing Decisions on Individ-
ual Biases.-To overcome the presence of individual trial courtjudges'
biases in the decisionmaking process, the Boswell court emphasized
that "before a trial court restricts the noncustodial parent's visitation,
it must make specific factual findings based on sound evidence in the
record."'62 The court's opinion ensures that stereotypical presump-
tions do not improperly guide judges in their determination of what is
in the best interests of the child. By clarifying the standard and creat-
ing a nexus test, the court limited the discretion of trial court
judges.'63 The nexus approach requires that there be "a clear rela-
tionship between a parent's homosexuality and harm to the child
before custody is denied to the parent on the basis of that factor. 164
Actual harm must be shown as a result of contact with the nonmarital
partner, in order to restrict custody or visitation. 165
The Boswell court stated that " [t] he only relevance that a parent's
sexual conduct or lifestyle has in the context of a visitation proceeding
of this type is where that conduct or lifestyle is clearly shown to be
detrimental to the children's emotional and/or physical wellbe-
160. See supra Part 2.d (discussing custody and visitation cases involving homosexual par-
ents from various states).
161. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) (finding that the fact that
the mother is a lesbian has no effect on her ability to raise her child); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510
N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting that a mother's homosexuality in itself does
not evidence any harm to her children); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that a homosexual father could not be denied overnight visitation
with his children because of his homosexuality).
162. Boswel; 352 Md. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
163. See id. (stating that "if a trial court relies on abstract presumptions, rather than
their sound principles of law, an abuse of discretion may be found").
164. See Karen Markey, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced By Gay and Lesbian Parents:
How Courts Treat the Growing Number of Gay Families, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 721, 726-27
(1998) (examining courts' use of the nexus test in awarding custody and visitation rights to
homosexual parents).
165. See id. at 727 (discussing S.N.E. v. RL.B., 699 P.2d 878 (Alaska 1985), in which the
Supreme Court of Alaska applied the nexus test).
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ing. '  The Court of Appeals originally adopted the nexus test in
Davis, rejecting use of the per se rule that presumed parental unfitness
based on adulterous conduct. 16 7 Likewise, a similar presumption of
unfitness based on a parent's homosexuality can no longer be main-
tained, as the Court of Appeals now requires a specific, direct connec-
tion between any showing of actual harm and contact with the
nonmarital partner.168 Therefore, the Boswell court upheld the Court
of Special Appeals's decision to vacate the visitation prohibition "be-
cause the trial court made no factual findings that evidenced actual or
likely future harm to Ryan or Amanda due to contact with Mr.
Donathan and it also appeared to consider the factor of Mr. Boswell's
nonmarital relationship to the exclusion of all others .... -" The
trial court in Boswell ordered restricted visitation without a finding of
harm to the children; instead, the court restricted visitation because it
deemed Mr. Boswell's relationship with Mr. Donathan to be "inap-
propriat[e]." 17 The Court of Appeals, however, disapproved of the
trial court's method of determination, noting that no key party in the
case, including Ms. Boswell, had asked the trial court to restrict Mr.
Boswell's visitation. 171 Instead, the trial court acted on its own initia-
tive based on its own beliefs regarding Mr. Boswell's relationship with
Mr. Donathan,' 72 and by failing to show how Mr. Donathan's presence
harmed either Ryan or Amanda, the court failed to apply the require-
ments of the nexus test. 7 ' In the future, Maryland courts must elimi-
nate sexual prejudices from their determinations and strictly follow
the best interests of the child and actual harm standards, coupled with
the nexus test. Moreover, the requirement of strict factual findings
limits a trial judge's ability to interject his or her own value based judg-
ments and prejudices into the custody or visitation analysis.
5. Conclusion.-The best interests of the child and actual harm
standard, coupled with the nexus approach, is now the applicable
standard for all custody and visitation disputes in Maryland. The reli-
ance in Boswell on both heterosexual custody and visitation cases in
Maryland, as well as cases in other jurisdictions involving homosexual
166. 352 Md. at 237-38, 721 A.2d at 678.
167. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 127, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977).
168. See Boswell, 352 Md. at 237-38, 721 A.2d at 678.
169. Id. at 239, 721 A.2d at 679.
170. Boswell v. Boswell, 118 Md. App. 1, 33, 701 A.2d 1153, 1168 (1997).
171. See 352 Md. at 238, 721 A.2d at 678.
172. See id. ("[T]he trial court acted on its own initiative, seemingly influenced by its
own biases and belief that Mr. Boswell's [homosexual] relationship . . . was
inappropriate.").
173. See id. at 239, 721 A.2d at 679.
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and heterosexual parents seeking custody and visitation, demonstrates
that trial courts in Maryland should not only apply the standard estab-
lished in Boswell to visitation disputes involving a homosexual parent
but should apply it to custody disputes as well. While Boswell dealt
only with the request of Mr. Boswell, a homosexual father, seeking
liberal visitation with his two children; in the future, the decision in
Boswell should extend the best interests of the child and actual harm
standard to custody decisions involving a homosexual parent. Thus,
in both custody and visitation disputes, "the correct standard to be
applied is the best interests of the child, with liberal visitation being
restricted only upon a showing of actual or potential adverse impact
to the child resulting from the contact with the non-marital part-
ner."174 Furthermore, trial judges must strictly apply this standard,
and refrain from allowing individual biases to influence their deci-
sions in disputes involving a heterosexual or homosexual parent seek-
ing custody or visitation with his or her children.
HOPE D. MILLER




A. Shifting Nonallocated Risks to the Insurer in Disability Insurance Cases
In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commissioner,1 the Court
of Appeals addressed for the first time whether an insurance company
can refuse to pay a claim made under a disability insurance policy on
the grounds that the claim arose from a condition that had mani-
fested itself prior to the issuance of the insurance policy.2 The insur-
ance policy at issue contained a statutorily required incontestability
clause3 but also included a provision that precluded payment for
claims arising from sicknesses that had manifested prior to the effec-
tive date of the policy.4 The Court of Appeals held that the definition
of sickness used in the insurance policy was inconsistent with the statu-
torily required incontestability clause.5 In so holding, the court has
incorrectly forced insurers to assume the risk of loss for conditions
excluded from coverage by the terms of the insurance policies.
1. The Case.-In November 1985, Mary L. Holland (Holland)
applied for disability insurance with the Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany of New York (MONY).6 As part of the application process, Hol-
land denied having had any previous mental or nervous disorders
within the past ten years.7 Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
York issued Holland a disability insurance policy that covered disabili-
ties that manifested while the policy was in force.8 Under the policy,
disability was defined in terms of "the insured not being able to work
'because of injury or sickness."' 9 The policy also included, however,
1. 352 Md. 561, 723 A.2d 891 (1999).
2. Id. at 563, 723 A.2d at 892.
3. An incontestability clause is
a clause in a life insurance or health insurance policy providing that after the
policy has been in force for a given length of time ... the insurer shall not be able
to contest it as to statements contained in the application; and, in the case of
health insurance, the provision also states that no claim shall be denied or re-
duced on the grounds that a condition not excluded by name at the time of issue
existed prior to the effective date.
BLACK'S LAw DcrrIONARv 766 (6th ed. 1990); see also note 10 and accompanying text (set-
ting forth Maryland's statutorily required incontestability clause).
4. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 562-64, 723 A.2d at 892-93.
5. Id. at 575-76, 723 A.2d at 898. The court additionally held that the Insurance Com-
missioner had the power to force the defendant insurance company to pay the claim. Id.
6. See Insurance Comm'r v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Md. App. 156, 160, 680 A.2d 584,
586 (1996), affd, Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. 561, 723 A.2d 891.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. (footnote omitted).
[VOL. 59:7431152
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
an incontestability clause as required by Article 48A, Section 441 of
the Maryland Annotated Code (Section 441).1° The policy stated:
After this policy has been in force for 2 years during your
lifetime, we may not contest any statements in the applica-
tion. (We will not count as part of the 2 years any period
when you are disabled.) .... We may not reduce or turn
down any claim for loss incurred [or] Disability [as defined
in the policy] starting after two years from the Policy Date on
the grounds that a disease or physical condition existed prior
to the Policy Date, unless that disease or physical condition is
excluded from coverage by name or specific condition.'
The policy also defined the term sickness as a "sickness or disease
which first manifests itself while this Policy is in force, 12 and the term
injury as an "accidental bodily injury sustained while this Policy [is] in
force."13
In June 1989, Holland filed a claim for disability based upon a
diagnosis of acute and chronic anxiety with panic attacks.14 In Octo-
ber 1991, MONY denied Holland's claim on the grounds that the con-
dition had manifested itself prior to the issuance of the policy and
therefore fell outside of the policy's definition of sickness. 5 Both par-
ties stipulated that the sickness that caused Holland's disability did in
10. See id. at 586-87. Section 441 states:
There shall be a provision as follows: "Time Limits on certain defenses: (1) After
two years from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, except fraudulent
misstatements, made by the applicant in the application for such policy shall be
used to void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred or disability (as de-
fined in the policy) commencing after the expiration of such two-year period
.... " (2) No claim for loss incurred or disability (as defined in the policy)
commencing after two years from the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced
or denied on the ground that a disease or physical condition not excluded from
coverage by name or specific description effective on the date of loss had existed
prior to the effective date of coverage of this policy.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 441 (1994).
11. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Md. App. at 161, 680 A.2d at 587 (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 160-61, 680 A.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 160 n.3, 680 A.2d at 586 n.3 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14. See id. at 162, 680 A.2d at 587.
15. See id, The court noted that Ms. Holland had experienced symptoms of her condi-




fact manifest itself prior to the inception date of the insurance
policy. 16
Holland filed a complaint with the Maryland Insurance Adminis-
tration (MIA), which subsequently ruled in her favor.' 7 An Associate
Commissioner for MIA ordered MONY to refrain from denying the
claim on the grounds that the disability had manifested itself prior to
the date of the policy, and to pay Holland's claim.'" The Commis-
sioner reasoned that the language of Section 441 bars insurers from
denying claims based on pre-existing conditions regardless of whether
the conditions have or have not manifested themselves. 9 MONY
sought review of the Associate Commissioner's decision before the In-
surance Commissioner. ° The Insurance Commissioner affirmed the
ruling of the Associate Commissioner and issued an order requiring
MONY to pay Holland "all benefits due under the policy."'" The In-
surance Commissioner held that under article 48A, section 441(2) of
the Maryland Annotated Code "incontestability extends to a pre-ex-
isting condition regardless of whether the condition manifested itself
prior to the policy's effective date. '22 The Commissioner further
stated that MONY was attempting to elude the common sense result
of the incontestability clause statute by defining sickness to include
only ailments that manifest themselves after the policy was issued.21
MONY appealed the Commissioner's decision to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.24 The circuit court affirmed the Commis-
sioner's interpretation of the statute and, in addition, held that the
incontestability provision prohibited MONY from disputing the
16. See id. at 162-63, 680 A.2d at 587-88. The parties also stipulated that Ms. Holland
was unaware that the condition had manifested at the time she applied for the policy.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 565, 723 A-2d at 893.
17. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 565, 723 A.2d at 893.
18. See id. at 565-66, 723 A.2d at 893.
19. See id. at 566, 723 A.2d at 893. The Associate Commissioner also found that
MONY's denial of the claim violated the penalty provisions contained in sections 55(2) (i),
55(2) (iv), and 230A(c) (2) of Article 48A. See id. Section 55(2) (i) gives the Insurance
Commissioner the authority to take action against an insurer that has violated any section
of the Insurance Article. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 55(2)(i) (1994). Section 55(2) (iv)
empowers the Insurance Commissioner to take action against an insurer that has, without
just cause, withheld or delayed payment from a claimant. Id. § 55(s)(iv) (1994). Section
230A(c) (2) prohibits insurers from refusing to pay a claim for an arbitrary or capricious
reason. Id. § 230A(c)(2) (1994).
20. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 566, 723 A.2d at 893.
21. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 567, 723 A.2d at 894.
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claim. 25 The court refused to accept MONY's invitation to distinguish
between nonmanifested pre-existing conditions and manifested pre-
existing conditions.26 The court found that allowing for such a dis-
tinction would cause "insurers ... to search any and all records re-
garding an insured's appointments with physicians for some hint of a
manifestation prior to the effective date of the policy." 27 The circuit
court, however, reversed the Insurance Commissioner's order that
MONY pay Holland disability benefits. 28 The circuit court held that
because there were no technical violations of the insurance code, the
penalty provisions of section 55A of the code were not applicable.
29
The court reasoned that MONY's interpretation of section 441 was not
unreasonable in light of other interpretations of similar statutes in
courts of similar jurisdiction. 0
Both parties appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.31 The
Court of Special Appeals agreed with the circuit court's interpretation
of section 441 but reversed the circuit court's ruling regarding
MONY's obligation to pay Holland's claim.12 The court considered
decisions from jurisdictions that, when interpreting similar incontest-
ability clauses, recognized the "exist/manifest" distinction that allows
the insurer to exclude pre-manifesting conditions from coverage.33
The court, however, declined to follow that line of cases.3 4 Instead,
the court adopted the minority rule,35 holding that the policy's defini-
tion of sickness was in contradiction with the incontestability provision
of the policy.3 6 The court reasoned that allowing such a definition of
sickness would be contrary to the ordinary meaning of the incontest-
25. Insurance Comm'r v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Md. App. 156, 168, 680 A.2d 584,
590 (1996), af'd, Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. 561, 723 A.2d 891.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 168, 680 A.2d at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the memo-
randum opinion of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City).
28. Id. at 169, 680 A.2d at 590.
29. Id. at 169, 680 A.2d at 591 (noting that MONYs policy had previously been filed
with and approved by MIA prior to MONY's use of the policy in Maryland).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 158, 680 A.2d at 585-86.
32. See id. at 159, 680 A.2d at 586.
33. Id. at 176-78, 680 A.2d at 594-95.
34. Id. at 184, 680 A.2d at 595.
35. Id. ("We find the reasoning set forth by . . . [those courts who reject the exist/
manifest distinction] persuasive and consistent with Maryland's well-settled rules concern-
ing the continuation of insurance policies and statutes.").
36. Id. at 188, 680 A.2d at 600.
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ability clause, 37 and would allow insurers to subvert the legislative in-
tent for requiring incontestability clauses.
The Court of Special Appeals further held that MONY was re-
quired to pay Holland's claim because of a stipulation entered into by
the parties at the administrative proceeding. 9 The court interpreted
the stipulation as requiring MONY to pay the claim in the event the
Insurance Commissioner's interpretation of Section 441 was upheld.4 °
The court did not address MONYs argument that payment could not
be ordered because no actual violations of section 441 were present.4"
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to examine two issues.4 2
The first issue was whether an insurer could deny a claim for disability
based upon the illness having first manifested itself prior to the policy
date, despite the insurance policy containing the statutorily required
incontestability clause.43 The second issue was whether the Insurance
Commissioner had the authority to order MONY to make payment of
the claim. 44
2. Legal Background.-
a. Early Development of the Incontestability Clause.-The first
known incontestability provision was introduced in 1848. 4' The provi-
sion was most likely a marketing tool created in response to public
distrust of the insurance industry after a series of cases in which insur-
37. Id. at 186, 680 A.2d at 600.
38. See id. at 187-88, 680 A.2d at 600 ("[W]e are satisfied that the legislature did not
intend that an 'exist/manifest' distinction, enabling an insurer to institute litigation con-
cerning coverage of pre-existing conditions after the expiration of the two years contest-
ability period, be read into the statute.").
39. See id. at 191, 680 A.2d at 602. The stipulation provided:
In the event the Insurance Commissioner affirms the December 14, 1993, Notice
and Order, MONY agrees not to deny payment for the claim at issue on the
ground that the Insured's condition of Acute and Chronic Anxiety with Panic
Attacks first manifested itself prior to the effective date of the Policy, and, the
MIA agrees not to hold that MONY's initial declination was a § 230A(c) (2) viola-
tion. This agreement, however, will in no way impede either Party's right to an
appeal nor MONY's right to request a Stay from the court on the disability pay-
ments pending the outcome of the appeal.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 192, 680 A.2d at 602.
41. See id. at 193, 680 A.2d at 602.
42. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 567-68, 723 A.2d at 894.
43. See id. at 567-68, 723 A.2d at 894.
44. See id. at 568, 723 A.2d at 894.
45. See David G. Newkirk, An Economic Analysis of the First Manifest Doctrine: Paul Revere
Life Insurance Co. v. Haas, 76 NEB. L. REv. 819, 825 (1997) (citing I BERTRAM HARNETT &
IRVING L. LESSNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE 507[3], at 5-207 (1997)).
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ance companies relied on breach of warranty as a defense.46 Insur-
ance companies began voluntarily using incontestability clauses in the
United States as early as 1864,47 and less than ten years later, the Ohio
legislature passed the first legislation rendering insurance policies in-
contestable after three premium payments had been made.48 Under
the Ohio statute, however, insurance companies were allowed to deny
claims for reasons of fraud or misstatements of age.49
By 1905, widespread charges of corruption and fraud in the insur-
ance industry, combined with exposes in two popular journals,
spurred the creation of a probe in New York known as the Armstrong
Commission. 50 Following an investigation, the Armstrong Commis-
sion urged the New York legislature to pass wide ranging reform legis-
lation aimed at curbing the alleged fraud within the insurance
community.5t The Armstrong Commission, and similar groups, also
developed standard insurance policy language, including provisions
that specifically required incontestability clauses.52 These standard
provisions were quickly adopted by numerous jurisdictions anxious to
join the reform efforts.5"
b. The Incontestability Statute in Maryland.-The Maryland
Legislature required incontestability clauses to be included in certain
types of insurance policies as early as 1937." 4 In 1951, the Maryland
General Assembly enacted the Uniform Individual Accident and Sick-
ness Policy Provisions Law (Uniform Provisions Law), which had been
recommended by the National Association of Insurance Commission-
46. See id. at 825-26; see also Eric K. Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the Incontestability Clause, 66
N.D. L. Rev. 267, 268 (1990) (noting that the incontestability clause was first offered "be-
cause of public distrust of insurers and their promises to pay benefits in the future" (citing
J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CoTrRACT 237 (1968)).
47. See Fosaaen, supra note 46, at 268 (noting that the first incontestability clause used
in the United States was by the Manhattan Life Insurance Company in 1864).
48. See id. (citing 1872 OHIO LAws, at 160 (codified as OHIO REVISED STATUTES OF 1880,
§ 5779 (LANING 1907)).
49. See id. at 268 n.13 (noting that the first incontestability statute barred the raising of
all defenses except fraud and misstatements of age and did not permit insurers to preserve
other defenses in the policy).
50. See H. ROGER GRANT, INSURANCE REFORM: CONSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 28-29 (1979) (referring to articles in Everybody's Magazine, Era Magazine, and the New
York World); see also Newkirk, supra note 45, at 826.
51. See Grant, supra note 50, at 29.
52. See Newkirk, supra note 45, at 826.
53. SeeJANICE E. GREIDER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK: BASIC LEGAL CON-
CEPTS 191-95 (Davis W. Gregg ed., 2d ed. 1964).
54. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 569, 723 A.2d at 895.
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ers a year earlier.55 The Uniform Provisions Law contained incontest-
ability provisions that were later codified in the Maryland Annotated
Code.56 In 1997 this statute became section 15-208 of the Insurance
Article of Maryland. 57 Section 15-208(a) requires that all health insar-
ance policies issued in Maryland contain a provision that states that
the insurer can not deny a claim based upon misstatements made by
the insured in the application process after the expiration of a two-
year period. 5' The provision must also state that no claim may be
denied two years after the date of the policy on the grounds that the
condition causing the claim existed prior to the inception of the pol-
icy.59 Subsection (c) allows the insurer to substitute the following lan-
guage for the clause mandated by 15-208(a) (1): "After this policy has
been in force for a period of two years during the lifetime of the in-
sured (excluding any period during which the insured is disabled), it
shall become incontestable as to the statements contained in the
application."6"
Prior to Mutual Life, the Court of Appeals had not addressed
whether the incontestability provision of section 44161 recognized, or
would permit, a distinction between pre-existing conditions and con-
ditions that had manifested prior to the policy date.62 However, nu-
merous other courts of similar jurisdiction have addressed the scope
of incontestability provisions of insurance policies.
55. See 1951 Md. Laws Ch. 687 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 151-154 (1951)) (repealing MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 106A-D (Supp. 1947)).
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A (1957).
57. See MD. ANN. CODE, INS. § 15-208 (1997).
58. Id. § 15-208(a)(1). Section 15-208(a)(1) states:
After two years from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, except
fraudulent misstatements, made by the applicant in the application for such pol-
icy shall be used to void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred or disability
(as defined in the policy) commencing after the expiration of such two-year
period.
Id.
59. Id. § 15-208(a)(2). Section 15-208(a) (2) states:
No claim for loss incurred or disability (as defined in the policy) commencing
after two years from the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced or denied on
the ground that a disease or physical condition not excluded from coverage by
name or specific description effective on the date of loss had existed prior to the
effective date of coverage of this policy.
Id.
60. Id. § 15-208(c) (2).
61. For clarity purposes, section 15-208 will be referred to under its previous name,
section 441. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
62. See generally Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 571, 723 A.2d at 895-96.
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c. Cases Dealing with the Incontestability Clause.-In National Life &
Accident Insurance Co. v. Mixon,6" the Supreme Court of Alabama
viewed an insurance policy as "a whole" and concluded that the incon-
testability clause could coexist with a provision limiting coverage. 6 4
The Mixon insurance policy contained an incontestability provision
and a clause requiring the injury to be "caused solely by disease or
injuries contracted or sustained after the Date of Issue."65 In render-
ing its decision, the Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with Professor
Williston that "[a] n incontestable clause forecloses contests of the va-
lidity of the policy, as intended, but does prevent the insurer from
defending on the ground that the loss incurred was expressly ex-
cluded from or clearly never covered under the terms of the policy."
66
The court also stated that "an incontestable clause does not relieve the
claimant of the duty to establish his right of recovery in the first in-
stance under the specific language of the policy, as where he must
show that the insured's illness arose after the attachment of the
policy."6 7
The court concluded its opinion by stating that there was no con-
flict between the incontestability clause and the pre-existing disease
exclusion clause.6 8 The court noted that the insurer was not seeking
to deny the validity of the policy, which would have been prohibited
under the incontestability statute, but only to exclude injuries suffered
as a result of diseases excluded from coverage by means of the pre-
existing clause. 69 The Mixon court cited twenty-six cases from sixteen
different jurisdictions that supported the proposition that incontest-
ability clauses and clauses that exempt recovery for sicknesses stem-
ming from pre-existing diseases can coexist in the same insurance
policy."y
In Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas,7 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey addressed an insurance policy that contained both an in-
contestability clause and a provision limiting coverage to injuries sus-
tained as a result of conditions that first manifested themselves while
63. 282 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1973).
64. See id. at 316.
65. Id. at 310.
66. Id. at 315 (quoting S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON COrRAcrs § 912 (3d ed. 1963)).
67. Id. at 316 (quoting G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 72:65 (2d ed. 1968)).
68. Id.
69. See id. (describing the operation of the two clauses as the "latter [pre-existing
clause] constitutes an exception to the former [incontestability] . . . clause").
70. See Mixon, 282 So. 2d at 314 (listing numerous cases that allow both clauses in
insurance policies).
71. 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994).
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the policy was in effect.72 The court stated that the purpose of the
statutorily required incontestability clause was to protect innocent in-
sureds that were unaware of their diseases.73 However, the court held
that the insurer would not be precluded from limiting the scope of
coverage to disabilities that first manifest while the policy is in effect.74
The court also noted that relevant to its decision was the "principle
that '[o]ne cannot obtain insurance for a risk that the insured knows
has already transpired.' 75 The Haas court allowed the insurer to
deny the claim of an insured that had intentionally concealed a mani-
fested pre-existing condition.76
3. The Court's Reasoning.--In Mutual Life, the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that the statutorily required incontestability clauses
in insurance policies apply to pre-policy conditions regardless of
whether the condition "manifests" before the policy takes effect.
77
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by identifying the purposes
behind incontestability statutes. 78 The court stated that public pres-
sure and discontentment with the insurance industry caused state leg-
islatures to enact laws forcing insurance companies to include
incontestability provisions in their policies. 79 The court further noted
that
[t]he reason such clauses were statutorily required "lies in
the early greed and ruthlessness of the insurers. All too
often, instead of paying the beneficiary, they resisted liability
stubbornly on the basis of some misstatement made by the
insured at the time of applying for the policy, as to which
they carefully refrained from comment until the insured had
died and was unable to testify on his own behalf.
80
The court then provided a brief history of Maryland's incontest-
ability clause and noted that following the adoption of Maryland's in-
contestability statute, the annual report of the Maryland Insurance
72. See id. at 1104.
73. Id. at 1108.
74. Id. at 1107.
75. Id. at 1108 (quoting Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Cas. Co., 668 F. Supp.
394, 403 (D.NJ. 1987)).
76. Id.
77. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 572, 723 A.2d at 896.
78. See id. at 568-71, 723 A.2d at 894-95 (describing the evolution of the modern day
incontestability clause).
79. Id. at 568, 723 A.2d at 894.
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fischer v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins.
Co., 458 F. Supp. 939, 944 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRAcrs § 912,
at 394 (3d ed. 1963))).
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Commissioner stated that the new law "provides new and substantially
increased protection to [insurance] policyholders."'"
The court explained that the legislative intent in requiring incon-
testability clauses was to protect the insured and their beneficiaries.8 2
Upon examination of prior case law, the court noted that a further
purpose of the incontestability clause was to put "a checkmate upon
litigation and to prevent an expensive resort to the courts for resolu-
tion."83 The court suggested that the insured is not in a good position
to "wage battle" with the insurance company regarding statements
that were made years earlier.84 The court acknowledged that such
clauses were created for the benefit of the insured, but also insisted
that the clauses allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investi-
gate the statements made by the applicant.85
The Court of Appeals next turned its analysis to the language of
the Maryland incontestability statute.8 6 The court stated that the man-
ifest/pre-exist distinction advanced by MONY "is flatly inconsistent
with the statutory language set forth in Art. 48A, § 441(2) ."87 The
court noted that the statute precludes denial of any claim after two
years from the policy's inception date, on the grounds that the illness
or condition existed prior to the date of coverage, and that any condi-
tion that manifests itself prior to the date of the policy clearly exists
prior to the policy.88 Adopting language from an earlier decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court
asserted that the term exist "refers broadly to a state of being, without
reservation as to other qualities, including manifestation."8 9 The
court also relied upon the reasoning of the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court for the proposition that whether or not an
illness has manifested itself, the fact that the condition exists prior to
81. Id. at 569, 723 A.2d at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 570, 723 A.2d at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Equitable
Life Assurance v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 262-63, 508 A.2d 137, 140 (1986)).
84. See id. (quotingJOHN A. APPLEMA.N &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
WITH FORMS § 311, at 305-06, 321 (1981)).
85. See id. (citing Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir.
1975)). The court also noted that "[t]he . . . [incontestability clause] encourages the in-
sured to have confidence that after the period passes they are assured of receiving benefits
upon the happening of a covered loss." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
18 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 72:16, at 293-94 (1983)).
86. See id. at 571-76, 723 A.2d at 896-98.
87. Id. at 572, 723 A.2d at 896.
88. See id.
89. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 572, 723 A.2d at 896 (internal quotation marks




the inception of the insurance policy brings into play the incontest-
ability provision of the policy.9 °
The Mutual Life court, however, did recognize one exception to
the operation of the incontestability clause of section 441.91 The
Court of Appeals stated that insurance companies are free to exclude
certain conditions from coverage by name or by specific description.92
As an example, the court noted the gastro-intestinal exception con-
tained in Holland's insurance policy.93 The court stated, however,
that Holland's disabling condition did not fall within the statutorily
allowed exceptions of section 441 because the condition was not ex-
cluded by name or by specific description.94
The court next explained that an exception to section 441 for
pre-existing conditions, which have not manifested prior to the effec-
tive date of the policy, would circumvent the very reason for requiring
incontestability clauses-to prevent expensive and time-consuming lit-
igation.95 The Court of Appeals asserted that deciding whether a par-
ticular symptom is a manifestation of a later diagnosed disease is a
very difficult question that would likely lead to "many additional ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings."96 The court further main-
tained that allowing such an exception would allow an insurance
company to contest every possible illness on the grounds that the ill-
ness had manifested prior to the date of the policy.97
The court also rejected MONY's argument that section 441 did
not prohibit an insurer from defining the term sickness in the policy as
it wished, and as such, sickness could be defined to exclude pre-ex-
isting conditions manifesting prior to the issuance of the policy. 8
The court characterized this argument as allowing the statutorily re-
90. See id. (quoting Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 512 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987)). The Monarch Life court further stated that there was no indication that the
legislature wished any definition to be used for the term exist other than its broader plain
meaning. See Monarch Life Ins. Co., 512 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
91. See 352 Md. at 573, 723 A.2d at 896-97.
92. See id.
93. See id., 723 A.2d at 896 (noting that the parties agreed that the gastro-intestinal
exception did not cover the condition from which Ms. Holland is now claiming injury).
94. See id.
95. Id. at 573, 723 A.2d at 897 (stating that such an exception "cannot be squared with
the purpose of incontestability clauses . .. [to] 'put[ ] a checkmate upon litigation' and
'prevent[ing], after the lapse of a certain period of time, an expensive resort to the
courts."' (quoting Equitable Life Ins. v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 262, 508 A.2d 137, 140
(1986) (third and fourth alterations in original).
96. See id.
97. See id. (quoting Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 512 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102-03 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987)).
98. See id. at 574-75, 723 A.2d at 897-98.
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quired incontestability clause to be completely circumvented by a
"skillful and abnormal definition of the key coverage terms in the
policy." 99
The court also asserted that adopting this position would violate
the long-standing principle that "if [an] insurance policy contains a
limitation which is inconsistent with . . . [the Insurance Code] ....
such limitation is unenforceable."' 0 0 The court stated that an insur-
ance company could not avoid this principle because "the policy's lim-
itation on coverage is couched in terms of a definition." 101 Finally,
the court noted that this argument, which was "based on a disingenu-
ous definition of the term 'sickness,"' had been previously rejected by
a number of other courts. 10 2
The court concluded by discussing MONY's argument that there
was no technical violation of the insurance code and therefore the
Insurance Commissioner lacked the authority to order MONY to pay
Holland's claim.' The court, in discussing the enforcement and
penalty provisions of the insurance code, noted that article 48A, sec-
tion 24(2) confers not only expressly granted powers and authority,
but also grants authority "reasonably implied from the provisions of
* . . [the] article."'1 4 The court further stated that sections 55(2) (iv)
and 55(2) (i) authorize the Insurance Commissioner to revoke the in-
surer's certificate of authority if the insurer violates any provision of
the article or unreasonably refuses or delays payment due an insured
without just cause. 1°5 The court continued the analysis by noting that,to guarantee that injured parties are compensated for damage suf-
99. Id. at 574, 723 A.2d at 897. The court further noted that if this argument were
valid, with the right definition, insurance companies would be able to avoid all pre-existing
conditions, rendering the incontestability clause wholly superfluous. See id.
100. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (first, third, and fourth alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 465 n. 2, 723 A.2d 1, 6 n.2 (1998)
(quoting Forbes v. Harleysville Mut., 322 Md. 689, 702, 589 A.2d 944, 950 (1991))) (citing
Enterprise v. Allstate, 341 Md. 541, 550, 671 A.2d 509, 514 (1996), Gable v. Colonial Ins.
Co., 313 Md. 701, 703, 548 A.2d 135, 136 (1988), Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 238, 528
A.2d 912, 915 (1987), Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 285 Md. 548, 552 n. 1, 403 A.2d
1229, 1231 n.1 (1979)).
101. Id. at 575, 723 A.2d at 897 (citing West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 465, 723
A.2d 1, 6 (1998)).
102. See id., 723 A.2d at 897-98 (citing Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Bell, 27 F.3d
1274 (7th Cir. 1994), Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 948 P.2d 1103 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1997), Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Altman, 795 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Mich.
1992), Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Ind. 1989)).
103. See id. at 577, 723 A.2d 898.
104. Id. at 576, 723 A.2d at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 48A, § 24(2) (1957)).
105. See id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 55(2)(i), 55(2) (iv)).
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fered at the hands of the insurer, section 55A gives the Insurance
Commissioner the authority to impose monetary penalties in lieu of
revoking or suspending the insurer's certificate.10 6
The court then discussed section 230A, which makes it a violation
of the law to refuse "to pay a claim for an arbitrary or capricious rea-
son 1 ° 7 . . . [, fail] to make a good faith attempt promptly, fairly, or
equitably to settle claims for which liability has become reasonably
clear' ° 8 ... [, or to fail to promptly provide] a reasonable explanation
for the basis for denial of a claim . . . ."" The court explained that
the referenced statutory provisions authorize the Insurance Commis-
sioner to order an insurer to pay a claim whenever the insurance pol-
icy or the law has been violated.110 The court noted that MONY,
rather than refuting this position, argued that the definition of sickness
in the policy did not violate the code.11' The court disputed the con-
tention that section 441 was not violated because MONY included the
incontestability clause in Holland's insurance policy." 2
The Court of Appeals also disposed of MONYs argument that
section 230(A) (c) (2) was not violated because the refusal to pay Hol-
land's claim was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 113 The court stated
that MONY's argument "border[ed] on the frivolous."' 1 4 The court
concluded that when the legislature required a particular clause to be
inserted into insurance policies, it intended for there to be adherence
to the clause so as to set a standard of minimum coverage to which
beneficiaries are entitled." 5
4. Analysis.-In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commis-
sioner, the Court of Appeals held that insurers could not use an "exist/
manifest" distinction to exclude pre-existing conditions from cover-
age, contrary to the policy's statutorily required incontestability
106. Id.
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 230(c) (2)).
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 230A(d) (6)).
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 230(d) (14)).
110. Id. (discussing the penalty provision of the Insurance Code).
111. Id. at 577, 723 A.2d at 898-99.
112. Id. at 577-78, 723 A.2d at 899 (stating that such an argument was without merit).
113. Id. at 577, 723 A.2d at 899. MONY argued that because there was no section 441
violation, sections 55(2)(i), 55(2)(iv), and 55(A) could not have been violated because
they are merely enforcement provisions that take effect after the violation of another provi-
sion. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 577-78, 723 A.2d at 899.
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clause." 6 The court's holding, however, has inappropriately shifted
the assumption of risk for certain conditions to insurers, while giving
the insured an unwarranted additional protection from risks excluded
from their insurance policies.
A person usually purchases disability insurance policies so that he
or she can transfer the risk of loss from a catastrophic injury to an-
other party." 7 The insurer accepts payments from the insured in ex-
change for a contractual guarantee that the insured will be entitled to
certain benefits if he or she becomes disabled." 8 In such situations, it
would appear that the most cost-effective option for insurance compa-
nies would be to accept payments from the insured and then find
some reason to escape liability for the benefits. In fact, early nine-
teenth-century insurance companies often engaged in this proce-
dure. l" 9 In response, many state legislatures passed laws requiring
insurance companies to include incontestability provisions in their
policies.'
20
However, legislatures have expressly allowed insurers to define
the particular risks against which they are insuring.121 For example, it
would not be sensical for an insurance company to issue an insurance
policy against loss from a heart attack to a person that had recently
undergone triple or quadruple by-pass surgery. Adhering to this gen-
eral principle, the Maryland General Assembly has, in section 441, ex-
pressly instructed the insurer to define the disability against which it is
insuring.' 2 2
Contrary to this principle, the Court of Appeals decision in Mu-
tual Life effectively broadened the scope of numerous insurance poli-
116. Id. at 575-76, 723 A.2d at 898.
117. See generally HERBERT S. DENENBERG ET AL., RISK AND INSURANCE (2d ed. 1974).
118. See id. at 301-15.
119. See Fosaaen, supra note 46, at 268 n.10 (noting that it was common during this
period for insurance companies to refuse to pay benefits or offer to settle for substantially
less than the policy value based on "minor misrepresentations in the application" (citing
H. GRANT, INSURANCE REFORM: CONSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 22-27 (1979)).
120. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (describing attempts by state legisla-
tures to limit the ability of insurance companies to deny policy claims).
121. See Robert R. Googins, Fraud and the Incontestable Clause: A Modest Proposal for
Change, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 51, 58 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994), recognized that
the classic view was that the incontestability provision only dealt with challenges to the
validity of the contract and did not prohibit the defense that the risk was outside of the
coverage of the policy; and additionally discussing justifications for the classic view); see also
Fosaaen, supra note 46, at 281-83 (describing cases that took the position that the risks
assumed by an insurance policy are unaffected by an incontestability clause).
122. MD. ANN CODE art. 48A, § 441(2) (1994) (addressing losses and disabilities "as
[those] defined in the policy").
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cies and superseded the intent of the parties when entering into the
insurance contract. Holland's insurance policy clearly defined disabil-
ity as a "sickness or disease which first manifests itself while this Policy
is in force."12 By forcing MONY to pay Holland's claim, the court has
inappropriately broadened the scope of Holland's policy to include
risks originally not assumed by the insurer.
a. Both Clauses of the Insurance Policy are Compatible.-The
court argues for a "plain language" approach when interpreting the
incontestability provision of an insurance policy, 124 but refuses to ap-
ply the same approach when interpreting the provision that defines
disability. In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.,125 the
Court of Appeals stated that "[t]o determine the intention of the par-
ties to the insurance contract, which is the point of the whole analysis,
we construe the instrument as a whole.' 26 The court further stated
that in so doing "we accord words their ordinary and accepted mean-
ings.''m 7 Yet in Mutual Life, the court ignored the clear definition of
sickness provided in the policy, which limited recovery to a "sickness or
disease which first manifests itself while... [the policy] is in force." a21
Also, in Cheney v. Bell National Life,129 the Court of Appeals, when ad-
dressing competing interpretations of an insurance contract, stated
that the correct rule is "the rule applicable to the construction of con-
tracts generally, . . . that the intention of the parties is to be ascer-
tained if reasonably possible from the policy as a whole."'3 ° By
disallowing the policy's definition of the scope of coverage, the court
in Mutual Life effectively altered the nature of the policy and based its
decision on only a fraction of the actual policy.
The court decided not to give effect to the plain meaning of the
term sickness because of its belief that the incontestability provision of
the policy was incompatible with the definition of sickness used in the
123. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 565, 723 A.2d at 892-93.
124. See id. at 572 A.2d at 896 (asserting that the "exist/manifest" discretion by MONY
was "flatly inconsistent with the statutory language" of section 441).
125. 302 Md. 383, 488 A.2d 486 (1985).
126. Id. at 388-89, 488 A.2d at 488.
127. Id.
128. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 392 at 565, 723 A.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Holland's insurance policy also defined disability as "either a Total Disability or a Partial
Disability, provided that in either case the Disability starts while this Policy is in force." Brief of
Petitioner at 6, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 352 Md. 561, 723 A.2d 891
(1999) (No. 103)).
129. 315 Md. 761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989).
130. Id. at 766-67, 556 A.2d at 1138.
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policy."l ' However, as the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged,
many courts that have considered this issue have recognized that an
insurer has the ability to preclude pre-manifesting conditions from
policies, while also including statutorily required incontestability pro-
visions.1 3 2 The courts, adhering to the "interpret as a whole" princi-
ple, have found that such a definition of the term sickness can work in
conjunction with an incontestability clause.
In the Mutual Life case, MONY was not seeking to deny the exis-
tence of the insurance policy, only to except from coverage those inju-
ries resulting from conditions that had manifested prior to the
inception of the policy. 133 However, the court chose to interpret the
two provisions in such a manner as to force their contradiction.
The holding in this case has given protection to the non-innocent
insured who would have surely been denied recovery under the Mixon
or Haas courts. 33 The Court of Appeals has given protection to in-
sureds that conceal conditions they may have, regardless of the sever-
ity or duration of the condition. Additionally, the court has afforded
Holland protection for a risk that transpired over four years before
her claim for disability.' 35 By doing so, the court's decision clearly
contradicts the principles enunciated by the Haas court and creates a
windfall for any lucky insurance policy holder in Maryland that can
simply wait out the incontestability period. 36 The Mutual Life holding
131. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the court's belief that the
purpose behind the incontestability statute would be contravened by allowing the policy's
definition of sickness to stand).
132. See Insurance Comm'r v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Md. App. 156, 176, 680 A.2d 584,
594 (1996), affd, Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. 561, 723 A.2d 891 (citing cases which sup-
port the premise that both clauses can coexist in the same policy, including Button v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 584, 588-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909
(1988); Keaten v. Paul Revere Ins. Co., 648 F.2d 299, 301-03 (5th Cir. 1981); Allen v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 563 F.2d 1240, 1241-42 (5th Cir. 1971); Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. For-
man, 516 F.2d 425, 428-30 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976); Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 137 NJ. 190, 644 A.2d 1098, 1104-08 (1994); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York v. Hayden, 386 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 60 A.D.2d 823,
401 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. 1978)).
133. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 567, 723 A.2d at 897 (acknowledging MONY's
argument that "statutorily mandated incontestability clauses are not applicable to condi-
tions which manifest themselves prior to the policies").
134. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Mixon and Haus
courts' rulings that insurance policies may contain clauses limiting coverage without con-
tradicting the statutorily mandated incontestability provisions).
135. The parties stipulated that the sickness that caused Holland's disability manifested
prior to the inception of the policy and Holland filed the claim of disability "almost four
years after the policy's effective date." Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 565, 723 A.2d at 893.
136. Cf Home Life Ins. Co. v. Regueira, 313 So. 2d 438, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(contemplating the effects of interpreting an incontestability clause as precluding denial of
a claim even though the event giving rise to the claim is outside of the scope of coverage of
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allows a Maryland resident suffering from an ailment, and even possi-
bly receiving treatment for the ailment, to apply for a disability insur-
ance policy and later recover for injuries caused by that ailment. The
insured would only need to claim that he or she was unaware that the
symptoms were caused by a particular condition.
1 37
b. The Policy Justifications for Incontestability Clauses Have
Changed.-The Mutual Life court also supported its decision on the
grounds that allowing the definition of sickness used in the policy
would aid the insurer in contravening the intent of the legislature. 38
Regrettably, the court failed to consider, or even acknowledge, rele-
vant changes in the insurance industry and society since 1951 when
the statute was first passed. Assuming arguendo that the court's inter-
pretation of the legislative intent in passing section 441 is correct, the
possibility remains that changes in society have rendered the original
justifications for the statute inconsequential as to how the statute is
applied today.'" 9
Many of the underlying reasons motivating legislatures to enact
incontestability clauses are no longer viable threats to consumers. 40
The most significantjustification for statutorily required incontestabil-
ity clauses was that they give a sense of security to the insured, negat-
ing any fear they might have had that the insurance company would
fight any claim made under the policy.' 41 Incontestability clauses
the policy and further noting that the "actual calculations upon which the premium rate
had been determined could be distorted, with the consequence of increased rates being
imposed . . ." in the life insurance policy context).
137. The parties stipulated that Holland's injuries stem from "Acute and Chronic Anxi-
ety with Panic Attacks." Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 565, 723 A.2d at 893. The parties
also stipulated that this condition manifested itself prior to the inception of the policy, but
that Holland was unaware that this condition had manifested itself. See id. However, Hol-
land had received treatment for the symptoms presumably caused by this condition prior
to her application for insurance. See id. (noting that Holland's policy claim was turned
down based on information provided by her doctors that she had, prior to obtaining the
policy, complained of "feelings of anxiousness").
138. See Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Md. at 573, 723 A.2d at 897 ("[A]n exception to
§ 441(2) for a pre-existing condition which may have manifested before the effective date
of the policy cannot be squared with the purpose of statutorily required incontestability
clauses.")
139. See Googins, supra note 121, at 67, 77 (discussing the original reasons behind in-
contestability clauses and how societal changes should change the justifications behind
statutorily mandated incontestability provisions today).
140. Id. at 69-74 (arguing that many of the rationales for incontestability clauses, such as
avoiding frivolous litigation, protecting the consumer from the power discrepancies be-
tween themselves and the insurer, and ensuring consumer confidence, are not as relevant
to the issue as they once were).
141. See id.
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were also advocated on the grounds that they would aid in decreasing
litigation. 14 2 Neither of these concerns presents a significant danger
to modern day insurance consumers. The advancement of state spon-
sored consumer protection groups has greatly affected the ability of
companies to defraud.' 43 As one author stated, consumer "depart-
ments regularly compile and publish information on complaint indi-
ces dealing with sales and settlement practices.""'4 Consumer groups
also gather and publish information regarding questionable trade
practices.' 45 In addition, increased litigation is less of a concern to-
day. Modern juries are quite willing to award punitive damages as
punishment for inappropriate actions by corporations. 46 Lastly, the
power discrepancy between the insurer and the insured is less of an
issue because of the increase of contingency fee arrangements and the
virtual glut of lawyers in the market. 147
Additionally, the Court of Appeals in Mutual Life failed to con-
sider the significant increase in fraudulent claims over the past few
decades.148 Industry estimates place the amount of fraudulent insur-
ance claims in the range of billions of dollars annually. 49 At least one
court has recognized that fraud is a problem of massive propor-
tions. 5 ° The Court of Appeals has virtually opened the door to addi-
tional fraudulent claims by prohibiting insurers from precluding pre-
manifested conditions from coverage. As doctors gain the ability to
diagnose conditions earlier and earlier, insureds are often tempted to
submit fraudulent claims to offset anticipated losses. 51 Either the
142. See id. at 69.
143. See id. at 70 (discussing the ever expanding role that consumer affairs groups play
in examining the sales and claims practices of insurers).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id. (noting the "ever present threat of punitive damage liability and the ever
increasing attention given to the market conduct surveillance of insurers").
147. The number of attorneys alone practicing insurance law helps to evidence the les-
sening of the power struggle. A search of the Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Locator for attorneys
that practice insurance law in the state of Maryland revealed 564 listings of lawyers advertis-
ing their services as Maryland insurance lawyers (visited June 7, 2000) <http://lawyers.
martindale.com/marhub/form/by.html>.
148. See Newkirk, supra note 45, at 820-21 (stating that "[a ] s insurance fraud has become
more prevalent, however . . . [incontestability] clauses have been increasingly used by
opportunists as a safe harbor for fraud").
149. See Googins, supra note 121, at 75 (discussing the staggering increase in fraudulent
insurance claims).
150. Id. (quoting Merin v. Maglaki, 599 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. 1992)).
151. See Sheila J. Carpenter, The Impact of AIDS on Life and Health Insurance Fraud, SA93
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 229, 237-40 (discussing fraud in the context of incontestability provisions and
noting that not only do the insured sometimes commit fraud but that "third parties [may]
assist HIV-positive individuals in perpetrating insurance fraud... [and] some doctors have
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Court of Appeals or the Maryland Legislature must consider the po-
tential windfall created by the court's decision in Mutual Life and act
in such a manner as to reverse the dangerous trend.
5. Conclusion.-The threats that forced the need for incontest-
ability clauses are no longer as exigent as they once were, and as such,
the combination of an incontestability clause and a pre-existing condi-
tion clause could be used together in a policy to protect both the in-
terests of the insurer and the insured. The Court of Appeals, under
the guise of legislative intent, has forced insurers to compensate the
insured for disabilities specifically outside the scope of their insurance
policies. The intent of the Maryland General Assembly to balance the
insured's need for assurance of coverage and the insurer's need to
define the scope of coverage, would be best met if the court followed
the Haas line of cases and allowed insurance policies to contain both
the statutorily required incontestability clause and a clause prohibit-
ing recovery for illnesses stemming from manifested pre-existing
conditions.
DAVID E. WESLOW
been willing to falsify medical records and provide false attending physician's statements in
order to help their patients with AIDS get insurance").
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XII. LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Attorney Can Recover Only Upon Fulfillment of the Contingency When
Discharged for a Valid Reason
In Somuah v. Flachs,' the Court of Appeals considered whether an
attorney who was not licensed in the State of Maryland was entitled to
compensation in quantum meruie for fees and expenses incurred while
representing a client who discharged him after learning he was not
licensed to practice in Maryland.' After answering in the affirmative,
the court then determined the point at which an attorney could be
compensated when retained on contingency but discharged prior to
its fulfillment.4 The court overturned the Court of Special Appeals'
decision and held that an attorney must await the occurrence of the
contingency to recover reasonable compensation.' In the court's at-
tempt to strike a balance between a client's right to discharge her at-
torney and an attorney's right to compensation, it created a new rule
by prohibiting recovery in quantum meruit until the fulfillment of the
contingency.6 In so doing, the court narrowly defined the practice of
law as holding oneself out as an attorney or maintaining an office in
the state.
7
1. The Case.-Jeremy Flachs (Flachs), an attorney, brought suit
in quantum meruit to recover fees for services rendered and reimburse-
ment costs in connection with his representation of Millicent Somuah
and her minor daughter in a personal injury matter.8 The underlying
dispute arose out of an automobile accident on March 8, 1992, in
Prince George's County, Maryland, in which Somuah and her minor
daughter were severely injured.9 At the time of the accident, Somuah
1. 352 Md. 241, 721 A.2d 680 (1998).
2. Quantum meruit is defined as
[t]he reasonable value of services; damages awarded in an amount considered
reasonable to compensate a person who has rendered services in a quasi-contrac-
tual relationship. Quantum meruit is still used today as an equitable remedy to
provide restitution for unjust enrichment. It is often pleaded as an alternative
claim in a breach-of-contract case so that the plaintiff can recover even if the
contract is voided.
BLACK's LAW DIcrIONARY 1255 (7th ed. 1999).
3. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 246, 721 A.2d at 682 (considering whether an attorney can
recover the reasonable value of services rendered prior to discharge).
4. Id. at 246-47, 721 A.2d at 682-83.
5. Id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
6. See id. at 264-65, 721 A.2d at 691.
7. See id. at 261-62, 721 A.2d at 690.
8. See id. at 246, 721 A.2d at 682.
9. See id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
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apparently resided in Virginia with her husband."t Somuah's brother
contacted Flachs sometime after the accident about the possibility of
representing Somuah in a personal injury and products liability suit
based on injuries from the accident." After visiting Somuah on April
3, 1992, while she was recovering from the accident at a Maryland
hospital, Flachs agreed to represent Somuah in her suit.12 At this
time, Somuah and Flachs also signed a retainer agreement that in-
cluded a thirty-three percent contingency fee to be deducted before
the payment of expenses.' 3  The agreement also provided that
Somuah would pay all costs of investigation, preparation, and trial of
the case upon contingency and that Flachs had the right to cancel the
agreement if, upon investigation, Somuah's claim did not appear to
have merit.'4 Despite entering into the retainer agreement, Flachs
did not inform Somuah that he was not licensed to practice law in
Maryland." Furthermore, upon entering into the retainer agree-
ment, Flachs immediately began an extensive investigation into
Somuah's claim. t6
After learning that Somuah had moved from Virginia and had
established primary residence in Maryland in June 1992, Flachs began
to explore the possibility of bringing suit in Maryland.' 7 Also, as a
10. See id. Somuah also had a house in Maryland where she went to recuperate in June
1992. See id. at 246 n.1,721 A.2d at 683 n.1. There was, however, some dispute as to where
Somuah actually resided-Virginia or Maryland. Id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
11. See id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
12. See id. at 24748, 721 A.2d at 683.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 247-48, 721 A.2d at 683; see also id. at 247 n.2, 721 A.2d at 683 n.2 (detail-
ing the fee agreement).
15. See id. at 247-48, 721 A.2d at 683. There was some evidence to suggest that Flachs
thought all along that he would file suit in federal court or in Virginia state court. See id.
16. See id. at 248, 721 A.2d at 683. Flachs performed the following services for Somuah:
obtained the police report; interviewed the three or four eyewitnesses; arranged
to meet the investigating officer and the eyewitnesses at the accident scene fur-
ther to determine what happened; obtained medical records from the hospital
and from the three or four treating physicians; engaged an expert in highway
design safety to report on possibly defective design of the median; put Prince
George's County, Maryland on notice under the Local Government Tort Claims
Act; engaged a nationally known expert in auto design safety to report on possibly
defective seat or seat belt design by the manufacturer; located, purchased, and
stored the demolished taxicab; photographed and obtained from others photo-
graphs of the petitioner and caused a "day-in-the-life" video film of the petitioner
to be made; and met with the petitioner on approximately six occasions.
Id. at 272, 721 A.2d at 695 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
17. Somuah, 352 Md. at 248, 721 A.2d at 683. The court, however, stated that the suit
was likely to be brought in Maryland despite Somuah's Virginia residency. Id. at 257, 721
A.2d at 687-88 (stating that "[o]nce [Somuah] became domiciled in Maryland, the possibil-
ity of filing in Maryland federal court based on diversity jurisdiction was foreclosed").
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result of Somuah's move to Maryland, Flachs asked local counsel to
assist him with the Maryland lawsuit."8 Flachs and local counsel met
with Somuah at her home in July 1992.19 It was during this meeting
that Flachs first informed Somuah that he was not licensed to practice
in Maryland. 20 Shortly after the meeting, local counsel opted not to
assist Flachs. 21 Before Flachs could arrange a meeting with Somuah
and another local counsel, Somuah discharged Flachs by letter dated
August 20, 1992.22 Subsequent to his termination, Flachs sent a bill to
Somuah for time spent and expenses incurred during his investiga-
tion, but Somuah refused to pay.
2 3
Shortly thereafter, Flachs filed suit against Somuah in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County, seeking to recover the reasonable
value of services rendered and expenses incurred 24 during the course
of his representation of Somuah.25 After both parties' motions for
summary judgment were denied, the jury awarded Flachs
$19,946.01.26 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgement for Flachs. 27 The Court of Special Appeals
specifically found that Flachs's failure to inform Somuah that he was
not licensed in Maryland did not constitute good cause to discharge
Flachs and thus Somuah was ordered to pay Flachs for the reasonable
value of services he rendered prior to being discharged.28 Somuah
then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
29
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether Flachs was
discharged for cause because he failed to inform Somuah that he was
not licensed to practice law in Maryland and generally, at what point






24. See id. at 248-49, 721 A.2d at 683. Flachs sought to recover $8685 (20 hours at $150
per hour for his services rendered) and $11,324.66 for expenses. See id. at 273, 721 A.2d at
696 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
25. Somuah, 352 Md. at 248, 721 A.2d at 683. The automobile accident case for which
Somuah retained Flachs was still pending and thus the contingency upon which the rela-
tionship began had not been fulfilled. See id. at 249, 721 A.2d at 683.
26. See id. Thejury awarded $8585 for time spent and $11,261.01 as compensation for
his expenses. See Record Extract at 61, Somuah v. Flachs, 352 Md. 241, 712 A.2d 682
(1998).
27. Somuah v. Flachs, 118 Md. App. 303, 316, 702 A.2d 788, 794 (1997).
28. Id. at 316, 702 A.2d at 794.
29. Somuah, 352 Md. at 249, 721 A.2d at 684.
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can an attorney retained on contingency, discharged prior to its fulfill-
ment recover-immediately or upon the contingency's fulfillment 30
2. Legal Background.-
a. Development of Case Law Addressing the Timing of Attorney
Recovery After Discharge by Client.--It is well settled in Maryland law that
a client can freely terminate her attorney.' The Court of Appeals has
interpreted retainer contracts as containing "an implied term" grant-
ing the client such power.3 2 Maryland adheres to the "modern rule"
which states "that if the client terminates the representation, with or
without cause, the client does not breach the retainer contract."33
Consequently, the discharged attorney cannot recover on the con-
tract34 and must seek a remedy under the equitable notions of unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit.
Skeens v. Miller is among the most recent in a long line of Mary-
land cases35 to make clear that a client can terminate her attorney at
30. Id. at 246, 721 A.2d at 682.
31. See, e.g., Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 335, 628 A.2d 185, 187 (1993) ("It is well
settled that the authority of an attorney to act for a client is revokable at the will of the
client." (citing Palmer v. Brown, 184 Md. 309, 316, 40 A.2d 514, 517 (1945); Boyd v. John-
son, 145 Md. 385, 389, 125 A. 697, 698-99 (1924); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73
Md. 9, 18, 20 A. 127, 128 (1890); FREDERICK MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES 77 (1964); STUART SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES §§ 4.24, 4.32 (1973 & Supp. 1991);
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.2 (1986))).
32. Id. ("The client's power to discharge the attorney is an implied term of the retainer
contract." (citing Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 192, 517 A.2d 1092, 1097 (1986)
(Rodowsky, J., concurring); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48, reh'g denied, 114 N.E. 1072
(N.Y. 1916), modified on other grounds, 115 N.E. 1044 (N.Y. 1917); SPEISER, supra note 31,
§ 4.24, at 172))).
33. Skeens, 331 Md. at 335, 628 A.2d at 187 (citing Vogelhut, 308 Md. at 192, 517 A.2d at
1097 (Rodowsky, J., concurring); WOLFRAM, supra note 35, § 9.5.2, at 546; Robert W. Hill-
man, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L.
REv. 1, 17 (1988); E. Randall Morrow, Note, Attorney-Client-Attorney's Right to Compensation
When Discharged Without Cause From a Contingent Fee Contract-Covington v. Rhodes, 15
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 677-78 (1979)).
34. See id. ("Because the client's power to end the relationship is an implied term of the
retainer contract, the modern rule is that if the client terminates the representation, with
or without cause, the client does not breach the retainer contract, and thus, the attorney is
not entitled to recover on the contract.").
35. See Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 192, 517 A.2d 1092, 1097 (1986) (Rodowsky,
J., concurring) ("The authority of an attorney to act for a client is revocable at the will of
the client." (citations omitted)); Palmer v. Brown, 184 Md. 309, 316, 40 A.2d 514, 517
(1945) (stating that when an attorney is discharged for good-faith prior to the fulfillment
of her contract, she may recover for services performed on the partial contract (citations
omitted)); Boyd v. Johnson, 145 Md. 385, 389, 125 A. 697, 698-99 (1924) (holding that a
retainer contract inherently contains a clause that a client can freely terminate her attor-
ney (citations omitted)); see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md. 9, 18, 20 A.
127, 128 (1890) (stating that a client can freely determine when she would like to settle or
terminate a lawsuit).
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will. In Skeens, an attorney brought suit in quantum meruit against his
client after alleging the contingency contract he was retained under
was terminated by his client without cause.36 While Skeens has made
clear that a client must be able to discharge her attorney at will,3 7 the
court also held that an attorney discharged without cause deserved to
be compensated for "the reasonable value of the legal services ren-
dered prior to termination."38 Upon holding as such, the same issue
that faced the Somuah court was left to be decided by the Skeens court:
at what point can the discharged attorney recover, immediately upon
termination or only upon fulfillment of the contingency.39 Under the
holding in Skeens, Maryland adopted the New York rule4" by allowing
an attorney to recover compensation immediately after being dis-
charged without cause.41
In most jurisdictions, an attorney discharged without cause is
awarded reasonable compensation, usually in quantum meruit,42 as de-
termined by the New York rule or the California rule.43 Martin v.
Camp44 established what is referred to as the New York rule by holding
that an attorney's "cause of action... accrue [s] [when] discharged by
[his] client and the contract of employment terminate [s]."" The Cal-
36. 331 Md. at 334, 628 A.2d 186-87.
37. Id. at 335, 628 A.2d at 187. The court argued that the client's right to terminate
her attorney at will is "necessary in view of the confidential nature of the relationship ...
and the evil that would be engendered by friction or distrust." Id. (citing Martin, 114 N.E.
at 48; MACKINNON, supra note 31, at 77; SPEISER, supra note 31, § 4.24, at 172).
38. Id. at 336, 628 A.2d at 187 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kortoki, 318 Md.
646, 670, 569 A.2d 1224, 1236 (1990); Vogelhut, 308 Md. at 192, 517 A.2d at 1097 (Rodow-
sky, J., concurring); Palmer, 184 Md. at 316, 40 A.2d at 517; Boyd, 145 Md. at 389-90, 125 A.
at 699; Western Union Tel. Co., 73 Md. at 20-21, 20 A. at 128; SPEISER, supra note 31, § 4.36, at
73-74 (Supp. 1991); WoIFaRM, supra note 31, § 9.5.2, at 546; Hillman, supra note 33, at 17;
Note, supra note 33, at 677-78).
39. Id. at 335-36, 628 A.2d at 187; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the question faced by the Somuah court).
40. See infra notes 43-64 (detailing the New York rule and its counterpart, the Califor-
nia rule).
41. Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 343-44, 628 A.2d 185, 191 (1993); see also infra notes
65-69 and accompanying text (discussing Skeens).
42. SeeJudy Becker Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REv.
399, 446 (1992) (commenting that mostjurisdictions allow discharged attorneys to recover
in some form of quantum meruit).
43. See Skeens, 331 Md. at 337, 628 A.2d at 188.
44. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
45. Id. at 49; see also Skeens, 331 Md. at 338, 628 A.2d at 189 ("Courts following the New
York rule hold that the discharged attorney's cause of action accrues immediately upon the
termination of the attorney's services without cause, rather than being deferred until the
happening of the contingency." (citing Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. at 48-49 (N.Y. 1916);
Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75, 76 (N.Y. 1932))).
2000] 1175
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ifornia rule, as established in Fracasse v. Brent,46 states "that the action
to recover compensation for services rendered prior to the revocation
of a contingent fee contract does not accrue until the occurrence of
the stated contingency."4 7 The divergence of the two rules is high-
lighted by the policy reasons supporting each of them; the New York
rule concentrates more on the attorney's ability to recover the reason-
able value of his services," while the California rule looks to protect
the client's interest by alleviating the burden of substantial legal fees
upon the termination of her attorney prior to the fulfillment of the
contingency.4 9
The underlying rationale of the New York rule as stated in Till-
man v. Koman5° states that once a client terminates the retainer agree-
ment with her attorney, the contract has been abandoned.5 1 The New
York Court of Appeals, established the New York rule by deciding that
an attorney discharged without cause must be compensated immedi-
ately52 by reasoning that:
The value of one attorney's services is not measured by the
result attained by another. [The original attorney] did not
contract for his contingent compensation on the hypothesis
of success or failure by some other member of the bar. A
successor may be able to obtain far heavier judgments than
the efforts of the original attorney could secure, or, on the
other hand, inferior equipment of a different lawyer might
render futile an attempt to prove damage to the client.
53
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the New York rule articulating
three reasons in support.54 First, the original retainer agreement is a
contract, and when a client terminates that contract, it ceases to exist.
Therefore, "[a] client cannot terminate the agreement and then res-
urrect the contingency term when the discharged attorney files a fee
claim."55 Second, a client would be "unjustly enriched if he were to
46. 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
47. Id. at 15.
48. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing the policy reasons behind
the New York rule).
49. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text (discussing the policy reasons behind
the California rule).
50. 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932).
51. Id. at 75.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 76.
54. See In re Estate of Callahan, 578 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Il1. 1991).
55. Id.
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retain the services without paying for them."5 6 Third, the court indi-
cated that the outcome of the lawsuit should not be the only indicator
"in calculating that value of an attorney's services."
'5 7
The California Supreme Court cited two reasons for adopting its
rule by emphasizing a client's interests when discharging an
attorney.
58
First, one of the significant factors in determining the
reasonableness of an attorney's fee is the amount involved
and the result obtained. It is apparent that any determina-
tion of the amount involved is, at best, highly speculative un-
til the matter has finally been resolved. Second, and perhaps
more significantly, we believe it would be improper to bur-
den the client with an absolute obligation to pay his former
attorney regardless of the outcome of the litigation. The cli-
ent may and often is very likely to be a person of limited
means for whom the contingent fee arrangement offers the
only hope of establishing a legal claim. Having determined
that he no longer has the trust and confidence in his attor-
ney necessary to sustain that unique relationship, he should
not be held to have incurred an absolute obligation to com-
pensate his former attorney.5 9
The California rule has also been applied in other jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court of Florida, when deciding Rosenburg v. Levin,6"
cited two additional reasons for adopting the California rule.6 ' The
first rationale was to preserve the client's freedom to terminate her
attorney, and the second stated that "any resulting harm to the attor-
ney is minimal because the attorney would not have benefitted earlier
until the contingency's occurrence."6 2  Finally, Plaza Shoe Store v.
Hermel Inc.63 cites "promoting greater confidence in the legal profes-
sion and the attorney-client relationship" as a basis for adopting the
California rule.6 4
56. Id. (citing Romanek-Golub & Co. v. Anvan Hotel Corp., 522 N.E.2d 1341, 1348 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); Van C. Argiris & Co. v. FMC Corp., 494 N.E.2d 723, 725-26 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986); Nardi & Co. v. Allabastro, 314 N.E.2d 367, 370 (I1. App. Ct. 1974)).
57. Callahan, 578 N.E.2d at 988.
58. See Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 15 (Cal. 1942) (citing reasons for establishing the
rule that a discharged attorney can only recover upon the fulfillment of the contingency).
59. Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
61. Id. at 1022.
62. Id.
63. 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
64. Id. at 60.
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While the California rule emphasizes the client and promotes the
public's view of attorneys, the Court of Appeals in Skeens adopted the
more technical and contract-based New York rule.65 The court noted
that, as indicated above, an "attorney discharged without cause is enti-
tled to compensation for the reasonable value of the services rendered
prior to being discharged."66 Furthermore, the court cited previous
rulings that have also held that "an attorney who had been retained
on a contingent fee basis was entitled to assert immediately his right to
a retaining lien based upon the reasonable value of the legal services
provided prior to his discharge without cause."6 These premises
combined convinced the court that the New York rule was most ap-
propriate for Maryland.6" Therefore, the court held that "where an
attorney has been discharged without cause, the attorney's claim in
quantum meruit accrues immediately upon discharge, notwithstanding
the fact that the contingency has not occurred."6 9
It is also important to note that in some circumstances a dis-
charged attorney may not recover at all.7" In Attorney Grievance Com-
mission v. Korotki, the court found that the charging of a seventy-five
percent contingency fee by an attorney was excessive and that that
type of fee warranted an eighteen-month suspension from practicing
law." ] Despite noting "the prevailing rule that, if the client discharges
the attorney for cause, the attorney may not recover any compensa-
tion,"" the court suspended the attorney and allowed him to recover
65. Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 344, 628 A.2d 185, 191 (1993).
66. Id. at 340, 628 A.2d at 190 (citing Palmer v. Brown, 184 Md. 309, 316, 40 A.2d 514,
517 (1945); Boyd v. Johnson, 145 Md. 385, 389, 125 A. 697, 699 (1924); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md. 9, 18, 20 A. 127, 128 (1890)).
67. Id. at 343, 628 A.2d at 191 (citing Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 190-91, 517
A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986)).
68. Id. (reasoning "that the rationale of the courts adopting the New York rule is con-
sistent with our view of the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contingent fee
agreement").
69. Id. at 343-44, 628 A.2d at 191.
70. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 669, 569 A.2d 1224, 1236
(1990) (stating that "if the client discharges the attorney for cause, the attorney may not
recover any compensation" (citations omitted)); Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 192, 517
A.2d 1092, 1097 (1986) (Rodowsky, J., concurring) (stating that an attorney discharged for
serious misconduct may not be compensated (citations omitted)). Although several courts
cite that an attorney discharged for serious misconduct should be denied compensation
even in quantum meruit, a case applying this premise in Maryland was unable to be located.
Cf Korotki, 318 Md. at 669, 569 A.2d at 1236 (1990) (stating the rule and noting that the
attorney did in fact engage in serious misconduct, but allowed for reasonable recovery).
71. Korotki, 318 Md. at 670, 569 A.2d at 1236.
72. Id. at 669, 569 A.2d at 1236 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 77-80; SPEISER,
supra note 31, § 4.3,7 at 189-90; EARL W. WOOD, FEE CoNTRAcrs OF LAwYERS, § 68, at 201-03
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a more "reasonable value of his services. '73 Nonetheless, the Korotki
court indicated that an attorney discharged for serious misconduct
could, in fact, lose his right to any compensation.74
The standards established by Skeens and Korotki demonstrate that
the dispositive issue when determining whether the attorney will be
compensated hinges upon the reasons for the discharge of the attor-
ney.75 First, as found in Korotki, the court noted that if an attorney is
discharged for cause he may lose an opportunity to recover compensa-
tion.76 The second category, as found in Skeens, allows an attorney
discharged without cause to collect a reasonable fee in quantum
meruit.
7 7
b. Statutes and Case Law Governing the Unauthorized Practice of
Law.-While the regulation of attorneys is a function of the judicial
branch,78 several state statutes exist to supplement the courts' role.79
Three Maryland statutes are particularly relevant: Maryland Business
Occupations and Professions Code sections 10-601;8o 10-602; s1 and 10-
(1936)). Compare Skeens, supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that an attorney
discharged without cause can recover a reasonable fee for the services rendered).
73. Id. at 670, 569 A.2d at 1236 (citations omitted).
74. See supra note 72-73 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (discussing whether an attorney, dis-
charged prior to the fulfillment of a contingency, will recover the reasonable value of his
services).
76. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussing Korotki).
77. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing Skeens).
78. The almost exclusive control behind the court's regulation of the bar is known as
the inherent powers doctrine. See STEPHEN GILLESs, REGULATION OF LAwYERs: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND ETHICS 2 (1998); see also Lukas v. Bar Ass'n, 35 Md. App. 442, 447, 371 A.2d
669, 672, cert. denied, 280 Md. 733 (1977) (stating that the power to regulate the practice of
law is "vested solely in the judicial branch"); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Hahn Transp., Inc.,
253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969) (stating that the regulation of attorneys is
"essentially and appropriately ... a function of the judicial branch of the government").
79. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. §§ 10-601, -602, -606 (1998) (prohibiting
and explaining the consequences of practicing law in Maryland without a license).
80. Id. § 10-601. The statute in full reads:
§ 10-601. Practicing without admission to Bar
(a) In general-Except as otherwise provided by law, a person may not practice,
attempt to practice, or offer to practice law in the State unless admitted to the
Bar.
(b) Activities of lawyers on disciplinary status.-While an individual is on inactive
status or disbarred or while the individual's right to practice law is suspended
or revoked, the individual may:
(1) discharge existing obligations;
(2) collect and distribute accounts receivable; or
(3) perform any other act that is necessary to conclude the affairs of a law
practice but that does not constitute practicing law.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:743
606.82 The applicable part of section 10-601 states as follows:
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person may not practice,
attempt to practice, or offer to practice law in the State unless admit-
ted to the bar."83 Section 10-602 states that "[u]nless authorized by
law to practice in the State, a person may not represent to the public
... that a person is authorized to practice law in the State." 4 Section
10-606 provides that the unauthorized practice of law is a misde-
meanor with a fine not exceeding $5000 or imprisonment not exceed-
ing one year, or both. 5
While sections 10-601 and 10-602 prohibit the practice of law in
Maryland, section 10-101 of the Maryland Business and Occupations
and Professions Code attempts to define the "practice of law."86 Sec-
(c) No defense to act through lawyer.-It is not a defense to a charge of a viola-
tion of this section that the defendant acted through an officer, director,
partner, trustee, agent, or employee who is a lawyer.
Id.
81. Id. § 10-602. The statute in full reads:
§ 10-602. Misrepresentation as authorized practitioner.
Unless authorized by law to practice law in the State, a person may not re-
present to the public, by use of a title, including 'lawyer', 'attorney at law,' or
'counselor at law,' by description of services, methods, or procedures, or other-
wise, that the person is authorized to practice law in the State.
Id.
82. Id. § 10-606. The statute reads in full:
(a) Practice without admission; misrepresentation.-
A corporation, partnership, or any other association that violates § 10-601 or
§ 10-602 of this subtitle is subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000.
An officer, director, partner, trustee, agent, or employee who acts to enable a
corporation, partnership, or association to violate § 10-601 or § 10-602 of this sub-
title is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceed-
ing $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both.
Except as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person
who violates § 10-601 of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction
is subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or
both.
Attorney trust accounts.-A person who willfully violates any provision of Subti-
tle 3, Part I of this title, except for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust
monies in an attorney trust account for charitable purposes under § 10-303 of this
title, is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceed-
ing $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both.
Other offenses.-Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion, a person who violates any provision of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding 1 year or both.
Id.
83. Id. § 10-601.
84. Id. § 10-602.
85. Id. § 10-606.
86. Id. § 10-101.
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tion 10-101(h) (1) defines "giving legal advice" as "representing an-
other person before a unit of the state government or of a political
subdivision" or "performing any other service that the Court of Ap-
peals defines" as the practice of law.
87
Rule 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Mary-
land 88 in relation to the unauthorized practice of law requires an out-
of-state attorney to be specially admitted to practice in Maryland.89
Other regulations that govern the unauthorized practice of law in-
clude the Maryland Lawyer Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5,90
Rule 7.191 and Rule 8.5.92 These administrative and professional rules
87. Id. § 10-101(h) (1).
88. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND Rule 14 (1998).
89. Id.
90. MARYLAND LAWYER RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1998). The rule
reads in full:
Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law
A lawyer shall not:
(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of
the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Id.
91. Id. Rule 7.1. The rule reads in full:
Rule 7.1. Communications Concerning A Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the law-
yer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact neces-
sary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that
violate the rules of professional conduct or other law;
(c) or compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the
comparison can be factually substantiated.
Id.
92. Id. Rule 8.5. The rule reads in full:
Rule 8.5. Jurisdiction
(a) A lawyer admitted by the Court of Appeals to practice in this State is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this State for a violation of these rules in
this or any other jurisdiction.
(b) A lawyer not admitted by the Court of Appeals to practice in this State is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this State for conduct that constitutes a
violation of these Rules and that:
(1) involves the practice of law in this State by that lawyer, or
(2) involves that lawyer holding himself or herself out as practicing law in
this State, or
(3) involves the practice of law in this State by another lawyer over whom that
lawyer has the obligation of supervision or control.
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further underscore the judicially recognized and statutorily prohib-
ited practice of law without a license.93
While these statutes and regulations act as guideposts, it is ulti-
mately left to the Court of Appeals to define the practice of law.94 On
occasion, courts have said that it would not try to formulate a precise
definition of the practice of law because such a definition may, in the
words of Judge Stern in Shortz v. Farrell,95 "be more likely to invite
criticism than to achieve clarity."96 Maryland courts, however, have
recognized several activities that would constitute practicing law. The
Court of Special Appeals, quoting Shortz, has stated:
[W]hen a lawyer has, through patient years of study, ac-
quired an understanding of the law and obtained a license to
engage in its practice, he applies his knowledge in three
principal domains of professional activity:
1. He instructs and advises clients in regard to the law,
so that they may properly pursue their affairs and be in-
formed as to their rights and obligations.
2. He prepares for clients documents requiring familiar-
ity with legal principles beyond the ken of the ordinary lay-
man-for example, wills, and such contracts. . . are not of a
routine nature.
3. He appears for clients before public tribunals to
whom is committed the function of determining rights of
life, liberty, and property according to the law of the land, in
order that he may assist the deciding official in the proper
interpretation and enforcement of the law.97
While in Lukas, the Court of Special Appeals wrote that representing
clients and preparing legal documents constitutes the practice of
93. See In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 627, 541 A.2d 977, 978 (1988) ("As a
general rule, a person may not practice law in Maryland until he or she has been admitted
to the Bar of this State."); see also supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text (quoting the
Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility and other state regulations that prohibit the
unauthorized practice of law).
94. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 324, 666 A.2d 1246, 1248
(1995) ("Ultimately, the Court decides what is the practice of law." (citing Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583, 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969); Lukas v. Bar
Ass'n of Montgomery County, Inc., 35 Md. App. 442, 447, 371 A.2d 669, 672 (1977))).
95. 193 A. 20, 21 (Pa. 1937).
96. Lukas, 35 Md. App. at 443, 371 A.2d at 671 (alteration in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Shortz, 193 A. at 21).
97. Id. at 444, 371 A.2d at 671 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Shortz, 193 A. at 21).
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law, 98 the Court of Appeals has held "that the practice of law includes
'utilizing legal education, training, and experience [to apply] the spe-
cial analysis of the profession to a client's problem."'' 9 Similarly, the
court has held that "[d] epending on the circumstances, meeting with
prospective clients may also constitute the practice of law because 'the
very acts of interview, analysis and explanation of legal rights consti-
tute practicing law in Maryland.""'1 °
In support of her contention that Flachs did not deserve any com-
pensation because he committed serious misconduct by practicing law
in a state where he was not licensed, Somuah cited four out-of-jurisdic-
tion cases that disallowed recovery to an attorney, in varying degrees,
for practicing in a state in which he was not licensed.'0 1 In Perlah v.
S.E.I. Corp., 102 an attorney, licensed only in New York, was denied com-
pensation for legal services he performed in Connecticut prior to be-
coming licensed in the state.'0°  The attorney was denied
compensation for "prepar[ing] legal documents" and "form[ing] a
Connecticut corporation"'0 4 because the court considered him to be
practicing law in Connecticut without a license.'
0 5
Similarly, in Taft v. Amsel,1° 6 a New York attorney was found to be
practicing law in Connecticut without a license and was subsequently
denied compensation.1 0 7 The attorney provided a range of services
for his clients including forming corporations, negotiating to acquire
other companies, and managing the corporation.' 0 8 Because the
court asserted that it was impossible to determine at what point the
attorney was acting as the client's attorney and not as a member of the
98. Id. at 447-48, 371 A.2d at 672-73 (stating that when an attorney prepares documents
and represents a client in ajudicial proceeding, the attorney is practicing law (citing Hahn
Tranp., 253 Md. at 580-81, 253 A.2d at 850)).
99. James, 340 Md. at 324, 666 A.2d at 1248 (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v.
Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 662, 561 A.2d 200, 208 (1989)).
100. Id. (quoting Kennedy, 316 Md. at 666, 561 A.2d at 210).
101. Somuah, 352 Md. at 259, 721 A.2d at 689; see Perlah v. S.E.I Corp, 612 A.2d 806, 809
(Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (denying compensation to attorneys who practiced law in a state
where they were not licensed); Taft v. Amsel, 180 A.2d 756, 757 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962)
(same); Lozoffv. Shore Heights, 362 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (Ill. 1977) (same); Spivak v. Sachs,
211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965) (same).
102. 612 A.2d 806 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
103. Id. at 807, 809.
104. Id. at 807.
105. Id. at 809. It should be noted that the attorney was permitted to collect reasonable
compensation for services performed after he became licensed to practice in Connecticut.
Id.
106. 180 A.2d 756 (Conn. Sup. 1962).
107. Id. at 756, 757.
108. See id. at 757. The court wrote that the attorney's services "in attempting to build
this traffic empire were extensive, intricate and at times intriguing." Id.
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corporation,' 0 9 the court reasoned that the attorney was practicing
law without a license in the state and that he could not recover com-
pensation for legal services unless he has "been duly admitted to prac-
tice before the court."'
10
In Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd.,"' the Illinois Supreme Court held
that an unlicensed Wisconsin attorney could not recover for legal ser-
vices that included negotiations and the preparation of documents for
a client's real estate transaction in Illinois." 2 To support its decision,
the court emphasized that the attorney was practicing law in the state
without a license."1 ' Finally, in Spivak v. Sachs,1" 4 a California attorney
was denied compensation for services performed while in New York,
for a New York resident, in connection with his client's "matrimonial
litigation."115 The attorney's work included examining "drafts of sepa-
ration agreements," arranging and attending several meetings on his
client's behalf, and advising his client using his "knowledge of both
New York and California law" despite being licensed only in Califor-
nia.116 The New York Court of Appeals "recogniz[ed] the numerous
multi-State transactions and relationships of modern times,"11 and ar-
gued that "we cannot penalize every instance in which an attorney
from another State comes into our State for conferences or negotia-
tions relating to a New York client and a transaction somehow tied to
New York." ' The court, however, decided that the attorney's con-
duct was illegal and therefore deserved no compensation for the legal
services rendered.119
Shortly after the Court of Appeals of Maryland gave its opinion in
Somuah, the Supreme Court of California decided a case that
presented similar issues in that it attempted to define what constitutes
the practice of law in the state by unlicensed practitioners. 120 In Bir-
109. Id. There was some question as to what the attorney's role exactly was in the corpo-
ration he helped form. See id.
110. Id.
111. 362 N.E.2d 1047 (111.1977).
112. Id. at 1048.
113. Id.
114. 211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965).
115. Id. at 330-31.
116. Id. at 330.
117. Id. at 331 (citing Apell v. Reiner, 204 A.2d 146, 148 (NJ. 1964)).
118. Id. (citing Apell 204 A.2d at 148); see also Lozoff 362 N.E.2d at 1049 ("We recognize
there are transactions involving parties' attorneys from more than one State which would
require a result different from today's holding.").
119. See id. (holding that the attorney's conduct was illegal and therefore he should not
receive compensation).
120. See Birbrower v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.
1998) (establishing the "sufficient contact" test to define the practice of law).
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brower, a group of New York attorneys (Birbrower) filed a counter-
claim against their former California client for fees associated with
their representation. 121 The court denied Birbrower nearly one mil-
lion dollars in compensation by finding that Birbrower did indeed
practice law in the state without a license, thereby precluding com-
pensation for services performed while in California. 122 Some of the
activities that the court cited to support its finding included making
recommendations and giving advice, strategizing to resolve disputes,
holding meetings on behalf of the client, and negotiating a settle-
ment.123 In rendering its decision the California Supreme Court es-
tablished the "sufficient contact" test as a means to determine whether
an attorney was practicing law in California.124 The court opined:
In our view, the practice of law "in California" entails suffi-
cient contact with the California client to render the nature
of the legal service a clear legal representation. In addition
to a quantitative analysis, we must consider the nature of the
unlicensed lawyer's activities in the state. Mere fortuitous or
attenuated contact will not sustain a finding that the unli-
censed lawyer practiced law "in California." The primary in-
quiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient
activities in the state, or created a continuing relationship
with the California client that included legal duties and
obligations.1
21
While the court established the sufficient contact test, it also argued:
" [c] onversely, although, we decline to provide a comprehensive list of
what activities constitute sufficient contact with the state, we do reject
the notion that a person automatically practices California law 'in Cali-
fornia' whenever that person practices law anywhere, or 'virtually' en-
ters the state by telephone, fax, e-mail, or satellite."1 26 Therefore,
Birbrower was entitled to recover legal fees and expenses for the ser-
vices that he performed in New York, even though it was for a Califor-
nia client.
127
121. Id. at 4. The client originally sued Birbrower for malpractice, alleging the practice
of law in California without a license.
122. Id. at 4, 13.
123. Id. at 3.
124. See id. at 5 (ruling that "sufficient contact" with California will result in a finding
that an out-of-state attorney has practiced law in the state).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 6 (citing Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. 1970)).
127. See id. at 11; see also Perlah v. S.E.I., 612 A.2d 806, 809 (denying an attorney com-




3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Somuah v. Flachs, the Court of Ap-
peals held that an attorney discharged for reasons other than serious
misconduct, but in "good faith," could not recover in quantum meruit
until the contingency for which he was retained is fulfilled."'z The
court first acknowledged that a client can exercise great discretion
when terminating an attorney. 129  Because of "the confidential na-
ture" of the attorney-client relationship and "the evil that would be
engendered by friction or distrust""' a client may discharge an attor-
ney upon any "reasonable subjective dissatisfaction."131 The client
maintains an "absolute right" to discharge an attorney despite having
retained the attorney under a contingent fee agreement. 132 The
court explained that it had not specifically addressed what constitutes
a proper basis for terminating an attorney-client relationship in prior
decisions, 3 ' but it recognized that many jurisdictions permitted quan-
tum meruit recovery by the attorney even when there was a good faith
reason why the client terminated his relationship with the attorney. 134
In support of the client's right to discharge her attorney, the
court classified an attorney-client agreement as "a form of contract for
performance of personal services," which the client can terminate at
any time if the attorney's services are unsatisfactory regardless of
whether the contract is on a contingent basis. 1 5 The court also quali-
fied the attorney-client relationship as one of an employer and em-
ployee, and stated that similar to a contract for personal services, the
128. Somuah, 352 Md. at 268, 721 A.2d at 693. In dicta, the court wrote that an attorney
discharged in "bad faith" or without "just cause" has an "immediate cause of action for
breach of the fee contract." Id. at 255, 721 A.2d at 687.
129. Id. at 250, 721 A.2d at 684.
130. Id. at 251, 721 A.2d at 684 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Skeens v.
Miller, 331 Md. 331, 335, 628 A.2d 185, 187 (1993)).
131. Id.; see also Skeens, 331 Md. at 335, 628 A.2d at 187 (commenting that the power of
the client to discharge his or her attorney "is an implied term of the retainer contract"
(citations omitted)).
132. Somuah, 352 Md. at 251, 721 A.2d at 685 (citing ROBERT L. Rossi, ATTORNEY'S FEES
§ 3:18, at 167-68 (2d ed. 1995)).
133. Id. at 251, 721 A.2d at 685. The court however explained situations where an attor-
ney must forfeit his fees. Id. For instance, attorneys are not entitled to fees if they re-
present "conflicting interests," where the agreement was induced by "fraud or undue
influence," or where the agreement violates the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional
Conduct. Id. at 251-52, 721 A.2d at 685 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 252, 721 A.2d at 685 ("It is noteworthy that many jurisdictions found, or
indicated that there was, cause for termination but still permitted quantum meruit recovery
by the attorney.").
135. Id. at 254, 721 A.2d at 686.
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employer-employee relationship is revocable at the will of an unsatis-
fied employer.
1 36
Upon establishing that a client can virtually terminate a relation-
ship with an attorney at will, 137 the court then claimed that the dis-
charge could be placed into one of two categories, as established by
previous Maryland case law. 13' The first category is when an "attorney
commits serious misconduct, i.e. fraud or illegal conduct."' 9 The sec-
ond category is when "the attorney acts competently and there is no
serious misconduct, but the client has a good faith basis to be dissatis-
fied with the attorney." 4 ° These two categories establish a bright line
rule determining what circumstances allow an attorney to be compen-
sated for work performed.' In the first case, characterized as "cause"
by the court, the attorney is not entitled to any fee.' 4 2 In the second
situation, considered "no cause," the attorney is entitled to compensa-
tion.'4 3 The distinguishing issue of the present case, however, was
when an attorney is terminated without cause, but by a reasonably dis-
satisfied client,' 44 at what point can he recover fair compensation for
the services rendered; immediately upon discharge or only on fulfill-
ment of the contingency.' 45
The court stated that Somuah did in fact have a good faith basis
to be dissatisfied with Flachs because he did not inform her that he
was not licensed to practice law in Maryland until three months after
agreeing to represent her.'46 Furthermore, the court also recognized
that Maryland was the "likely" forum for Somuah's lawsuit,"' and that
Flachs accrued over $20,000 in fees and expenses, in Maryland, after
136. See id. (explaining that "[t] he right of a dissatisfied client to discharge an attorney
is analogous to the right of a dissatisfied employer to discharge an employee under a con-
tract of employment specifying that the employee's services must be satisfactory to the
employer").
137. Id. at 250, 721 A.2d 684; see also Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 335, 628 A.2d 185,
187 (1993) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that the authority of an attorney to act for a
client is revocable at the will of the client" (citations omitted)).
138. Somuah, 352 Md. at 256, 721 A.2d at 687.
139. Id.
140. Id. The court noted that the trend in most jurisdictions is to allow the attorney to
recover in quantum meruit when discharged by the client in good faith. Id. at 258, 721 A.2d
at 688 (citing Crockett & Brown v. Courson, 849 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (Ark. 1993);
Kopelman and Assoc. v. Collins, 473 S.E.2d 910, 917 (W. Va. 1996)).
141. Id. at 256, 721 A.2d at 687.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 258, 721 A.2d 688.
145. Id. at 256, 257, 721 A.2d at 688.




beginning his investigation without ever consulting Maryland coun-
sel.148 These factors convinced the court that Somuah did in fact have
a "good faith basis" to lack confidence and become dissatisfied with
Flachs. 4 9 The court, however, held that Flachs's conduct did not rise
to the level of serious misconduct prohibiting due compensation. 150
To support its ruling that Flachs's conduct was not serious, the
court distinguished the four cases from other jurisdictions, cited by
Somuah.'5 ' These cases supported the contention that Flachs prac-
ticed law without a license in violation of Maryland Business and Pro-
fessions Code sections 10-601 (a), 10-602 and Rule 14 of the Maryland
Rules Governing Admission to the Bar.152 The court implied that the
four cases differed because they all involved instances where the attor-
ney's conduct was egregious and deceiving. 153 For example, in these
cases prohibiting recovery of costs, the attorneys "draft[ed] docu-
ments or advis[ed] the clients regarding matters of local law."' 54 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that, in Perlah, Taft and Lozoff the attorneys
fraudulently represented themselves as attorneys of the state in which
they were not licensed. 155 Moreover, the court noted that in Perlah
the attorney maintained an office in the state where the attorney was
not licensed to practice.' 56 Finally, the court highlighted that Lozoff
and Spivak "explicitly cautioned against a per se ruling denying com-
pensation to all out-of-state attorneys who perform transactions in a
148. Id. at 249, 257, 721 A.2d at 683, 688. Despite having recognized that the claim was
likely to be filed in Maryland all along, the court mentioned that the attorney could have
filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction had the client remained at her initial
residence in Virginia. Id. at 257, 721 A.2d at 688. The court also emphasized that the
attorney performed competently. Id. at 256, 721 A.2d at 687. These findings were proba-
bly the underlying motivation for the court to assure that Flachs has a chance to recover
compensation. See id. at 264, 721 A.2d at 691 (noting that "[a]lthough [Flachs] was prop-
erly discharged, [Flachs] has not engaged in any serious misconduct thatjustifies forfeiture
of any compensation for services").
149. Id. at 257, 721 A.2d at 688.
150. Id. at 258, 721 A.2d at 688.
151. Id. at 259-61, 721 A.2d at 689-90 (discussing Perlah v. S.E.I, 612 A.2d 806, 809
(Conn. App. 1992); Lozoffv. Shore Heights, Ltd., 362 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ill. 1977); Spivak
v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965); Taft v. Amsel, 180 A.2d 756, 757 (Conn. Super.
1962), all of which denied compensation to attorneys who practiced law in a state where
they were not licensed).
152. Somuah, 352 Md. at 259, 721 A.2d at 688-89; see also supra notes 79-81, 88-89 and
accompanying text (citing the relevant statutory text and administrative rules).
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state in which they are not licensed, noting the frequency of multi-
state transactions in modern times. "157
Despite citing past decisions that held that "meeting with pro-
spective clients may ... constitute the practice of law because 'the very
acts of interview, analysis, and explanation of legal rights constitute
practicing law in Maryland,""' 151 the court ruled that Flachs's investiga-
tion and preservation of evidence was not the unauthorized practice
of law.15 9 The court agreed with Somuah that an out-of-state attorney
should disclose that he is not licensed in the particular state and ad-
vise the client that local counsel may have to be retained.160 Neverthe-
less, the court reasoned that an attorney's failure to disclose that he is
not licensed in a particular state should not result in the loss of all
compensation because this would result in the client's unjust enrich-
ment.' 6 ' In addition, because Flachs's work benefitted Somuah's sub-
sequent attorney in her products liability claim against Chrysler, the
court sought to prevent a "windfall" on Somuah's behalf by allowing
her to utilize Flachs's work without paying a fair price.'62 In so ruling,
the court attempted to "strike a balance between the client's absolute
right to discharge his or her attorney and the attorney's right to fair
compensation for services competently rendered prior to
discharge."' 63
After determining that Flachs did indeed deserve compensation
for the services he rendered to Somuah, the court had to then decide
157. Id. (citing Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965); Lozoff v. Shore Heights,
Ltd., 362 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (Ill. 1977)).
158. Id. at 262, 721 A.2d at 690 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 324, 666 A.2d 1246,
1248 (1995) (quoting Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 316 Md. 646, 666, 561
A.2d 200, 210 (1988))).
159. Id. (explaining that "unlike in Kennedy, [Flachs] did not expressly hold 'himself
out to the public as an attorney engaged in the general practice of law in Maryland' and
did not maintain his principal office in Maryland" (quoting Kennedy, 316 Md. at 659, 561
A.2d at 207)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 263, 721 A.2d at 691. The court stated that
[o]ften "a clients's termination of an attorney-client relationship will not be
'wrongful' but... the attorney's conduct will also not be 'wrongful' to the extent
that it should bar quantum meruit recovery of attorney fees. In such circumstances,
it would be unfair not to compensate the attorney for work completed before the
discharge under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Polen v. Reynolds, 564 N.W. 467, 471 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997)).
162. Id. at 266, 721 A.2d 692; see also id. at 265, 721 A.2d at 692 ("The primary considera-
tion is to what extent have the attorney's services directly benefitted the client." (citing
Kenny v. McAllister, 198 Md. 521, 525, 84 A.2d 897, 899 (1951))).
163. Id. at 264-56, 721 A.2d at 691.
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atwhat point he could recover, immediately upon discharge, or only
upon fulfillment of the contingency. 164 To support its holding that
"[w] here any fee is contingent on recovery by the client and where...
there has been some basis for the client being dissatisfied with the
attorney, the contingency generating the fee must occur prior to the
attorney's recovery,"' 65 the court needed to reconcile its decision with
Skeens v. Miller,166 which addressed the very issue of a discharged attor-
ney's timing of recovery. 167 The Skeens court adopted the New York
rule '6 by holding that "where an attorney has been discharged with-
out cause, the attorney's cause of action in quantum meruit accrues im-
mediately upon the termination of the contingent agreement, and the
attorney is not required to wait until the contingency is fulfilled.' 169
The Somuah court found that Skeens was not controlling because the
attorney in Skeens was discharged "without any good faith basis prior to
the occurrence of the contingency,"'1 70 unlike the instant case where
Somuah did in fact have a valid reason to be dissatisfied with and dis-
charge Flachs.' 71 Thus, Somuah was distinguished from Skeens and, by
the court's holding, Flachs was not entitled to compensation until
Somuah resolved her dispute with the Chrysler Corporation.172
Judge Rodowsky, in his dissent, argued that the majority opinion
"muddles" well-settled Maryland law on attorney-client retainer con-
tracts in which he divided into five categories. 173 The majority's opin-
ion, as interpreted by Judge Rodowsky, established two categories of
discharge that he termed "High Grade" and "Low Grade" cause.1 74
Judge Rodowsky agreed with the majority that High Grade cause ex-
164. Id. at 266-67, 721 A.2d at 692.
165. Id. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693.
166. 331 Md. 331, 628 A.2d 185 (1993).
167. See supra notes 39, 66 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Skeens).
168. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that Skeens adopted the New York
rule).
169. Somuah, 352 Md. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693 (citing Skeens, 331 Md. at 343-44, 628 A.2d
at 191).
170. Id. at 266-67, 721 A.2d at 692 (citing Skeens, 331 Md. at 336-37, 628 A.2d at 188).
171. Id. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693.
172. See id. at 267-68, 721 A.2d at 693 ("We conclude that the attorney's claim accrues
upon the fulfillment of the contingency, i.e., where the plaintiff/former client obtains a
final judgement.").
173. Id. at 269, 721 A.2d at 693-94 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). Judge Rodowsky's five
"well-settled" aspects of Maryland law include: (1) a client can terminate her attorney at
will, (2) the client does not breach the retainer contract by discharging her attorney, (3)
when a client discharges his attorney for serious misconduct, the attorney cannot recover
compensation, (4) an attorney is entitled to compensation when he is terminated without
cause, or the attorney justifiably terminates the attorney-client relationship, and (5) "the
holding in Skeens." Id. at 269-70, 721 A.2d at 694 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 270, 721 A.2d at 694.
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cused the client "from paying promised compensation" when the at-
torney committed serious misconduct.'75 Low Grade cause, Judge
Rodowsky stated, was a "creature of the majority," that he defined as a
"bona fide dissatisfaction on the client's part with the attorney's per-
formance." '176 Judge Rodowsky reasoned that a client cannot termi-
nate her attorney for Low Grade cause because "It]here is no such
thing."' 77 Therefore, according to Judge Rodowsky, "the attorney's
right to sue, where the retainer contract has been terminated by the
client without traditional, i.e., High Grade cause, is not deferred or
converted into a contingent claim." 7
To distinguish Somuah from Skeens, Judge Rodowsky stated that
the majority created Low Grade cause 179 by "borrowing from cases in-
volving contracts under which the promisor's obligation to continue
to pay for personal services is expressly conditioned on the promisor's
continued satisfaction."' 0 Judge Rodowsky disagreed with the major-
ity on this point because under previous Maryland employment law,
there must be an express term in the contract for a contract to be
"conditioned upon the employer's subjective satisfaction.""1 Judge
Rodowsky further explained that the Somuah-Flachs retainer contract
did not contain an express satisfaction provision. 2 Additionally, sat-
isfaction clauses are wholly unnecessary because attorney-client rela-
tionships are terminable at will t83 and if such a clause were read into
the retainer contract it "would operate as a limitation on the power of
the client to terminate." 84
175. Id. The determination of whether an attorney committed High Grade cause is to
be made objectively. Id.
176. Id. Low Grade cause, as defined by Judge Rodowsky, is the equivalent to the major-
ity's phrase, "a 'basis' for an attorney's discharge." Id. (quoting Somuah, 352 Md. at 264,
721 A.2d at 691). According to Judge Rodowsky, Low Grade cause constitutes a subjective
standard. Id. at 270, 721 A.2d at 694.
177. Id. at 271, 721 A.2d at 694.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 270-71, 721 A.2d at 694-95 ("Under Maryland law prior to today cause was
either traditional or High Grade cause, or it was not cause at all.").
180. Id. at 273, 721 A.2d at 696 (citing Somuah, 352 Md. at 254, 721 A.2d at 686).
181. Id. (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished Ferris v. Polansky, 191 Md.
79, 59 A.2d 749 (1948) and H &RBlock, Inc. v. Garland, 278 Md. 91, 359 A.2d 130 (1976),
used by the majority, by noting that the contracts in these cases had express satisfaction
clauses, while the contract in the case at bar did not. Somuah, 352 Md. at 274-75, 721 A.2d
at 696 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 275, 721 A.2d at 696.




Furthermore, Judge Rodowsky argued that since Somuah termi-
nated the contract without a "material breach" by Flachs,185 his claim
became "one for restitution, and the damages are the value of services
rendered prior to the date of termination.""8 6 Finally, because
Somuah (and her subsequent attorney) immediately benefitted from
Flachs's services, as in Skeens, "the claim in quantum meruit uncondi-
tionally accrues at the time of termination. 1
8 7
4. Analysis.-
a. Balancing the Client's and the Attorney's Interests.-This Note
argues that the Court of Appeals's attempt to balance the interests of
the attorney and the client, while laudable in that it protects the attor-
ney's right to recover compensation for services rendered, and per-
haps more importantly the client's constitutional interest in
maintaining her choice of counsel, the decision may present an un-
workable standard that creates uncertainty for future litigation. Even
more troubling, is the narrow definition of the practice of law used by
the court to assure each party's-the attorney and the client-inter-
ests were accounted for. Finally, the article will offer a possible solu-
tion to the problems created by the Maryland decision using a
recently decided California case.
In its effort to "strike a balance" between the client's absolute
right to discharge her attorney and the attorney's right to reasonable
and fair compensation,' the Somuah court held that when a client
has some "basis for.., being dissatisfied with the attorney, the contin-
gency generating the fee must occur prior to the attorney's recov-
ery. ''a81 Prior to Somuah, a discharged attorney could be discharged
for one of two reasons, for cause or without cause.1 90 An attorney
would receive no compensation if he were discharged for cause mean-
ing that he committed fraud or illegal conduct.1 9' If a client dis-
charged an attorney without cause, or for reasons anything less than
185. Judge Rodowsky did not discuss whether Flachs engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law and therefore considered him to be discharged without "traditional" or High
Grade cause. Id. at 270-71, 721 A.2d at 694-95 (reasoning under the premise that Flachs
did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law).
186. Id. at 276, 721 A.2d at 697.
187. Id.; see also Skeens, 331 Md. at 343-44, 628 A.2d at 191 (holding that an attorney
discharged without cause can bring a cause of action immediately).
188. Somuah, 352 Md. at 264-65, 721 A.2d 691.
189. Id. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693.
190. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (defining for cause and without cause
as reasons for dismissal).
191. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (explaining that an attorney dis-
charged for serious misconduct may not be compensated).
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fraud or illegal conduct, the attorney would be compensated immedi-
ately upon discharge. 9 2 Somuah created what can be considered a
third category of discharge that the majority calls "basis" and the dis-
sent calls Low Grade cause. According to the Somuah majority, a cli-
ent has a basis to discharge an attorney when the attorney does not
commit serious misconduct but the client still has a valid good faith
reason to be dissatisfied. 193 When discharged with a basis or Low
Grade cause, the attorney will be paid if, and only if, the contingency
for which he was originally obtained under is fulfilled.194
The court acknowledged that when Somuah retained Flachs as
her lawyer, she fully expected that he would be able to represent her
in "any court proceedings."' 95 When he informed her he was not au-
thorized to practice law in the state of Maryland, but could lawfully
retain local counsel, the court concluded that Somuah "had a basis for
losing confidence" in Flachs.'96 The court, however, ruled that
Flachs's conduct did not qualify as, or rise to serious misconduct,
thereby assuring an opportunity to recover compensation depending
on the outcome of Somuah's litigation.' 97 By rendering its decision in
the manner it did, the court attempted to balance the client's right to
discharge an attorney because of a reasonable dissatisfaction and the
attorney's right to recover for services rendered.' 98
b. Uncertainty Created by the Court's Decision. -The Somuah de-
cision blurs what was once a bright line rule regarding when an attor-
ney may recover after being discharged.' 99 By establishing a third
category of discharge, the Somuah court leaves in doubt whether an
attorney will ultimately recover costs upon discharge by a dissatisfied
client.2 °° Before Somuah, the court was merely required to determine
whether an attorney was discharged for serious misconduct when de-
ciding if an attorney deserved compensation for his services. 20 1 If the
192. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (citing that an attorney discharged with-
out cause can recover immediately in quantum meruit).
193. Somuah, 352 Md. at 264, 721 A.2d 691.
194. See id. at 267-68, 721 A.2d 693; see also supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
195. Somuah, 352 Md. at 257, 721 A.2d at 688.
196. Id. at 257-58, 721 A-2d at 688.
197. See id. at 267-68, 721 A.2d at 693 (holding that Flachs must await the outcome of
Somuah's case against Chrysler "to maintain his action for compensation").
198. Id. at 265-66, 721 A.2d 692.
199. See id. at 269, 721 A.2d at 693 (Rodowsky,J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's
decision "unnecessarily muddles Maryland law concerning attorney-client contracts").
200. See id. at 267-68, 721 A.2d at 693 (holding that Flachs must await the occurrence of
the contingency to be compensated).
201. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (citing Skeens and Korotki as establish-
ing the defining issues of an attorney's recovery).
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attorney was discharged for cause he would be denied compensa-
tion,2° 9 if he was discharged without cause he would be paid immedi-
ately upon discharge.23
With the Somuah holding, however, courts must now undertake a
second layer of analysis when an attorney is discharged. After decid-
ing whether or not the attorney deserves compensation-whether the
attorney was discharged for cause or without cause-the court now
must also consider at what point the attorney can recover, on occur-
rence of the contingency or immediately upon termination.2"4
The Somuah decision did not change the fact that an attorney dis-
charged for cause may be denied compensation.20 5 The uncertainty
and subjectivity of the analysis now required by the Somuah decision
manifests when an attorney is discharged without cause.20 6 Upon de-
ciding that an attorney was discharged without cause, the court must
then scrutinize if there was actually a valid reason for the client to
discharge her attorney or whether the client had a reasonable basis
for dissatisfaction, as in Somuah.2 ° 7 If there is a reasonable basis for
the client to discharge her attorney, he must then await the occur-
rence of the contingency to be compensated.208 If, however, the attor-
ney is discharged by the client, for anything less than reasonable
dissatisfaction, or without cause, the attorney can bring his action for
compensation immediately upon termination. 219 While in theory the
framework established by the Somuah court is reasonable, complicat-
ing and confusing the issue is that the decision lacks any workable
standard whereby a reasonable prediction can be made on when an
202. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 669, 569 A.2d 1224,
1236 (1990) (stating that when an attorney is discharged for cause he may not recover
compensation).
203. See Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 343-44, 628 A.2d 185, 191 (1993) (holding that
"where an attorney has been discharged without cause, the attorney's claim in quantum
meruit accrues immediately upon discharge, notwithstanding the fact that the contingency
has not occurred").
204. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 267-68, 712 A.2d at 693 (holding that when an attorney is
discharged for a valid reason he must await the occurrence of the contingency to recover);
see also supra note 172 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining that an attorney discharged
for cause may be denied compensation).
206. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693 (distinguishing Skeens from the case at
bar).
207. See id. at 266-67, 721 A.2d at 692-93 (examining the reasons for an attorney's dis-
charge to determine when he will be compensated).
208. Id. at 267-68, 721 A.2d at 693 (holding that an attorney discharged because of a
reasonable dissatisfaction on the client's behalf must await the occurrence of the contin-
gency to recover).
209. See Skeens, 331 Md. at 343-44, 628 A.2d at 191 (holding that an attorney discharged
without cause may recover in quantum meruit immediately).
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attorney may recover after being terminated by a dissatisfied client
and at what point must a client compensate an attorney she has termi-
nated.211 While the Somuah decision laudably promotes the client's
interest by allowing a reasonably dissatisfied client to discharge her
attorney without being burdened by the original retainer agree-
ment,211 the holding allows the court great discretion to determine,
on a case by case basis, what will constitute reasonable dissatisfaction.
The Somuah decision is inherently subjective, ultimately resulting in
uncertainty about the terms of compensation for both parties, in the
event that a client terminates her attorney.
Prior to Somuah, Maryland followed the New York rule when an
attorney was discharged for any reason other than serious miscon-
duct.2 12 Under the New York rule, as applied in Skeens, if the attorney
was discharged for any reason other then serious misconduct the cli-
ent was required to pay in quantum meruit immediately.213 While ap-
plying the New York rule allowed for a bright line test,2 14 it did not
provide a mechanism for a client with a reasonable good faith excuse,
amounting to less than serious misconduct, to discharge her attorney,
retained on contingency, without having to compensate the attorney
immediately.215
The Somuah court, by its holding, essentially required the applica-
tion of the California rule when an attorney is discharged for basis-
somewhere in between the established categories of for cause and
without cause.21 6 In this regard, the Somuah decision fills the gap left
210. All the decision offers as a standard are the facts that an attorney's failure to notify
his client, until three months after they signed a retainer agreement, that he was not li-
censed in the state and thereby could not represent her without local counsel could cause
reasonable dissatisfaction to a client. This necessitates a very fact-based and at times subjec-
tive inquiry by the court to determine whether an attorney was discharged for cause or
without cause.
211. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text (citing the policy reasons in support
of the California rule).
212. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (citing Skeens v. Miller as adopting the New
York rule in Maryland).
213. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (citing the application of the New York
rule).
214. See Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75 (1932) (stating that "[e]ither the [retainer con-
tract] wholly stands or totally falls").
215. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 267-68, 721 A.2d at 693 (holding that a client with a basis to
be dissatisfied with her discharged attorney is not responsible to compensate him until the
fulfillment of the contingency for which he was retained).
216. See id. at 264-65, 267, 721 A.2d at 691-93 (defining "basis" as a category for dis-
charge and requiring an attorney to await the contingency in order to recover). "Thus,
'basis' for an attorney's discharge and 'cause' for the forfeiture of an attorney's compensa-
tion are not one and the same." Id. at 264, 721 A.2d at 691; see also supra notes 75-77
(defining the categories of for cause and without cause).
2000) 1195
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
by the Skeens court's application of the New York rule. Under Mary-
land law today, when an attorney is discharged because a client has a
basis to be dissatisfied with an attorney's performance, the attorney
must await the occurrence of the contingency in order to recover.217
In essence, the Somuah decision allows courts to apply either the Cali-
fornia or the New York rule depending on why the client discharged
her attorney.218 This flexibility inherent in the Somuah court's deci-
sion promotes the client's interests in that an "immediate cause of
action would place a coercive burden on the contingency fee client,
who is likely to be of limited means, to pay his former attorney before
final determination of the litigation." 219 The California rule, as ap-
plied in Maryland, is also preferable in that "the deferred cause of
action approach [is] consistent with its objective of promoting the cli-
ent's ability to terminate the attorney-client relationship. '" 220 Further-
more, "the harm to the discharged attorney [is] negligible because
the attorney would not have benefitted prior to the contingency even
under the terms of the discharged contract."22 1 In the spirit of the
California rule, the Somuah court has protected client autonomy by
allowing clients to discharge unsatisfactory attorneys without imposing
an insurmountable burden of repayment until after a judgment or
settlement has occurred.2 2 2 Furthermore, the court's holding does
not foreclose the attorney's recovery-it merely delays his compensa-
tion until settlement or the successful completion of the lawsuit for
which he was originally retained.223
217. Id. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693 (holding that "where any fee is contingent on recovery
by the client and where... there has been some basis for the client being dissatisfied with
the attorney, the contingency generating the fee must occur prior to the attorney's
recovery").
218. Id.
219. Craig B. Glidden, Note, Contracts-Attorney Fees-Right To Recovery Upon Discharge
Without Cause-Rosenberg v. Levin, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (1982), 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 167, 178
(1982).
220. Id. (internal footnote omitted) (discussing Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla.
1982)).
221. Id. (internal footnote omitted) (discussing the Rosenberg case).
222. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 264-65, 721 A.2d at 691 (contemplating both the attorney
and client's interests).
223. Id. at 267, 721 A.2d at 693 (holding that Flachs must await the occurrence of the
contingency to recover). The decision, however, does not mention "whether the preclu-
sion of any immediate action to recover the reasonable value of the discharged attorney's
services also precludes efforts to impose an equitable lien on the client's future recovery."
By allowing a lien that "attaches only to a settlement orjudgement favorable to the client"
the court could have established a reasonable compromise-allowing Flachs to recover for
her services and Somuah to proceed with an attorney she felt more comfortable with. See
Glidden, supra note 219, at 180.
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While awaiting the occurrence of the contingency may seem
somewhat unfair to the attorney because recovery is dependent on the
work of subsequent counsel, it should not be forgotten that the subse-
quent attorney also shares an interest with the discharged attorney in
that without winning the case, or gaining a favorable settlement in the
instance of a contingency agreement, he himself will not be compen-
sated.224 The Somuah decision assures that attorneys must remain ac-
countable and attentive to their clients or risk the chance of being
discharged and having to wait for the fulfillment of the contingency
based on another attorney's performance.225 In this regard, the deci-
sion therefore raises the standard for attorneys by insisting that they
attend to their client or lose the chance to represent them and be
paid for doing SO. 2 2 6 Notwithstanding some of the uncertainty caused
by the decision, for policy reasons, the Somuah holding is preferable to
prior Maryland law governing sovereign attorney-client retainer
agreements.
The Somuah decision also relates to the larger issue of attorney-
client fee arrangements and contingency contracts.2 2 7 Contingency
fee arrangements allow indigent clients access to attorneys because
typically poorer clients cannot finance litigation under any other ar-
rangement.228 The Somuah decision thus empowers indigent clients
by establishing a mechanism whereby a client can terminate an attor-
ney they are reasonably dissatisfied with, without incurring a substan-
tial burden of having to pay the attorney in quantum meruit
immediately after discharge. 229 Although the Somuah decision man-
224. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (citing reasons for adopting the New
York rule).
225. See Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972) (citing the client's interests for
adopting the California rule).
226. Id. (arguing that the loss of trust between an attorney and client may result in an
attorney losing a chance to recover compensation for the work completed prior to his
termination).
227. See infra notes 229-230 (explaining the Somuah decision in relation to contingency
agreements).
228. See Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14 (stating that contingency agreements are vital to persons
of lesser means to help pay for litigation).
229. Id. But see Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 343-44, 628 A.2d 185, 191 (1993) (holding
that a client must recompense his attorney immediately upon discharge when terminated
without cause). On the other hand certain attorneys may not accept clients on contin-
gency agreements to avoid a situation like Somuah. In this respect, the Somuah decision
lowers the pool of available attorneys to those clients whose only hope of representation is
through a contingency agreement. Furthermore, attorneys may be leery to accept clients
on a contingency basis because they could be discharged "on the courthouse steps" without
guarantee of reimbursement for costs incurred. See Morrow, supra note 33, at 686-87 (cit-
ing a possible increase in fees because of times when an attorney may not have recovered,
the potential for the discouraging of a vigorous pursuit of a client's interests and attorney's
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dates an intense factual inquiry by adding another level of analysis
requiring the court to gauge the subjective and personal reasons given
by the client when discharging her attorney, the benefits to the client
and the flexibility awarded to the court arguably outweigh these
concerns.
2 30
c. Narrow Definition of Law.-
(1) Departure from Precedent.-For the court to conclude that
Flachs did not commit serious misconduct and thereby potentially
precluding him from recovery,231 the court decided he was not prac-
ticing law in Maryland and therefore did not commit serious miscon-
duct as suggested by Somuah.232 The Somuah court established a
curiously narrow definition of the practice of law by ruling that be-
cause Flachs did not "expressly hold 'himself out to the public as an
attorney engaged in the general practice of law in Maryland,' and did
not maintain his principal office in Maryland" he was not practicing
law.233 This very narrow definition of the practice of law is inconsis-
tent with other Maryland decisions that define the practice of law in
Maryland as "[u] tilizing legal education, training, and experience...
[to apply] the special analysis of the profession to a client's prob-
lem."2 34 The Court of Appeals has even held that "meeting with pro-
spective clients may ... constitute the practice of law because 'the very
acts of interview, analysis and explanation of legal rights constitute
practicing law in Maryland.'
2 35
Somuah's narrow definition of practicing law appears to be at
odds with the policy goals that the court itself cited. 2 6 The prohibi-
tion of the unauthorized practice of law acts as a means "to protect
fear of not being compensated as support for allowing an attorney to seek recovery imme-
diately upon termination).
230. SeeFracasse, 494 P.2d at 14 (citing reasons for adopting the California rule). On the
other hand, the case-by-case nature of the Somuah analysis may result in the failure to iden-
tify a working precedent. See supra notes 210-211 (arguing that Somuah did not establish an
effective workable standard).
231. See supra notes 70-74 (citing that an attorney that engaged in serious misconduct
may forfeit his right to recovery).
232. Somuah, 352 Md. at 264, 721 A.2d at 691.
233. Id. at 262, 721 A.2d at 690 (quoting Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County,
316 Md. 646, 659, 561 A.2d 200, 207 (1989)).
234. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kennedy,
316 Md. at 662, 561 A.2d at 208); see also supra notes 95-100 (offering additional theories
on defining the practice of law).
235. Somuah, 352 Md. at 262, 721 A.2d at 690 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 324, 666 A.2d
1246, 1248 (1995) (quoting Kennedy, 316 Md. at 666, 561 A.2d at 210)).
236. See infra note 246 and accompanying text (citing policy reasons behind prohibiting
the unauthorized practice of law).
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the public from being preyed upon by those not competent to prac-
tice law-from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representa-
tion. '2 7 Furthermore, a narrow definition is also in disagreement
with the state code and professional rules that prohibit the practice of
law.238 These laws and rules make clear, along with the supporting
case law, that the unauthorized practice of law is illegal in Mary-
land.239 By cursorily dismissing the prospect that Flachs was practic-
ing law, despite its strong opposition to the unauthorized practice, the
court avoids the issue of whether he conducted serious misconduct, 240
which would have precluded Flachs from recovering his fees and
expenses.241
Flachs prepared documents and counseled Somuah regarding
her potential claim.242 He collected and preserved evidence, namely
the demolished taxicab, and obtained confidential information in the
form of medical reports.243 Finally, Flachs secured national experts,
interviewed potential witnesses, and met with Somuah on at least six
occasions.2 4 4 While all of these activities appear as the practice of law
based on previous decisions, 245 the court chose to apply a very narrow
definition of the practice of law as an attorney holding himself out to
the public as a member of the Maryland Bar or as having a law office
in the state.246 Essential to this discussion is that Flachs completed his
work on Somuah's behalf. Although this information is absent from
the record it is implied and can be inferred that much of Flachs's
work was in fact done in Maryland. There is no evidence on the re-
cord to suggest that Flachs met with Somuah, collected and presented
evidence, and interviewed potential witnesses anywhere other than
237. Somuah, 352 Md. at 261-62, 721 A.2d at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 638, 541 A.2d 977 (1988)).
238. See supra notes 78-93 (citing the Maryland Code, Rules of Professional Conduct,
and Rules Governing Admission to the Bar that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law).
239. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. §§ 10-601, -602, -606 (prohibiting the unau-
thorized practice of law in Maryland without a license); RULES GovWRNING ADMISSION TO
BAR OF MARYLAND RULE 14 (requiring an out-of-state attorney to be specially admitted to
practice in Maryland); MARYLANo LAwmRs RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5, 7.1,
8.5 (prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law and explaining the consequences of
such); see also In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 627, 541 A.2d 977, 978 (1988)
(recognizing the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland).
240. See id. at 262, 721 A.2d at 690 (stating that Flachs "investigation" did not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland).
241. See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text (stating that an attorney who commits
serious misconduct may not recover).
242. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 272, 721 A.2d at 695 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (defining the practice of law).
246. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (defining narrowly the practice of law).
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Maryland.247 It also can be inferred, however, that Flachs most likely
prepared documents and made necessary phone calls for Somuah's
case from his office in Virginia.248 In finding that Flachs was not prac-
ticing law, and failing to conclude that any of his activities resulted in
serious misconduct, the court permits substantial leeway for both out-
of-state and in-state practitioners not licensed in Maryland to perform
legal services for unsuspecting clients.
Instead of strongly discouraging out-of-state attorneys from prac-
ticing law in Maryland without a license, the court attempted to strike
a balance to assure that Somuah could discharge her attorney without
a severe financial burden, and that Flachs was reasonably compen-
sated for the services he performed. 249 In the court's strain to com-
promise,25 ° it created an unsatisfactory, narrow definition of the
practice of law; one which easily could be circumvented by both unli-
censed out-of-state, and unlicensed in-state attorneys.25'
247. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 272, 721 A.2d at 695 (describing Flachs's investigation and
work done on behalf of Somuah). On the contrary, the court says that Flachs first met with
Somuah in Maryland at Prince Georges Community Hospital. Id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
There is no information, however, that Flachs did any of his work, outside of his initial
meeting with Somuah, anywhere other than Virginia. Id. at 247, 272, 721 A.2d at 683, 695.
248. Id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 695 (describing Flachs's investigation of Somuah's cause of
action).
249. Somuah, 352 Md. at 264-65, 721 A.2d at 691 (stating that "we strike a balance be-
tween the client's absolute right to discharge his or her attorney and the attorney's right to
fair compensation for services competently rendered prior to discharge"); see also D.P.
Grawunder, Right Of Attorney Admitted In One State To Recover Compensation For Services Ren-
dered In Another State Where He Was Not Admitted To The Bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 907, 908 (1999).
Grawunder stated:
Most courts take the view that in the absence of some extenuating circumstance,
an out-of-state attorney who renders services locally falls within the prohibition
against illegally practicing law and cannot recover compensation from his client
for the local services. On the other hand, recovery has been allowed in a few
instances, especially where it appeared that before undertaking to represent a
client, the attorney made a full disclosure of his lack of qualification in the local
state, and the client nonetheless agreed to the retainer. Of course, if the services
rendered by the out-of-state attorney do not involve courtroom appearances or
actual litigation, he may be found not to have been illegally "practicing law" and
may accordingly be allowed his fee, but some courts have denied recovery even
though it did not appear that the attorney's services consisted in the pursuit of
actual adversary litigation.
Id.
250. The exceptional circumstances of the case may have motivated the court to com-
promise. See infra note 271 (detailing some of the unique circumstances, i.e., the potential
for a federal lawsuit and Somuah's change of residency from Maryland to Virginia).
251. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (stating that Flachs did not practice law
in Maryland because he did not have an office in the state or because he did not falsely
state he was licensed to practice in Maryland).
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(2) The Birbrower Solution. -Arguably, a more reasonable
way to determine if an out-of-state attorney practiced law in ajurisdic-
tion where he was not licensed is the "sufficient contact" test cited in
Birbrower.25 2 The Birbrower "sufficient contact" test provides that an un-
licensed attorney is practicing law in a jurisdiction where he is not
licensed if he engages in "sufficient activities in the state, or created a
continuing relationship with the . . . client that included legal duties
and obligations. "253 Applying this framework to the instant case, by
entering into an agreement to represent Somuah, 254 and beginning
an investigation that eventually resulted in over $20,000 in fees and
expenses, 255 Flachs arguably engaged in "sufficient activities in the
state" and created "legal duties and obligations" by establishing a
"continuing relationship ' 256 with Somuah. Flachs's relationship with
Somuah and the services he performed for her in Maryland could
surely satisfy the "sufficient contact" test.2 57 In short, under the Bir-
brower "sufficient contact" analysis, Flachs practiced law in Maryland
without a license, thereby giving rise to serious misconduct. 258 Unlike
Maryland law prior to Somuah that prohibited compensation for seri-
ous misconduct, the solution offered in Birbrower would not prevent
Flachs from recovering some compensation for his representation of
Somuah.2 59
The Supreme Court of California reasoned that while "Bir-
brower's statutory violation may require exclusion of the portion of
the fee attributable to the substantial illegal services, . . . that violation
does not necessarily entirely preclude its recovery under the fee agree-
252. See supra note 124-125 and accompanying text (defining the 'sufficient contact'
test). This analysis limits the shaping and reshaping of the definition of practicing law by
simply inquiring whether the attorney had sufficient contact with a client in the state that
created legal duties.
253. Birbrower v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998).
254. Somuah, 352 Md. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
255. Id. at 249, 721 A.2d at 683.
256. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5-6 (defining "sufficient contact"); see also supra notes 248-249
and accompanying text (discussing the services Flachs performed for Somuah and in what
state, Maryland or Virginia).
257. See id. Applying the sufficient contact test to the Somuah-Flachs relationship indi-
cates a "continuing relationship" that resulted in legal duties and obligations on behalf of
Flachs. This relationship is key to the "sufficient contact" analysis in Birbrower. Id.
258. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5-6 (emphasizing that a range of activities, including "suffi-
cient contact" and a "continuing relationship" with an in-state client would result in the
practice of law in a state using a "sufficient contact" test).
259. See id. at 13 (allowing an attorney who practiced law without a license and there-
fore forfeited the portion of the fee attributable to those illegal services, to recover under




ment for the limited services it performed outside California. '26 ° Fur-
thermore "to the extent that the illegal compensation can be severed
from the rest of the agreement," the portion of the fee agreement
between the attorney and the client that includes payment for services
rendered in New York may be enforceable. 261  The Birbrower court
then remanded the case so the trial court could separate "the value of
the California services" from the rest of the fee agreement and deter-
mine "how much of this sum is attributable to services Birbrower ren-
dered in New York" and compensate Birbrower in that amount.26 2
Applying the Birbrower framework to the instant case, Flachs
would be compensated for those services he performed in Virginia,
the state where he was licensed. 263 Further, Flachs would be denied
compensation for any work that he performed in Maryland, because
under the "sufficient contact" analysis Flachs would be practicing law
without a license in Maryland, constituting serious misconduct.264 If
the Court of Appeals of Maryland were to adopt the California "suffi-
cient contact" test, Flachs could recover compensation for the services
he performed in Virginia despite having illegally practiced law in Ma-
ryland.265 Perhaps, this would not result in a substantial recovery for
Flachs if a more thorough factual inquiry proved most of his work was
performed in Maryland. 266 Nevertheless, such a ruling would result in
a broader definition of the practice of law in Maryland, thereby al-
lowing the court to police all Maryland attorneys, and all attorneys
working in Maryland. 267 This class of attorneys includes all those who
created a legal duty and obligation with a Maryland client through
sufficient contact, 268 not just simply those attorneys with an office in
260. Id. (citing Calvert v. Stoner, 199 P.2d 297, 300-01 (Cal. 1948)).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. More factual analysis would be necessary to determine exactly what Flachs did out
of his office in Virginia and what services he performed for Somuah in Maryland. While
the "sufficient contact" test lends itself to be somewhat arbitrary in that Flachs is compen-
sated for services depending on bordering state boundaries, the analysis prevents Flachs
from receiving compensation for the unauthorized practice of law. See supra note 261 and
accompanying test (defining "sufficient contact").
264. See infra note 266 and accompanying text (citing the Birbrower holding and applying
its holding to Somuah).
265. Id.
266. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 272, 721 A.2d at 695 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) (providing
limited details of the Flachs investigation).
267. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that it is the court's duty to regu-
late the state's attorneys).
268. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (defining the sufficient contact test).
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the state or those who claim to be Maryland attorneys.2 69 Under the
Somuah court's unsatisfying definition of practicing law, an unlicensed
attorney in Maryland-both out-of-state attorneys or in-state unli-
censed attorneys-could render advice, complete an investigation,
and seemingly perform any out-of-court representation with impunity
as long as the attorney neither had an office in Maryland nor held
himself out as a Maryland attorney.27 ° Finally, the Birbrower solution
offers a compromise by allowing the court to award compensation to
an attorney for the lawful work he completed in his licensed jurisdic-
tion and denying compensation for work performed in jurisdictions
where he was not licensed.
The instant case, does in some respects, contain exceptional cir-
cumstances. For example, Somuah lived in Virginia when Flachs was
retained, and the attorney began his investigation with the reasonable
notion that he was going to file Somuah's case in federal court, where
he was admitted to practice. 271 Because the client moved from Vir-
ginia to Maryland, the court could arguably have concluded that
Flachs's conduct was simply an investigation and not the practice of
law.27 2 By the court's term, the distinction between an investigation
and the practice of law is paramount because if Flachs was determined
to be practicing law in Maryland without a license this would consti-
tute serious misconduct and preclude recovery. Instead of emphasiz-
ing this key fact, the court chose to create a general, yet narrow,
definition of the practice of law.2 7 ' A better approach would have
been to compensate Flachs for the initial fees incurred while Somuah
was in Virginia and disallow those expenses incurred in Maryland.2 7 4
5. Conclusion.-In Somuah v. Flachs, the Court of Appeals found
that an attorney discharged because a client had a valid basis to be
dissatisfied must await the contingency to be compensated. The court
269. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (defining the practice of law in Maryland
as holding yourself out as an attorney or maintaining an office in the state).
270. Id.
271. See Somuah, 352 Md. at 256, 721 A.2d at 687 (stating it was not immediately clear
where Flachs would file the suit, in federal or in state court).
272. See id. at 256-57, 266, 721 A.2d at 687, 692 (detailing Flachs's investigation and
asserting that Somuah would benefit from Flachs's work despite failing to find that he had
practiced law).
273. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (defining the practice of law in Maryland
as holding yourself out as an attorney or maintaining an office in the state).
274. See Birbrower v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998) (separating an attorney-
client fee agreement into two parts by denying the attorney compensation for services ren-
dered in violation of an unauthorized practice of law statute and allowing recovery for




came to this conclusion by establishing a narrow definition of the
practice of law, which included having an office in the state and hold-
ing oneself out to the public as an attorney. While the court's defini-
tion of the practice of law is unsatisfying, its holding allows the court
flexibility in determining when a discharged attorney can recover if
terminated prior to the contingency; either immediately upon dis-
charge or only upon fulfillment of the contingency depending in why
the attorney was discharged. If the client has an adequate reason by
the court's determination, the attorney must await the occurrence of
the contingency, if the attorney is discharged without cause, he may
recover immediately. In sum, the flexibility established by the court's
ruling will help protect both the clients' interests by not burdening
them with legal fees after discharging an under-performing attorney
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XIII. TORTS
A. Maryland's Adoption of Pre-Impact Fright as a Legally Compensable
Element of Damages
In Benyon v. Montgomery Cablevision, L.P.,1 the Court of Appeals, in
a case of first impression, permitted recovery in a survival action for
the mental anguish a decedent suffered in apprehension of his fatal
impact with another vehicle.2 The court held that "in survival actions,
where a decedent experiences great fear and apprehension of immi-
nent death before the fatal physical impact, the decedent's estate may
recover for such emotional distress and mental anguish as are capable
of objective determination."' In so deciding, the court, for the first
time, acknowledged "pre-impact fright" as a legally compensable ele-
ment of damages in a survival action.4 The court's decision to allow
the recovery of damages for pre-impact fright preserves the policy
goals of the "physical injury" rule adopted in Green v. T.A. Shoemaker &
Co.,5 and modified in subsequent cases. 6 This decision, however, rep-
resents a deviation from the principle prohibiting the award of com-
pensatory damages based upon speculative or conjectural evidence.7
1. The Case.--On the night of June 7, 1990, Montgomery
Cablevision discovered that one of its transmission cables located at
Interstate 495 required repair.8 To repair and re-position the cable,
the repairpersons needed unobstructed access across the heavily trav-
eled Interstate.9 To facilitate this repair, the Maryland State Police
stopped traffic on both sides of 1-495 in the early morning hours of
June 8, 1990, for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes pursuant to
a permit obtained by Montgomery Cablevision from the Maryland
State Highway Administration.' ° During that time, a one-mile back up
1. 351 Md. 460, 718 A.2d 1161 (1998).
2. Id. at 464, 718 A.2d at 1163.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 463, 718 A.2d at 1163 (internal quotation marks omitted) (observing that
"[w]hether 'pre-impact fright' ... is a legally compensable element of damages in a survival
action is an issue hitherto unaddressed by this Court").
5. 111 Md. 69, 83, 73 A. 688, 693 (1909) (rejecting "the rigid rule applied in some
Courts, requiring actual contemporaneous physical impact producing physical injury" in
favor of compensating injury to one's health brought on by fright without physical impact).
6. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the physi-
cal injury rule).
7. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (citing cases that follow this principle).
8. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 464, 718 A.2d at 1163.
9. See Montgomery Cablevision, L.P. v. Benyon, 167 Md. App. 363, 369, 696 A.2d 491,
493 (1997).
10. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 464, 718 A.2d at 1163.
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formed on both sides of 1-495." l At the rear of the back up, one of the
co-defendants, a truck driver stopped his tractor-trailer upon ap-
proaching the congestion on the westbound side of 1-495.12 Douglas
Benyon (decedent) was also traveling westbound in the same lane as
the truck driver within the fifty-five miles per hour speed limit. 3 Ac-
cording to evidence presented at trial, Benyon became aware and re-
acted to the impending danger of the stopped traffic ahead of his van
approximately one hundred ninety-two feet from the rear of Kirk-
land's tractor-trailer. 14 Benyon's van skidded for approximately sev-
enty-one and one-half feet and veered slightly to the right before
colliding with the rear of Kirkland's tractor-trailer at forty-one miles
per hour. 15 Benyon died instantly upon impact.
16
Benyon's estate filed a wrongful death and a survivorship ac-
tion, 7 naming Montgomery Cablevision, the truck driver and the
owner of the tractor-trailer 8 as defendants.' 9 The jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of Benyon's estate. 20  Among the damages awards,
Benyon's estate received a $1,000,000 damage award for the dece-
dent's pre-impact fright,21 which was reduced by the trial judge to
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 464-65, 718 A.2d at 1163.
14. See id. at 465, 718 A.2d at 1163.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. The differences between a wrongful death action and a survivorship action are ex-
plained in an opinion by Chief Judge McSherry in Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power
Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906):
Under... [the wrongful death statute,] the damages recoverable are such as the
equitable plaintiffs have sustained by the death of the party injured; under [the
survivorship statute,] the damages recoverable are only such as the deceased sus-
tained in his lifetime and consequently excluded those which result to other per-
sons from his death. Under ... [the wrongful death statute,] the damages are
apportioned by the jury among the equitable plaintiffs, and belonging exclusively
to them and form no part of the assets of the decedent's estate; under ... [the
survivorship statute,] the damages recovered go into the hands of the executor or
administrator and constitute assets of the estate. Under... [the wrongful death
statute,] there is no survival of a cause of action the cause of action is created by it
and is a new cause of action and consequently one which the deceased never had;
under [the survivorship statute,] there is a survival of a cause of action which the
decedent had in his lifetime.
Id. at 339-40, 65 A. at 52 (internal citations omitted).
18. The insurance carrier for the tractor-trailer intervened as a defendant. See Benyon,
351 Md. at 465, 718 A.2d at 1163.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 466, 718 A.2d at 1164.
21. See id, The jury was instructed by the trial judge "that it could consider and make
award for 'pain, suffering, and mental anguish' that the decedent experienced before the
crash." Id. (citation omitted).
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$350,000 pursuant to a statutory limitation on the amount of
noneconomic damage awards.22
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the
jury's award of damages for the decedent's pre-impact fright.23 The
court recognized the fact "[t] hat there has not previously been any
recovery for pre-impact fright in a survival action is not a basis for
concluding that there can never be an appropriate set of facts and
circumstances that would permit a tort victim to recover damages for
such emotional distress. '24 Reasoning that no recovery can be permit-
ted without physical injury or injury capable of objective determina-
tion, the majority held that decedent's estate could not recover
damages because a person "who died instantly upon impact or . . .
without recovering consciousness following impact cannot have suf-
fered any injury capable of objective determination as a result of pre-
impact fright.
25
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari26 to determine
"[w] hether 'pre-impact fright,' or any other form of mental and emo-
tional disturbance or distress, suffered by an accident victim who dies
instantly upon impact is a legally compensable element of damages in
a survival action. '
27
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland's Survivorship Statute.--Originally, at common
law, when a victim of a tort died prior to recovery, the cause of action
expired with the victim's death. 2' Therefore, the victim's estate could
not bring an action to recover compensatory damages for injuries suf-
fered on the decedent's behalf.29 In 1888, however, the Maryland
General Assembly enacted a survivorship statute permitting a cause of
action to survive a claimant's death,30 now codified as section 7-401 (x)
22. See id. Section 11-108(b) (1) of Maryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
states, in pertinent part: "In any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause
of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an award for noneconomic damages may not
exceed $350,000." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PRO. § 11-108(b)(1) (1998).
23. See Montgomery Cablevision, L.P. v. Benyon, 116 Md. App. 363, 403, 696 A.2d 491,
510 (1997).
24. Id. at 375, 696 A.2d at 496.
25. Id. at 388, 696 A.2d at 503.
26. See Benyon v. Montgomery Cablevision L.P., 347 Md. 683, 702 A.2d 291 (1997).
27. Benyon, 351 Md. at 463, 718 A.2d at 1163.
28. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 333-34, 65 A. 49, 50
(1906) (noting that at common law a tort claim expired upon the victim's death).
29. See id.




of the Estates and Trusts Article.3 Pursuant to section 7-401(x), a
personal representative of a claimant's estate may "prosecute . ..a
personal action which the decedent might have commenced or prose-
cuted."3 2 Recovery under section 7-401 (x) is limited to compensation
for the pain, suffering and loss endured by the deceased.33
b. Measuring Recovery of Compensatory Damages.-In establish-
ing a correct measure of compensatory damages, Maryland law pro-
hibits the jury's use of speculative and conjectural evidence. 4 In
Asibem Associates, Ltd. v. Rill," the plaintiff purchased a tract of land
from the defendant and later discovered the tract measured approxi-
mately ten acres less than the contract specified. 6 After granting
summary judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of liability for breach
of contract, the court conducted a trial to calculate damages.3 7 At
trial, the plaintiff attempted to prove damages solely through the testi-
mony of one lay witness.38 Because the witness failed to support her
opinion of the value of the plaintiffs property by comparing it to
other properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling
on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove with requisite rea-
sonable certainty that it had suffered compensable damages.39 The
court explained that "Maryland cases are in accord with the prevailing
rule elsewhere: that if compensatory damages are to be recovered,
they must be proved with reasonable certainty, and may not be based
on speculation or conjecture . "..."40
c. The Development of the "Physical Injury" Rule. -Shortly after
the turn of the century, the Court of Appeals, for the first time, al-
lowed recovery of damages for physical injuries caused by fright,
31. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401(x) (1998).
32. Id.
33. See id. (permitting "the commencement of a personal action which the decedent
might have commenced or prosecuted"); see also Stewart, 104 Md. at 343, 65 A. at 53 (con-
struing the predecessor to section 7-401(x)).
34. See Maicobo Inv. Corp. v. Von Der Heide, 243 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D. Md. 1965)
(recognizing that under Maryland law "damages must be reasonably certain and may not
be based on speculation or conjecture"); Asibem Assocs., Ltd. v. Rill, 264 Md. 272, 276, 286
A.2d 160, 162 (1972) (stating that "if compensatory damages are to be recovered, they
must be proved with reasonable certainty, and may not be based on speculation or
conjecture").
35. 264 Md. 272, 286 A.2d 160 (1972).
36. Id. at 273, 286 A.2d at 161.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 276, 279, 286 A.2d at 162, 164.
39. See id. at 280, 286 A.2d at 164.
40. Id. at 276, 286 A.2d at 162.
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shock, mental anguish, and other forms of emotional distress without
requiring that the victim endure contemporaneous physiological
harm. In Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co.,4 1 the first case in Maryland
allowing such recovery, the court rejected the "physical impact" rule.4 2
That rule, "requiring actual contemporaneous physical impact pro-
ducing physical injury," was intended to protect against spurious and
feigned claims of emotional distress.
In Green, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could re-
cover for physical and emotional injuries resulting from fright and
nervousness caused by constant demolition and blasting in a rock
quarry located next to the plaintiffs house.4 4 The court allowed re-
covery although none of the blasted rocks actually struck the plain-
tiff.4 5 In so holding, the court rejected the more rigid "physical
impact" rule, and adopted the "physical injury" rule instead.4 6
The court explained that "when it is shown that a material physical
injury has resulted from fright caused by a wrongful act . . . in [its]
nature calculated to cause constant alarm and terror, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to perceive any sound reason for denying a right of
action in law, for such physical injury."47 According to the Green deci-
sion, emotional distress manifesting itself in the form of a physical
injury as a natural result of tortious conduct provides a sufficient guar-
antee of the authenticity of the claim. While the Green court crafted a
holding that sanctioned recovery for emotional distress, it did so in a
way that protected the policy behind the rejected "physical impact"
rule: the prevention of spurious or feigned claims.4 8 The court noted
that the new "physical injury" rule still protected against feigned
claims because it still required that the physical injury be the "natural
and proximate effect' of the alarm and terror that the victim endured.4 9
41. 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
42. Id. at 83, 73 A. at 693.
43. Id. at 77, 83, 73 A. at 691, 693 (noting that the rule protected against fictitious
litigation).
44. Id. at 83, 73 A. at 693.
45. See id. at 79, 83, 73 A. at 692, 693.
46. Id. at 77, 73 A. at 691.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 81, 73 A. at 693 (requiring that the injury be the natural proximate cause of
the tortious act).
49. Id. at 78, 73 A. at 691 (emphasis added) (citing Baltimore City Passenger Railway
Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 80 (1883)). The Court explained:
It must be conceded that the numerical weight of authority supports the general
rule that there can be no recovery for nervous affections unaccompanied by con-
temporaneous physical injury, but the sounder view, in our opinion, is, (sic) that
there are exceptions to this rule, and that where the wrongful act complained of
is the proximate cause of the injury.., and where the injury ought, in the light of
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Several Court of Appeals's decisions rendered after Green also re-
jected the "physical impact" rule, while modifying the "physical injury"
rule espoused in Green. In Bowman v. Williams,5" the plaintiff, standing
in his first floor dining room, witnessed a truck driven by the defen-
dant veer out of control and crash into the lower level of his house.5"
The plaintiff was not hit by the truck nor knocked to the ground by its
impact with the house.52 Nevertheless, overcome by fear for his safety
and that of his children, he collapsed to the floor.53 The plaintiff,
bedridden for two weeks, suffered from severe emotional distress, ner-
vousness, and weakness.54 In affirming the trial court's disposition
awarding the plaintiff damages for his emotional injuries that arose
from fright, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that
a plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for nervous
shock or injury caused, without physical impact, by fright
arising directly from defendant's negligent act or omission,
and resulting in some clearly apparent and substantial physi-
cal injury, as manifested by an external condition or by symp-
toms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological,
physiological, or mental state.55
The court further supported its holding by reasoning:
In fright a man's whole being reacts. The shock to his ner-
vous system is reflected in instinctive excitement and inten-
sive action of the muscles and organs of the body, and so it is
clear that the mental state has a corresponding physical ac-
companiment, although there has been no impact
suffered.
56
The court's ruling reaffirmed the policy judgment expressed in Green,
that claims of physical injuries resulting from fright and fear are viable
in spite of the possibility they could be simulated or spurious.57 The
unanimous ruling stated that such "difficulties are common, are sur-
all the circumstances, to have been contemplated as a natural and probable con-
sequence thereof, the case falls within the exception and should be left to the
jury.
Id. at 81, 73 A. at 692.
50. 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
51. Id. at 398-99, 165 A. at 182.
52. See id. at 399, 165 A. at 182.
53. See id., 165 A. at 182-83.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 404, 165 A. at 184.
56. Id. at 401, 165 A. at 184.
57. See Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909) (noting
that it is as easy to feign a nervous injury resulting from actual physical impact as it is to
feign one arising from fright without physical impact).
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mountable, and so should not prevent the operation of the general
and fundamental theory of the common law that there is a remedy for
every substantial wrong. "58
In Vance v. Vance,59 the Court of Appeals clarified and explained
the "physical injury" rule as set forth in Bowman. In Vance, the plaintiff
suffered from nervousness, insomnia, spontaneous crying, and other
symptoms of emotional distress as a consequence of learning that her
marriage was a nullity because the defendant, whom she thought she
wed almost twenty years prior, had not finalized his divorce from his
first wife until after his wedding with the plaintiff.6 ° The defendant
argued that the plaintiffs injuries did not constitute the requisite
physical injury under Bowman.61 The court explained that "physical
injury" resulting from emotional distress could be proven in one of
four ways, all designed to guard against feigned claims by requiring
objective evidence of injury.62 According to the court, the first three
categories of "physical injury" resulting from emotional distress were
"manifestations of a physical injury through evidence of an external
condition or ... symptoms of a pathological or physiological state."63
Additionally, a plaintiff could show "physical injury" by evidence indic-
ative of a "mental state."64 The court explained that in the context of
the Bowman rule's requirement of a "physical injury," the word physi-
cal is not used in its ordinary dictionary sense, but is used to indicate
that the injury for which recovery is sought must be capable of objec-
tive determination.65 Reasoning the plaintiff in this case had "suffered
an objectively manifested, definite nervous disorder of a magnitude
similar to the mental distress established in Green [and] Bowman," the
Vance court upheld the jury finding that the plaintiff was physically
injured "as a foreseeable result of [defendant's] negligent misrepre-
sentation concerning his marital status."66
While the Court of Appeals's decisions following Green have facili-
tated the recovery of damages for emotional distress, the court has
limited the recovery for emotional distress to the mental distress that
58. Bowman, 164 Md. at 404, 165 A. at 184.
59. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
60. See id. at 493-95, 408 A.2d at 729-30.
61. See id. at 495, 408 A.2d at 731 (arguing that claims based only on-emotional distress
were not legally compensable under Bowman).




66. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734.
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the victim experiences during a "reasonable window of anxiety."6 7 In
Faya v. Almaraz,68 the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's decision
to dismiss the complaints of two plaintiffs seeking relief for emotional
and mental distress69 resulting from the defendant surgeon's negli-
gent failure to disclose his HIV-positive status before performing sur-
gery on them.7' The plaintiffs alleged that they continued to suffer
emotional and mental distress more than a year after they tested nega-
tive for the virus.71 Relying on Vance and its precursors, the court
ruled that the plaintiffs could recover for the symptoms they had al-
leged "to the extent that they can objectively demonstrate their exis-
tence."72  The court, however, determined that the plaintiffs'
continued fear of contracting AIDS after they tested HIV-negative
could be deemed unreasonable, because the possibility of their con-
tracting AIDS from the defendant had become extremely unlikely.
73
Therefore, the court concluded that "[the plaintiffs] may only recover
for their fear and its physical manifestations which may have resulted
from... [defendant's] alleged negligence for the period constituting
their reasonable window of anxiety."74 The court described this window as
"the period between which they learned of [the defendant's] illness
and received their HIV-negative results."75
In light of the development of the "physical injury" rule in Green
and its progeny, it appears that a plaintiff in Maryland must satisfy
three requirements to recover for purely psychological injury result-
ing from the tortious conduct of another. First, the tortious conduct
of the defendant must proximately cause the victim's emotional dis-
67. See Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 455-56, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (1993) (limiting recov-
ery for alleged injuries occurring outside of the time frame in which they could reasonably
be suffered).
68. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).
69. The plaintiffs, two patients of the defendant surgeon, alleged "they were put in fear
of having contracted HlV and thereby suffered the derivative consequences of that fear,
which were manifested by emotional and mental distress, headaches, [and] sleeplessness."
Id. at 451, 620 A.2d at 334.
70. Id. at 450-51, 620 A.2d at 334.
71. See id. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337 (noting that the plaintiffs' alleged emotional and
mental distress continued after they received negative HIV test results, which was well over
a year after their last contact with the defendant).
72. Id. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338.
73. See id. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337 ("Appellants' continued fear of contracting AIDS
may, however, be unreasonable after they tested HIV-negative upon learning of Dr. Al-
maraz's illness, which was well over a year after their last contacts with the physician.").
The court based this conclusion on "current credible evidence of a 95% certainty that one
will test positive for the AIDS virus, if at all, within six months after exposure to it." Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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tress.76 Next, the plaintiff must prove that the victim's particular psy-
chological state or mental state is "capable of objective
determination."77 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that emotional dis-
tress occurred during a period which the victim legitimately could
have suffered such distress.78
d. Pre-impact Fright in Other Jurisdictions. -The availability of
recovery for pre-impact fright in individual jurisdictions is by no
means uniform. 79 Courts, however, throughout the nation, have in-
creasingly expressed willingness to allow recovery for pre-impact
fright.8 ° Although pre-impact fright claims developed from cases in-
volving airplane disasters, they are increasingly permitted in cases in-
volving car, train, and boating accidents in which the decedent
suffered a legally compensable amount of pre-impact fright.81
76. See Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 402, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933) (stating that the
plaintiff's injuries "naturally, directly, and reasonably arose" from the defendant's negli-
gence); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909) (requiring
that the defendant's tortious conduct must proximately cause the plaintiff's emotional in-
juries to obtain recovery).
77. See Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 735, 621 A.2d 872, 885
(1993) (finding that Maryland law allows recovery for purely emotional injuries if such
injuries are objectively determinable); Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 457-58, 620 A.2d 327,
338 (1993) (same); Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733 (1979) (same).
78. See Faya, 329 Md. at 455-56, 620 A.2d at 337 (requiring that the plaintiffs injuries
occur during a "reasonable window of anxiety").
79. See Thomas D. Sydnor, II, Note, Damages for a Decedent's Pre-Impact Fear: An Element of
Damages Under Alaska's Survivorship Statute, 7 ALAsKA L. REV. 352, 353-54 (1990) (exploring
the disparity of recovery for pre-impact fright among various jurisdictions).
80. See Christine Nierenz, "Wy Aren't the Pilots Doing Something?" A Look at the Ap-
proaches Courts Use To Handle Claims For Pre-Impact Terror in Airplane Disasters, 47 DRAKE L.
REV. 343, 348-49 (1999). According to Nierenz, while some courts maintain a relaxed phys-
ical impact standard-"dust in the eye, or the inhalation of smoke, ... [o]ther courts take
an even more liberal approach, and allow recovery for negligent infliction of serious emo-
tional distress without considering whether the plaintiff incurred any physical injury or
illness as a result." Id. at 349.
81. See Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1988) (permitting
recovery for pre-impact fear suffered by occupants of a capsized boat before drowning after
colliding with an offshore drilling platform); Reid v. Louisiana, 637 So. 2d 618, 628-29 (La.
Ct. App. 1994) (allowing recovery for pre-impact fear decedent suffered in a car crash);
Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Neb. 1989) (permitting recovery for pre-impact fear
suffered by operator of a motorcycle prior to his collision with an automobile); Thibeault
v. Campbell, 622 A.2d 212, 215 (N.H. 1993) (permitting recovery for pre-impact fright
suffered by the passenger of a car involved in an automobile accident prior to the colli-
sion); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. App. 1986, no writ)
(allowing recovery for the pre-impact fright suffered by the operator of a truck prior to
being struck by a freight train); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 237-38 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979, no writ) (allowing recovery for pre-impact fear of a 13-year-old boy killed when truck
tires crushed his skull); see also Sydnor, supra note 79, at 352 (noting that claims for pre-
impact fear are increasingly being used as a mode of recovery in automobile accident
cases).
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(1) Inferring Pre-impact Fright From Circumstantial Evidence.-
Recognizing the evidentiary dilemma that direct evidence of the dece-
dent's fright is often taken to the grave, some courts have allowed the
jury to infer existence of pre-impact pain and suffering through the
use of circumstantial evidence. 2 For example, in Solomon v. Warren,
8 3
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Flor-
ida law, affirmed a district court's verdict awarding compensatory
damages to the decedents' families for pre-impact fright despite the
lack of direct evidence that the decedents' suffered emotional dis-
tress.8 4 In Solomon, which involved the disappearance of a small plane
over the Caribbean, the decedents' estates admitted into evidence the
transcript of a radio transmission stating that the plane was out of fuel
and the pilot planned to attempt to land the plane at sea and to wait
for a rescue.8 5 The court affirmed the reasonableness of the jury's
inference that the decedents knew of their impending doom, stating
that "[w] hile the evidence at trial was silent as to the exact length of
the time that the [decedents] were aware of the probability of their
impending deaths, nevertheless the inference is reasonable, almost
compelling, that they appreciated that possibility." 6
A similar inference was upheld by the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas in Green v. Hale.8 7 In Hale, the jury relied upon circumstantial
evidence to infer that a young boy suffered pre-impact fright immedi-
ately prior to his head being crushed by the tires of the defendant's
82. See, e.g., Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming that a
jury could infer from the circumstances that the decedents suffered mental anguish prior
to an airplane's crash); Hale, 590 S.W.2d at 237 (observing that "[ilt is well established that
the existence of conscious pain and suffering may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence, and further that such suffering may be inferred or presumed as a consequence of
severe injuries"); Reid, 637 So. 2d at 628-29 (holding that jury could have reasonably in-
ferred that decedent suffered emotional distress based on the presence of skid marks and
the fact that the car operated by the decedent careened across traffic before it collided
with a tractor trailer); Nelson, 434 N.W.2d at 32 (holding that the jury could infer that the
decedent apprehended and feared his impending death during the five seconds his motor-
cycle was dragged by the defendant's car after collision but before being fatally crushed by
the car). This approach has not been universally accepted. See 3 JEROME H. NATES ET AL.,
DAMAGES IN TORT ACrIONS § 21.02 [4] [b] (1999) (noting that "some opponents of the
award of damages for preimpact terror have based their opposition on the ground that the
proof of terror is circumstantial").
83. 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 792-93 (acknowledging that "the evidence at trial was silent as to the exact
length of time that the Levins were aware of the probability of their impending death," but
finding that "the inference is reasonable, almost compelling, that they appreciated the
possibility").
85. Id. at 782 & n.5.
86. Id. at 792.
87. 590 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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pickup truck.8 The thirteen-year-old decedent attempted to exit
from the rear of his employer's pickup to retrieve a co-worker's hat
that blew off and into the road. 9 While the decedent climbed down
from the tailgate of the truck, the defendant put the truck into reverse
and began to back up.9° As a result of the truck's unexpected sudden
movement, the decedent lost his balance and fell off, landing behind
the vehicle.91 The reversing wheels crushed the decedent's head, kill-
ing him.9 2
Responding to the defendant's argument that the jury's award for
pre-impact fright lacked support by sufficient factual evidence, the
Hale court stated that "the existence of conscious pain and suffering
may be established by circumstantial evidence, and further that such
suffering may be inferred or presumed as a consequence of severe
injuries."93 The court ruled that the testimony from other passengers
in the truck describing the decedent's body position and his attempt
to hold on to the truck's tailgate to prevent from falling, and the dece-
dent's intelligence supported an inference that "the inevitability of be-
ing crushed by the wheel of the truck must have become apparent to
him as he fell to the ground behind the truck."94
(2) Courts' Use of Evidence of the Decedent's Behavior Prior to Im-
pact to Infer Pre-impact Fight.--Owing to the fact that decedents do not
provide the jury with testimony of the tremendous fright they suffered
prior to impact, some courts use evidence of the decedent's behavior
prior to impact to provide a sufficient basis to support an inference of
fright.95 In Thomas v. State Farm Insurance Co.,96 the Court of Appeals
88. Id. at 237-38 ("Under the applicable law, the jury could draw a reasonable infer-
ence of terror and mental anguish which occupied the last moments of [decedent's] life
for their finding and award.").




93. Id. at 237 (noting that the applicable rule in Texas is that "[w]here serious bodily
injury has been inflicted, some degree of physical and mental suffering is the necessary
result; and in such cases the jury [is] authorized, without the direct proof of such suffering,
to consider the pain both of body and mind in assessing the amount of damages").
94. Id. at 238.
95. See Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1988) (using eyewit-
ness testimony that the decedent sailor clung to the hull of a capsized boat to infer that the
decedent had realized peril and had suffered mental anguish prior to his death); Monk v.
Dial, 441 S.E.2d 857, 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (using evidence that the driver made an
evasive maneuver immediately prior to the fatal impact to infer awareness of imminent
peril and the resultant fright); Thomas v. State Farm Ins. Co., 499 So. 2d 562, 567 (La. Ct.
App. 1986) (using testimony that the decedent passenger had gasped and grabbed the
driver's arm before fatal impact to set damage award for pre-impact fright). Some courts,
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of Louisiana upheld a pre-impact fright damages award based on testi-
mony describing the decedent's reaction immediately prior to the fa-
tal impact.9 7 In Thomas, the decedent was a passenger in a car
involved in a collision negligently caused by one of the co-defend-
ants. 98 The decedent's son, the driver of the car, testified that imme-
diately prior to impact, the decedent, upon hearing her son exclaim,
"Oh, no, mom!," looked up, grabbed her son's arm, and gasped.99
Some courts have gone so far as to allow inferences that the dece-
dent suffered pre-impact fright based solely on testimony from wit-
nesses to the accident resulting in the fatality. Georgia's intermediate
appellate court allowed recovery based on such an inference in Monk
v. Dial.1°° In that case, the court held that evidence that the decedent
driver unsuccessfully attempted an evasive maneuver before fatally col-
liding with a tractor-trailer supported an inference that the decedent
suffered pre-impact fright.101 Similarly, in Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 10 2
the Fifth Circuit determined that testimony that a human figure, pre-
sumably the decedent, clung to the hull of a capsized boat about an
hour after its initial impact with a drilling platform was sufficient to
support ajury's inference that the decedent suffered severe emotional
distress before drowning."0 3 In Snyder, two men set out on a shrimp-
ing expedition, during which their boat collided with a drilling plat-
form."0 4 Due to a manufacturing defect, the otherwise harmless
impact caused a gaping hole in the vessel.10 5 The boat capsized
however, have required direct evidence that the decedent was aware of impending doom
to recover for pre-impact fright. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Denny, 781 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Kan.
1989) (assuming arguendo that the state law allows a claim for pre-impact fright, but af-
firming the trial judge's directed verdict for the defendant motorist on the grounds that
evidence from tire marks left at the scene that showed that the plaintiff had attempted an
evasive maneuver to avoid the collision were insufficient to establish fright).
96. 499 So. 2d 562 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
97. See id. at 567 (affirming the jury verdict based on the testimony of the driver of the
car that the decedent was aware of the impending collision just before she died, but find-
ing that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a damages award of $15,000, and
hence, reducing the amount of the damages award for pre-impact fear to $7500).
98. See id. at 563.
99. Id. at 567.
100. 441 S.E.2d 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
101. See id. at 859 (noting that "from evidence that the decedent's vehicle veered shortly
before the collision, the jury could infer that decedent was aware of the impending
crash").
102. 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 1092-93 (concluding that the jury could reasonably infer that the decedent
experienced compensable emotional distress during his attempt to prevent himself from
drowning).
104. Id. at 1088.
105. See id. at 1088-89.
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shortly thereafter.1" 6 Testimony showed that about forty-five minutes
after the boat capsized, an occupant of the drilling platform saw the
last glimpse of one of the crewman clinging to the hull of the boat.10 7
In response to the defendant manufacturer's objection that the plain-
tiff did not present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find
pre-death fright, the court ruled that given the testimony, "the jury
could reasonably infer that [the decedents] struggled for several
hours in the water."
1 0 8
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Benyon v. Montgomery Cablevision
L.P., a four-to-three majority' of the Court of Appeals held, as a mat-
ter of first impression, that "in survival actions, where a decedent ex-
periences great fear and apprehension of imminent death before the
fatal physical impact, the decedent's estate may recover for such emo-
tional distress and mental anguish as are capable of objective determi-
nation."110 The court first conducted a lengthy examination of other
courts' decisions regarding the viability of recovery for pre-impact
fright in their respective jurisdictions.'11 In examining the persuasive
authority, the court concluded that "the cases upholding the recover-
ability of pre-impact fright as an element of damages are more persua-
sive and compatible with Maryland law."112
Next, the court discussed the establishment and the evolution of
emotional distress as a legally compensable element of damages in
Maryland, beginning with its decision in Green v. T.A. Shoemaker &
Co. 113 The court explained that
damages for mental distress no longer ha[ve] a "parasitic sta-
tus" and that recovery is not "dependent upon an immediate
physical injury accompanying an independently actionable
tort." Rather ... damages for mental and emotional distur-
bances are recoverable when there has been no physical im-
106. See id. at 1088.
107. See id. The Coast Guard was unable to rescue the crewmembers, and their bodies
were never found. See id.
108. Id. at 1092-93.
109. The majority was composed of the author of the opinion, Chief Judge Bell, as well
as Judges Eldridge, Rodowsky, and Cathell.
110. 351 Md. 460, 464, 718 A.2d 1161, 1163 (1998).
111. See id. at 476-97, 718 A.2d at 1169-79 (surveying pre-impact fright claims from juris-
dictions across the United States).
112. Id. at 497, 718 A.2d at 1179.
113. Id. at 497-509, 718 A.2d at 1179-85; see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the Green decision).
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pact and injury, provided that "the mental state for which
recovery is sought is capable of objective determination." ''"4
The court concluded that "damages for emotional distress or mental
anguish are recoverable in Maryland, provided that it is proximately
caused by the wrongful act of the defendant and it results in a physical
injury ... or is capable of objective determination. '115
The court then addressed the two rationales for denying recovery
advanced by the Court of Special Appeals.' 16 The Court of Special
Appeals had decided, first, that the decedent died instantly upon im-
pact and therefore did not suffer any physical injury capable of objec-
tive determination.' 17  Second, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that the decedent's fright did not result from, and there-
fore was not proximately caused by, his physical injuries as required
under Green.1
18
The Court of Appeals disagreed with both of the lower courts'
reasons for denying recovery.119 The court explained that the physi-
cal injury rule adopted in Green serves a dual purpose: to establish the
genuineness of the claim presented by requiring an objective manifes-
tation of the injury, and to serve as a means of measuring the victim's
emotional harm. 20 The decedent's fright in the present case, the
court concluded, was accompanied by both physical injury and an ob-
jective manifestation. 121 First, the Court of Appeals found that " It] he
physical injuries that accompanied the decedent's pre-impact fright
[were] the fatal injuries he sustained as a result of the feared impact-
the automobile accident.1 22 Second, the court noted that the dece-
dent's fright of his impending death was objectively determinable by
the seventy-one and one-half-feet of skid marks deposited by his van's
114. Benyon, 351 Md. at 503, 718 A.2d at 1182 (quoting Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found.,
Inc., 329 Md. 709, 733-34, 745, 621 A.2d 872, 884, 889 (1993) (internal citations omitted)).
115. Id. at 504-05, 718 A.2d at 1183 (internal citations omitted).
116. See id. at 506, 718 A.2d at 1184.
117. See Montgomery Cablevision, L.P. v. Benyon, 116 Md. App. 363, 388, 696 A.2d 491,
503 (1997) (concluding that the decedent died instantly upon impact). The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals explained that "obviously one who died instantly upon impact or... without
recovering consciousness following impact cannot have suffered any injury capable of ob-
jective determination as a result of'pre-impact fright,' i.e., fear terror or mental anguish or
distress from anticipation of imminent injury or death." Id.
118. Id. at 389, 696 A.2d at 503 (noting the lack of evidence capable of objective deter-
mination sufficient to prove causation).
119. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 506, 718 A.2d at 1184.
120. See id. at 506-07, 718 A.2d at 1184.
121. See id. at 507, 718 A.2d at 1184.
122. Id.
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tires and evidence that the decedent attempted to swerve to avoid the
impact.1
21
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the fact that the dece-
dent's fright preceded his bodily injuries did not affect causation. 124
The court declared that "[t]he wrongful conduct need only proxi-
mately cause the emotional distress or mental anguish, independent
of the physical injuries; the mental disturbance need not result from physical
injury. "12' As a result, the court concluded that "the automobile crash
caused the decedent's fatal injuries, for which a separate cause of ac-
tion exists, and that the [defendant] is responsible for the emotional
disturbance resulting from the crash." 12 6
Having rejected the Court of Special Appeals's interpretation of
the principles espoused in the "physical injury" rule cases (Green and
its progeny), the Court of Appeals supported its decision to reinstate
the jury's damage award by recalling that the underlying purpose of
the Maryland survivorship statute is to allow the decedent's estate to
maintain a cause of action the decedent could have pursued had he
or she lived. 27 The court concluded that because the decedent
would have been able to recover damages for his fright sustained prior
to impact had he survived the impact, that statutory purpose dictates
that his estate be able to recover these damages on his behalf.12
The three remaining judges filed two separate dissenting opin-
ions. 29 The first dissent, written by Judge Chasanow and joined by
Judge Raker, adopted the Court of Special Appeals's reasoning.1 °
The second dissent, authored by Judge Wilner, agreed with the major-
123. See id. The court noted that a jury reasonably could have inferred from that evi-
dence that the decedent was aware of the impending peril, that he was going to crash, and
that he attempted an evasive maneuver to avoid it. See id. at 508, 718 A.2d at 1185.
124. See id. at 507, 718 A.2d at 1184.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. The court's language is somewhat confusing. It appears to suggest that a defen-
dant is liable if his or her wrongful act causes fright. Of course, the wrongful act precedes
both the crash and the fright. It is confusing to say-as the court does-that fright results
from the crash because the crash occurs after the fright.
127. See id. at 508, 718 A.2d at 1185.
128. Id. The court explained:
A rule that does not permit a decedent's estate to recover pre-impact fright dam-
ages in a survival action would be illogical in view of the fact that a victim who
[survived a similar accident] would be entitled to recover damages for the emo-
tional distress he or she suffered before the accident, independent of any physical
injury that may have been sustained before, or after the emotional injury.
129. See id. at 509, 718 A.2d at 1185 (Chasanow, Raker, and Wilner, JJ., dissenting).
130. See id. (Chasanow and Raker, 1J., dissenting). Judges Chasanow and Raker's dissent
reads in its entirety: "We respectfully dissent for the reasons so well expressed by Judge
Bloom, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Montgomery Cablevision v. Benyon, 116
Md. App. 363, 368-389, 696 A.2d 491, 495-503 (1997)." Id.
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ity's recognition of an action for the recovery for pre-impact fright,
but disagreed solely on whether there was sufficient evidence with
which the jury could make a reasonable inference that the decedent
had suffered emotional distress. 13 '
Judge Wilner argued that the majority failed to recognize the
speculative and conjectural nature of the jury's inference that the de-
cedent suffered pre-impact fright.13 2 Judge Wilner considered the
facts of pre-impact fright cases from other jurisdictions examined by
the majority and found most of them to be distinguishable from
Benyon.13 3 Those cases, according to Wilner, "involved circumstances
where the decedents were obviously aware of an impending disaster
that they, themselves, could do nothing to avert," leaving the dece-
dent's mind to contemplate his or her impending death.' 34 Judge
Wilner argued that the Benyon-type cases differ because when "the per-
son either reacts instinctively or marshals his or her whole being in a
supreme effort to control the event, absent some evidence beyond merely
that effort, it is purely speculative to infer that the decedent was con-
sciously pondering the effects of an impending death.""' 5 Judge Wil-
ner concluded that the court's support of the jury's attenuated
inference, based upon speculative and conjectural evidence, violated
the principle that compensatory damages should be calculated with
reasonable certainty.'
36
131. See id. at 509-10, 718 A.2d at 1185-86 (Wilner, J., dissenting). Judge Wilner ex-
plained that "[i]f there was any substantial evidence that ... thoughts [such as anticipation
of imminent death, worry about the effect of his death on his family, etc.] were, in fact,
consuming Mr. Benyon during that second or two [before collision], I would agree that a
recovery would be permissible." Id. at 511, 718 A.2d at 1186.
132. See id. at 511, 718 A.2d at 1186 ("It is rank speculation to conclude that Mr. Benyon
was consciously thinking about anything other than stopping his vehicle, or, indeed, that
his mind and body were engaged in anything but an instinctive reaction directly entirely at
self-preservation, requiring little or no ideation at all.").
133. See id. at 510, 718 A.2d at 1186. The cases Judge Wilner distinguished include the
following: Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (claiming
pre-impact fright damages in plane crash); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.
1976) (same); Shu-Tao-Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (same); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (al-
lowing recovery for pre-impact fright in a train collision with a car). Benyon, 351 Md. at
511-12, 718 A.2d at 1186 (Wilner,J., dissenting).
134. Benyon, 351 Md. at 511, 718 A.2d at 1186 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 512, 718 A.2d at 1187.
136. See id. at 513, 718 A.2d at 1187 (stating that the majority's support of the jury's
inference violates the long-established principle that "if compensatory damages are to be
recovered, they must be proved with reasonable certainty, and may not be based on specu-
lation or conjecture" (citations omitted)).
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4. Analysis.--In Benyon, the Court of Appeals, as a matter of first
impression, allowed the recovery, in a survival action, for the mental
anguish that a decedent had suffered in apprehension of imminent
death. The court's adoption of pre-impact fright as a legally compen-
sable element of damages is a logical outgrowth of a line of "physical
injury" rule cases beginning with Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co.137 The
court's result, however, is weakened by its affirmation of the jury's in-
ference that the decedent suffered mental anguish from seventy-one
and one-half feet of skid marks and the testimony that the decedent
attempted to swerve in avoidance of the impact.138 As noted by Judge
Wilner in his dissent, the court's affirmation of the inference repre-
sents a deviation from the principle requiring compensatory damages
to be based on reasonable certainty, not on speculation or
conjecture. 139
a. Maryland Jurisprudence Regarding the Recoverability of Emo-
tional Damages and the Court's Adoption of Pre-impact Fright as a Legally
Compensable Element of Damages.-During this century, Maryland juris-
prudence regarding recoverability for emotional injuries has evolved
to allow recovery for objectively determinable emotional distress or
mental anguish without a contemporaneous physical impact. 140 The
court in Benyon recognized the jurisprudential evolution and crafted a
well-tailored holding that comports with the apparent requirements to
support recovery for purely psychological injury set forth in Green v.
T.A. Shoemaker and its progeny.141 These requirements preserve the
policy goal inherent in the Green line of cases: to provide courts with
reasonable assurance of the authenticity of the claims presented. 142
The Court of Appeals's holding in Benyon preserves these three
requirements for recovery of emotional injuries. The court held that
"in survival actions, where a decedent experiences great fear and ap-
137. 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); see also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text
(discussing the Green decision).
138. SeeBenyon, 351 Md. at 511, 718 A.2d at 1186 (Wilner,J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's inference that the decedent suffered emotional distress); see also supra notes 127-
132 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Wilner's arguments on this point).
139. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 512-13, 718 A.2d at 1187 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority's inference that the decedent suffered pre-impact fright was based on
speculative and conjectural evidence).
140. See discussion supra Part 2.c (tracing the evolution of Maryland law involving recov-
ery for emotional distress).
141. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (identifying and discussing three re-
quirements which need to be satisfied for recovery for emotional distress).
142. See Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., 329 Md. 709, 735, 621 A.2d 872, 885 (1992)
(noting that the requirement that harm suffered be capable of objective determination
"provides reasonable assurance that the claim is not spurious").
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prehension of imminent death before the fatal physical impact, the
decedent's estate may recover for such emotional distress and mental
anguish as are capable of objective determination." 4 ' The first re-
quirement-that emotional distress be "capable of objective determi-
nation"-constitutes the last part of this holding. The second
requirement-that emotional distress occur "during [a] legitimate
window of anxiety"-also appears in the language of the holding.
Benyon describes such a window by requiring that the "decedent ex-
perienc[e] great fear and apprehension of imminent death before the
fatal physical impact."' 44 This requirement is inherently satisfied by
all pre-impact fright cases because pre-impact fright cases only sup-
port one legitimate window of anxiety, the period between the point
in time that the decedent realizes his or her impending demise and
the moment of the fatal impact.145 The Benyon holding also embraces
the third requirement-that emotional injury be proximately caused
by tortious conduct of the defendant. The language "where a dece-
dent experiences great fear and apprehension of imminent death" implicitly
requires that the decedent is suffering great fear because of the realiza-
tion of imminent death.146 Under Green, emotional injury is proxi-
mately caused by tortious conduct if the emotional injury is a natural
and probable consequence of such conduct.'47 As the Benyon court
correctly realized, this determination is not affected by the fact that
the injury (fright) occurs before the fatal impact.148 Instead, as long
as the fright is a natural and probable consequence of the wrongful
conduct, the decedent can recover for the fright. 49
b. The Court Should Not Have Upheld the Jury's Inference that the
Decedent Suffered Mental Anguish. -Although the court's adoption of
pre-impact fright as a legally compensable element of damages com-
ports with Maryland jurisprudence, the court's application of the rule
143. Benyon, 351 Md. at 464, 718 A.2d at 1163.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. See id. at 507-08, 718 A.2d at 1185 (stating that the window of anxiety in this case
"opened when the decedent became conscious of the fact he was in imminent danger and
it closed with his death").
146. See id. (emphasis added).
147. See Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 78, 73 A. 688, 691 (1909) (requir-
ing that the emotional distress be directly related to the defendant's tortious conduct).
148. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 507, 718 A.2d at 1184 (stating that "[tihe fact that the fright
or mental anguish in this case preceded the crash that resulted in the decedent's fatal
bodily injury does not affect causation").
149. See id. ("The wrongful conduct need only proximately cause the emotional distress
or mental anguish, independent of the physical injuries; the mental disturbance need not
result from physical injury.").
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is problematic. In Benyon, the jury inferred that the decedent had suf-
fered pre-impact fright from evidence that his van veered to the right
and created seventy-one and one-half feet of skid marks before im-
pact.15 ° In affirming the jury's inference based upon this evidence,
the majority deviated from the principle that compensatory damages
"must be proved with reasonable certainty." 151
Only two of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals as allowing
recovery for pre-impact fright suffered during a time frame of just a
few moments did so without the aid of direct testimony of the dece-
dent's realization of her impending doom.15 2 These cases, therefore,
leave great doubt as to whether the decedent, in fact, suffered emo-
tional distress before the fatal impact.
While some courts use circumstantial evidence surrounding the
decedent's demise to infer pre-impact fright, they usually do so only
when the circumstantial evidence is substantiated by the testimony of
passengers in the same vehicle or, in some cases, substantiated by the
testimony from witnesses able to observe the decedent.15 The cir-
cumstantial evidence in Benyon, however, is primarily based upon evi-
dence of seventy-one and one-half feet of skid marks and that the
150. Id. at 465, 508-09, 718 A.2d at 1163, 1185.
151. SeeAsibem Assocs., Ltd. v. Rill, 264 Md. 272, 276, 286 A.2d 160, 162 (1972) (requir-
ing reasonable certainty in determining property values for compensation in contract ac-
tion); see also Maicobo Inv. Corp. v. Von Der Heide, 243 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D. Md. 1965)
(observing that "Maryland recognizes the general principle that damages must be reasona-
bly certain and may not be based on speculation or conjecture").
152. See Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Exp. Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D. Kan. 1986) (dece-
dent died instantaneously in an automobile accident); Monk v. Dial, 441 S.E. 857, 859 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994) (affirming reasonableness of the jury's inference based on evidence that
decedent's vehicle engaged in an evasive maneuver shortly before the collision). In his
dissent, Judge Wilner noted that neither of these cases were decided by a state supreme
court. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 510, 718 A.2d at 1186 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
153. See Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1988) (using eyewit-
ness testimony that the decedent sailor clung to the hull of a capsized boat for over an
hour to infer that the decedent had realized peril and had suffered mental anguish as a
result); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (using the final radio
transmission from the pilot indicating the pilot's intent to "ditch" the airplane at sea to
infer the decedents' realization of impending doom and suffering of mental anguish);
Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (affirming the trial court's
award of compensatory damages for the decedent's pre-impact fright in a car accident
where there was "no evidence [that the decedent] had sufficient time to physically react
with the vehicle," based on testimony that the decedent's son, a passenger in the car acci-
dent, screamed out while in the hospital and not fully cognizant, "Watch out, Mom! Watch
out, Mom!"); Thomas v. State Farm Ins. Co., 499 So. 2d 562, 567 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (using
passenger testimony that decedent gasped and grabbed the passenger's arm before the
fatal impact to support recovery for pre-impact fright); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 238-
39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (using testimony from passengers as to the decedent's body posi-
tion and his attempt to hold on to the truck's tailgate to prevent himself from falling to
support award of damages).
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decedent engaged in a slightly evasive maneuver, all of which took
about two seconds.15 4
The weight of the evidence in Benyon is easily distinguishable
from that found in the other cases allowing recovery for the dece-
dent's fright that occurred and lasted for no more than two-and-a-half
seconds prior to impact. In three of these cases, Chapple v. Ganger,
Green v. Hale, and Thomas v. State Farm Insurance Co., the circumstantial
evidence that the decedent suffered pre-impact fright included testi-
mony from co-passengers located extremely close to the decedent
before impact. 55 Most notably, in Thomas v. State Farm Insurance Co.,
the decedent's estate's claim for pre-impact fright was supported by
testimony from the decedent's son, the car's driver, of the decedent's
recognition and reaction to the impending danger.156 Similarly, in
Green v. Hale, the jury based its inference that the decedent recog-
nized the peril and as result suffered mental anguish based on testi-
mony from passengers located in the same compartment from which
the decedent slipped. 5 7 The proximity of the witnesses enabled them
to observe the decedent's body position and attempt to grasp the tail-
gate to prevent from falling beneath the bed of the truck prior to the
impact.158
Owing to the fact that the decedent in Benyon was the sole occu-
pant of his car, the jury did not hear testimony from co-passengers as
to the decedent's reaction to the peril or resultant mental state. In-
stead, the jury inferred his mental state based on seventy-one and-a-
half feet of skid marks and the van's slight swerve to the right.1 59 The
lack of definitive circumstantial evidence upon which to base a reason-
ably certain inference leaves the decedent's mental state open to spec-
ulative conclusions, and therefore, incapable of objective
determination. 6 ' The decedent possessed only a couple of seconds
154. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 511, 718 A.2d at 1186 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (stating that the
decedent's car skidded for "one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half seconds").
155. See supra note 153 (discussing evidence in these and other cases).
156. See Thomas, 499 So. 2d at 567. The son testified that "[the decedent] looked up and
saw the car coming, and she reached over and grabbed my arm, and she gasped, which is a
frequent thing that she did when she got frightened." Id.
157. See Hale, 590 S.W.2d at 238 (regarding testimony from four passengers in the vehi-
cle that the decedent grasped onto tailgate in an attempt to arrest his fall under the truck
prior to fatal impact).
158. See id.
159. See Benyon, 351 Md. at 508-09, 718 A.2d at 1185 (WilnerJ., dissenting) (noting that
the jury inferred that the decedent suffered pre-impact fright from "nothing more than
seventy-one-and-a-half feet of skid marks").
160. See id. at 511, 718 A.2d at 1186 (characterizing the inference, absent evidence be-
yond skid marks, that the decedent was "consumed with conscious fright" as "rank
speculation").
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to process thoughts to react and to avoid the collision.' 61 Given this
short time frame, it is also reasonable to suggest that the decedent did
not have enough time to process fearful thoughts and form the resul-
tant anguish. Moreover, his attempt to brake and swerve could have
been purely instinctive reactions without an emotional component. 162
Also, assuming the decedent did realize the impending impact, it is
also possible that he thoroughly concentrated on avoiding the colli-
sion thereby suppressing any emotional feeling.'63 Given the various
possibilities supported by the circumstantial evidence surrounding the
fatal impact in Benyon, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the
Court of Special Appeals's vacation of the award of compensatory
damages for the decedent's pre-impact fright.
5. Conclusion.-The court's decision in Benyon v. Montgomery
Cablevision, Ltd., recognizes pre-impact fright as a legally compensable
element of damages in survival actions. This recognition is a logical
outgrowth and preserves the policy goals of the "physical injury" rule
cases represented by Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., and its progeny by
protecting against feigned claims. The court's holding, however, is
tainted by its affirmation of this particular damages award calculated
by the jury's inferential decision making. The court's affirmation rep-
resents a troubling deviation from the principle that compensatory
damages must be proven with reasonable certainty and may not be
based on speculation or conjecture.
DANIEL J. GROMAN
161. See id.
162. See id. (arguing that there is a strong possibility that the decedent instinctively
made an evasive maneuver and was not contemplating imminent death).
163. See id. at 512, 718 A.2d at 1187 (discussing the possibility that the decedent had
marshal[ed] his.., whole being in a supreme effort to control the event... [rather than]
consciously pondering the effects of an impending death").
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B. An Overextension of Foreseeability Resulting in a Decision of
Economic Necessity
In Coates v. Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.,1 the Court
of Appeals considered whether a utility company had a duty, when
placing utility poles, to anticipate and to guard against injuries to pas-
sengers in a vehicle that deviated from the roadway.2 The passengers
suffered serious injuries when their car left the road under extraneous
circumstances and crashed into a utility pole that was located three
feet, three inches from a curve in the roadway.' The court ruled that
the utility company could not be held liable.4 In doing so, the court
determined that, while the risk of a deviation at a particular place in
the road may be foreseeable, the circumstances of this particular acci-
dent did not create a foreseeable duty to guard against the accident as
it occurred.5 The court reasoned that the utility had no duty to antici-
pate that a vehicle traveling in a posted thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone
would lose control, spin across the oncoming lane, and strike a pole
that was at least fourteen feet from the edge of the lane in which it
had been traveling.6 The court, however, overextended the foresee-
ability inquiry associated with the determination of a legal duty. The
court's decision would have been strengthened had it fully considered
economic policy factors and placed more weight on them. Because it
is not legal practice to make determinations solely based upon policy
considerations, the court could have reached its policy motivated deci-
sion by considering the other elements of a negligence cause of ac-
tion. While the court chose to rule solely based on the duty element,
it would have created a stronger decision had it considered breach of
duty and proximate cause as well.
1. The Case.--On August 19, 1991, George Thompson was driv-
ing his employer's Ford pick-up truck north on Olivers Shop Road in
Bryantown, Maryland.7 Thompson, Mary Ann Coates, and her preg-
nant, teenage daughter, Lavita Coates, were returning home from a
1. 354 Md. 499, 731 A.2d 931 (1999).
2. Id. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945.
3. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Coates v. Southern Md. Elec. Coop., Inc., 354 Md. 499,
731 A.2d 931 (1999) (No. 100).
4. Coates, 354 Md. at 525-26, 731 A.2d at 945.
5. Id. at 524-26, 731 A.2d at 944-45.
6. Id. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945.
7. Brief for Appellant at 3, Coates (No. 100). Olivers Shop Road, a rural county high-
way, is described as "hilly and twisty," with one lane in each direction. See Coates, 354 Md. at
504, 731 A.2d at 933. The road has a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. See id.
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party at a friend's house." It was a rainy night, and the road was wet.9
Thompson testified that the rear tires on the truck he was driving
were "kind of bald," and the back of the truck slid "a little bit" when
he applied the brakes.' 0 After successfully traversing a number of
turns, Thompson claims to have slowed to "between 25 and 30 miles
per hour" to negotiate a left hand turn. 1 Thompson claims that
"[w] hen he hit a 'dip' in the road, the truck began to slide, eventually
spinning out of control" in a counter-clockwise direction. 12 The truck
spun across both the center line and the southbound lane of Olivers
Shop Road, completely leaving the road and eventually colliding with
a utility pole located three feet, three inches off the southbound
lane. 3 The impact of the pole against the passenger side door caused
Mary Ann Coates to sustain serious injuries, of which she later died. 4
The pole also directly struck Lavita Coates, causing her permanent
physical and mental damage and the loss of her unborn child.'5
The pole had been installed by Southern Maryland Electric Co-
operative, Inc. (SMECO) in 1954 with the permission of the county.1 6
The utility was "to construct electric lines along, upon, or above the
streets and roads in Charles County provided that 'the same shall not
be so constructed as to incommode the public use of the said' streets
and roads."' 7 The original pole was made of wood. 8 After being
damaged in a previous automobile accident, however, the pole was
repaired and reinforced by cutting the pole at ground level, removing
the stump, replacing the stump with a concrete stub, inserting a metal
sleeve, and then resetting the pole in the metal sleeve.' SMECO did
not give any consideration to moving the pole from its original
location.2 °
Subsequent to the accident, Irene Coates brought suit in the Cir-
cuit Court for Prince George's County, individually as mother of the
deceased Mary Ann Coates and on behalf of her minor granddaugh-
8. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Coates (No. 100).
9. See Coates, 354 Md. at 504, 731 A.2d at 933.
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id.
13. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Coates (No. 100).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Coates, 354 Md. at 505, 731 A.2d at 933.
17. Id. at 505, 731 A.2d at 933-34.
18. See id., 731 A.2d at 934.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 505-06, 731 A.2d at 934.
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ters, Lavita Coates and her unborn child.21  The suit implicated
George Thompson for negligently driving the car2 2 and SMECO for
negligent placement of the utility pole.23 With regards to her sum-
mary judgment motion against SMECO, Coates produced deposition
testimony from two experts supporting her claim that SMECO was
negligent in erecting the pole at its current location and in leaving the
reinforced pole at the same spot.24 Dr. Paul Wright, a retired engi-
neering professor, expressed the opinion that the pole was "too close
to the road" and stated that it was "accepted orthodoxy" among high-
way engineering designers that placement of poles "that close to the
road especially in the vicinity of curves" was "not a very smart thing to
do."'25 He did not, however, have a "magic number" as to how far
away the pole should have been placed.2 6 Dr. Wright also made it
clear that his opinions did not speak to what was customary in the
electric utility practice, but only to accepted engineering practices as
to whether the road itself was safe. 2 7
Coates's second expert, John St. Clair, acknowledged that utilities
had no formal policies relating to pole placement, but explained that
the informal policy was to keep them off the shoulders.28 He also
stated that when poles are replaced after an accident they are usually
put back in the same place.29 He further expressed particular con-
cern about concrete-reinforced poles, explaining that there is an in-
creased likelihood of damage to vehicles and physical injury to
passengers if such poles are struck.3° St. Clair noted that the best and
safest place for a pole on a road with a left curve is on the inside of
that curve, as the pole in this case was situated.31
The circuit court entered summary judgment for SMECO, find-
ing that the utility owed no duty to the plaintiff.32 The court ex-
21. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Coates (No. 100).
22. See Coates, 354 Md. at 503 n.1, 731 A.2d at 933 n.1. The court granted Coates's
partial motion for summary judgment as to Thompson's liability even though the issue of
damages had not been resolved. Id. at 504, 721 A.2d at 933. The court determined that, as
a matter of law, Thompson was negligent in his driving of the automobile and that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Id.
23. See id. at 503, 731 A.2d at 933.
24. See id. at 506, 731 A.2d at 934.
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. See id. at 507, 731 A.2d at 935.
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plained that the duty of care owed by the utility when placing its poles
was not to interfere with the "proper use and reasonable use of the
highway by vehicles," and that this duty did not extend to situations in
which the driver of the vehicle was negligent.33 The court concluded
that it would be an impossible burden for a utility to anticipate and to
prepare for incidents arising from a driver's unreasonable and negli-
gent conduct. 4 Accepting appellate jurisdiction prior to argument
before the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted review to determine whether SMECO owed a duty to antici-
pate and to guard against vehicle deviations from the road when con-
structing utility poles. 5
2. Legal Background.-To state a cause of action in negligence, a
plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) that the defendant
was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) that the de-
fendant breached that duty; (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual in-
jury or loss; and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from
the defendant's breach of the duty.36 The plaintiff must establish the
existence of all four elements to be awarded monetary
compensation.37
At the time of Coates, the issue of whether a utility company owed
a duty of reasonable care in its placement of utility poles to people
injured in collisions with utility poles was not a new concern. As far
back as 1913, in the case of Earp v. Phelps,3s Maryland courts have ad-
dressed the issue of whether a utility company owes a duty of due care
to avoid placing its poles at locations that unreasonably endanger
those traveling on the roads. In Earp, the plaintiff passenger was
seated on the lazy board of a horse drawn wagon. 39 The lazy board
was located off of the rear, left wheel "and when drawn out to its full
length" it "extend[ed] about two and a half feet beyond the hub."4
The road on which the wagon was traveling was about 22-1/2 feet
wide.4' This distance was the measure between a telegraph pole on
one side of the road and a locust tree on the other.42 The road super-
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 507-08, 731 A.2d at 935.
35. Id at 503, 731 A.2d at 933.
36. See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994); See
also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
37. SeeW. PAGE KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
38. 120 Md. 282, 87 A. 806 (1913).
39. Id. at 286, 87 A. at 807.
40. Id. A lazy board acts as a seat for the person who applies the brakes. See id.
41. See id., 87 A. at 807.
42. See id., 87 A. at 807-08.
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visor testified that the road surface was worked and graded as wide as
possible, that the plow of the road machine sometimes ran against the
pole in the course of its work, and that people often drove "right up to
the pole."43 As the wagon moved through this part of the road, the
lazy board struck the pole and the plaintiff's leg was crushed."
In deciding whether the telephone company owed a duty to the
plaintiff, the court relied on Article 23, section 359 of the 1912 Mary-
land Annotated Code that provided that utility poles "shall not be so
constructed as to incommode injuriously the public use of' the
roads.45 This provision was interpreted as prohibiting the placement
of poles "so near the beaten track as to endanger the safety of the
travellers."46 In upholding a verdict for the plaintiff, the Court of Ap-
peals found that the road condition and the surrounding facts did not
make "the danger of collision with the pole too remote and improba-
ble to be reasonably anticipated by those who are responsible for its
location.""
Next, the Earp court considered whether the plaintiff should be
barred from recovery because he failed to show conclusively that both
he and the driver of the wagon were free of negligence.48 The court
found that the evidence set forth at trial did not conclusively establish
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.49 While the court
agreed that contributory negligence may bar recovery in a negligence
action, it concluded that such questions are left "for the jury to deter-
mine from all the circumstances of the particular case."'50 It also
noted that such decisions should not be disturbed by the appellate
courts unless the act was so "distinct, prominent, and decisive" that
ordinary minds could not differ in declaring it to be negligent.51 Fur-
ther, the court determined the question of the driver's negligence to
be inconsequential because the driver was not considered to be the
43. Id., 87 A. at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See id. at 286-87, 87 A. at 808.
45. See id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 359 (1912)). This statutory duty is now codified in MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 318 (1998).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 288-89, 87 A. at 809.
48. Id. at 289-90, 87 A. at 809.
49. Id. at 290, 87 A. at 809 ("[W]e are not willing to decide that [plaintiffs) conduct
... was so distinctly and decisively negligent to prevent his recovery.").
50. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roth v. Highways Comm'n, 115
Md. 469, 479, 80 A. 1031, 1035 (1911)). The court recognized that the question of contrib-
utory negligence had been duly submitted to the jury and negatively decided during the
trial. See id.
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roth, 115 Md. at 479, 80 A. at
1035).
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agent or servant of the plaintiff.5 2 Thus, the court found that the pas-
senger "was not bound by the driver's negligence even if it had been
established by the testimony.
'5 3
Thirty years later, in Parsons v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co.,5 4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland was faced with another case
involving allegation of liability due to the negligent placement of a
utility pole. In Parsons, the plaintiff was operating an automobile
which unexplainedly deviated from the traveled portion of a state
highway and immediately encountered an overgrown ditch.55 The ab-
rupt side of the ditch "forcibly guided [the] automobile" into the de-
fendant's pole.56 Both the plaintiff and his passenger filed suit.
57
While Earp recognized a duty not to incommode injuriously the
public use of roads,58 the Parsons court found that the ditch consti-
tuted the intervening, superseding cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.59
The court explained that because the ditch had "forcibly guided said
automobile into said pole," it would have made no difference whether
the utility had placed the pole further away from the roadside.6" The
court reasoned that where the negligence of the defendant was not
the sole cause of the injury complained of, "without the intervention
of any independent factor[s]," a plaintiffs claim is unactionable.61
Thus, the utility company could not be held liable.
A few years later, in East Coast Freight Lines v. Consolidated Gas
Co.,6 2 the Court of Appeals revisited the question of a utility's duty. In
this case, a tractor trailer was driving late at night on an unlit road that
became divided in the middle by a six-foot grass plot.6" Under con-
tract with the City of Baltimore, the defendant gas and electric com-
pany had constructed a line of electric light poles in the grass plot,
and both maintained and supplied the poles with electric current.
64
52. Id. at 293, 87 A. at 810.
53. Id.
54. 181 Md. 502, 30 A.2d 788 (1943).
55. Id. at 504-05, 30 A.2d 789.
56. Id. at 504, 30 A.2d at 789 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See id. at 503, 30 A.2d at 789.
58. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Earp court's recogni-
tion of such a duty).
59. Parsons, 181 Md. at 505, 30 A.2d at 790.
60. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149,
161, 200 A. 353, 358 (1938)). This finding is based on a failure to establish proximate
cause, one of the four elements required in a negligence claim. See supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text (setting forth the elements of a negligence claim).
62. 187 Md. 385, 50 A.2d 246 (1946).
63. See id. at 388, 50 A.2d at 247-48.
64. Id. at 391-92, 50 A.2d at 249.
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The light on the pole nearest the beginning of the grass plot was not
lit on the night in question.65 Unable to see the division, the tractor
drove into the curbing around the plot, struck the pole, spun over the
west-bound lane, and crashed into a tractor traveling in the opposite
direction.66
There was evidence that the pole had been struck a number of
times before and had been repaired by the electric company after
each incident.6 7 The plaintiff alleged that the pole was a dangerous
nuisance and that the utility was negligent in continuing to repair and
replace it.68 The court, following Earp, stated that "[a] n electric light
pole is not a nuisance by itself, although it may become one by reason
of its location."69 The court explained that a utility may be liable if
the pole is located improperly-in such a way as to endanger traffic.70
Nevertheless, the court denied any liability on the part of the utility,
finding that "where competent municipal or public authority has
fixed the location of obstructions, such obstructions are not of them-
selves nuisances and the contractor who places them in the designated
position is not responsible. 71
Following this rule, in East Coast Lines v. Mayor of Baltimore,72 the
Court of Appeals determined that Baltimore City could be held liable
for the injuries to the same plaintiff.73 In an extended complaint, the
plaintiff attacked the municipal authority that had ordered the con-
struction of the poles, claiming the city was negligent in its creation of
a dangerous obstruction and its failure to post adequate warnings of
this danger.7 ' The court concluded that the city "was under a legal
duty to anticipate the occurrence of such weather conditions as ex-
isted at the time of the accident" and therefore should have "placed
65. See id. at 388, 50 A.2d at 248.
66. See id. at 388-89, 50 A.2d at 248.
67. See id. at 392, 50 A.2d at 249.
68. See id. at 393, 50 A.2d at 250.
69. Id. at 397-98, 50 A.2d at 252.
70. Id. at 398, 50 A.2d at 252.
71. Id.; see also Green v. Mayor of Baltimore, 181 Md. 372, 30 A.2d 261 (1943). Green
involved an accident where an automobile collided with a pylon in the middle of the street
that was erected by a railway company under the city's direction to create a "safety zone."
Id. at 376, 30 A.2d at 262. The court explained:
[The pylons] are obstructions in the streets, intentionally erected by the city ...
but their purpose is to promote, not hinder, the public safety. If we were to yield
to the plaintiffs contention it would be to declare these safety zones, protected by
pylons to be nuisances per se, but we are unwilling to do this.
Id.
72. 190 Md. 256, 58 A.2d 290 (1948).
73. Id. at 279, 58 A.2d at 301.
74. See id. at 270, 58 A.2d at 297.
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such warning devices, which under storm conditions, would have per-
mitted a traveler approaching the grass plot to have discovered its lo-
cation in time to avoid colliding with it."75
Sixteen years later, in 1964, the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
published. Section 368 is entitled, "Conditions Dangerous to Trav-
elers on Adjacent Highway[s]."76 This section states that a landowner
is subject to liability for injury caused by conditions on his property
when the persons injured by such condition are traveling on the high-
way or reasonably deviate from it. 77 To clarify the position of this rule,
comments were published for guidance purposes. Comment h states
that "the essential question is whether [the pole] is so placed that trav-
elers may be expected to come in contact with it in the course of a
deviation reasonably to be anticipated in the ordinary course of
travel."' 78 Comment e states that "[t]he public right to use the high-
way carries with it the right to protection by reasonable care against
harm suffered in the course of deviations which may be regarded as
the normal incidents of travel. ' 7' Finally, comment i states that "[t] he
possessor's obligation is only one of reasonable care in the light of the
risk; and he is not liable... where he has taken all reasonable precau-
tions."8 ° While this is the most current version of the Restatement, and,
as such, holds weight, many feel it is lacking in clarity and revision is
needed in light of modern changes to tort law.
8
'
75. Id. at 279, 58 A.2d at 301. This holding was strengthened by the fact that the lamp
post was painted green, and situated in a green grass plot surrounded by a curb that could
not be seen given its color and its surroundings. See id. at 278, 58 A.2d at 300-01. These
conditions were found by the court to constitute a threat to the safety of the traveling
public. Id. at 278-79, 58 A.2d at 301.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368 (1964).
77. The Restatement provides:
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation or
other artificial condition so near an existing highway that he realizes or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally brought into
contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the high-
way, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who (a) are
traveling on the highway, or (b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course
of travel.
Id.
78. Id. § 368 cmt. h.
79. Id. § 368 cmt. e.
80. Id. § 368 cmt. i.
81. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 17
(5th ed. 1984); see also Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consoli-
dation of Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Liability Limiting Use of
Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1503, 1513-15 (1997).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Coates v. Southern Maryland Electric
Cooperative, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that SMECO had no duty,
in installing utility poles, to anticipate and to guard against the plain-
tiffs deviation from the traveled portion of the road. 2 Judge Wilner,
writing for the majority, began his analysis by considering the current
state of Maryland law with regard to a negligence cause of action.83
Judge Wilner noted that, to bring a negligence cause of action, the
plaintiff must first show that the defendant was under a duty to pro-
tect the plaintiff from injury, and that, in determining the existence of
duty, the court has applied a "foreseeability of harm" test.8 4 The court
noted that this test was based on the "recognition that duty must be
limited to avoid liability for unreasonably remote consequences. "85
Judge Wilner also noted that an assignment of duty requires a rela-
tionship between the parties, even though this need not be a direct
relationship when the action in question creates a risk of personal
injury 8 6
The majority recognized that, ultimately, a determination of duty
assignment is made by weighing various policy considerations and
reaching a conclusion that the plaintiffs protection necessitates a
higher standard of conduct upon the defendant. 87 While the majority
refused to provide a set formula for making this determination, it
looked to a number of factors including "convenience of administra-
tion, capacity of the parties to bear the loss, a policy of preventing
future injuries, . . . the moral blame attached to the wrongdoer,"88
and "the extent of the burden to the defendant ... [,] consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insur-
ance for the risk involved."89
82. Coates, 354 Md. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945.
83. Id. at 509-14, 731 A.2d at 936-39.
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A.,
335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994)). This test assigns duty when the action in
question taken together with outside circumstances carries a recognizable probability of
harm. See id. (citing Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 551, 727 A.2d 947, 950
(1999)).
85. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642
A.2d at 189).
86. Id. (citing Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 535, 515 A.2d 756, 760
(1986)).
87. Id. (citing Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189).
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 81,
§ 53).
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
Calif., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (1976)).
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Keeping these factors in mind, the majority looked to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 368.90 The majority focused on clause
(b) and recognized the language's possibility for expanding liability
beyond its practical interpretation.9 1 Judge Wilner affirmed the as-
signment of duty as a question of foreseeability. He looked to com-
ment h of section 368 for further clarification. The majority noted
that while comment h recognizes the obvious relevance of the dis-
tance between the condition and the roadway, that distance is impor-
tant "only as it affects the recognizable risk."9 2 The court further
recognized comment h and its implication that other factors, "such as
the nature of the condition itself, its accessibility, and the extent and
character of the use of the highway, must be taken into account."9 "
The court also looked to comment e for guidance.9 4 The majority
recognized comment e as an indication of the policy intent to make
foreseeability the cornerstone in the assignment of duty.9 5
After an extensive discussion of the law in Maryland and other
jurisdictions with respect to the liability of utility companies arising
from the placement of utility poles,9 6 the court turned its attention to
the case at hand.9 7 The court began this discussion by admitting that
the documented number of collisions between automobiles and road-
side poles made it impossible to claim that off-road collisions are not
generally foreseeable.9" The majority recognized numerous reasons
why a vehicle might leave a road under "normal incidents of travel,"
even when some of those reasons would not constitute proper use of
the highway or traveling "with reasonable care."9 9
Nevertheless, the majority found that, in determining liability,
the decisive consideration was not whether it was foreseeable that some
pole would be struck, but whether it was foreseeable that a particular
pole would be struck. 0° Because "most poles ... [probably] exist for
years ... without incident," and "most people are able to navigate...
without running into a pole," the court concluded that although devi-
ations occur with some frequency and are therefore to be generally
90. Id. at 517, 731 A.2d at 940 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368); see supra
note 77 and accompanying text.
91. Coates, 354 Md. at 517, 731 A.2d at 940.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
95. Coates, 354 Md. at 517, 731 A.2d at 940.
96. See id. at 510-22, 732 A.2d at 936-43.
97. Id. at 522, 732 A.2d at 943.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 523, 731 A.2d at 943 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id., 731 A.2d at 943-44.
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anticipated, a collision with a particular pole is not per se foreseeable
"merely by virtue of its proximity to the traveled portion of a road."'' 1
Instead, the court asserted that the foreseeability of collision with a
particular pole would be "based on the condition and topography of
the road, the proximity of the pole to the traveled portion of the road,
other site conditions, and experience."102 According to the majority,
of these factors, "experience" would usually be the best guide in deter-
mining foreseeability. °3 The court noted that experience, absent sig-
nificant changes to the road or site, could "amalgamate" many of the
other relevant factors.10 4 Judge Wilner opined that "[i]f a pole has
existed at a relatively unchanged site for any significant length of time
without serious problem, there may be little reason to anticipate a fu-
ture collision, for it suggests that motorists are able to navigate that
part of the road without incident."' '
Next, the court briefly addressed a few public policy considera-
tions.10° The court noted first, that "the same general principle that
applies to utility poles" might also apply to other items that are placed
along public roadways, including signs, railings, and landscaping left
by adjacent property owners.'0 7 The majority also expressed its inten-
tion not to establish a law which would provide absolute immunity for
utility owners, negating the incentives for utilities to use due care in
their placement of poles.1 08 Nevertheless, the majority declined to
"create the prospect of a damage award every time someone ran off
the road and struck a pole," reasoning that allowing juries to decide
liability in these situations would likely result (1) in an increase in cost
and decrease in the availability of liability insurance, and (2) would
force utilities to move hundreds, if not thousands, of poles at enor-
mous cost and inconvenience. 0 9




105. Id. Apparently, the majority did not find it "important" that the particular pole at
issue in the case had been struck one time about ten years before the accident in question.
Id. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945 (stating that the record contained no information as to the
nature of the previous collision and whether it was "a freakish event not likely to be
repeated").
106. Id. at 523-24, 731 A.2d at 944 (pointing to such factors as "convenience of adminis-
tration, the extent of the burden on the utility and its capacity to bear that burden, the
benefit or detriment to the community, the desire to prevent future injuries, and any
moral blame associated with the placement of the pole").
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For these reasons, the majority found SMECO had no duty to
anticipate and guard against the type of deviation which occurred in
the case before it, i.e., "that a vehicle traveling in a posted 35 mile per
hour zone would go so out of control as to spin across the oncoming
lane and strike a pole that was at least 14 feet from the edge of the
lane in which the vehicle was traveling."1 1 ° The court further ex-
plained that the question of Thompson's negligence had no impact
on the determination of whether a duty existed; the only considera-
tion was whether SMECO had a duty to anticipate such a deviation as
occurred here.1"1
In a concurring opinion, Judge Cathell accused the majority of
not going far enough in its limitation of utility liability." 2 He found
the majority's "reliance on foreseeability" as too expansive a standard
for determining liability, reasoning that such a reliance would open
the possibility that owners of property abutting public roads would be
held to a "duty to make sure there are no obstacles on the owner's
property for the uninvited motorist to strike."'1 13 Instead, Judge
Cathell argued that the better result would be to hold that "there is no
duty on the part of a property owner to provide a safe place on his or
her property for motorists, and their passengers, to have accidents." 1 4
According to Cathell, to find otherwise would create an unacceptable
burden upon landowners to remove potentially dangerous obstacles
such as trees, ponds, rocks, and even animals." 5 He concluded that
so long as the property owner's activities do not encroach upon the
traveled portion of the roadway, the court should find no duty for
landowners to do anything on their property to lessen the damage to
passengers injured by the actions and/or negligence of themselves or
others." 6
4. Analysis.--First and foremost, the result of the Coates decision
was consistent with the Court of Appeals's past decisions in previous
tort actions of this nature." 7 Although the court's holding resulted in
110. Id. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945.
111. Id.
112. Id. (Cathell, J., concurring). Judge Eldridge joined in the concurrence. Id.
113. Id. at 527, 731 A.2d at 946.
114. Id. at 528, 731 A.2d at 94. Judge Cathell also asserted that "without duty, there is
no liability, regardless of whether a result is foreseeable or a party has the power to influ-
ence that result." Id. at 530, 731 A.2d at 947.
115. See id. at 527, 731 A.2d at 946.
116. Id. at 530, 731 A.2d at 947.
117. See Parsons v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Baltimore City, 181 Md. 502, 506,
30 A.2d 788, 790 (1943) (denying liability on the grounds that the position of the pole was
not the proximate cause of the accident, but that it was the condition of the ditch and road
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the appropriate outcome, the court's reasoning was incomplete. In
reaching its decision, the court should have considered public policy
factors to a greater degree than it did in its denial of SMECO's liabil-
ity. Moreover, a decision addressing lack of a breach or lack of causa-
tion would have been more compelling than the court's
determination that SMECO owed no duty because a collision with this
particular pole was unforeseeable.
a. The Court's Determination on Duty.-In determining what
case law to follow, the Coates court had three elements of appellant's
negligence claim to review.11 The Coates court chose to focus its rea-
soning on the question of duty. As discussed above, the court found
that SMECO owed no duty and therefore was not liable for the plain-
tiffs injuries." 9 The court's reasoning, however, is misguided. The
majority's discussion of foreseeability relies too heavily on issues of
breach and causation in its duty determination. Although this overex-
tension of foreseeability has been replicated in other tort analyses,1 20
it is this overextension and the court's decision to ignore relational
and public policy issues that weakens the standing of the court's
conclusion.
Doctrinally, duty is identified as the first element of a prima facie
case of negligence and is distinguished from the second element,
breach.1 21 The existence of duty is a prerequisite to negligence liabil-
ity, and is the foremost question to be answered, as a matter of law.122
The duty question in negligence cases is whether the defendant owed
a legally cognizable duty to the plaintiff to use a particular level of
care, under a particular set of circumstances, to avoid the injury plain-
side); Green v. Mayor and City Council, 181 Md. 372, 376, 30 A.2d 261, 262-63 (1943)
(denying guest in automobile recovery because the proximate cause of the accident was
not the negligence of the defendant but that of another party); Mayor of Cumberland v.
Turney, 177 Md. 297, 320, 9 A.2d 561, 571 (1939) (determining that plaintiffs failure to
use ordinary care while traversing a road was the proximate cause of the accident); Earp v.
Phelps, 120 Md. 282, 287-89, 87 A. 806, 808-09 (1913) (holding owner of telephone pole
liable for plaintiff's injuries because the position of the pole was so close to the road that it
required a reasonable anticipation of a collision).
118. Coates, 354 Md. at 528-29, 731 A.2d at 94748.
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
120. Prosser has pointed out that duty has been frequently dealt with in terms of proxi-
mate cause. It has been this treatment which has resulted in confusion over the appropri-
ate duty considerations. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 53, at 358.
121. See PROSSER, supra note 36, § 30, at 143.
122. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
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tiff suffered. 123 This duty is often described as conducting one's self
under the restraints of reasonable (due) care. t24
The determination of whether a duty is owed by one person to
another requires the consideration of three factors: (1) the relation-
ship between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to
the injured party, and (3) public policy concerns. 125 Thus, duty is
measured by the scope of the risk that the defendant's conduct
foreseeably entails to the injured party.126
When making its duty determination, the Coates court relied al-
most exclusively upon the foreseeability prong. In its consideration,
the court overexpanded the breadth of the foreseeability inquiry in-
tended for duty determinations. This expansion moved the court's
discussion from the duty element to the type of foreseeability relied
upon in determining proximate cause.
It is undisputed that a utility company owes the public a duty
when choosing where to place its utility poles. This duty requires utili-
ties to construct lines and necessary fixtures that do not "incommode
injuriously the public use" of the roads or highways. 127 The court's
conclusion that SMECO's pole placement did not "incommode" the
public use of the road was logical given the amount of traffic travers-
ing the road without incident. 128
The plain language of the Maryland statute, however, limits this
duty to individuals traveling on the roadway. Because the injury in
question occurred off the roadway, the court was forced to consider
whether SMECO owed the public a duty to anticipate and to guard
against the type of road deviations leading to the injuries here. 129 The
court, utilizing the "foreseeability of harm" test, determined that
SMECO had no duty to anticipate and guard against the deviation
123. See PROSSER, supra note 36, § 30, at 324; see also Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,
306 Md. 617, 626-27, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986).
124. See PROSSER, supra note 36, § 32, at 149-51. The theory of negligence presupposes
this uniform standard of behavior. This standard of reasonable care holds individuals to
act as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would under the same set of circumstances.
Id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 31, 169 (stating that due care is the almost
universally used phrase to describe what is not negligent).
125. See Bush v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 685 N.E.2d 174, 179 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997). Relationship and foreseeability are discussed infra notes 134-138 and accompanying
text.
126. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 18.2, at 655 (2d ed.
1986).
127. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 318 (1998); see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
128. Coates, 354 Md. at 524-525, 731 A.2d at 944.
129. Id. at 522, 731 A.2d at 943. This anticipation and protection from injuries would
require placement of the utility pole in a reasonably safe place.
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because a collision with the specific pole involved in the accident was
unforeseeable.'
30
The court came to this conclusion despite the fact that it recog-
nized off-road collisions between vehicles and utility poles as "gener-
ally foreseeable.' 31  This general foreseeability should have been
enough to trigger a duty between SMECO and individuals in vehicles
deviating from the road.
1 3 2
In the landmark decision Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co.,1 3 3 Judge
Cardozo established the use of foreseeability when making duty deter-
minations. While reasonable foreseeability figures prominently in Pal-
sgraf it does so only as part of a relational conception of duty."'
In actuality, Palsgraf dealt with two duty issues. The first was
whether the railroad owed a duty of care to its customer, Mrs. Palsgraf.
It is obvious that the railroad did, and thus, there was no need for any
discussion of reasonable foreseeability on this point. Instead, Judge
Cardozo used foreseeability to establish the outer boundary on the
level of precaution the railroad was required to provide.1 3 5 Because
the harm that Mrs. Palsgraf suffered was unforeseeable to the conduc-
tor who pushed the package-carrying passenger, the court was re-
quired by law to conclude that the duty owed to Mrs. Palsgraf was not
breached. 1 6 This conclusion led to the question of whether Mrs. Pal-
sgraf should be permitted to borrow the railroad's negligence towards
another, because it was already presumed to have breached its duty of
reasonable care with respect to the package-carrying passenger."3 7
Judge Cardozo denied liability, finding that the duty alleged to have
been breached by the defendant must be relational to the plaintiff.' 38
Using the Palsgraf reasoning in the present case, it would appear
that a duty was owed by SMECO. The possibility of a vehicle deviating
130. Id. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945; see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
132. This duty would have required SMECO to use reasonable care when placing its
poles so as to avoid injury to people in vehicles deviating from the road.
133. 248 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
134. Id. at 99-100. Judge Cardozo stated: "The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a
wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the
plaintiff, standing far away. Relative to her it was not negligence at all." Id.
135. Id. (reasoning that to ask defendants to take measures against unforeseeable harms
is to demand of them "extravagant" care, rather than ordinary, reasonable care).
136. The court noted: "If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an
act innocent and harmless, al least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did not take
to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong . . .with reference to
someone else." Id. at 99.
137. Id. at 100.
138. Id. ("What the plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to herself; i.e., a violation of her
own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else ....").
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from the road and colliding with the utility pole, by the court's own
admission, was foreseeable. In contrast to Palsgraf SMECO's place-
ment of a utility pole along a roadway could foreseeably result in in-
jury to those deviating from that roadway. This foreseeability is
directly relational to the plaintiff. Therefore, SMECO had a duty to
use reasonable care in its placement of the pole so as not to make
deviations unreasonably dangerous. Unless the court is willing to
make all persons who deviate from the road outside the scope of the
pole placement relational duty,"5 9 foreseeability should have required
the court to find a duty owed by the defendant.
The court's discussion, however, went outside of the "duty fore-
seeability" established in Palsgraf The court reasoned that SMECO
could not be held liable because, given the condition and topography
of the road, the proximity of the pole to the traveled portion of the
road, experience, and other site conditions, the collision with this par-
ticular pole was unforeseeable. 40 While all of these factors make the
probability of a deviation more or less likely, these considerations are
better left to the breach element of negligence analysis.' 41 In as-
signing duty, foreseeability is not to be measured in terms of what is
more probable or not, but "includes whatever is likely enough in the
setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful person would take
account of it in guiding practical conduct." '4 2 Given the nature of
travel today and the number of documented off-road collisions, the
139. This type of holding would create absolute immunity for utilities in pole place-
ment, unless the pole was situated in a manner making normal road travel impossible.
Such a holding appears to be in opposition with sound public policy principals. Limiting
duty to individuals who remain on the road would negate all incentives for utility compa-
nies to place their poles in reasonably safe places. The court recognized the potential
danger of eliminating this duty when it said, "[w] e do not wish, or intend, to establish a law
that provides an absolute immunity for utility companies and gives them no incentive to
use due care in the placement of their poles." Coates, 354 Md. at 524, 731 A.2d at 944.
Moreover, there are instances where a driver, using the road in a reasonable manner, con-
sistent with the intended use of the road, may be forced to leave the roadway. If a pole
were placed in such a position that it was the proximate cause of injuries to that driver
forced to deviate under foreseeable circumstances, it seems unreasonable that compensa-
tion should be barred. See McMillan v. Michigan State Highway Comm'n, 393 N.W.2d 332,
339-40 (Mich. 1986) (reasoning that pole placement outside the traveled portion of a high-
way carries an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of vehicles which leave that
highway); see also supra notes 78, 79, and 122 and accompanying text and infra note 147.
140. Coates, 354 Md. at 525, 731 A.2d at 944-45.
141. See infra discussion part 4.c; see also Bush v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 685
N.E.2d 174, 179 (1997) ("When analyzing foreseeability in the context of duty we must
focus on the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the
actual occurrence.").
142. HARPER ET AL., supra note 126, § 18.2, at 658-59 & n.9.
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foreseeability of a deviation along a road should be accounted for. 143
Moreover, a duty may be imposed on a defendant even if a victim's
own conduct brings him within the range of a danger, so long as that
conduct is foreseeable.' 44
b. Public Policy as the Ultimate Consideration. -While the rela-
tional and foreseeability prongs of the duty inquiry favor imposition of
a duty, the court could have justified its finding of no duty by placing
more weight on public policy considerations. The Court of Appeals
has often addressed public policy factors when making tort liability
decisions.14 These policy considerations are important and should
be weighed when reaching conclusions as to whether the plaintiff's
interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
defendant.146 Because duty is a legal conclusion, the court would
have been free to direct attention to the policy issues, in order to de-
termine the extent of the original obligation and its continuance.147
143. The court recognized that there is a level of risk that a vehicle will deviate from the
road. Coates, 354 Md. at 522, 731 A.2d at 943. Greater road congestion, more prevalent
roads, and faster vehicles have all added to increased documentation of collisions between
vehicles and roadside poles. Vehicle malfunction, tire blow-outs, brake failure, loss of con-
trol, carelessness, drowsiness, or intoxication have become almost commonplace in the
course of "normal travel." Id. at 522-23, 731 A.2d at 944. As reasonable incidents of nor-
mal travel, such deviations appear to fall within the explanations of comments (e) and (h)
of the Restatement. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
144. HARPER ET AL., supra note 126, § 18.2, at 659.
145. See e.g., Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083
(1986); Coates, 354 Md. At 509, 731 A.2d at 936 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A.
335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1993)); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 54, at
359. These factors include, but are not limited to, the foreseeability of harm, the nexus
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the policy of preventing future
harm, the capacity of the parties to bear the loss, the moral blame attached to the wrong-
doer, the extent of the burden to the defendant, the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty with resulting liability, and the cost and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved. Id.
146. See Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189. It is important to note that the
purpose of tort liability is not to compensate any injured party, returning them back to
their original state. It is to compensate an innocent party who should not be expected to
bear the burden of a particular injury caused by the negligent action of a separate party.
See generally PROSSER, supra note 36, §§ 1,2, at 1-7.
147. See McMillan v. Michigan State Highway Comm'n, 393 N.W.2d 332, 334, 340 (Mich.
1986) (discussing the relationship between duty and proximate cause, and ultimately find-
ing defendant utility owed a duty of reasonable care in positioning and maintaining its
utility poles because no policy justification for insulating utilities from liability could be
found).
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When looking at the policy considerations, it is easy to see why
the court wanted to use duty as a limitation on liability.148 Had the
court determined that SMECO had a duty to protect against the acci-
dent and, in turn, was liable for the plaintiffs injuries, regardless of
the extraordinary factors surrounding the accident, the court would
have created a presumption of negligence against utility companies
whenever a vehicle crashed into a utility pole. Utility companies
would be unable to avoid liability if there was an accident with a pole,
regardless of where the pole had been placed. 149
The foreseeability test was created and utilized because the courts
recognized the necessity to limit duty to avoid the imposition of liabil-
ity for "unreasonably remote consequences."15 ° If utilities had a duty
of reasonable care in their pole placement and liability was deter-
mined on whether or not a crash occurred, there would be no limita-
tion of duty.
It is under this umbrella of absolute duty from which the appel-
lant asked for compensation.15 ' Appellant argued that the level of
care used in SMECO's pole placement was the only determinant af-
fecting risk.152 This would mean that victims' actions play no role in
the risk analysis because, presumably, the victims could not have done
anything to prevent the harm.1 53 Appellant asks for compensation de-
148. The court expressed its reluctance to impose a duty and, thus, make liability in
every accident a question for the jury. Coates, 354 Md. at 523, 731 A.2d at 944; see also supra
note 114.
149. This is necessarily true because all accidents today have a degree of foreseeability.
If this general foreseeability created a duty to use reasonable care in the placement of
utility poles so as to guard against the foreseeable injury associated with off-road deviations,
a crash would create a presumption of duty breach. This presumption would not be rebut-
table if the extraneous circumstances of the crash were made irrelevant (or ignored during
deliberations). Because it would be impossible to erect poles which would be crash
friendly, the policy would imply a breach of this duty whenever an accident occurs. The
burden to prove causation would lie with the plaintiff in order to complete the negligence
claim.
150. Coates, 354 Md. at 509, 731 A.2d at 936; see also Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at
189 (explaining that a defendant causing injury to plaintiff can not be liable under negli-
gence if defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff to avoid said injury).
151. Essentially, the appellant is arguing that the utility failed to protect against a risk
that it was required to anticipate, and therefore it should be held liable. This failure was
placement of a utility pole in an unreasonable place. The placement is assumed to be
unreasonable because the victims' vehicle collided with the pole.
152. Coates, 354 Md. at 508, 731 A.2d at 935; see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF ACCIDENT LAW 6-7 (1987) (explaining that in some accidents, only the injurer's behav-
ior affects the risk of said accident. In these cases, the accidents are seen as unilateral, in
that the victim's activities play no role in creating the harm, not could they have done
much to prevent the harm.).
153. The question as to whether the driver's contributory negligence may be imputed
onto the victims was passed on by the court and will therefore be considered a moot topic.
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spite the fact that this was an unusual accident caused by reckless driv-
ing and not by the placement of the utility pole.'54 To affirm this
request would create a ruling akin to strict liability.1 55
Finding liability for utility companies in spite of an accident's sur-
rounding circumstances would negate all incentive for utility compa-
nies to plan and place poles in the safest location possible. 156
Economic interests would lead utilities to place poles in whatever loca-
tions offered cheapest installment, easiest access, and greatest service-
ability. These locations might sometimes be safe or at substantial
distance from roads, but such occurrences would be purely coinciden-
tal. This result can not be reconciled with the court's policy of
preventing future harm. 57
Moreover, creation of utility liability for all vehicle/pole collisions
would drive the cost of utilities' liability insurance up astronomi-
cally.158 This cost, in turn, would be passed along to everyday consum-
ers who would face exponential price increases.'5 9 This is a relatively
frightening thought considering society's dependence upon the mass
154. See infra discussion part 4.d.
155. An affirmation of liability would hold the utility liable for all injuries caused in the
crash regardless of the degree of care exercised in the placement of the pole. See supra
notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
156. See MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT
REFORM 39 (1995) (discussing how strict liability fails to take cost-benefit determinations
into account and therefore results in suboptimal allocation of resources with respect to
safety issues). This is especially true if any defense based on the victim's negligence is
eliminated, because, under such a regime, any incentive for the consumer of a product or
service to engage in safe conduct is virtually eliminated. The producer of that product or
service would bear the cost of accidents under all circumstances. Id.
157. See generally PROSSER, supra note 36, § 1, at 1-6.
158. See LIABILITY- PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 5 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Crawfford
eds., 1988) (discussing the unprecedented growth of personal injury lawsuits and this
trend's detrimental effect on the stability of liability insurance premiums and availability in
general). Insurers must forecast future losses when setting premiums. Id. Over-insurance
for high-risk candidates will make product prices too high. Id. The majority briefly recog-
nized this point, stating that allowing juries to decide liability would likely "remove availa-
bility of affordable liability insurance for utilities. ... ." Coates, 354 Md. at 524, 731 A.2d at
944.
159. See LIABILITY. PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, supra note 158, at 5. Product price has
three components: cost of production (including cost of prevention), a premium for de-
sired insurance, and a premium for undesired insurance payout. Faced with paying out
this extra insurance, producers increase their prices beyond their efficient level to com-
pensate for the increase in operating costs. This sets the stage for a natural dichotomy of
interests. Id.; see TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 17 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). Con-
sumer interest that products and services be safe, and an interest that they be cheap seem
to co-exist in constant tension. For the safer the product, the more the production cost,
and the more the production cost, the greater the sale price. Id.
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availability of utility services."' Many areas are provided with gas and
electric by only one company.16 t The average consumer would be
faced with either paying the price increase of these virtual monopolies
or foregoing the benefits of modern technology.
Some might argue that a possible solution to this absolute liability
regime would be to carve out a liability exception for utility companies
who place their poles at a minimum safe distance from any given road-
way. The logic behind this argument is that after a certain distance,
the likelihood of a vehicle deviating so far off the road as to create the
possibility of a vehicle/pole collision is so remote that it would be
deemed unforeseeable.
Unfortunately, this argument is fundamentally flawed. First,
there is no "magic number" at which the possibility of a collision be-
comes unreasonably remote. Appellant's witness, Dr. Wright, was una-
ble to give such a number, despite his expert status and years of
experience, with regards to the limited situation in Coates.1 62
Second, the designation of minimum safe distances is impractica-
ble given the varying terrain of the country. Certain roads run
through areas with limited space available for pole construction. For
example, rural, mountainous roads often have steep grades and are
narrow and windy. It would be both overly expensive and burden-
some to expect a utility to grade a roadside, clear a shoulder, con-
struct on a mountain slope, or make other improvements just to
situate a utility pole at a certain distance.
Third, mandating "minimum safe distance" could lead to the un-
necessary extension of liability to private property owners. The ra-
tional behind the "magic number" theory is to create an open area for
vehicles to safely stop if they deviate from the road. This concept
raises implications as to other natural obstructions occurring in close
proximity to traveled portions of the highway. If utility companies
were required to construct utility poles at a certain distance from a
roadway so as to avoid liability for accidents occurring therewith, a
similar rule might be extended to owners of private property abutting
160. Because society today is so dependant upon municipal services, the court should
consider the necessity to have readily available gas, electric, water, etc. services for the
population. This includes availability to rural and more isolated locations. See Penn-
sylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 434 U.S. 414, 422-23 (1952) (The Federal Power Com-
mission must assure an abundant supply of electricity throughout the United States to
protect the public interest).
161. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) (finding towns
which could accommodate only one distribution system, made each town a "natural mo-
nopoly" for the distribution and sale of power by power company).
162. Coates, 354 Md. at 506, 731 A.2d at 934.
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roads. Trees, fences, ponds, and other common occurrences ob-
served on private property pose the same foreseeability of harm to
passengers deviating from the roadway as do utility poles. The impli-
cation would require landowners to cut down trees, fill in ponds, and
remove other obstacles in order to create a "landing pad" for vehicles
which leave the road for any number of reasons.
The court has previously recognized that "care must be taken to
avoid unduly burdening an occupant of land in the use of land."'' 6
3
The rule has been that an abutting landowner is charged with the
duty to use reasonable care so that nothing originating on his or her
property creates a danger to travelers on an adjacent road.164 This
includes the maintenance of trees and vegetation.161
An extension of liability to private landowners for travelers deviat-
ing from the road is overly burdensome. Such requirements on a pri-
vate landowner's use and enjoyment of his property would amount to
a governmental taking and would require compensation. 166 A land-
owner should not be subjected to liability by virtue of his property's
location to a road.
The potential costs to society go far beyond the infringement on
private land owner's rights and the estimated expense of removal and
relocation of utility poles. Imposing liability on landowners with ob-
structions located just off the traveled roadway jeopardizes a number
of widespread activities which have important societal benefits.
It appears to be common practice to locate poles, fire hydrants,
parking meters, street lights, and the like, along roadways.1 67 These
items have the same potential to cause injury to deviating motorists as
do utility poles. The possibility of extending tort liability to the own-
ers of such items is too incredible to be rationally considered.
163. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189.
164. See Hensley v. Montgomery County, 25 Md. App. 361, 364, 334 A.2d 542, 544
(1975).
165. Id. at 369-70, 334 A.2d at 547 (holding that urban land owners' duty to inspect for
dead, dying or decaying trees does not extend to owner of "suburban forest" land).
166. See Hayes v. Malken, 26 N.Y.2d 295, 299 (1970) (finding no liability for a collision
with a utility pole located on private property because such a holding would entitle a driver
"swerving off the road and striking an object entirely on private property" to "bring an
action against the landowner and have ajury pass on whether the placement of the object,
regardless of its distance from the road, was such as to create an unreasonable danger to
travelers." This entitlement would effectively act, in the court's opinion, as a restriction on
land use "equivalent to a taking .. .without just compensation.").
167. See, e.g., id. at 298 (denying compensation to a driver whose car struck a pole that
was approximately seven inches from the edge of the road and was located on private
property behind a two-inch granite header).
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As a final policy consideration, it is relevant to note that the ap-
pellant in this case was not precluded from recovery by the court's
refusal to hold SMECO liable. The main purpose of tort law is to
compensate innocent parties, returning them to the position they
were at before their injury.16 8 Appellant, in this case, is seeking recov-
ery for injury to her innocent family members. The fact that the ap-
pellant has been precluded from compensation by SMECO does not
keep her from receiving compensation altogether. Appellant may still
seek recovery against the negligent driver of the vehicle involved in
the accident.' 69 Whether or not this party is solvent should not be of
importance to the court. The financial situation of the responsible
party is not justification for the court to award liability against the
"deep pocket" in order to assure substantial monetary compensation.
Because duty has been defined as "an expression of the sum total
of... considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plain-
tiff is entitled to protection, '  the court could have relied upon a
detailed discussion of public policy to better justify its finding of no
duty. Although these economic policies are an important factor that
should be considered by the court in its denial of liability against
SMECO, it is not common legal practice for a court to base its deci-
sions solely upon policy considerations.' 71 It was understandable,
then, that the court was reluctant to base its decision upon these con-
siderations without an additional legal theory supported by case law
and precedent. The Court of Appeals could have reached its policy
motivated conclusion by considering the other elements of negli-
gence, specifically the lack of breach or the lack of proximate cause.
While it is understandable that the court did not want to leave these
168. KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 1, at 5-6.
169. See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text. In fact, appellant not only sought
recovery from Thompson but was awarded summary judgment against Thompson for his
negligent driving of the automobile. Coates, 354 Md. at 504, 721 A.2d at 933. Damages had
yet to be awarded at the time of this decision.
170. KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 53, at 358. Prosser explains that determining duty
requires a conclusion as to whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendants conduct. As such, duty is "as broad as the whole law of negligence,"
and that there is no all inclusive, universal test for it. Id. § 53, at 357-58; see Lake, supra
note 81, at 1523 (finding that American courts adhere to the idea that duty is a conclusion
which must be analyzed in terms of public policy, social considerations, and/or other such
factors).
171. See Lake, supra note 81, at 1528 (stating that court decisions that rest upon unpopu-
lar policy balancing are at risk of reversal in the legislature).
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questions for the jury, the court could have ruled on them as a matter
of law.
17 2
c. A Determination on Breach of Duty.--The court could have
focused on the second element of a negligence cause of action,
breach of duty. The Coates court could have reached its same conclu-
sion by finding that the breach of duty element was not satisfied. A
rejection of this element would have been justified and of greater
strength than its no duty determination.
Proving that SMECO breached its duty of reasonable care would
have required a showing that the utility did not act in the same man-
ner that a reasonable, prudent utility company would have under the
same circumstances. 173 The circumstances of this case do not support
the conclusion that all locations along a given road carry an equal risk
of vehicle deviation. While the frequency of off-road collisions is in-
dicative of the general likelihood that a crash may occur, the
probability of an off-road deviation at any particular place along a
road is not equally apparent.
The court determined that a particular deviation may be foresee-
able based on the condition and topography of the road, the proxim-
ity of the pole to the traveled portion of the road, other site
conditions, and previous incidents. 174 These considerations, however,
are more determinative of the reasonableness of a utility's pole place-
ment. 175 Assignment of liability based on this type of analysis is predi-
cated on whether or not the utility, in its placement of a pole at a
location with some degree of foreseeable danger, was unreasonable,
so as to breach its duty, or within the scope of reasonability. 176
Olivers Shop Road was a two-lane, rural county highway, de-
scribed as "hilly and twisty. ' 177 This road was without a shoulder and
contained numerous curves and steep grades. 178 Because of these
172. Bush v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 685 N.E.2d 174, 178 (1997) (stating that
when only a single conclusion can be drawn from the facts, the question becomes a matter
of law).
173. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 33, at 193. That duty would have been
one of reasonable care in the placement of its utility pole.
174. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
175. McMillan, 393 N.W.2d at 338 (stating that the conditions of a highway are critical in
determining whether the location of a utility pole adjacent to that highway is
unreasonable).
176. See id. at 338 (stating that negligent placement of a utility pole is a question of
whether the place chosen is so dangerous and the danger is so needless that the choice
becomes unreasonable).
177. See supra note 7.
178. Brief for Appellant at 3, Coates (No. 100).
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road conditions and the increased likelihood that an accident could
occur on this type of road, it is reasonable to hold SMECO to an in-
creased level of responsibility.'79
SMECO chose to locate its utility pole outside the traveled por-
tion of the road and on the inside of a left curve.' ° Appellant's ex-
pert, Dr. Wright, opined that it was unwise to "put poles that close to
the road especially in the vicinity of curves."'' While Dr. Wright's
observation may be true, his criticism does not take into account the
nature of Olivers Shop Road and the fact that there is no safe place to
construct a utility pole on hilly, twisty, curvy roads.'8 2 The fact that
SMECO's pole was not located in a completely safe spot is not an indi-
cation of negligence per se. Negligence can only be assigned if the
appellant can prove that SMECO's actions were inconsistent with
those of a reasonable, prudent utility company. When a utility is
forced to decide where to place a utility pole along an inherently dan-
gerous road, the placement itself is the determinant of
reasonableness.
Appellant's claim that SMECO's placement was unreasonable is
weakened by the testimony of its second expert. St. Clair noted that
when a road contains a left curve, the best and safest place for a pole
is on the inside of the curve.' The fact that SMECO situated its pole
on the inside of the left curve is indicative of the utility's reasonable
and prudent consideration of where to construct a pole on this inher-
ently dangerous road.
179. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note
81, § 31, at 169-70 (explaining that situational facts within the acting party's knowledge
which increase the probability of injury to another may establish a duty to guard against
the recognized risk). Simply stated, the obvious nature of the road added to the
probability of an accident. The fact that SMECO was or should have been aware of these
characteristics when deciding where to construct its utility pole calls for a more stringent
examination of the reasonableness of its ultimate placement of the pole.
180. See Coates, 354 Md. at 507, 731 A.2d at 935.
181. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
182. See Mayor of Cumberland v. Turney, 177 Md. 297, 309-10, 9 A.2d 561, 566 (1939)
(finding negligence can not be inferred from the mere fact that a road or street is unsafe,
and that absolute safety can not be obtained except at prohibitive or impractical cost, espe-
cially in the case of steep, narrow, winding roads). On certain types of roadways, especially
those in rural or mountainous areas, there is a greater threat of accidents. Because this
increase in risk is not the result of negligence, the limits of discretionary decisions dele-
gated to utilities for the construction of public improvements when those improvements
are inherently and unavoidably dangerous are naturally questioned. Id.; see also Albin v.
National Bank of Commerce, 375 P.2d 487, 491 (Wa. 1962) (reasoning that there is a
marked distinction between the duty, with reference to trees, that may be imposed upon
the owners of land adjacent to city streets or heavily traveled highways and those imposed
on owners of forest land adjacent to little-used roads).
183. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the reasonableness of the pole location is supported
by the fact that the pole had been located at the site for thirty-seven
years, and there had been only one known accident.18 4 It would be
irrational to factually conclude that the pole was placed in an unrea-
sonably dangerous spot given the amount of traffic traversing the road
without incident."8 5 The reasonableness of the location is further cor-
roborated by the fact that Thompson had traveled past the pole with-
out incident numerous times before the accident.18 6
While the court looked at these external circumstances as an indi-
cation that the utility owed no duty to reasonably place the pole, in
anticipation of this particular deviation, it seems more appropriate for
this information to have been considered in a "breach of duty" con-
text. These factors are more indicative of the reasonableness of
SMECO's pole placement decision, and go less to the foreseeability of
harm resulting from the defendant's actions."8 7
Clearly, the utility took into account the inherent dangers of the
road itself while attempting to place the pole in a safe location along
an unsafe roadway. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to say that
SMECO failed to act reasonably in its placement of the utility pole. As
such, the court would have been justified in a denial of liability based
on the absence of a breach.
d. Absence of Proximate Cause.-The court could also have fo-
cused its decision on the third element of a negligence cause of ac-
tion. The court would have had a strong position in its denial of
liability had it relied upon the argument that SMECO's placement of
the utility pole was not the proximate cause of the appellant's injury.
A utility company should be entitled to anticipate that travelers
on "hazardous" roads will use them in a lawful and reasonable man-
ner. 88 Maryland law has held that a motorist on a public road is re-
184. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
185. If SMECO had unreasonably placed the pole, a high toll of accidents would have
been likely given the number of cars traversing the road over the 37 years the pole was in
existence.
186. Thompson's knowledge of the road could further be used prove his contributory
negligence, despite its irrelevance to the present case. See Coates, 354 Md. at 526, 731 A.2d
at 945.
187. It seems counterintuitive to state that no duty was owed in the utility's placement
based on factors such as experience, which may be considered only after the pole has been
located for some time.
188. Coates, 354 Md. at 525, 731 A.2d at 945; see also Bush v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv.
Co., 685 N.E.2d 174, 178 (Ind. 1997) (finding that a utility is only required to anticipate
the ordinary and normal use of the highway and is not required to anticipate and to guard
against the illegal or reckless conduct of motorists); see also Armand v. Louisiana Power &
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quired to exercise due care and caution when driving.'" 9 Individuals
with knowledge of a defective road condition must use due care and
caution while utilizing those roads.1 90 Failure to avoid a known, obvi-
ous danger in a road has been held to be contributory negligence per
se.
19 1
While the question as to whether a driver's act of contributory
negligence can be imputed to his passengers is moot in this case, 192 a
determination as to the causation of plaintiff's injuries is not. 9 The
negligent placement of a utility pole is not actionable unless it, with-
out the intervention of any independent factor, causes the harm com-
plained of.'94
The cause of the accident in this case can not be attributed to the
pole alone. 95 Thompson had traveled Olivers Shop Road without in-
cident frequently, over many years, and was well aware of its terrain
and inherent dangers.' 96 While Thompson claims to have slowed to
"between 25 and 30 miles per hour" in order to negotiate the left
curve, appellant's expert determined the "critical speed at which a ve-
hicle can transverse the curve without leaving the roadway on the
outside of the curve" was 52 to 56 miles per hour.' 97 The fact that the
vehicle left the road under these circumstances, in conjunction with
the rainy weather and the condition of the vehicle's tires, point to the
driver's erratic behavior as the cause of the accident.
Light Co., 482 So. 2d 802, 804 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that a motorist has a duty to
control an automobile and maintain a proper lookout).
189. See Mason v. Baltimore, 137 Md. 476, 112 A. 818 (1921) (denying compensation to
an automobilist, who crashed into a rising safety gate when he had a chance to stop, knew
of the bridge, knew that it was going to open, but attempted to outrun the opening of the
draw of a bridge).
190. See County Comm'rs of Kent County v. Pardee, 151 Md. 68, 77, 134 A. 33, 36 (1926)
(stating that when roads "become, to a greater or less extent, defective, the public does not
necessarily assume all the risk attendant upon using them after it acquires knowledge of
the defects, but is only required to use due care and caution, taking into consideration the
nature and extent of the defects").
191. See id.
192. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. Utilizing the precedent set in Earp,
the contributory negligence of Thompson can not be imputed upon his passengers be-
cause he was not their agent or servant. Earp, 120 Md. at 293, 87 A. at 810.
193. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
194. Parsons v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 181 Md. 502, 505, 30 A.2d 788, 790
(1943) (citing Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149, 161, 200 A. 353, 358 (1938)).
195. See supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text and infra note 197 and accompanying
text.
196. See Coates, 354 Md. at 526, 731 A.2d at 945.
197. Id. at 506, 731 A.2d at 934.
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The facts clearly indicate that the position and maintenance of
the pole were not the proximate cause of the crash."' 8 Rather, multi-
ple superseding events appear to be the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. Even though defendant's pole placement may have
originally set in motion the chain of events which led to the injury,
this chain was severed by separate, independent acts. 19 9 Superseding
causes that are nonconcurrent and are, by themselves, the "natural
and logical cause of the harm" are considered outside the doctrine of
proximate cause.2 ° ° When these superseding causes arise, the original
act becomes a remote cause and the subsequent, independent act be-
comes the proximate cause of the accident.2 "1 Therefore, the court
could have found that SMECO was not negligent based on the fact
that the causation requirement for a negligence cause of action was
not satisfied.
5. Conclusion.-The cost-benefit analysis applied to the Coates
case shows the extent of the burden on the defendant and the conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty upon utility operators
would greatly outweigh the minimal safety benefits yielded by such a
policy. Tort law is the body of principles that determines when an
individual who suffers personal injuries may shift that loss to an-
other.20 2 However, the cost of that loss should not be spread to the
detriment of the public when a utility makes a reasonable placement
of a pole which does not interfere with the ordinary use of the road.
The public policy concerns inherent in holding a utility liable should
have been given greater consideration by the court. Because it is unu-
sual for a court to base its conclusion solely upon policy considera-
198. See Shapiro v. Toyota Motor Co. Ltd., 248 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1978). In this case, a
passenger in an automobile brought suit when the car in which he was traveling left the
road in a 35 mile per hour zone at an intersection known as "dead man's curve" and
crashed into a telephone pole which had been struck some seven times since 1967. The
Court of Appeals for North Carolina entered summary judgment for the telephone com-
pany finding that "the pole would not have been struck had the Toyota been operated in a
proper manner. Thus, the maintenance of the pole did not constitute an act of negli-
gence." Id at 871; see also Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Marks, 198 So. 330 (Fla. 1940) (denying
liability upon a finding that the negligence of the driver, and not the location of a tele-
phone pole located approximately 3 feet off of a sharp curve, was the proximate cause of
the accident).
199. Bush v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 685 N.E.2d 174, 178 (Ind. 1997) (finding
that plaintiffs reckless driving and excessive speed were superseding events which broke
the causal chain).
200. Parsons, 181 Md. at 505, 30 A.2d at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing A.L.I. RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, §§ 440, 441, 447).
201. Bush, 685 N.E.2d at 178.
202. See TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 17 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
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tions, the court could have considered the elements of a negligence
claim. The court did, in fact, focus on the element of duty. However,
findings on either breach of duty or proximate cause would have been
stronger than the court's no duty determination.
MICHAEL STRANDE
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
C. Landlord's Duty Extended to Protect Tenant's Guest from Vicious Dogs
Within the Leased Premises
In Matthews v. Amberwood Associates L.P., Inc.,' the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland considered whether the landlord of an apartment
complex owes a duty to the guest of a tenant who is injured or killed
by a "highly dangerous pit bull dog"2 while in the tenant's apartment.3
The court answered in the affirmative, ruling that a landlord did owe
such a duty "when the landlord knew of the dog's presence and was
aware of the dog's dangerousness, when the presence of the dog was
in violation of the lease, and where the landlord could have taken
steps to abate the danger."4 In resolving this issue of first impression
in Maryland,5 the court extended the reach of tort duty beyond dan-
gerous rental premise conditions to include instrumentalities brought
into the apartment by the tenant.6 As a result, the court unnecessarily
broadened and clouded a landlord's duty to police a tenant's actions
within the premises and provides a disincentive for including "no
pets" clauses in leases.
1. The Case.--On February 9, 1994, Shanita Matthews and her
sixteen-month-old son Tevin visited Ms. Matthews's friend Shelly Mor-
ton and her five-year-old son at Morton's apartment.7 While Ms. Mor-
ton was away from the apartment for a moment, her boyfriend's pit
bull, Rampage, attacked Tevin while the two young boys played in the
living room.8 Rampage bit into Tevin's neck and shook him vio-
l. 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998).
2. Id. at 548, 719 A.2d at 120. While this Note does not examine the debate over the
classification of pit bulls and whether they are inherently vicious, these issues are always a
backdrop when confronting cases of this sort. See infra notes 58, 114 & 155 (reviewing the
court's efforts to establish per se viciousness of pit bulls); see also Matthews, 544 Md. at 586-
87, 719 A.2d at 139-40 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (pointing out the possible misnomer in
using the term "pit bull" in the instant case because the dog involved was a Staffordshire
bull terrier rather than an American Pit Bull terrier); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of Statute, Ordinance, or Regulation Applying to Specific Dog Breeds, Such
as "Pit Bulls" or "Bull Terriers," 80 A.L.R.4th 70, 76 (1990) (noting that, in classifying "Pit
Bulls," there is "inherent confusion in identification of the particular allegedly dangerous
breed among several breeds similar in appearance or name or both").
3. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 548, 719 A.2d at 120.
4. Id.
5. See Amberwood Assocs. v. Matthews, 115 Md. App. 510, 516, 694 A.2d 131, 134
(1997), rev'd, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998) (noting that this issue "is one of first
impression in Maryland").
6. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 563, 719 A.2d at 128 (stating that the imposition of this
duty on a landlord is supported by Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998),
which involved an attack on parties in the common areas of a rental property).
7. See id. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22.
8. See id., 719 A.2d at 122.
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lently.9 After extraordinary effort, including stabbing the dog several
times with a knife, Ms. Morton and Ms. Matthews were able to make
Rampage release the boy.10 Tragically, Tevin suffered fatal injuries,
dying approximately one hour after arriving at the hospital.11 Tevin's
parents filed negligence claims against Morton's landlords
Amberwood Associates and Monocle Management, Ltd. (Amber-
wood), alleging that Amberwood "owe[d] a duty of care to visitors
when the landlord has knowledge of a vicious animal on its premises
and the ability to take reasonable steps to protect against the
animal."12 In all, four counts were filed against Amberwood. 13 Ms.
Matthews and Andre T. Williams, Tevin's father, filed a wrongful
death action. 4 In addition, Ms. Matthews filed a survival action on
behalf of Tevin's estate, an individual count for "shock, fright, alarm,
anxiety, emotional distress, and physical and psychological pain and
suffering" and a count for the defendant's "reckless infliction of emo-
tional distress" upon Ms. Matthews.' 5
Amberwood countered that it owed no such duty, did not know
that Rampage was vicious, and could not have prevented the harm
even if it did know and have such a duty. 6 Three days before the trial
date, Amberwood filed an amended answer that, inter alia, added the
affirmative defenses of Ms. Matthew's contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk.' 7 The trial court, however, struck down these
amendments. 8
The case was bifurcated, and ajury trial was held on the issue of
liability in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 9 At trial, both parties
presented evidence on the question of whether Rampage was a vicious
dog.2" Matthews contended that Rampage "constituted a known dan-
gerous condition upon the property and that Amberwood retained
control over the presence of the pit bull within the leased premises
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 551, 719 A.2d at 122.
12. Id. at 552, 719 A.2d at 123.
13. See id. at 551, 719 A.2d at 122.
14. See id.
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. See Appellees' Brief at 29-30, Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs., 351 Md. 544, 719
A.2d 119 (1998) (No. 97-76) (arguing that eviction of the tenant and the dog would not
have prevented the attack on the tenant's friend's son, who would have visited Morton
regardless of where she lived).






through the 'no pets' clause in the lease." 21 Matthews also argued
Amberwood owed "a duty of care to protect Matthews and her son
from that extremely dangerous animal."22 Amberwood's maintenance
personnel were examined to determine whether knowledge of the vi-
cious dog's presence could be imputed to Amberwood.23 Ultimately,
the jury found Amberwood liable and awarded damages amounting to
over $7.3 million.24
Amberwood appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which re-
versed the trial court's ruling. 25 The Court of Special Appeals held
that the trial court erred as to the landlord's liability,26 concluding
that a "no pets" clause in the tenant's lease did not create a duty of
care in the landlord for the tenant's social invitee.27 Judge Sonner,
writing for the court, employed the policy discussions from the lead-
ing California case Uccello v. Laudenslayer,28 which the trial court had
considered analogous to Matthews.29 Although the court recognized
the important policy concerns articulated in Uccello, it concluded that
the landlord did not owe a duty of care."0 Further, the court pointed
out that Rampage was a nuisance brought into the premises by the
tenant, and the "no pets" clause of the lease was for the landlord's
benefit only.
31
The Court of Special Appeals construed the "no pets" clause as
contemplating damage to property, not injury to people.3 2 Applying
the tenets of contract law, the court opined that a landlord may waive
a lease provision that benefits the landlord without incurring tort lia-
bility. 3 Alternately, the court found that even if the landlord owed a
21. Id. at 553, 719 A.2d at 123.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 549-50, 719 A.2d at 121.
24. See id. at 552, 719 A.2d at 122.
25. SeenAmberwoodAssocs. L.P., Inc. v. Matthews, 115 Md. App. 510, 514, 694 A.2d 131,
133 (1997), rev'd, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 513, 694 A.2d at 133.
28. 118 Cal. Rptr. 741, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a duty of care arises
"when the landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it
removed from the premises"); see also infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (describing
the facts of Uccello).
29. See Amberwood, 115 Md. App. at 517, 694 A.2d at 134-35.
30. See id. at 522, 694 A.2d at 137 (explaining that imposing a duty in this situation
"would ... chill a myriad of contract clauses that protect landlords and their property").
31. See Amberwood, 115 Md. App. at 520-21, 694 A.2d at 136 ("Clauses in lease contracts
creating a duty on the part of tenant to the landlord, unless specifically designed to do so,
do not create obligations on the part of landlords to third parties.").
32. See id. at 520, 694 A.2d at 136.
33. See id. at 521, 694 A.2d at 136-37 (stating that "the beneficiary of a clause has no
obligation to enforce the contract provision, but could waive the provision by his conduct.
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duty of care to the tenant's invitees, its failure to enforce the "no pets"
clause of the lease did not proximately cause Tevin's death, since Ms.
Matthews's and Ms. Morton's actions were intervening and supersed-
ing causes.3 4 The court thus reversed the trial court's ruling on the
issues of wrongful death and Ms. Matthew's survival action on behalf
of Tevin's estate.3 5 Matthews appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
granted certiorari to review the judgment of the intermediate appel-
late court.
36
2. Legal Background.-Maryland law relating to landlord/tenant
relationships is grounded in common law doctrines of property and
contract rights. 37 In the past several decades, however, the relation-
ship has been defined to a greater extent by civil tort duties arising
out of the lease provisions that provide exceptions to the traditional
rule of total landlord immunity.3"
a. The Common Law Standards.-With respect to the private
areas of the leased premises, the traditional rule of landlord liability
flows from the notion that "where property is demised, and at the
time of the demise it is not a nuisance, and becomes so only by the act
of the tenant while in his possession . . . the owner is not liable."3"
In this case, the landlords, who were the beneficiaries of the 'no pets' clause, had no duty
to third parties to enforce the rule" (internal citation omitted)).
34. See id. at 522, 694 A.2d at 137 (noting that the trial court erred in refusing to
permit the jury to consider potential intervening and superseding causes of Tevin's death).
35. See id. at 523, 694 A.2d at 138 (holding that the trial court erred in attributing
liability to the Landlord and reversing the judgment on the first and second issues of liabil-
ity claimed by the plaintiff).
36. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 552, 719 A.2d at 123.
37. See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4:1, at 186
(1980) ("[T]he condition of the premises at the commencement of the lease has been
governed by the doctrine of caveat emptor, and the common law imposed no obligation on
the lessor, in absense of an express agreement, to repair defects . . .arising during the
tenancy." (footnote omitted)).
38. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 555-56, 719 A.2d at 124 (describing the circumstantial
exceptions to landlord immunity that give rise to tort duty); infra notes 41-45 and accompa-
nying text; see also Danny R Veilleux, Annotation, Landlord's Liability to Third Person for
Injury Resulting from Attack on Leased Premises by Dangerous or Vicious Animal Kept by Tenant, 87
A.L.R.4th 1004, 1012-13 (1991) (reviewing different jurisdictions' limits on liability for the
landlord and the control mechanism of imputing liability); 4 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN LAw OF TORTS § 14:76, at 257-58 & n.49 (1987) (describing instances in
which a landlord has been held liable for the retention of tenants whose vicious animals
have injured third parties).
39. Owings v. Jones, 9 Md. 108, 117-118 (1856); see also Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687,
689, 161 A. 172, 173 (1932) (applying the rule that "[i]f a landlord demise premises which
are not in themselves a nuisance, but may or may not become such, according to the
manner in which they are used by the tenant, the landlord will not be liable for a nuisance
created on the premise by the tenant").
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The rationale behind this rule is that the landlord has parted with
control of the premises.4 ° There are, however, exceptions to this gen-
eral rule of landlord immunity.41 Landlords may be liable if they are
contractually obligated to rectify dangerous or defective conditions
but fail to do SO, 4 2 voluntarily undertake to rectify a dangerous or de-
fective condition but do so negligently,43 or if there are dangerous or
defective conditions on the premises that violate statutes or ordi-
nances.44 Although contract law does not impute liability through
failure to enforce a term of the contract,45 a tort duty has nevertheless
emerged in some states in the last couple decades through suits based
upon unenforced prohibitions in the lease contract.46 A few states
have actually gone beyond the duty of the landlord to the tenant and
guests through the terms of the lease to a general duty of reasonable
care.
47
40. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 37, § 4.1, at 186 ("The basic rationale for lessor immu-
nity has been that the lease is a conveyance of property which ends the lessor's control over
the premises . . ").
41. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 555-56, 719 A.2d at 124 (surveying cases in which courts
have held landlords liable for failing to complete promised corrections to known danger-
ous conditions); see also 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.16, at 271-300
(2d ed. 1986) (surveying the various theories of recovery for individuals injured on the
premises of another).
42. See Sacks v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40, 44-46, 251 A.2d 858, 861-62 (1969) (holding that a
landlord is liable for an injury sustained inside an apartment when the landlord, although
under no contractual duty, promises to fix a dangerous condition but does not do so).
43. See Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 155, 110 A.2d 683, 686 (1955) (holding that a
landlord who inadequately filled in an excavation in the tenant's yard was liable for the
tenant's guest's injuries, even though the landlord voluntarily made the repairs and was
not contractually bound to do so).
44. See Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 672, 645 A.2d 1147, 1152
(1994) (concluding that "a private cause of action in a landlord/tenant context can arise
from a violation of any statutory duty or implied warranty created by the Baltimore City
Code").
45. See Amberwood Assocs. v. Matthews, 115 Md. App. 510, 521, 694 A.2d 131, 136-37
(1997), rev'd, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998) (stating that "[c]ontract law provides that
the beneficiary of a clause has no obligation to enforce the contract provision, but could
waive the provision by his conduct" (citing John B. Robeson Assocs., Inc. v. Gardens of
Faith, Inc., 226 Md. 215, 172 A.2d 529, (1961))).
46. See Veilleux, supra note 38, at 1023 (reviewing cases that have held landlords liable
for injuries sustained by third parties when they were attacked by dogs on leased premises,
based on the landlord's right or duty to terminate leases because of the presence of the
animal on the premises); see also 4 SPEISER, supra note 38, § 14:76, at 257-58 (classifying dog
bite cases as instances where a landlord may be liable for negligently selecting and retain-
ing tenants who may create a risk to the public by their activities).
47. See 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 41, § 27.16, at 293-95 (describing the process by
which first exceptions are created for the general principle of landlord immunity, as well as
how, in New Hampshire, California, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Florida, Idaho, and Nevada,
the immunities and exceptions, such as the "control" exception described in this Note,
have been abandoned in favor of general negligence principles).
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b. Emerging Tort Duty.-In determining whether to assign a
tort duty to a party, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has considered
the relationship that exists between the parties and the nature of the
harm likely to result from the failure to exercise due care.48 The
courts have stated as a general rule that a landlord is not ordinarily
liable to a tenant or guest of a tenant for injuries from a hazardous
condition in the leased premises that comes into existence after the
tenant has taken possession.49 The landlord's duty, however, is "an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection, and ex-
ceptions to immunity are made."5 The common thread in determin-
ing a landlord's duty is the "landlord's ability to exercise a degree of
control over the defective or dangerous condition and to take steps to
prevent injuries arising therefrom."51 This theory of a control-based
duty is an expansion from traditional common law principles, espe-
cially when considering hazardous conditions created by the tenant on
the property.52 Maryland law holds a landlord liable for injuries that
48. See Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 752, 556
A.2d 1126, 1131 (1989) (noting that in previous cases, "we discussed the relationship of the
parties and the nature of the actual or foreseeable harm in a given case as additional
factors to be considered in determination of the existence of a duty");Jacques v. First Nat'l
Bank, 307 Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756, 759-60 (1986) ("In determining whether a tort
duty should be recognized in a particular context, two major considerations are: the na-
ture of the harm likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the relationship
that exists between the parties.").
49. See Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689, 161 A. 172, 172 (1932) ("[W]hen the owner
has parted with his control, the tenant has the burden of proper keeping of the premises,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary; and for any nuisance created by the tenant
the landlord is not responsible.").
50. Jacques, 307 Md. at 533, 515 A.2d at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 357 (5th
ed. 1984)).
51. Matthews, 351 Md. at 557, 719 A.2d at 125. In Richwind, the Court of Appeals
adopted the formulation provided by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 (1977),
which states that
[a] landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and
others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant ... by dangerous
condition existing before or arising after tenant has taken possession if [the land-
lord] has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the exis-
tence of the condition is in violation of:
(1) an implied warranty of habitability or
(2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.
Richwind, 335 Md. at 672, 645 A.2d at 1152.
52. The Maryland courts have not found landlords responsible for nuisances created
on the leased property by the tenant that cause injuries to third parties. See State v. Feld-
stein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955) (finding no landlord liability for the death of a
tenant's family from asphyxiation from a tenant's faulty water heater installation); see also
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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result from a defective condition on his property if, and only if, "the
landlord either knows or has reason to know of the condition and has
a reasonable opportunity to correct it."'53 A landlord has a "reasona-
ble opportunity to correct" a condition when he retains control over
the premises. 54
Although Matthews was the first case in Maryland to address the
issue of landlord liability regarding dangerous animals within the
rental premises, one year prior, the Court of Appeals decided Shields
v. Wagman,55 which involved two separate attacks in a common area
parking lot by a pit bull that had escaped from inside the rental prem-
ises immediately prior to the attacks.56 In finding that the landlord
had a duty to a business invitee and a co-tenant who were attacked by
the dog, the court determined that the landlord could have prevented
the foreseeable harm in the common area by refusing to renew the
lease with the tenant after the landlord became aware of the vicious
nature of the tenant's dog and the tenant's inability to control it.57
This case reflects a shift from a view of landlord control based solely
on the landlord's control and maintenance of the common area.
c. Other Jurisdictions' Responses to Dangerous Animals and a
Landlord's Duty.-Due to public health concerns over vicious dog at-
tacks, many states have passed laws regarding the owning, harboring,
and keeping of dogs. 51 In addition, some states have judicially ex-
tended liability to landlords when dogs have attacked co-tenants and
guests on the leased premises.
53. Richwind, 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1153.
54. See Langley Park v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 407, 199 A.2d 620, 623 (1964) (observing
that since a landlord retained control over parts of the property for the common use of all
tenants, he had a duty of "ordinary care and diligence to maintain the retained portions in
a reasonably safe condition" (emphasis added)).
55. 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998).
56. See id. at 670-72, 714 A.2d at 883.
57. See id. at 690, 714 A.2d at 892-93. The court concluded that a lack of control was
demonstrated by the fact that the dog was kept in a chicken-wire cage, was let loose during
walks, and was let loose in the office when members of the public were there. Id. at 670,
714 A.2d at 882.
58. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 561-63 & n.4, 719 A.2d at 126-27 (noting that "[a] number
of states or municipalities, recognizing the unique danger pit bull dogs pose to their citi-
zens, have enacted legislation that classify pit bull dogs as vicious" (citation omitted)); see
also 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 101, at 438 (discussing statutes abrogating the necessity of
scienter in vicious dog bite cases). See generally Ward Miller, Modern Status of Rule of Absolute
or Strict Liability for Dogbite, 51 A.L.R.4th 446 (1987) (reviewing common law and statutory
principles of liability for dogbites); John P. Ludington, Who "Harbors" or "Keeps" Dog Under
Animal Liability Statute, 64 A.L.R.4th 963 (1988) (chronicalling the statutory history of lia-
bility founded on the keeper or harborer of a dog).
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In Uccello v. Laudenslayer,59 a German shepherd bit a tenant's
child invitee within the premises of a leased apartment.60 The dog
was normally penned in the back yard but it went into the kitchen
area through an open door and bit the child.6' The dog's owner had
not properly controlled it in the past, and it had attacked and bitten
two other individuals previously. 62 California's Court of Appeal, Fifth
District, concluded that the landlord had a duty to the injured child
because of the landlord's ability to remove the dog from the premises
by not renewing the lease and evicting both the tenant and the dog,6"
despite the fact that the landlord had expressly given permission for
the tenant to keep the dog on the premises.64 The court reasoned
that when the landlord has control over property to the extent that "it
fairly may be concluded that he can obviate the presence of the dan-
gerous animal and he has knowledge thereof, an enlightened public
policy requires the imposition of a duty of ordinary care. "6 The court
further explained that "[t] o permit a landlord in such a situation to sit
idly by in the face of the known danger to others must be deemed
socially and legally unaccepted. ' 66
The Court of Appeals of New York reached a similar result in
Strunk v. Zoltanski.67 In Strunk, the court denied a motion for sum-
mary judgment by a landlord whose tenant's guest was injured by a
German Shepherd.6" The court held that when a landlord with
knowledge of a tenant's vicious dog enters into a lease, and the land-
lord fails to take appropriate precautions by adding conditions to the
lease that would better ensure the tenant's control over the dog, the
59. 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
60. See id. at 743-44. The apartment was leased on a month-to-month basis. See id. at
744.
61. See id. at 743-44.
62. See id. (chronicling the four separate attacks on three children and a neighbor, and
describing how thirty neighbors had signed a petition to get the dog removed from the
neighborhood).
63. See id. at 748 ("[O]nly when the landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, cou-
pled with the right to have it removed from the premises, does a duty of care arise ....
[The landlord] could have abated the harboring of the dog on the premises by terminat-
ing the tenancy.").
64. See id. at 744.
65. Id. at 746.
66. Id.
67. 468 N.E.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a landlord may be held liable to per-
sons bitten on the premises when the landlord leases to a tenant whom the landlord knows
will keep a vicious dog on the premises and the landlord fails to insert pertinent provisions
in the lease to protect persons who might be on the premises).
68. See id. at 14.
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landlord may be held liable for injuries to third parties.69 The court
explained that while a landlord "would not be subject to the same
strict liability to which a tenant as harborer of the dog would be sub-
ject ... landlords as others must exercise reasonable care not to ex-
pose third person to an unreasonable risk of harm. '7' The court also
noted that a tenant may have a legitimate interest in keeping a watch
or guard dog, and that "the proper accommodation of these interests"
would require a landlord to establish, through the lease, provisions
that would ensure "confinement or control of the dog."
7 1
A contrasting result, however, was reached by the Washington
State Supreme Court in Frobig v. Gordon. 2 The court held that a land-
lord was not liable when a tiger kept by an animal handling company
attacked a helper during a television commercial shoot.73 Explicitly
rejecting the Uccello approach, the court applied common law princi-
ples and concluded that "a landlord is not responsible ... for condi-
tions which develop or are created by the tenant after possession has
been transferred. '74 Thus, because the landlord would not be liable
to the tenant for the tiger's attack, the court reasoned that the land-
lord should not be liable to third parties for such an attack.75
Finally, in Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley,7 6 the Supreme Court of
Alaska considered whether a landlord owed a duty to a tenant at-
tacked by a dog owned by a fellow tenant in that tenant's backyard
77
where the landlord included a lease provision specifically prohibiting
vicious dogs. 78 The court answered in the affirmative, explaining that
the co-tenant "was entitled to rely on ... [the landlord] to perform its
duty."79 The court reached this conclusion because, in light of a pre-
vious attack involving the same animal, it was foreseeable that a per-
son would be harmed, the landlord's "blatant disregard of its tenant's
safety is morally blameworthy," it would support a policy of encourag-
69. See id. at 15 (stating that "at a time when... [the landlord] had complete control of
the premises she leased them to the tenant . . . [and] took no measures by pertinent
provisions in the lease or otherwise to protect third persons who might be on the premises
from being attacked by the dog").
70. Id.
71. Id. at 16.
72. 881 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1994).
73. See id. at 228.
74. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6,
at 434 (5th ed. 1984)).
75. See id. at 229.
76. 720 P.2d 945 (Alaska 1986).
77. See id. at 947.
78. See id. at 946.
79. Id. at 948.
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ing landlords to enforce their own rules, and "landlords may obtain
insurance or require tenants that own vicious animals to do so."80
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Matthews v. Amberwood Associates,"1
the Court of Appeals held that a landlord of an apartment complex
owes a duty to social guests of a tenant who are injured or killed in the
tenant's apartment by a highly dangerous pit bull dog kept by the
tenant.8 2 The duty arises (1) when the landlord knows of the dog's
presence and is aware of the dog's viciousness, (2) when the presence
of the dog is in violation of the lease, and (3) where the landlord can
take steps to abate the danger through lease enforcement and, ulti-
mately, eviction."3 The Court of Appeals also held that there was suffi-
cient evidence in this case to find that the landlord had a duty to
protect a tenant's invitee from harm caused by the vicious dog within
the tenant's apartment.8 4 Writing for the majority, Judge Eldridge
first established that a landlord's duty arises partially from his "ability
to exercise a degree of control over [a] defective or dangerous condi-
tion and to take steps to prevent injuries arising therefrom."85 The
court also noted that the landlord's duty with regard to matters within
his control extends beyond common areas and "may be applicable to
conditions in the leased premises."86 In applying these principles to
the present case, the court concluded that Amberwood had a duty to
protect third parties from a tenant's dogs. 7
The court looked for guidance from states outside of Maryland."
The court noted the rule expressed in Strunk v. Zoltanskhi 9 that
with respect to the liability of a landlord whose tenant comes
into possession of the animal after the premises have been
leased, in order to establish liability it must be shown that the
landlord had knowledge of the vicious propensities of the
80. Id.
81. 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119.
82. See id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
83. See id. Another significant issue that the Court of Appeals decided, which is not
within the scope of this Note, was whether Ms. Matthews was entitled to recover damages
for emotional distress during her struggle with the dog, while it attacked Tevin, although
she did not suffer any physical injury. Id. at 570-75, 719 A.2d at 132-34. Despite the fact
that she suffered no physical injury, the court found that "Matthews obviously suffered real
and severe emotional distress during the attack .... She was entitled to recover damages
for such emotional distress." Id. at 574, 719 A.2d at 134.
84. See id. at 565-66, 719 A.2d at 129.
85. Id. at 557, 719 A.2d at 125.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129.
88. See id. at 566-70, 719 A.2d at 129-31; see also infra note 101.
89. 468 N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1984); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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dog and had control of the premises or other capability to
remove or confine the animal ......
The court found that the landlord's power to evict through a violation
of the lease gave it the ability to remove the dog from the premises
and, consequently, to prevent the death which occurred.91 Although
the court recognized that there was no guarantee that Amberwood
would have successfully evicted Morton prior to the attack, the major-
ity pointed out that Amberwood would have fulfilled its duty by
"promptly institut[ing] an eviction proceeding," regardless of the out-
come.92 Amberwood, however, did not enforce the "no pets clause" in
any manner.93 The court also conceded that Morton's harboring of
the dog may have constituted negligence on her part, but, neverthe-
less, noted that "the insertion in a lease of a restriction against ...
offensive conduct is precisely for the purpose of enabling the landlord
to control that conduct."94
The court then asserted that "the forseeability of harm [also] sup-
ports the imposition of a duty on the landlord."95 The court reasoned
that harm to the tenant's guest by the dog in this case was "entirely
foreseeable" because of the testimony by several employees of
Amberwood to the effect that they had seen the dog, were afraid of
the dog, and had witnessed attacks by the dog.96 The court also noted
that "[t] he extreme dangerousness of this breed, as it has evolved to-
day, is well recognized."
9 7
The court analogized this case to its most recent decision involv-
ing pit bulls and a landlord's duty in Shields v. Wagman.9" Although
the court recognized that the attack in Shields had occurred in a com-
mon area, unlike the attack in the present case, which occurred in the
leased premises, it concluded that "this difference is ... not very sig-
nificant in light of the circumstances of both cases."99 The court rea-
soned that Shields was not a case about a defective or dangerous
90. Matthews, 544 Md. at 567, 719 A.2d at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Strunk, 468 N.E.2d at 15).
91. See id. at 558-59, 719 A.2d at 125-26.
92. Id. at 559 n.3, 719 A.2d at 126.
93. See id. at 558-59, 719 A.2d at 125-26 (stating that "[t]he record in this case, however,
shows that the landlord did nothing").
94. Id. at 560, 719 A.2d at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bocchini v.
Gorn Management Co., 69 Md. App. 1, 12, 515 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986)).
95. Id. at 560, 719 A.2d at 127.
96. See id. at 561, 719 A.2d at 127.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 563-65, 714 A.2d at 128-29; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the Shields decision).
99. Matthews, 351 Md. at 565, 719 A.2d at 129.
1264 [VOL. 59:743
2000] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 1265
condition in a common area.' 00 The "control" factor relied on in
Shields, according to the Matthews majority, did not concern the con-
trol the landlord exercised over the common area, but instead, like
the case at hand, involved "the landlord's control over the tenant's
remaining in the leased premises." '' The court also pointed out that
both the death in this case and the injuries in Shields "arose from the
leased premises." 102
Finally, the court explained that the "landlord's retention in the
lease of some control over particular matters in the leased premises is,
standing alone, [not] a sufficient basis to impose a duty on the land-
100. See id.
101. Id.; see also id. at 566-70, 719 A.2d at 129-31 (considering the persuasive authority of
the following state courts and cases: Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 118 Cal. App. 3d 741 (Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that a landlord who knows of vicious propensities of animal kept on
leased premises, gave express permission to harbor vicious dog, and who could abate har-
boring of the animal by terminating month-to-month tenancy owes duty of care to tenant's
invitees and may be held liable for injuries inflicted by animal.); Strunk v. Zoltanski, 468
N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a landlord who leases to a tenant with knowledge that
the tenant will keep a vicious dog on the premises, without taking reasonable measures, by
pertinent provisions in the lease, to protect persons who might be on the premises, may be
held liable to a person who is thereafter bitten on the premise.); Giaculli v. Bright, 584 So.
2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing summary judgment for the landlord when it
was on notice of the tenant's pit bull's vicious propensity and it had sufficient time to
further control the dog prior to its attacking a child); Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720
P.2d 945 (Alaska 1986) (holding the landlord liable for the tenant's dog attack because
"no vicious dogs" clause in lease demonstrated obvious intent and power to control dogs
on the leased property); Arrington Funeral Home v. Taylor, 474 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971) (holding that a corporation is liable to a person injured by a vicious dog on
premises owned, controlled, and partially used in the furtherance of the business of the
corporation, where the corporation has given its permission and consent to its employee to
keep and to harbor the dog on such premises); Szkodzinski v. Griffin, 431 N.W.2d 51
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming summary judgment for the leasor when there is no ques-
tion of fact that the leasor did not know that its tenant's dog had attacked a child within an
enclosed yard was vicious); Gallick v. Barto, 828 F. Supp. 1168, 1174-75 (M.D. Pa. 1993)
(denying summary judgment for the landlord and finding that the landlord may be held
liable to the tenant's guest who was bitten by the tenant's ferret because the landlord knew
that the ferret was a wild animal and the landlord could control the premises through a
"No Pets" clause in the lease); McDonald v. Talbott, 447 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969)
(finding that the landlord can be liable for attacks by the tenant's vicious dog on areas of
the property open to the public when the landlord has foreknowledge of dangers to visi-
tors); Lucas v. Kriska, 522 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (refusing to find a property
owner liable for a child's dog bite because the landlord had no foreknowledge of dog's
viciousness); McCullough v. Bozarth, 442 N.W.2d 201, 208 (Neb. 1989) (holding that the
landlord is liable when he has actual knowledge of viciousness and nevertheless leases the
premises to the dog's owner); and Parker v. Sutton, 594 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (holding that a landlord who exercises no control over the tenant's vicious dog is
not liable for injury to third parties, if the landlord believed the dog had been killed or if
the landlord did not have reasonable time to abate the dangerous condition)).
102. Id. at 565, 719 A.2d at 129.
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lord which is owed to a guest on the premises."' 1 3 Instead, the ulti-
mate question of whether to impose a duty of reasonable care in this
case would have to be answered by "weighing the various policy con-
siderations. '1 0 4 According to the court, the policy considerations at
issue here were whether the tenant exercised primary control over the
leased premises, the public safety concerns regarding the harboring of
a dangerous animal within the leased premises, the degree of control
exercised by the landlord, and the landlord's knowledge and ability to
abate the dangerous condition.0 5 Taking this consideration into ac-
count, the court concluded that it agreed with "the majority of courts
addressing this issue in other states . . . that the balance should be
struck on the side of imposing a duty on the landlord which is owed to
guests on the premises." ' °6
Judges Chasanow, Cathell, and Rodowsky dissented, arguing that
the intermediate court's ruling should be affirmed.10 7 In reaching his
conclusion, Judge Chasanow relied on several factors, including the
landlord's inability to control Rampage's actions within the leased
premise and the landlord's inability to evict Ms. Morton for owning a
dog.l08 Based on these factors, Judge Chasanow opined that the land-
lord owed no duty of care to a tenant's invitee to protect them against
vicious animals kept on the premises.'0°
4. Analysis.-In Matthews, the Court of Appeals recognized, for
the first time, a landlord's duty to protect its tenant's guests from vi-
cious pit bull dogs within the tenant's premises." 0 The court found
that the landlord breached its duty when it did not make efforts to
eliminate this source of harm by removing the dog through the con-
tractual power of eviction from the "no pets" clause in the lease."'
The Court of Appeals has never before held a landlord liable for inju-
ries inside the premises to the guest of a tenant caused by an instru-
103. Id.
104. See id. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosen-
blatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994)).
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 583-84, 719 A.2d at 138 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting).
108. See id. at 610, 719 A.2d at 151 (ChasanowJ., dissenting) (arguing that "[e ] ven if the
landlord knew the dog had vicious tendencies, the landlord should be able to assume that
when the dog was confined within the tenant's apartment that the tenant would take rea-
sonable precautions to protect guests in her home").
109. See id. In addition, he noted that Ms. Matthew's actions could constitute an inter-
vening superseding cause. Id. at 614, 719 A.2d at 153.
110. See id. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129.
111. See id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
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mentality brought onto the land by the tenant after taking possession
of the property.1 2 Nevertheless, in an effort to control the public's
exposure11 to often-dangerous pit bull dogs,'1 4 the court over-ex-
tended the landlord's duty into the unforeseeable interactions be-
tween tenant, guest, and pet within a secured premises." 5 The court
unfairly derived landlord liability from the lease's "no pets" clause,
1 6
basing the landlord's duty on a misleading concept of landlord "con-
trol" over the leased premises,1 17 and overstated Rampage's vicious-
ness and the foreseeability of harm within the premises. 118 The
court's interpretation of premise control merely provides landlords
with a disincentive for including lease terms pertaining to pets. Such
a tenuous standard will not satisfy the court's stated policy of prevent-
ing future pit bull attacks.
a. The "No Pets" Clause: Purpose and Intended Beneficiaries.-
Arriving at the "no pets" clause as the source of the landlord's ability
to have prevented the harm in this case, the court adopted an imprac-
tical and attenuated standard for determining a landlord's duty of
care to its tenant's guests.11 9 The court agreed with Matthew's argu-
112. See id. at 614, 719 A.2d at 153 (Chasanow,J., dissenting) (concluding that landlord
negligence in Maryland "has never included failure to protect a tenant's social guests from
things exclusively under the tenant's control within the tenant's dwelling"); cf. 1 MILTON R.
FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES §§ 10.105a-10.501a, at 665-711 (4th ed. 1997) (contrasting
the concept of landlord negligence for failure to abate the tenant's creation of a nuisance
or for negligently entrusting the tenant, into which Friedman places dog bite cases, with
the landlord's liability in tort for breaching a covenant to repair dangerous conditions
within the leased premises).
113. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129 (setting up a weighing of privacy
issues verses the threat of public safety in arguing for landlord liability).
114. The court came close to establishing a per se viciousness standard for pit bulls. See
id. at 561-63 & n.4, 719 A.2d at 126-28 & n.4 (reviewing case law and pit bull-prohibiting
statutes from other states in finding that "the extreme dangerousness of this breed.., is
well recognized").
115. While the court stated that "[t]he facts here unequivocally indicate that harm to a
tenant's guest by Rampage was entirely foreseeable" based on the dog's behavior as ob-
served by apartment maintenance personnel, id. at 561, 719 A.2d at 127, Judge Chasanow
stated, in his dissent, that "[e]ven if the landlord knew the dog had vicious tendencies, the
landlord should be able to assume that when the dog was confined within the tenant's
apartment that the tenant would take reasonable precautions to protect guests in her
home." Id. at 610, 719 A.2d at 151; see also infra Part 4.c (arguing that given the facts in
Matthews, the landlord should not have been held to a foreseeability standard).
116. See infta Part 4.a.
117. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 565, 719 A.2d at 129 (adopting a definition of "control");
see also infra Part 4.b (arguing that the Matthews court should have distinguished the facts of
Shields and that by not doing so, it created an over-broad definition of "control").
118. See infra Part 4.c.
119. The standard is especially impractical regarding non-privity-holding third parties
that have not entered into identical lease agreements (i.e. co-tenant third parties).
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ment that although the "no pets" clause did not create the duty of
care for third parties, it gave the landlord an element of control over
whether the pit bull was on the premises, and, by not exercising this
control, the landlord breached its duty of care. 20 In examining the
basis for landlord duty, however, it is unwise to divorce the method for
landlord control-the "no pets" clause-from the purpose and in-
tended beneficiary of that control.
The purpose of a "no pets" clause is to prevent property damage
in the apartments and the intended beneficiary is the landlord.' 21
The Amberwood clause does not clearly demonstrate an intent on the
landlord's part to control a dangerous condition. 122 Furthermore, the
dog attacked a tenant's guest, not a co-tenant.1 23 The arguments for
creating a duty in co-tenant cases are more convincing because a ten-
ant who signs a lease with a "no pets" clause has a reasonable expecta-
tion that no pets, including dogs, will be encountered on or in a
neighbor's premises. 124 A guest, however, has no such contractual no-
tice and no such expectation. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
non-enforcement of the "no pets" clause caused Tevin's death. 25
This conclusion by the court begs the question of whether a landlord
could simply release himself from liability by eliminating the "no pets"
clause. 12 6
120. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
121. See id. at 603-04, 719 A.2d at 148 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the "no
vicious dogs" clause in the Alaskan Village lease, with the "no pets" clause in Matthews by
noting that "the Alaskan Village lease could much more reasonably be found to be intended
to keep tenants safe; whereas the lease in the present case could just as likely be intended
to protect the landlord's property").
122. Amberwood Assocs. L.P., Inc. v. Matthews, 115 Md. App. 510, 520, 694 A.2d 131,
136 (1996) ("The Amberwood ['no pets' clause] did not contemplate the harm that an
animal might do to people, only the harm it can do to the premises."), rev'd, 351 Md. 554,
719 A.2d 119 (1998).
123. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22.
124. See Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 948 (Alaska 1986) (noting that
the landlord had agreed that he had an obligation to enforce the rules concerning pets for
the safety of the tenants, and that the co-tenants were "entitled to rely on [the landlord] to
perform its duty"); see also Matthews, 351 Md. at 604, 719 A.2d at 148 (Chasanow, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "unlike in [Matthews], the plaintiffs in Alaskan Village were tenants and,
thus, more likely to be the intended beneficiaries of the lease provision").
125. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 558-59, 719 A.2d at 125-26.
126. Herein lie the problems with the creation of both the "fiction devised to meet the
case" of control through a lease term covenant or contract and the creative "ingenious
theories" to fit landlord actions into the control exception to general landlord immunity.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 444 (5th ed.
Supp. 1988); see also SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 37, § 4:4, at 192 ("Resorting to the fiction of
'retained control' to support liability under a covenant to repair has been justly criticized
by the commentators."). The court would accomplish more by either pushing the law in
situations like Matthews either towards a more explicit "intended beneficiaries," contract-
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b. The Unruly Concept of Control.-The court erroneously ex-
trapolated from a landlord's duty to maintain and to control the com-
mon areas 127 and the physical premises, 128 and to prevent nuisances
from within the premises from disturbing co-tenants, 129 to the land-
lord's ability to control tenant-harbored animals within the secured
premises. 13  Significantly, Judge Chasanow, who dissented in Mat-
thews, authored the Shields v. Wagman opinion, where he stated that
the "issue is not whether ... [the pit bull] was being kept in the com-
mon area, but rather whether . . . [the pit bull's] presence posed a
based standard as in Alaskan Village, or towards general negligence principles that take into
consideration the totality of the landlord's knowledge and powers, not just the attenuated
link between a "no pets" clause and the control exception to landlord immunity. See gener-
ally 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 41, § 27.16.4, at 293-95 (discussing the emergence in the
past three decades of general negligence principles in landlord/tenant law in New Hamp-
shire, California, and other states, and specifically citing Uccello as demonstrative of this
shift from the landlord immunity and exceptions paradigm).
127. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 553-55, 719 A.2d at 123-24 (discussing a type of control
premised on the control a landlord maintains over the common areas); see also 5 HARPER ET
AL., supra note 41, § 27.17, at 295 (stating that "[t]he duty owed by a landlord to tenants
and their visitors with respect to .. . [common areas], which the landlord retains in his
possession for the use of his tenants, is sharply different from the duty owed with reference
to the leased premises themselves: It is the full duty of reasonable care to make conditions
reasonably safe" (footnote omitted)).
The Restatement states:
[a] landlord who leases a part of his property and retains in his own control any
other part the tenant is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him, is
subject to liability to his [tenant's guests] for physical harm caused by dangerous
condition upon that part of the leased property retained in the landlord's
control.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 17.3 (1977).
128. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 557, 719 A.2d at 125 (stating that "the principle that the
landlord may have a duty with regard to matters within his control extends beyond com-
mon areas; it may be applicable to conditions in the leased premises"). This theory of tort
liability follows from a retained control through a covenant to repair. See generally KEETON
ET AL., supra note 126, § 63, at 442 ("[Common areas duty] may even extend into the
portion of the premises leased to the tenant, provided that the landlord has retained con-
trol over the aspect of the premises responsible for the injury." (footnote omitted)).
129. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 560, 719 A.2d at 126-27. Traditionally, this theory has been
used to recover for injuries outside of the premises. The Restatement states:
A lessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity carried
on upon the land while the lease continues .. .if the lessor would be liable if he
had carried on the activity himself, and (a) at the time of the lease the lessor
consents to the activity or knows of or has reason to know that it will be carried
on, and (b) he then knows or should know that it will necessarily involve or is
already causing the nuisance.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 837(1) (1968).
130. The ramifications of the holding in this case are disturbing because the tenant's
guest, her child, and the pit bull were within a secured premise when the attack occurred.
See Matthews, 351 Md. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22. Also, there was no evidence of an agent of
the landlord observing the pit bull acting aggressively towards guests of the tenant within
the premises. See id. at 549-50, 719 A.2d at 121.
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threat to those in the common area."1 3 1 The location of the injury
should correspond to the area of the premises in which the landlord
may foresee the harm. The issue of common area duty verses on-
premises duty should be a valid demarcation line between Matthews
and Shields. In its attempt to analogize the facts of Shields, however,
the court made two overly broad assertions. First, the court stated that
"[t]he 'control' factor upon which the Court relied in Shields was not
the traditional control over common areas. Rather, as in the instant
case, it was the landlords' control over the tenant's remaining in the
leased premises. '  The court did not recognize, however, that the
facts of Shields are distinguishable in that if the dog had been properly
confined to the premises, the two attacks would not have occurred.
Rampage, on the other hand, was confined within the premises when
the attack occurred.
Second, the Matthews court stated that "[b]oth the injuries in
Shields and the injuries and death in the present case arose from the
leased premises." 3 ' The court made a logical leap when it extrapo-
lated from the lack of control in keeping a dog confined on-premises
in Shields to the lack of control over the dog's behavior on-premises in
Matthews. The court could have provided a stronger and more pre-
dictable standard by following the precedent in Shields,' and the per-
suasive authority of Uccello v. Laudenslayer,13' and Alaskan Village v.
Smalley1"6 in a different fashion, looking at the inability of the tenants
in those cases to control the dog and the landlord's knowledge
through complaints and actual knowledge that the tenant was not
controlling the dog by chaining, penning, muzzling or otherwise se-
curing them in the premises.
31
131. Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 678, 714 A.2d 881, 886-87 (1998) (differentiating
between where a dog is kept and where it poses a threat to invitees and co-tenants and
holding that the landlord had a duty of care to a business invitee and a co-tenant when the
tenant's pit bull attacked and bit them in the common area where the landlord had knowl-
edge of the potential danger in the common area and had the ability to rid the premises of
that danger by refusing to re-let the premises).
132. Matthews, 351 Md. at 565, 719 A.2d at 129.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (describing the facts and the court's
holding in Shields).
135. 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741 (Ct. App. 1975).
136. 720 P.2d 945 (Alaska 1986).
137. In Uccello, the landlord actually gave the keeper of the dog (the tenant) special
permission to have the vicious dog on the premises. 118 Cal. Rptr. at 744. This is a troub-
ling case to rely on because the aspect of control was not derived from a "no pets" clause in
the lease, as it was in Matthews. Instead, the court in Uccello reasoned that the landlord
retained control because the case involved a month-to-month lease that could have been
easily broken after either of the first two attacks by the dog. Id. at 746-47. In Alaskan
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In addition, when confronting the control issue, the court should
have distinguished between eviction on one hand, and either not en-
tering into a lease with a vicious dog owner or choosing not to renew a
lease with the owner on the other. Both Uccello and Strunk v. Zolant-
ski'3 8 were based on the landlord's renewing or entering into a lease
with foreknowledge that a vicious dog would be harbored on the
premises. 39 In fact, the court in Strunk explicitly stated that landlord
"control" of the premises is absolute at the time of lease renewal and
found it dispositive that there were no lease provisions implemented
by the landlord to further protect third parties on the premises from
the vicious dog.14° In contrast, the property in Matthews was demised
without the foreknowledge of a vicious dog and there was a lease pro-
vision for "no pets. '  In the final calculation, the court should have
concentrated on how the landlord assures that dogs are controlled on
the premises so as to prevent injury to the public rather than how
landlords control animals by eliminating both the animal and the
keeper from the premises.
c. Viciousness Standard and Unforeseeable Actions Within Prem-
ises. -The court in Matthews stated that the facts of the case "unequiv-
ocally indicate that harm to a tenant's guest by Rampage was entirely
foreseeable."142 The foreseeability of harm, however, is more prob-
lematic than the court would like to admit because the attack oc-
curred within a secured apartment.143 Short of defining a pit bull dog
as a per se vicious animal, which the court does not do, the court
should have recognized Rampage's watchdog-like behavior. 144 The
landlord's maintenance men witnessed the dog's behavior while
Village, the court noted that "[there was ample evidence that... [the landlord] had actual
knowledge of prior incidents involving [the dogs at issue]." 720 P.2d at 948.
138. 468 N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1984).
139. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (describing the foreknowledge that
landlord had when renewing a month-to-month lease in Uccello); supra note 69 and accom-
panying text (describing the Strunk landlord's foreknowledge when initiating a lease).
140. Strunk, 468 N.E.2d at 15.
141. Matthews, 351 Md. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125 ("The landlord retained control over the
presence of a dog in the leased premises by virtue of the 'no pets' clause in the lease.").
142. Id. at 561, 719 A.2d at 127.
143. See id. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22. The issue of landlord foreseeability in this case is
made all the more untenable by the fact that Ms. Matthews and her child had visited with
Ms. Morton and Rampage on dozens of previous occasions. See id. at 586, 719 A.2d at 139
(Chasanow, J., dissenting).
144. The dissent recognized that "there may be tenants who have a legitimate desire to
keep watch dogs or guard dogs for the protection of their person or property, and this
practice is not necessarily to be discouraged if the tenant keeps the dog.., confined to the
tenant's premises." Matthews, 351 Md. at 610, 719 A.2d at 151 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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guarding the house from intruders, not while inside the apartment, 145
playing with children. 46 Instead, all of Rampage's "vicious" behavior
was observed during what may be considered boundary disputes be-
tween itself and the maintenance people and other individuals in the
apartment and common areas of the complex.
147
Where the tenant is not adequately controlling the dog and there
is a threat to individuals in the common areas, then a landlord's duty
should arise because it is foreseeable that the dog will come into con-
tact with co-tenants, invitees, or guests in an injurious manner. 148 In
Matthews, however, the attack took place in the home where Rampage
was kept.'49 In this sense, the Shields case is not analogous. Although
the Matthews court argued that Shields is not a common area case,1 50
the holding hinged on whether the "landlord has knowledge of the
potential danger in the common area."'' In Matthews, because the
landlord did not know that Rampage would be allowed to intermingle
with guests without some protection, 152 there was little foreseeability
of harm to guests inside the premises.
145. Even if Rampage was a vicious dog, his confinement within the apartment at the
time of the attack was in compliance with the local code. See BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. 11,
§ 30(d) (1983) (providing that "every vicious or dangerous animal, as defined in this subti-
tle, shall be confined by the owner within a building or secure enclosure, and shall be
securely caged or muzzled and leashed whenever off the premises of its owner").
146. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22.
147. SeeJoint Record Abstract at E355-E371, Amberwood Assoc L.P., Inc. v. Matthews,
115 Md. App. 510, 694 A.2d 131 (1997). Ms. Matthews used the testimony of an apartment
maintenance worker, Mr. Monroe, who witnessed the dog's behavior on numerous occa-
sions, to demonstrate the dog's viciousness. See id. The dog's behavior included the fol-
lowing: growling on the other side of the door when Monroe went to the apartment to
perform a service call, id. at E357; hitting the other side of an interior door when Monroe
was inside the apartment performing a service call, id. at E358; growling and barking at
passersby and attempting to jump the fence in the front yard, id. at E362-368; and breaking
its chain and jumping the fence to pursue a boy who walked by the front yard, id. at E366-
367. Each of these instances involve the dog reacting towards people on the other side of a
door or fence, in the typical manner of a watch dog. None of the instances imputes any
knowledge of the dog's behavior within the premises among its keeper and her guests.
148. See, e.g., Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 947-48 (Alaska 1986) (impos-
ing a duty where the dogs involved climbed over a fence in their owner's yard and attacked
a six-year-old child, and the landlord had actual knowledge of prior incidents involving the
dogs); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1975) (finding the harm
inflicted by the dog's attack foreseeable where the dog had already attacked and bitten two
other people).
149. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22.
150. See id. at 565, 719 A.2d at 129 (arguing that "unlike the common area cases in this
Court, the failure of the landlords in Shields was not a failure to rectify a dangerous condi-
tion in the common area").
151. Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 690, 714 A.2d 881, 892 (1998).
152. Ms. Morton testified at trial that the day of the attack was the first instance in which
Rampage was not muzzled. See Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. v. Matthews, 115 Md. App. 510,
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Landlords in Maryland will now be caught in a Catch-22 between
including a "no pets" clause in the lease and assuming tort duty, as in
Matthews, or excluding and expunging the clauses when initiating or
renewing leases, since this is the control mechanism in which the
court now determines breach of duty. Landlords who attempt to
avoid the "no pets" clause, however, possibly still face the type of liabil-
ity found in Strunk where no controls were written into the lease.' 53
The court's holding surely frustrates the landlord and its insurer's per-
ception of risk and liability by failing to provide a uniform and antici-
patory standard for landlords with similar dilemmas. In the end, the
court is creating policy-based law vis-a-vis the shifting of pecuniary bur-
dens from tenants to landlords and their insurers. 154
5. Conclusion.-In Matthews, the Court of Appeals incorrectly
held that a landlord's duty of care for its tenant's guests extends to
abating the dangerous condition of an inherently dangerous pit bull
within the premises. 155 By extending the reach of tort duty beyond
the dangerous conditions of the rental premises itself, to include a
dog brought into the apartment by the tenant, 56 after initiation of
the lease containing a "no pets" clause, the court created a new
breach of landlord duty based on the landlord's "control" of the
premises through unenforced lease prohibitions. The court's deter-
mination unnecessarily complicates a landlord's duty to police a ten-
515, 694 A.2d 131, 133-34 (1997). Also, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland con-
cluded that "Ms. Matthews knew that Rampage was usually chained and muzzled while in
the apartment." Id. at 515, 694 A.2d at 138. These facts further demonstrate the impracti-
cable requirement that a landlord foresee the manner in which a tenant protects their
guests from a dog confined within the premises. Cf 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 41,
§ 27.16, at 278 (noting how landlords that make initial disclosures of hazards to tenants
have no further duty towards those who enter the premises because of the "relinquishment
of possession and control, the impossibility of standing guard so as to warn those who
visit").
153. See supra notes 67-71 (describing the New York court's finding of landlord liability
because no animal control was written into the lease).
154. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 584, 719 A.2d at 138 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[p]erhaps the worst tragedy (of the majority's decision] is the implication that rich
landlords and sympathetic victims are judged by totally different standards"); see also Clem-
mons v. Fidler, 791 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1990) (concluding, after rejecting the Uccello ap-
proach, that "[o]ur rule also promotes the salutary policy of placing responsibility where it
belongs, rather than fostering a search for a defendant whose affluence is more apparent
than his culpability").
155. Matthews, 351 Md. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131 (observing that pit bulls are an extremely
dangerous breed).
156. See id. at 563, 719 A.2d at 128 (stating that the court's holding in Matthews is sup-
ported by the duty of the landlord established in Shields).
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ant's actions within the premises, provides an incentive to expunge




The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
I. BANKRUPTCY
A. Debtors Must "Turn Square Corners" when Navigating Sovereign
Immunity in Bankruptcy
In In re NVR, LP' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit denied a chapter 11 debtor a judicial forum and
thereby allowed the states of Maryland and Pennsylvania to keep ap-
proximately seven million dollars worth of transfer and recording
taxes2 that two federal courts previously held were not owed to the
States under federal law.' The court held that the States' exercise of
sovereign immunity shielded them from the bankruptcy proceeding
initiated by the debtor to facilitate a refund of the taxes that the
debtor paid during their reorganization, but were exempted under
the Bankruptcy Code.4 The court affirmed its previous holding in
Schlossberg v. Maryland that section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code 6 un-
constitutionally attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy proceedings because it was not enacted pursuant to Con-
gress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.7 The court then
found that the section 90148 proceeding initiated by NVR was a "suit"
and was thus covered by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.9
1. 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. at 454.
3. See id. at 447 (noting that both the bankruptcy court and the district court found
that 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (Supp. 1999) exempted NVR from the taxes throughout the bank-
ruptcy period).
4. In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 454.
5. Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 1999), entitled "Waiver of Sovereign Immunity," states,
"Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as
to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with respect to ... the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure." Id
7. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 450. In Schlossberg, the Fourth Circuit held that
"[b]ecause there is no evidence that Congress either passed the Bankruptcy Code under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or sought to preserve the core values specifically enu-
merated in that amendment,... Congress' effort to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity through its 1994 enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) is unconstitutional and
ineffective." Schlossberg, 119 F.3d at 114.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 9014 (Supp. 1999), titled "Contested Matters," permits the debtor to
reopen the bankruptcy proceedings to get clarification on a matter in dispute. Id.
9. In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 454.
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These findings settled the issues between the debtor and the two
states. Because local taxing authorities do not enjoy sovereign immu-
nity,1° however, the court went on to discuss the tax exemption clause
embodied in section 1146(c)11 and held that property transfers taking
place before the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan were not cov-
ered by the tax exemption. 1
2
This decision correctly follows the literal meaning of binding au-
thority and Fourth Circuit precedent. However, it illustrates the com-
plexity and pitfalls that parties face when they assert federally created
rights against the states in federal court."3 While the opinion makes
clear that NVR cannot recover the tax, section 1146(c) exempted in
federal court, 4 it provides no guidance for how future debtors can
obtain relief. After the Supreme Court strengthened the state's sover-
eign immunity in the landmark case Seminole Tribe v. Florida,15 the
courts of the Fourth Circuit have attempted to balance equitably the
rights of private litigants against the state's sovereign immunity.16
This opinion, however, offers no guidance for future debtors with fed-
eral causes of action against the states and further muddles the Fourth
Circuit's jurisprudence after Seminole Tribe.17
1. The Case.-NVR was a leading homebuilder in Maryland and
Virginia throughout the 1980s." s NVR took on substantial debt when
10. See id.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (Supp. 1999), tiled "Special Tax Provisions," provides that all
stamp and recording taxes are exempt from state and local taxation. Id.
12. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 458.
13. Federally created rights fare no better in state court since the Supreme Court clari-
fied that states can also claim sovereign immunity from suits arising under federal law in
their own state courts. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267-68 (1999) (holding that
states can refuse to open their courts to certain suits brought against the states by litigants
holding federally created rights).
14. See id. at 454 (stating that "[b]ecause NVR 'commenced or prosecuted' a suit
against the states, sovereign immunity applies and the suit is barred as to the states").
15. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (discussing states' immunity from claims brought against them
in federal court by private citizens).
16. See In reNVR, 189 F.3d at 451-54 (considering whether a state is immune from a suit
brought to recover repayment of exempt transfer and recordation taxes); In re Collins, 173
F.3d 924, 931 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the state was not immune under the Eleventh
Amendment from a debtor's suit to reopen a bankruptcy case to determine whether debt
owed to the state was dischargeable); Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust,
123 F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that sovereign immunity did not apply to pro-
ceedings to confirm a chapter 11 reorganization plan); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Cre-
ative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that a state is immune
from a suit seeking a return of property from the state).
17. See infra Part 4 and accompanying text (describing how the court's opinion fails to
provide guidance to those who seek to pursue claims against states).
18. See In re NVR 189 F.3d at 447.
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it acquired Ryan Homes in 1987 in an effort to expand its opera-
tions.'9 Due to declining operating margins in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, NVR had difficulties servicing its debt and, consequently,
in 1992 sought reorganization under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding.
20
The bankruptcy court permitted NVR to continue its operations
while it developed its reorganization plan.2 ' By allowing NVR to con-
tinue its operations during the bankruptcy period, NVR generated
sufficient revenues to "convince the market that NVR had a viable
Plan, and a viable future." 22 NVR's transfers of properties during the
bankruptcy proceeding prevented its creditors from liquidating its as-
sets. 23 The transfers were crucial to NVR's reorganization, the satisfac-
tion of its creditors, its re-incorporation, and its rapid emergence
from bankruptcy as a viable tax revenue producing entity. According
to NVR's brief, "[t]he transfers were essential to what the Bankruptcy
Court characterized as 'a textbook example of how a Chapter 11
(bankruptcy) should work."' 24
During its reorganization, NVR made 5571 transfers of real prop-
erty and paid to the state and local taxing authorities $8,349,103 in
transfer and recordation taxes. 25 Of that sum, slightly fewer than
$7,000,000 went to taxing authorities in Maryland and Pennsylvania.26
Section 4.13 of the Bankruptcy Plan approved by the bankruptcy court
exempted NVR from the transfer and recordation taxes and reads as
follows:
Pursuant to section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the is-
suance, transfer, or exchange of securities pursuant to the
Plan, and the transfer of, or creation of any lien on, any
property of any Debtor under, in furtherance of, or in con-
nection with the Plan shall not be subject to any stamp tax,
real estate transfer tax, recordation tax, or similar tax.27
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 447-48.
22. Brief for Appellee at 18, In re NVR, LP, 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2211).
23. See id.
24. Id. (citation omitted).





The court found that this section of the plan mirrored section
1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,28 which entitles certain bankruptcy
debtors to this type of relief. After NVR emerged from bankruptcy, it
began to pursue refunds of the recordation and transfer taxes paid by
it during the entire bankruptcy period.29
Without protest, the states of Delaware, New York, North Caro-
lina, and Virginia refunded the taxes.3 ° Maryland and Pennsylvania,
on the other hand, refused to refund the requested taxes.3 ' NVR filed
a Rule 9014 motion under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure3 2 to obtain an interpretation of whether the payments made to
the taxing authorities in Maryland and Pennsylvania were exempted
under the Bankruptcy Code and the reorganization plan.3 3 Both the
state and local taxing authorities argued that the plan and the Code
provision did not operate throughout the bankruptcy period and only
exempted NVR for taxes paid on transfers that occurred after the re-
organization plan was confirmed and until NVR emerged from bank-
ruptcy.34 The state taxing authorities further argued that the
Eleventh Amendment exempted them from any ruling of the federal
courts.3 5
The bankruptcy court held that NVR was entitled to a refund of
the taxes paid during the entire bankruptcy period but held that the
states were not bound by its determination because of their Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. 36 The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's determination that NVR was entitled to a refund of
all the taxes paid during the bankruptcy period, but reversed the
bankruptcy court's finding of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immu-
nity.3 '7 The district court based its holding on the conclusion that the
Rule 9014 proceeding was not a "suit" covered by the Eleventh
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (Supp. 1999) provides that "[t]he issuance, transfer, or ex-
change of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan
confirmed.. . , may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax." Id.
29. See In re NVP4 189 F.3d at 448.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 9014 (Supp. 1999); see also supra note 8.
33. See In re AIM 189 F.3d at 448.
34. See Brief for Appellants at 11, In re NVR, LP, 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-
2211).
35. See id. at 30.
36. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 448.
37. See id.
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Amendment.38 The taxing authorities appealed to the Fourth
Circuit.39
2. Legal Background.-
a. The History of State Sovereign Immunity.-State sovereign
immunity is derived from the English common law theory that the
king "can do no wrong" and thus could not be sued in his own
courts.4 ° The Constitution makes no mention of sovereign immunity,
nevertheless the Supreme Court found that it was implicit in the
United States government and was adopted with the reception of the
common law from England.4
The first Supreme Court decision on state sovereign immunity,
Chisholm v. Georgia,4 2 adopted a literal interpretation of Article Ill. 3
In Chisholm, the Court allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue the
state of Georgia in federal court based on diversity of citizenship."
The holding that citizens of the United States could sue a state in
federal court "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted."45 In an effort to
reverse both the holding in Chisholm and the case's foundation in the
Constitution, state sovereignty advocates drafted the Eleventh Amend-
ment to mirror and reverse the language used in Article Ill.46 The
Eleventh Amendment provides: "[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
38. See Clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland v. NVR Homes,
Inc., 222 B.R. 514, 520 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the proceeding lacked the fundamen-
tal attributes that commonly identify a "suit").
39. See id.
40. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42 (1992) (quoting 1 W.
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 246 (1765)).
41. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (recognizing that
sovereign immunity existed before the Constitution and was implicit in the federal frame-
work). The notion that sovereign immunity was implicit in the government is perhaps in
conflict with the actual text of Article III. Article III provides that "[t] he judicial power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and . . . to Controversies . . .between a State and Citizens of another
state . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
42. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
43. See id. at 465 (stating that "[t]his Doctrine (allowing a citizen of South Carolina to
sue the state of Georgia) rests not upon the legitimate result of a fair and conclusive deduc-
tion from the Constitution: it is confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the direct and explicit
declaration of the Constitution itself').
44. Id. at 478.
45. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97 (1984) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934)).
46. See Gordon G. Young, Comment, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 56 MD. L. REv. 1411, 1423
(1997) (suggesting that the language of the Eleventh Amendment "closely tracks" the lan-
guage of Article III).
12792000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State. '4 7 Although the language of the amendment might be read to
make the states immune from suits in federal court based on diversity
only, the Court expanded the Amendment's coverage to include suits
based on federal questions in Hans v. Louisiana.48
After its decision in Hans, the Court held that Congress could
abrogate state sovereign immunity only when its intention is "unmis-
takably clear in the language of the statute,"49 and when acting under
a valid exercise of its power to abrogate.5" Before 1996, the Court
recognized two situations where Congress could abrogate state sover-
eign immunity. First, in Fitzpatrick v. BitzeA' the Court allowed abroga-
tion where Congress acted pursuant to its enforcement powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment.52 According to one commentator, "Fitz-
patrick suggests that the powerful policies of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment repeal any earlier constitutional immunities posing a threat to
realization of the aims of this Reconstruction Amendment. '53 In Fitz-
patrick Justice Rehnquist noted "that Congress may, in determining
what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits
against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissi-
ble in other contexts.
54
Second, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,55 the Court permitted abro-
gation when Congress acted under its Article I Commerce Clause Pow-
ers.56 In this 5-4 decision, the Court held that:
[b]ecause the Commerce Clause withholds power from the
States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and be-
cause the congressional power thus conferred would be in-
complete without the authority to render States liable in
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
48. 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890) (holding that sovereign immunity extended to suits
against a state brought by its own citizens).
49. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 104 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
50. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (noting that because of the Eleventh
Amendment, states may not be sued in federal court unless Congress, pursuant to a valid
exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate).
51. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
52. See id. at 456 (holding that Congress may provide for suits against the states if the
suits are appropriate to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment).
53. Young, supra note 46, at 1414.
54. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
55. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
56. See id. at 23.
1280 [VOL. 59:1275
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relin-
quished their immunity where Congress found it necessary,
in exercising this authority, to render them liable.57
The Court went on to find that the states consented to all suits arising
under the Commerce Clause when they ratified the Constitution.58 In
Union Gas, the Court found that the power given to Congress in Arti-
cle I would be meaningless without the ability to have those powers
enforced in the judiciary.59 The Court concluded that as long as Con-
gress was acting validly under its Article I powers, they could abrogate
state sovereign immunity.6" This holding was well received by legal
scholars who had long held that this view was necessary for effective
and equitable judicial resolutions in environmental, bankruptcy, intel-
lectual property, and maritime law cases.6
The Ex parte Young Doctrine embodies the only other circum-
stance where the Court permits a limitation on state sovereign immu-
nity.62 The Young Doctrine permits suits by citizens to enjoin state
officials from violating federal law.63 The Young Doctrine rests on a
legal fiction that places suits against state officials "outside the defini-
tion of suits against states" and thus outside the ambit of sovereign
immunity.64 The Young Doctrine is based on the notion that private
parties enjoy "economic substantive due process" rights,65 and that
when a state is depriving a private party of this right, the private party
can maintain an injunction to prevent the prospective harm from
continuing.
66
57. Id. at 19-20.
58. Id. at 20 ("The States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus
not 'unconsenting'; they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the Constitution con-
taining the Commerce Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis.").
59. Id. at 19-20.
60. Id. at 19.
61. See Young, supra note 46, at 1415 n.28 (noting that in the decade preceding Union
Gas many distinguished academics endorsed the broad position that state immunity had no
application to suits brought to enforce federal law (citing Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 549
(1977);JohnJ. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004 (1983))).
62. Young, supra note 46, at 1415.
63. ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
64. Young, supra note 46, at 1416, 1416 n.33 (citing PETER W. Low & JOHN CALVIN
JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 887 (3d ed.
1994)).
65. Patricia L. Barsalou & Scott A. Stengel, Ex Parte Young: Relativity in Practice, 72 AM.
BANR. L.J. 455, 479 (1998).
66. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (distinguishing permissible Ex
parte Young actions for an injunction from impermissible suits for retrospective damages).
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In a major shift in its jurisprudence on sovereign immunity, the
Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida overruled Union Gas,6 7 and cast doubt
on the broad application of Ex parte Young.6" In Seminole Tribe, an In-
dian Tribe sued the State of Florida and the Governor of Florida for
failing to negotiate in good faith under the Federal Indian Gaming
Act.69 Congress passed this Act pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause in Article 1.7' The Court stated:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the back-
ground principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate
when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of
Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the
Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional au-
thorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction.71
In overruling Union Gas, the Court noted that the Seminole Tribe
only stipulated that the statute was valid under Congress's power to
regulate under the Indian Commerce Clause, not the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Interstate Commerce Clause.72 Thus, the case
only dealt with abrogation under Congress's Indian Commerce Clause
67. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (stating that "[i]n
overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign
immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when
the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the
exclusive control of the Federal Government").
68. SeeYoung, supra note 46, at 1416-17 (noting that "the implausible lengths to which
the majority went in finding congressional intent to forbid injunctive enforcement suggest
that the Court might be moving toward allowing Ex parte Young suits to enforce federal
statutes only to the extent that the statutes expressly provide for such enforcement").
69. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52.
70. See id. at 47.
71. Id. at 72-73.
72. Id. at 60. The Court stated that
petitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Act was
passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate Com-
merce Clause. Instead, accepting the lower court's conclusion that the Act was
passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, peti-
tioner now asks us to consider whether that Clause grants Congress the power to
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.
Id. at 60.
1282 [VOL. 59:1275
2000] FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 1283
powers.73 Because the parties did not argue that the statute was a
valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court did not consider this avenue.7 ' Because the
Court did not address this issue, the Fourteenth Amendment power to
abrogate in this situation remains unresolved.75
The Court also cast doubt on Ex parte Young when it denied an
injunctive suit against the Florida governor. 76 The Court held that an
Ex parte Young suit was inappropriate because Congress already out-
lined the manner in which the Indian Gaming Act would be en-
forced.7 7 The Court held that Congress intended to impose certain
sanctions for violations of the Act, sanctions more limited than the
injunctive relief that courts would impose in an Ex parte Young suit. 71
Because the court found Ex parte Young inapplicable, injunctive relief
was inappropriate under the Act, and the Seminole Tribe was left
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. The Court, however, has recently decided two cases where the parties alleged that
state sovereign immunity was abrogated by Congress acting under its powers to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. In fTlorida Prepaid Postseconday Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), the Court found that Congress had expressly intended
that the states be subject to suit under certain patent infringement claims, and that Con-
gress had enacted the legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
635-36. However, the Court found that although the patent right was a property right,
there was neither sufficient evidence to show that the states were systematically and inten-
tionally depriving parties of this right nor were the state remedies safeguarding this right
inadequate to protect this right. Id. at 642-46. As such, the Court found that the remedial
legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was neither a necessary nor
appropriate way to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the abrogation provision
failed. Id. at 645-48. Similarly, the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 attempting to abrogate state sovereign immunity were found to be outside the
scope of Congress's remedial powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The Court again found a lack of
evidence that Congress was acting to remedy a significant pattern of unconstitutional dis-
crimination. Id. at 89. Thus, the Court held that "Congress had no reason to believe that
broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field." I. at 91. These cases make
clear that the Court will require extensive evidence that the states are engaging in a pattern
of violations involving the life, liberty, or property rights of its citizens and that inadequate
state remedies exist to protect these rights before it will find valid federal legislation abro-
gating state sovereign immunity.
76. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996). The Court concluded
that "[t]he situation presented here ... is sufficiently different from that giving rise to the
traditional Ex Parte Young action so as to preclude the availability of that doctrine." Id.
77. Id. at 74 (stating that "[w]here Congress has created a remedial scheme for the
enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused
to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary").
78. Id. at 74-75.
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without an apparent remedy because they had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.79
b. Fourth Circuit Jurisprudence under Seminole Tribe.-In the
bankruptcy case of Schlossberg v. Maryland,s° the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the precedent set out in Seminole Tribe.81 In Schloss-
berg, the trustee of a bankrupt estate filed an adversary proceeding
against the State of Maryland's Comptroller of the Treasury to avoid
as a preference the bankruptcy debtor's payment of income taxes
made to the state within ninety days of its filing for bankruptcy.8 2 The
court found that in section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code Congress ex-
pressly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity,83 but found
that Congress lacked the authority under the Bankruptcy Clause to do
so.8 4 The court concluded that "in light of Seminole ... Congress is not
empowered to use Article I authority, specifically the Bankruptcy
Clause, to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment's restriction on fed-
eral jurisdiction.""
The court discussed the possibility that section 106 could be a
valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment State Sovereign Immunity
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The court found,
however, "no evidence that Congress either passed [section 106 of]
the Bankruptcy Code under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or
sought to preserve the core values specifically enumerated in that
amendment. '87 The court concluded that Congress acted under the
same Article I powers in writing section 106 as it did in writing the
entire bankruptcy code,8 and declined to "presume that Congress in-
79. See Young, supra note 46, at 1435 (commenting that as a result of the Court's con-
clusion that Congress did not intend to impose injunctive sanctions against state officers,
"the Tribe lost for the simplest of reasons-failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted").
80. 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
81. Id. at 1145.
82. Id. at 1142.
83. Id. at 1144-45.
84. See id. at 1147 ("Because there is no evidence that Congress either passed the Bank-
ruptcy Code under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or sought to preserve the core val-
ues specifically enumerated in that amendment, we hold that Congress' effort to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity through its 1994 enactment of 11 U.S.C.
§ 106(a) is unconstitutional and ineffective.").
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1146.
87. Id. at 1147.
88. Id. at 1146 ("Indeed, the conclusion seems logically inescapable that in passing the
1994 Act Congress exercised the same specifically enumerated Article I bankruptcy power
that it has traditionally relied on in enacting prior incarnations of the bankruptcy law dat-
ing back to 1800-68 years before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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tended to enact a law under a general Fourteenth Amendment power
to remedy an unspecified violation of rights when a specific, substan-
tive Article I power clearly enabled the law."89 The court found the
state immune from the trustee's adversary proceeding and ordered
the action dismissed.9 °
The Fourth Circuit later fortified federal court jurisdiction over
states in State of Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors Liquidating Trust.9" In
Antonelli, the State contested the validity of a confirmed bankruptcy
court order holding that section 1146(c) allowed the debtor and its
assignees an exemption from certain transfer and recording taxes.9 2
The State claimed that the Eleventh Amendment made it immune
from the court order exempting these taxes and sought recovery of
the exempted taxes.93 The court held that the bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction over the entire bankruptcy estate and that this jurisdiction
extended to any claims that a State or any other creditor may have in
the estate.9 4 Thus, if a State wants to contest the validity of a bank-
ruptcy exception then it must enter the court and contest the bank-
ruptcy court order when it receives notice of the bankruptcy plan
prior to its confirmation.95 In the court's own words, "[w]hile forcing
a state to make such a choice may not be ideal from the state's per-
spective, it does not amount to the exercise of federal judicial power
to hale a state into federal court against its will and in violation of the
Eleventh Amendment."96 The court's holding in Antonelli advocates
that debtors with federal rights deriving from the bankruptcy process
should withhold all State taxes or payments that they believe ex-
empted. Then, if the States wishes to pursue the taxes, the State must
waive its sovereign immunity and submit to federal court jurisdiction
to prove its claims against the debtor.97
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1150.
91. 123 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 779.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 786-87. The court explained that "the power of the bankruptcy court to enter
an order confirming a plan, including a provision interpreting § 1146(c), derives not from
jurisdiction over the state or other creditors, but rather from jurisdiction over debtors and
their estates." Id. at 787 (citing Spartan Mills v. Bank of Am., 112 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.
1997)). After clarifying the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the court concluded that
"neither the party status nor the immunity of state and local governments has any impact
on the bankruptcy court's power to determine whether the terms of a reorganization plan
comply with federal law." Id.
95. See id. ("It is true that if a state wishes to challenge a bankruptcy court order of





In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Board of Public Works of the State of
West Virginia,98 the Fourth Circuit dealt with the continued viability of
Ex parte Young in cases in which private parties sue the states and the
states claim sovereign immunity.9 9 A railroad line, CSX, sued West
Virginia in federal court alleging that the state levied and collected ad
valorem taxes in violation of a federal act."° ° West Virginia claimed
Eleventh Amendment immunity from the suit.' The court held that
CSX could obtain relief against the state under the Ex parte Young doc-
trine.10 2 The court noted that because the Railroad only paid half of
the non-contested taxes assessed against it, it could seek prospective
relief in the form of an injunction ordering that it pay only a percent-
age of the other half of the non-contested taxes owed, deducting the
amount for the ad valorem taxes that were allegedly assessed in er-
ror.'0 3 Finding that an Ex parte Young injunction could provide CSX
with relief, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing the
suit for lack ofjurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court
to determine the merits of the allegedly illegal taxes assessed.10 4
Finally, in Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins)' 5 the Fourth Circuit
applied Antonelli and held the Commonwealth of Virginia subject to a
bankruptcy court's ruling on the dischargeability of a debt owed to
the Commonwealth."0 6 In Collins, the Commonwealth sought to col-
lect on a debt that the bankruptcy court had discharged four years
earlier.10 7 The debtor filed a motion to re-open the bankruptcy case
for a determination on the discharge of the debt."' The Common-
wealth then claimed Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from
the determination of the court.'0 9 The court concluded that jurisdic-
tion on this matter derived from jurisdiction over the debtor's estate
98. 138 F.3d 537 (4th Cir. 1998).
99. See id. at 538.
100. See id. at 538-39. CSX sued West Virginia for allegedly violating section 306(1) (a)
of the 4-R Act, and 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1) & (c). See id. at 539.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 540.
103. Id. at 543.
104. Id. This case affirms the continued validity of Exparte Young injunctions after Semi-
nole Tribe and shows the court's willingness to apply injunctions in creative ways to circum-
vent state claims of sovereign immunity. See id. (holding that CSX only paid a percentage
of the half of the taxes owed).
105. 173 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 928-31.
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and not from jurisdiction over the state and other creditors.' ° The
court also noted that a motion to reopen the case was not a suit."' 1 In
Collins, the court pointed out that the motion to reopen did not
amount to a suit because "The Commonwealth, however, was not
named as a defendant, was not served with process, and was not com-
pelled to appear in bankruptcy court."' 12 The court acknowledged
the "tough spot" in which this finding placed the Commonwealth.' 1 3
The Commonwealth had to either waive its sovereign immunity by en-
tering the bankruptcy proceeding and making its claim on the merits
of discharge in the original bankruptcy case, or stay out of court and
be forced to abide by the federal court's order." 4 The Common-
wealth was free to respond to the motion or ignore it." 5 The court
held that the state could not claim immunity from the decision of the
court and discharged the debt owed to the Commonwealth." 6
c. History of What Constitutes a Suit for Eleventh Amendment Pur-
poses.-The United States Supreme Court first discussed what consti-
tutes a "suit" for Eleventh Amendment purposes in Cohens v.
Virginia."7 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, commented:
"[w]hat is a suit? We understand it to be prosecution or pursuit of
some claim, demand or request.""'  In Cohens, Chief Justice Marshall
pointed out that there are some legal actions that are not suits under
the Eleventh Amendment." 9 The Cohens Court enumerated six fac-
tors that are used in determining whether an action constitutes a
"suit."12 These factors are: (1) the existence of an adversarial pro-
ceeding; (2) which consists of at least two parties; (3) which emanates
110. Id. at 931. The court determined that "the bankruptcy court did not need to assert
jurisdiction over the Commonwealth to determine the dischargeability of the bail bond
debt in conjunction with its decision to reopen." Id. (citing Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813,
822 (5th Cir. 1998)). Rather, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court "had the
power to do that because it had jurisdiction over the debtors and their case." Id.
111. Id. at 929 (stating that "[iun these circumstances, the motion to reopen was not a
suit 'against one of the United States' within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment"
(quoting Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir.
1997))).
112. Id. at 929.
113. Id. at 931.
114. See id. (commenting, "[i]t could decline to appear and thereby forego the opportu-
nity to make its argument and challenge any decision" but "[o]n the other hand, it could
voluntarily submit to federal jurisdiction and take part in the proceedings").
115. See id. at 929.
116. Id. at 926.
117. 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
118. Id. at 405.
119. See id. at 407.
120. Id. at 407-09.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
from the deprivation of property or injury; (4) which compels the at-
tendance of the parties; (5) which asserts and prosecutes a claim
against one party; and (6) where one party demands the restoration of
some thing from the defending party.' 2'
More recently in Gardner v. State of New Jersey122 the Supreme
Court held that a bankruptcy court "had jurisdiction over the proof
and allowance of the tax claims and that the exercise of that power
was not a suit against a State."1 23 The Court held that the bankruptcy
court had the power to adjudicate all of the interests in the res of the
debtor, and that the state's tax claims did not elevate the proceeding
to a "suit."
1 24
The Court made a similar distinction between suits and the dispo-
sition of estates in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana.125
The Court stated that "[w] e have previously held that the nature of a
suit as one against the state is to be determined by the essential nature
and effect of the proceeding."' 26 The Court in Ford Motor Co. held
that because the action was "in essence one for the recovery of money
from the state," it constituted a suit against the state.' 27 The Court has
held that some legal actions against the states are suits that allow a
state to invoke the defense of sovereign immunity while others are
not, thus barring the use of sovereign immunity. These decisions
demonstrate that the nature of the action must be scrutinized in each
case to determine whether it amounts to a "suit."
d. The History of what Constitutes a Transfer made "Under a Plan
Confirmed" in Section 1146(c). -- Section 1146(c) of Title 11,121 "Special
Tax Provisions," details the protections that bankruptcy may afford a
debtor in reorganization. Section 1146(c) states, "[t]he issuance,
transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an
instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of
this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp or similar
tax. ' 121 Courts have construed this provision to exempt those taxes
imposed at the time of transfer or sale of the item at issue where the
121. See In reBarrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 803 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (citing
Cohens, 19 U.S. at 407-12).
122. 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
123. Id. at 572.
124. Id. at 573-74.
125. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
126. Id. at 464 (citing ExparteAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 490-99 (1887); Exparte NewYork, 256
U.S. 490, 500 (1920); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296-98 (1937)).
127. Id.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (Supp. 1999).
129. Id.
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amount due is typically "determined by consideration for, par value
of, or value of the item being transferred." ' ° The provision also ap-
plies to mortgage recording taxes"' and real property transfer
taxes. 
132
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In rejacoby-Bender Inc.13
interpreted the phrase "under a plan confirmed" in section 1146(c) to
mean necessarily contemplated by the confirmed bankruptcy plan.13 4
The court held that the sale of a building was under a plan confirmed
even though the plan did not specifically mention the transfer, rea-
soning that "where, as here, a transfer, and hence an instrument of
transfer, is necessary to the consummation of a plan, the plan seems
implicitly to have 'dealt with' the transfer instrument. ' 13 5 The federal
district courts in New York have used the Jacoby-Bender holding to sup-
port their findings that the transfers essential to the confirmation of
the bankruptcy plan were "under a plan confirmed.""1 6 In In re Smoss
Enterprises Corp., 3' the district court held that the sale of a building
under a pre-petition contract was "under a plan" confirmed and thus
exempt from stamp and recording taxes.'3 8 The court held that the
transfer was exempt because it was essential to the confirmation of the
bankruptcy plan and because the bankruptcy court contemplated the
transfer before confirming the plan. 139
e. Section 106(b) and the Fourteenth Amendment.-In CSX, the
Fourth Circuit discussed the possibility that the legislation abrogating
sovereign immunity may find support in the Fourteenth Amendment
and be held constitutional even if the legislation does not mention
130. 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs. v. New York State Dep't of Taxation and Fin. (In re995 Fifth
Ave. Assocs.), L.P., 963 F.2d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992).
131. See City of New York v. Baldwin League of Indep. Schs. (In re Baldwin League of
Indep. Schs.), 110 B.R. 125, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
132. See Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 784-86 (4th
Cir. 1997).
133. 758 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1985).
134. See id. at 842.
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
137. 54 B.R. 950 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
138. Id. at 951.
139. Id. The court concluded that "[tihe language of § 1146(c) exempting a transfer by
the Bankruptcy Court was surely designed to reach the one transfer on which the plan
hinged and which the court had to approve prior to the confirmation." Id.; see also In re
Permar Provisions, Inc., 79 B.R. 530, (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that where the plan proba-
bly could not have been confirmed but for the post confirmation, pre-petition sale of
debtor's assets, the sale was exempt from the taxes under section 1146(c)).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 140 The court noted "Congress's failure
to mention that it acted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not dispositive."'' In Schlossberg, however, the court
concluded that there was no evidence that Congress enacted section
106(b) under its Fourteenth Amendment powers or that the statute
deals with the "core values" of that Amendment. 142
Other courts considering this issue have held that section 106 was
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 143  In In re
Straight,'44 the district court in Wyoming adopted the pre-Seminole rea-
soning from In re Southern Star Foods.145 The Southern Star Foods court
held that the Bankruptcy Code bestows all citizens with rights and
privileges that come from Congress's Article I powers; however the
power to enforce these rights and privileges stem from Congress's
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14 6
A bankruptcy court in the Eleventh Circuit in In re Headrick'4 7
also held section 106 valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, stating
that "Article I empowers Congress to grant debtors the privileges and
immunities of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress the right to enforce those privileges and immunities by
creating private rights of action against the States.'
48
On appeal, both the Tenth' 49 and Eleventh Circuits 50 declined
to consider the Fourteenth Amendment issue and affirmed the lower
court's decision based on the State's waiver of sovereign immunity.
140. See CSX v. Board of Pub. Works, 138 F.3d 537, 540 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the
wealth of precedent establishing that Congress's failure to mention that it acted pursuant
to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is not dispositive"); see also supra notes 101-
104 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's holding in CSX).
141. CSX, 138 F.3d at 540.
142. Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C.), 119 F.3d
1140,1147 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that because there is no evidence that Congress passed
the Bankruptcy Code under the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress's effort to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity through its enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) is
unconstitutional and ineffective).
143. See Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 555 (D.
Wyo. 1997) (concluding that Congress has the authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suits brought under the Bankruptcy
Code); Headrick v. Georgia (In re Headrick), 200 B.R. 963, 967 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996)
(same); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.),
190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995) (same).
144. 209 B.R. 540 (D. Wyo. 1997).
145. See id. at 555.
146. See In re Southern Star Foods, 190 B.R. at 426.
147. 200 B.R. 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
148. Id. at 967.
149. Wyoming v. Department of Transp. (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998).
150. In re Headrick, 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In NVR, the court faced two principal
issues; whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the debtor's action
seeking a refund of exempt transfer and recording taxes and whether
section 1146(c) exempts debtors in reorganization from paying trans-
fer and recordation taxes paid after the bankruptcy petition but
before the confirmation of the reorganization plan.' 5 1 Justice Wil-
liams, writing for the court, addressed the Eleventh Amendment as-
pect first, as that issue dictated the outcome of the case.
1 52
The court began its decision with an extensive account of the Su-
preme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and the recent
Fourth Circuit cases discussed above. 153 The court then attempted to
apply the discussed precedent to the present case. The court noted
that in Schlossberg v. Maryland the Fourth Circuit applied the Seminole
Tribe analysis and held that the express abrogation of state sovereign
immunity embodied in section 106 of the bankruptcy code was uncon-
stitutional.1 54 The court reaffirmed its finding that this section of the
bankruptcy code had been enacted pursuant to Congress's powers
under the Bankruptcy Clause 55 and not under its authority to enforce
the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 56
The court then sought to clarify the correct classification of
NVR's section 9014 motion which sought a declaration that NVR was
exempt from the transfer and recording taxes.' 5 7 The court stated
that the inquiry turned on whether the motion was "the prosecution
of some demand in a court ofjustice" or "the orderly disposition of an
estate."15'  This issue controls the case because if the court found that
this action was a suit against the states, then Schlossberg would require a
holding that it was impermissible under the Eleventh Amendment. 59
The court noted that if the motion was found merely to be a proceed-
ing to clarify the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, then the Antonelli
151. In re NVR 189 F.3d at 448.
152. Id. at 454.
153. Id. at 448-52. The court first traced state sovereign immunity from its common law
origins through the Supreme Court's decision of Seminole Tribe. It then commented on the
Fourth Circuit's post-Seminole jurisprudence.
154. Id. at 450.
155. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The clause states that Congress shall have the
power "to establish .. .Uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies . " Id.
156. In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 450.
157. Id. at 451-54.
158. Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
264, 407 (1821)).
159. See id. at 450-51 (noting that in Schlossberg, the court found that an adversary pro-




precedent would control, and this action would not offend state sover-
eign immunity because the court's jurisdiction would derive from its
jurisdiction over the debtor's estate. 160
The court, relying upon Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v.
Virginia, 6' noted that there are three categories or "prongs" of "cru-
cial characteristics" that bear on the court's decision to either hold
this motion an impermissible suit against the states or a permissible
proceeding over an estate. 162 According to the court, these crucial
characteristics include "the coercion exercised against the states,
whether the resolution required federal jurisdiction over the states,
and the substance of the remedy sought ....
The court first addressed prong one, the coercive nature of the
section 9014 motion. 6 4 According to the court, this motion, entitled
"Contested Matters," was not treated as an administrative matter be-
cause it was adversarial and involved at least "two parties who are op-
posing each other with respect to relief sought by one of them."'65
The court noted, however, that Maryland and Pennsylvania did not
receive a summons but were merely served with notice of the proceed-
ing. 166 Furthermore, the court noted that the bankruptcy court in
this proceeding exercised no greater coercion over the two states than
the coercion exercised by the bankruptcy court in proceedings to de-
termine the disposition of the debtor's estate. 16 7 Thus, the precedent
set out in Antonelli and Collins bound the court to conclude that the
coercion exercised on the two states was insufficient by itself to find
this matter an impermissible suit. 6 ' The court pointed out that pro-
ceedings of this nature put the states in an awkward position and that
"this position was not an enviable one for the states because they ei-
ther had to enter federal court to defend their rights or to allow the
court to proceed without the benefit of their arguments."' 69 The
court concluded that irrespective of the unenviable position of the
160. In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 451; see, e.g., Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating
Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the power of a bankruptcy court to
enter an order confirming a plan derives not from jurisdiction over the state or other
creditors, but rather from jurisdiction over debtors and their estates).
161. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
162. In re NV, 189 F.3d at 452.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 452-53.
165. Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTC"Y
§ 9014.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1999)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 452-53.
168. Id. at 453.
169. Id. (citing In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 931 (4th Cir. 1999)).
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states, under prong one, the court's jurisdiction over this type of mat-
ter was not a violation of the Eleventh Amendment.17 °
The court then discussed prong two of its test-whether the reso-
lution required jurisdiction over the states. 171 The court discussed the
States' argument that the ultimate resolution of the matter required
jurisdiction over the states even if the procedural posture of the mo-
tion might not require jurisdiction. 172 Furthermore, the court noted
that to grant relief in this matter it would have to order the states to
return the tax payments.171 If the court could not make such an or-
der, then any court order would be "advisory and improper."'1 74 Thus,
the court concluded that to be able to grant the requested remedy-
the refund of the tax payments-the court needed jurisdiction over
the states. 175 The court concluded that "[t]his finding alone is
enough to determine that the action, if it is to meet the requirements
of Article III, is a suit against the states."' 7
6
The court then addressed the third prong of the test-the sub-
stance of NVR's demand for relief.177 The court noted that NVR de-
manded payment from the Maryland and Pennsylvania treasuries, and
that "[a]lthough federal law may reign supreme in the bankruptcy
context, the federal courts do not necessarily reign supreme over an
unconsenting state's treasury.' 17' The court focused its rationale on
the fact that while they had complete jurisdiction over the debtor's
estate, they lacked jurisdiction over the states' treasuries. 79 The court
concluded that "a state is closely identified with its treasury and an
action leading to an order forcing a payment to citizens is the quintes-
sential 'suit' under the Eleventh Amendment."'8 0
The court concluded that although NVR had not summoned the
states into court, the fact that a determination favorable to NVR would
170. Id. (stating that "it does not amount to the exercise of federal judicial power to hale
a state into federal court against its will, and in violation of the Eleventh Amendment"











180. Id. (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1994); Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Transp. of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Gray v. Laws, 51
F.3d 426, 433 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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require the court to "raid Maryland's and Pennsylvania's treasuries"
dictated that this proceeding was indeed a suit against the states from
which the States could rightfully claim state sovereign immunity.18 1 In
exercising judicial restraint, the court stated that its "constitutional
power to enforce federal bankruptcy law, absent a waiver of immunity,




The court noted that this holding only resolves the portion of the
proceeding between NVR and the States of Maryland and Penn-
sylvania, and not those proceedings brought against local government
because local taxing authorities do not enjoy sovereign immunity.1 8 3
The court then turned its attention to the correct interpretation of
"under a plan confirmed" in section 1146(c) as it was used in the NVR
reorganization plan. 184 NVR argued, and the lower courts held, that
section 1146(c) exempted NVR from transfer and recording taxes
made throughout the bankruptcy period.'85 However, the local tax-
ing authorities argued that the text of the section makes clear that the
exemption only applies to transfers made after the confirmation of
the reorganization plan.'8 6 The court set out to decide which trans-
fers were "under a plan confirmed" and thus exempt from taxation
under section 1146(c).
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that
all the transfers made by the debtor during the bankruptcy period
were "in furtherance of, or in connection with the Plan," as it was set
out in section 4.13 of the plan.' 87 The lower courts had reasoned that
if the transfers were necessary to the confirmation of the plan, then
they satisfied the "under a plan confirmed" requirement. 18 8 The
court pointed out that this interpretation of section 1146(c) enjoys
support from the lower courts of the Second Circuit. 8 0
181. Id. at 454.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978);
Gray, 51 F.3d at 431).
184. Id. at 454-55.
185. See id. at 454.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see, e.g., City of New York v. Smoss Enters. Corp. (In re Smoss Enters. Corp.), 54
B.R. 950, 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding a sale "under a plan" confirmed because "the trans-
fer of the property was essential to the confirmation of the plan"); see also supra notes 133-
139 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's approach to "under a plan
confirmed").
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The court began its analysis by observing that the Second Circuit
alone had addressed this issue in In reJacoby-Bender.9 ° According to
the In re NVR court, in Jacoby-Bender, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit found the transfers exempt because they were "necessary
to the consummation of a plan."'9 1 The Fourth Circuit further men-
tioned that lower federal courts in the Second Circuit had mutated
the term "consummation" to "confirmation." '92 The court rejected
this adaptation and stated that making all transfers necessary to the
confirmation of the plan was in "defeasance of § 1146(c)'s own
terms." '193 The court reasoned that while some interpretation of the
reorganization plan is needed to determine which transfers fall within
the scope of the plan, section "1146(c) [itself] determines the ulti-
mate extent of its operation. ' 94
The court reasoned that because the bankruptcy court ultimately
confirmed the plan, all of the transfers were "in furtherance of, or in
connection with the Plan."' 95 The court however, noted the restric-
tive terms of 1146(c) and held this language too expansive to survive
judicial scrutiny.'96 The court held that the issue turned on the defi-
nition of the phrase "under a plan confirmed" in the text of 1146
(c).197 The court, looking at the dictionary definitions of the term
"under," concluded that "a transfer made prior to the date of plan
confirmation could not be subordinate to, or authorized by, some-
thing that did not exist at the date of transfer-a plan confirmed by
the court."'98 As such, the court concluded that only the post confir-
mation transfers were "under a plan confirmed" and exempted from
the taxation by 1146(c).' 99
The court noted NVR's interpretation but rejected the proposi-
tion that "by mixing § 1146(c), the Plan, the bankruptcy court's order,
and a dash of legislative history, private parties in partnership with
federal courts can create new and improved tax exemptions for debt-
190. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 455.
191. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender,
Inc. (In reJacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir. 1985)).
192. Id. at 456 ("Lower courts, however, have extended the Second Circuit's language
and alteredJacoby-Bende's holding, changing the test from 'necessary to the consummation
of a plan,' to 'necessary to the confirmation of a plan.'" (quoting City of New York v. Smoss
Enters. Corp. (In re Smoss Enters. Corp.), 54 B.R. 950, 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1985))).
193. Id.
194. Id.




199. Id. at 458.
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ors in reorganization proceedings. '20 ' The court stated that interpret-
ing the plan in NVR's favor impermissibly expanded their judicial
power over legislative enactments. 20 The court noted the legislative
intent of 1146(c):
Congress struck a most reasonable balance. If a debtor is
able to develop a Chapter 11 reorganization and obtain con-
firmation, then the debtor is to be afforded relief from cer-
tain taxation to facilitate the implementation of the
reorganization plan. Before a debtor reaches this point,
however, the state and local tax systems may not be subjected
to federal interference.20 2
The court then concluded that "[r] easonable or not, we are bound to
implement the statute as it is written" and held that only the transfers
made after the plan was confirmed were exempt from the taxation
under 1146(c).20 3
Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote separately in concurrence with the
court's decision.20 4 Wilkinson stated that he did not agree that the
plain language of section 1146(c) compelled the court's decision of
holding only post confirmation transfers exempt from taxation. 2 5
The Chief Judge disagreed that section 1146(c) clearly contained a
temporal element, and he stated his preference towards making exis-
tence of the plan determinative of its coverage, rather than the timing
of the confirmation. 2 6 He stated that "[i] n a complicated reorganiza-
tion a debtor-in-possession may operate for some time pursuant to the
terms of an unconfirmed plan while it negotiates with its creditors. It
is far from obvious that those transfers fall outside section 1146(c)."20 7
Furthermore, ChiefJudge Wilkinson noted that NVR's reading of
the exemption to include transfers prior to the plan's confirmation
"comport[s] with a central purpose of our bankruptcy laws: 'permit-
ting business debtors to reorganize and restructure their debts in or-
der to revive the debtors' businesses and thereby preserve jobs and
200. Id. at 457.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 458.
203. Id.
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protect investors. "'20' The Chief Judge recognized that holding these
types of transfers exempt could "provide substantial funds to the
debtor," and allow the debtor to "emerge from bankruptcy and
thereby to generate substantial long-term tax revenues. "209
The Chief Judge nevertheless concurred as he found the major-
ity's reading of the statute reasonable. 21 ° He noted that precedent
cautions the judiciary to "proceed carefully" when abrogating the au-
thority of the state and local taxing entities.2 11 He concluded that
"[i]f Congress wished to exempt a bankrupt from state and municipal
taxation, 'the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be col-
lected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt.'
212
4. Analysis.-Justice Holmes succinctly stated in Rock Island, Ar-
kansas & Louisiana Railroad Co. v. United States2 '3 that "[m]en must
turn square corners when they deal with the Government."2 4 The
court's opinion in NVR denied a debtor relief because it failed to turn
the square corners that federal jurisprudence requires when dealing
with state sovereign immunity.
The NVR court first decided that the states could properly claim
immunity from a debtor's action. 2 15 In deciding this issue, the court
surveyed the methods that it had left open for debtors with claims
against the states in a vain attempt to find a fit.2 16 Unable to find that
the debtors complied with its complicated exceptions, the Fourth Cir-
cuit decided that the action could not escape, as it could not be con-
strued as anything less than a "suit against the states" impermissible
under the Eleventh Amendment. 21 7 Second, the court went on to de-
termine what constituted transfers "under a plan confirmed" for tax
exemption purposes in circumstances where the defendant's claims of
immunity failed. 21 8 In deciding that the states were immune from the
208. Id. at 459 (quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991)) (citing Landmark




211. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting California State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1989) (holding that a court must proceed
carefully when construing a federal abrogation of state and local taxing authorities)).
212. Id. (quoting Swars v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
213. 254 U.S. 141 (1920).
214. Rock Island, 254 U.S. at 143.
215. See In re NVR 189 F.3d at 454; supra note 12.
216. In re NV, 189 F.3d at 450-52.
217. Id. at 454.
218. Id. at 454-58.
20001 1297
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy procedure, 21 9 the court diminished the impact of the sec-
ond issue in the case. Nonetheless, the precedent it established will
have far reaching effects. While the decision rendered was safe and
correct by its binding precedent, the court failed to consider the fact
that the decision will further frustrate and complicate the two pur-
poses of the federal bankruptcy laws.220 While the court might justify
its decision that the debtor simply failed to "turn the square corners"
necessary to obtain redress, a closer look at this opinion shows that
there may have been no clear comers to turn.
While the court correctly applied Eleventh Amendment princi-
ples, it left future debtors with no guidance on how to pursue claims
against the states in similar circumstances. The court in NVR correctly
construed the history of state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment.221 Per the Supreme Court's post Seminole Tibe jurispru-
dence, Congress can only abrogate sovereign immunity when it is leg-
islating under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Seminole Tribe held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity under its Article I powers. 22 2 Article I, section eight of the
Constitution provides that Congress can provide for uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States and thus
provided Congress with the authority to enact the Bankruptcy
Code. 223 As such, the court is justified in holding that section 106 was
unconstitutional as an attempt to abrogate sovereign immunity under
an Article I legislative power.2 2 4
In Schlossberg, however, the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity
to hold that section 106 was constitutional notwithstanding Seminole
Tribe. The Seminole Tibe opinion did not expressly deal with the issue
of whether the statute could have been valid under the Fourteenth
219. Id. at 454.
220. The two purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws are "(1) maximization and equita-
ble distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate and (2) a fresh start for the debtor."
Teresa K. Goebel, Obtaining Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy Proceedings after Seminole
Tribe, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 912 (1998) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 1141
(1994)).
221. See In re NVR, 189 F.2d at 448-54.
222. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. The Court concluded that
[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authori-
zation of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be
used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction.
Id.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
224. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 450 (see supra notes 154-156).
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Amendment.2 25 As such, nothing in Seminole Tribe compels the court's
finding that section 106 was not enacted pursuant to Congress's Four-
teenth Amendment powers. 2 2 ' The court in Schlossberg merely relied
on the lack of evidence as to Congress's passing section 106 pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment.227 The same court, however, in CSX
noted the wealth of authority228 that holds that Congress need not
state expressly that it is legislating under its Fourteenth Amendment
powers for courts to find that the legislation was passed pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment.
229
The NVR court missed an opportunity to re-examine the possibil-
ity that section 106 was enacted under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 23 0 The Due Process Clause reads, "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'231 Ned Waxman and David Christian have made the
argument that in the bankruptcy context this section requires that no
225. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 60. In Seminole Tribe, the Court did not consider the
validity of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment because the Seminole Tribe did
not challenge the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Act was not passed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
226. The Court's recent post-Seminole cases dealing with Congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment show that the Court will re-
quire both extensive evidence that the states are engaging in a pattern of constitutional
violations and that the state's own measures are inadequate to remedy the violations before
they will find abrogation as a valid remedial measure under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); see also supra note 76.
227. See Maryland v. Schlossberg (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C.), 119
F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Because there is no evidence that Congress either passed
the Bankruptcy Code under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or sought to preserve the
core values specifically enumerated in that amendment, we hold that Congress' effort to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . is unconstitutional and
ineffective.").
228. See, e.g., Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243
n.18 (1983) (suggesting that Congress need not, "anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or
Fourteenth Amendment or 'equal protection'" when legislating under the authority
granted by that amendment).
229. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works of W. Va., 138 F.3d 537, 540 (4th Cir.
1998) (referring to "the wealth of precedent establishing that Congress's failure to men-
tion that it acted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
dispositive").
230. Section 106 could not be held valid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as these are limited to eight recognized privileges, not includ-
ing those arising from bankruptcy. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 7-4, at 555-56 (2d ed. 1988) (reciting the eight privileges recognized by the federal
courts); see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (listing some privileges of
national citizenship). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed that bankruptcy is
not a constitutional right. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (remarking
that "[t] here is no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy").
231. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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state deprive any person of property without substantive due process
of law.23 2 Several justices of the Supreme Court have recognized that
the Due Process Clause contains a substantive as well as a procedural
element. In Washington v. Glucksberg,2" Justice Souter noted in con-
currence that "[t] he text of the Due Process Clause ... imposes noth-
ing less than an obligation to give substantive content to the words...
'due process of law"'.234
Specifically in NVR, section 1146(c) vested NVR with a property
right in the exempted taxes.2" 5 Without section 1146(c), NVR would
have no practical way to protect this property right, and thus, the
states remain free to deprive NVR of this portion of its estate without
substantive due process of law.
In 1999, however, the Supreme Court reinforced that the scope
of legislative power granted by the Fourteenth Amendment is reme-
dial and nonsubstantive.236 Thus, any law passed under Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment powers must be shown to have a remedial or
corrective purpose and not grant any new substantive rights. 237
Congress enacted section 106 such that bankruptcy courts could
treat States like all the other creditors to a bankrupt's estate and
thereby remedy the problem that states' claims of sovereign immunity
had engendered by forcing the courts to try and dispose of a bank-
rupt's estate without all the claimants to the estate represented.23 8 In
1994, Congress in further recognition that state claims of sovereign
immunity were frustrating the goals of a federal uniform system of
232. See Ned W. Waxman & David C. Christian II, Federal Powers After Seminole Tribe:
Constitutionally Bankrupt, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 467, 491 (1999) (suggesting that the "most logi-
cal interpretation of 'without due process of law' is: without the protections provided by
the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code against state deprivation of property of
the bankruptcy estate").
233. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
234. Id. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-43
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
235. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 673 (1912) ("[T]he provision that the land
should be non-taxable was a property right, which Congress undoubtedly had the power to
grant. That right fully vested in the Indians and was binding upon Oklahoma.").
236. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1999) (finding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was not remedial and thus exceeded Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment Section Five enforcement power).
237. The Court reaffirmed that abrogation provisions must be remedial and nonsub-
stantive under City of Borne in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents; see supra notes 76 & 225 (noting the court
requirements for Congress to enact a valid abrogation provision under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
238. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 Historical and Revision Notes, Legislative Statements (Reform
Act of 1978) (stating that section 106 indicates that the use of the term "creditor" in title 11
applies to governmental units notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity).
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bankruptcy, amended section 106.239 Section 106 does not grant any
new right to debtors; it "merely requires states to adhere to the uni-
form laws on bankruptcy, as must all other creditors in a bankruptcy
case."2 4°1 As such, there is a clear foundation for holding that section
106 is a constitutional use of Congress's remedial power to enforce
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
24
'
The court was not compelled by its precedent to hold section 106
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.24 2 However, a re-
view of the viable options that debtors in similar circumstances will
now face when seeking equitable relief illustrates the impracticality of
the court's decision and the possibility that the decision leaves the
debtors without the ability to exercise their federally granted tax re-
lief. In Collins and Antonelli, the court attempted to provide a mode of
redress for debtors and implicitly advocated that debtors not pay the
taxes that they thought were exempt.243 If the states wished to pursue
those taxes, they would have to waive their immunity and subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 24 4 The court con-
ceded in both cases that the states would be in a difficult position if
they wished to share in the assets of a bankrupt estate,245 but nonethe-
less ruled that the states could not use claims of state sovereign immu-
nity to dictate the outcome of the cases.24 6
239. See id. Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decisions in Hoffman v. Connect-
icut Department of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989) and United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) that abrogation of sovereign immunity be unmistakably clear and
unequivocally expressed in order to be given effect and revised § 106 in 1994 (Reform Act
of 1994) to make their intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity unmistakably clear.
240. Waxman & Christian, supra note 231, at 492.
241. See id. at 493 (noting that section 106 "is constitutional as a remedial provision
designed to protect property rights in bankruptcy cases from deprivation by states without
due process of law").
242. In light of the Court's recent decisions in this area, litigants seeking to hold section
106 constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment must not only show that the legisla-
tion is remedial in nature but also extensive evidence of a pattern of constitutional viola-
tions by the state and inadequate state remedies to these violations. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, and Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, see supra notes 76, 225 & 238 (discussing Florida Prepaid and Kimel's impact on abro-
gation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
243. See Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins), 173 F.3d 924, 930 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that
"[iun short, if a state wishes to share in the estate, it must submit to federal jurisdiction");
Maryland v. Antonelli Creditor's Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir. 1997)
("The state, of course, well may choose not to appear in federal court. But that choice
carries with it the consequence of foregoing any challenge to the federal court's actions.").
244. See In re Collins, 173 F.3d at 930-31; Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 787.
245. See In re Collins, 173 F.3d at 931 (placing states in a "tough spot"); Antonelli, 123 F.3d
at 787 (creating a choice that is not "ideal").
246. In re Collins, 173 F.3d at 926; Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786-87.
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This remedy, however, would be essentially meaningless to a
debtor like NVR. NVR was in the business of building and selling real
estate.247 If they did not pay the stamp and recording taxes that sec-
tion 1146(c) held as exempt, they would be unable to transfer proper-
ties and their business would be brought to a standstill. 248 Without
the ability to continue transferring properties, there was no way for
NVR to reorganize and to emerge from bankruptcy. 249 As such the
"withhold payment until the state makes a claim" remedy that the
court advocated in the past provides no relief for a debtor like NVR
whose day to day business depends upon clarity in its tax procedures.
The debtor could seek an Ex parte Young injunction to prevent the
taxing authorities from enforcing the stamp and recordation taxes
that section 1146(c) exempted.2 10 This federal injunction, if recog-
nized by all of the state and local taxing authorities251 might allow a
debtor in the real estate business to continue its operations while in
bankruptcy. Considering the second part of the court's holding,
252
however, a debtor seeking to use this mode of redress would have to
file for bankruptcy, have the agreement of all its creditors regarding
its reorganization plan, have the court approve the plan, and be
granted Ex parte Young injunctions against all of the state and local
taxing authorities, all on the same day, to take full advantage of the
1146(c) tax exemption.253
247. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 447.
248. See Brief for Appellee at 13, In re NVR (No. 98-2211) (stating that "[t] he acquisition
and sale of sufficient properties during the chapter 11 period was the crucial factor in
insuring NVR's survivability").
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Ex parte Young doc-
trine).
251. The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 28 U.S.C. § 1341 provides: "The district courts
shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State." Thus, whether a federal injunction will be recognized in these circumstances de-
pends on whether the various state courts where NVR transacts business will provide a
"plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy to allow NVR to take advantage of the federal tax
injunction embodied in 1146 (c). See, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church 457 U.S.
393, 412 & n.28 (1982) (noting that a refund remedy conditioned by payment under pro-
test was "adequate" and Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303 (1952)
(finding a state remedy that would require the filing of over three hundred separate claims
in fourteen different counties to protect a single federal claim asserted by the taxpayer was
not "efficient" under the statute).
252. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 458 (holding that post petition pre-confirmation transfers
were not exempted from taxes owed).
253. Under the second part of the court's holding in In re NVR, in which the court held
that post petition pre-confirmation transfers were not exempted from taxes owed, In re
NVR, 189 F.3d at 458, a debtor would have to file for bankruptcy, have the agreement of all
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If the court continues to follow the Seminole Tribe reasoning, how-
ever, it might even find that Ex parte Young injunctions are not availa-
ble to the debtor.254 The Fourth Circuit would have to look to the
relief that Congress intended in bankruptcy actions against the
states. 25  Due to the existence of abrogation in the Bankruptcy Code
under section 106, the court might conclude that a litigated settle-
ment between the debtor and the state, and not Ex parte Young injunc-
tions, was the relief Congress intended when a debtor has a claim
against a State in Bankruptcy. As such, injunctions might be held im-
permissible as beyond Congress's intention in the Bankruptcy Code.
Thus, the debtor would be forced to pursue a remedy in state
court and attempt, under the Supremacy Clause, to have the state
courts uphold the section 1146(c) federal tax exemption. 256 How-
ever, here the debtor would have to overcome the states' common law
claims to sovereign immunity in their own courts.2 57
Practically, getting state court orders that the taxes were exempt
from all the states that a national real estate developer deals with
would take so much time that this remedy would be so inefficient as to
be without value.25 Thus, without a means for getting the tax exemp-
tion enforced against the state taxing authorities, 259 the tax exemp-
tion becomes worthless, and Congress's purpose in enacting section
its creditors regarding its reorganization plan, have the court approve the plan, and seek
the Ex parte Young injunction on the same day to get full relief.
254. See supra note 68 (discussing the limiting effect that Seminole Tribe may have upon
scope of future Ex parte Young injunctions).
255. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (concluding that
"[w] here Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular
federal right, we have in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme
with one created by the judiciary").
256. See Richard Lieb, Eleventh Amendment Immunity of a State in Bankruptcy Cases: A New
Jurisprudential Approach, 7 Am. BANKR. INST. L. Rrv. 269, 331-33 (1998) (noting that if the
Eleventh Amendment were to bar the proceeding from being conducted in a bankruptcy
court then the proceeding would have to be brought in a state court).
257. See id. at 331-33 (1998) (noting that "the abrogation or waiver of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity... does not necessarily waive the state's own non-Eleventh Amend-
ment (common law) sovereign immunity from suits in its own courts").
258. See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303 (1952) (finding
a state remedy that would require the filing of over three hundred separate claims in four-
teen different counties to protect a single federal claim asserted by the taxpayer was not an
.efficient" remedy under the Tax Injunction Act of 1937 and thus did not allow the tax-
payer to exercise its federal claim).
259. The federal courts may find that requiring a debtor to obtain state court orders
from the numerous state courts is so inefficient as to effectively prevent the debtor from
exercising his federal tax exemption. As such, even under the recently announced height-
ened standards for federal abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal courts could find that the state remedy is so inadequate as to
justify federal abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment; see supra notes 76, 225, 238 &
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1146(c), giving debtors a form of relief such that they can reorganize
and emerge as viable tax revenue producing entities, is frustrated.
The court rested its determination that the section 9014 motion
was a suit under the Eleventh Amendment on the fact that the pro-
ceeding required that the court raid the state's treasuries.260 This as-
pect of the court's holding is again safe and correct under Supreme
Court precedent holding that actions impacting a state's treasury
are almost per se suits against the states under the Eleventh
Amendment. 261
In the second main issue of the case, the court considered what
constitutes a transfer "under a plan confirmed" under section
1146(c). 26 2 This issue took on a less important role after the court
found the states immune from the jurisdiction of the court because
the majority of the taxes were paid to the states.263 While the court's
decision on this issue is justifiable and safe, the court again failed to
consider the practical effects of its decision and the impact of its hold-
ing on bankruptcy reorganizations.
The court focused on the language used in section 1146(c) and
not its role in the bankruptcy setting.264 The court based its holding
on the dictionary definition of the word "under" finding the transfers
that occurred before the plan's confirmation not technically carried
out "under" the authority of a "plan confirmed. ' 26 5 The court also
relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in California State Board of
Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc.2 6 6 to justify a narrow construction of
section 1146(c) favoring the state.267
243 (discussing Forida Prepaid and Kimets impact on Congress's ability to pass valid reme-
dial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
260. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 454.
261. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1994) (noting that
the primary factor in determining whether a state can claim immunity is whether the ac-
tion directly impacts the state treasury); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of
Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("We have previously held that the nature of a suit as
one against the state is to be determined by the essential nature and effect of the
proceeding.").
262. See In re NVR 189 F.3d at 454-58.
263. Id. at 454. Since the states were found immune from the proceeding, the remain-
der of the opinion only deals with the transfer and recording taxes assessed against the
debtor by the local taxing authorities who do not enjoy sovereign immunity.
264. See In re N, 189 F.3d at 455-58; see also supra note 203.
265. Id. at 457.
266. 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
267. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 457. The NVR court was guided by the language of the
Sierra Summit opinion which stated that "[a]lthough Congress can confer an immunity
from state taxation.... a court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemp-
tion from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed." Id. at 457 (quoting Sierra
Summit, 490 U.S. at 851-52).
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The court's holding ignores the Supreme Court mandate that
statutes should be interpreted by the courts in accordance with their
clear purpose and context.268 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in In reJacoby-Bender, Inc. did not hesitate to look to the pur-
pose of section 1146(c) and find that a transfer not mentioned in the
plan could be under the confirmed plan.269 While the Fourth Circuit
in NVR correctly noted that the nonspecified transfer in Jacoby-Bender
was post confirmation, it completely ignored the court's commentary
regarding the basis of its holding.27 ° In Jacoby-Bender, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that "Congress's apparent purpose in enacting section
1146(c) was to facilitate tax relief."' 27 ' The court continued, "where,
as here, a transfer, and hence an instrument of transfer, is necessary
to the consummation of a plan, the plan seems implicitly to have
'dealt with' the transfer instrument."272
Other lower federal courts in the Second Circuit have construed
the holding in Jacoby-Bender as support for the proposition that all
transfers "necessary" or "essential" to the confirmed plan are under a
plan confirmed and exempted by section 1146(c).273 While the court
in NVR attempted to distinguish Jacoby-Bender and its progeny,27 4 it
should have considered the fact that all the transfers that NVR made
during its time in bankruptcy were notjust necessary, but critical to its
268. See, e.g., United States v. Hiers of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1849) (noting that
"[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy").
269. See City of NewYork v.Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In rejacoby-Bender Inc.), 758 F.2d 840,
841-42 (2d Cir. 1985) (relying on statutory purpose and legislative history in addition to
plain meaning to determine whether the debtor was exempt under a confirmed reorgani-
zation plan).
270. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 455-56.
271. In reJacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841.
272. Id. at 842.
273. SeeCity of NewYork v. Smoss Enters. Corp. (In reSmoss Enters. Corp.), 54 B.R. 950,
951 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying Jacoby-Bender and finding that "the transfer of the property
was essential to the confirmation of the plan"); In re Permar Provisions, Inc., 79 B.R. 530,
534 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the legal standard to determine if the sale of property
was made under a plan confirmed is whether the sale was essential to the confirmation of
the plan).
274. See In re NVR, 189 F.3d at 455-56. While Jacoby-Bender itself dealt with a post confir-
mation transfer, Smoss and Permar dealt with pre-petition post confirmation transfers simi-
lar to those dealt with in NVR. See In re Smoss, 54 B.R. at 951 (holding that the post
confirmation transfer was exempted because, "the transfer was contemplated by the Bank-
ruptcy Court when it ruled on the [debtor's] application for exemption"); In re Perrar, 79
B.R. at 534 (holding that the post-petition, pre-confirmation sale of real property was
under a plan confirmed as the sale was essential to the confirmation of the plan).
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emergence from bankruptcy.2 75 As the Second Circuit noted, Con-
gress enacted section 1146(c) to provide tax relief and to promote
reorganization.2 76 As outlined in the Appellees Brief, the transfers
and their exempt status allowed NVR to reorganize and eventually
emerge from bankruptcy with satisfied creditors.277 The Bankruptcy
Court even noted that NVR was a "textbook example" of how a suc-
cessful reorganization should work.
2 71
NVR operated for fifteen months279 prior to the plan's confirma-
tion, and the exempt status of the transfers allowed NVR to convince
its creditors that it could reorganize and emerge.28 °
Furthermore, NVR acted under the auspices of the Bankruptcy
Court from the moment it filed bankruptcy, and the court decided to
allow it to continue to operate as a debtor in possession.21  Because
all of NVR's transactions occurred under the auspices of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, all of the transfers could be construed in connection
with the eventual plan and subject to section 1146(c).28 2 By holding
otherwise, the court's decision will have the perverse effect of encour-
aging debtors to stay in reorganization for longer periods of time in
order to reap the benefits of the tax exemption after plan
confirmation.
A more purpose-oriented construction of section 1146(c) would
facilitate rapid reorganization, one of the fundamental aims of bank-
ruptcy, and would allow debtors to minimize the time that they spend
under the court's jurisdiction. The court's holding in NVR will cause
debtors to seek to remain in reorganization longer and thus waste the
judicial resources of the bankruptcy court. In his concurrence, Chief
275. See Brief for Appellee at 17, In re NVR (No. 98-2211) (quoting the Bankruptcy
Court's language that the transfers were "necessary to [NVR's] emergence from bank-
ruptcy" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
276. See supra notes 269-272 and accompanying text (discussing the Jacoby-Bender court's
reliance on the purpose of section 1146(c)).
277. See Brief for Appellee at 17, In re NVR (No. 98-2211) (remarking that "[tihe reve-
nues [the transfers] generated allowed NVR to convince the market that NVR had a viable
Plan, and a viable future").
278. Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. NVR operated from April 6, 1992 to July 22, 1993. See id. at 10-14. The chapter 11
was filed on April 6, 1992, and the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan on July 22, 1993.
See id.
280. See id. at 16-18.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 17-18 (noting that the Bankruptcy Court found and the parties did not
dispute that all of the transfers were made under the jurisdiction and with the authoriza-
tion of the Bankruptcy Court).
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Judge Wilkinson noted the impracticalities of the court's holding. 28 3
While eventually agreeing that the court's interpretation was "reasona-
ble,' 2 4 he noted the lack of a plain "temporal element" in section
1146(c) and said that it was unclear that section 1146(c) required the
exclusion of post petition pre-confirmation transfers. 2 5 He suggested
that "reading the phrase [under a plan confirmed] to require only
that the plan ultimately be confirmed would comport with a central
purpose of our bankruptcy laws: 'permitting business debtors to reor-
ganize and restructure their debts in order to revive the debtors' busi-
nesses and thereby preserve jobs and protect investors.' 286 The Chief
Judge also noted that in a complicated reorganization, a debtor in
possession may operate for months under an unconfirmed plan and
that the substantial funds that section 1146(c) may provide to the
debtor "would permit the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy and
thereby to generate substantial long-term tax revenues."287 The Chief
Judge's concurrence notes the practical adverse affects that the hold-
ing may have on bankruptcy reorganizations.
The state sovereign immunity issue will continue to appear before
the courts as statistics show that in 1996, states are creditors in twenty-
five percent of all bankruptcy cases and hold claims of over 3.6 bil-
lion.288 Thus, to effectuate the two purposes of bankruptcy, 289 the
bankruptcy courts need to continue to find ways to render decisions
and orders that impact the States. As Congress recognized in drafting
and re-drafting section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy
courts need to be able to settle all the claims for and against a bank-
rupt's estate, including the claims that involve the States as a credi-
tor.290 By continuing to hold section 106 unconstitutional, the court
creates confusion and disorder through out the bankruptcy process
and will inevitably lead to further cases appearing before the Fourth
Circuit.
283. See In re NM, 189 F.3d at 458-59 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
284. Id. at 459.
285. Id. at 458-59.
286. Id. at 459 (quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991)).
287. Id.
288. See Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Special
Tables, Table F-2 for the Twelve-Month Period Ended Dec. 31, 1998 (tables on file with the
Statistics Division).
289. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) and 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
290. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (Reform Act of 1994); see also COLLIER ON BANKRuF-rcy § 106.LH
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1999) (noting that Section 106 was amended in order to
make clear Congress's intent to abrogate sovereign immunity).
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5. Conclusion. -Justice Holmes pointed out that, "[m]en must
turn square corners when they deal with the Government,"291 and in
the area of state sovereign immunity debtors can expect to face many
square corners. N, however, illustrates that there are times when
even "turning square comers" will not suffice when seeking relief in
the federal courts. As the analysis illustrates, the Fourth Circuit's juris-
prudence may not provide a debtor in NVR's circumstances any
method to seek relief. This inequitable result typifies the confused
and impractical effects that the Supreme Court's holding in Seminole
Tribe has had on lower federal courts throughout the country in exclu-
sively federal cases. Critics and federal judges are now seeking the
"Magic Bullet to Beat Seminole."2" 2 Unless the Supreme Court or Con-
gress reviews and resolves the difficulties that Seminole Tribe has cre-
ated, state sovereign immunity will continue to leave litigants with
federal causes of action against the states with potentially un-navigable
modes of redress.
ROBERT UHLFELDER
291. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
292. Mark Browning, A Magic Bullet to Beat Seminole , 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10
(1998) (describing methods to be used to avoid the effects of Seminole on debtors).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The First Amendment Challenge of the "Reasonable Likelihood"
Standard for Restricting Lawyer Speech
In In re Morrissey,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
examined the constitutionality of a Local Rule of the Eastern District
of Virginia (Local Rule 57)2 that restricts lawyer speech on certain
topics during pending criminal litigation.3 Specifically, the court con-
sidered whether Local Rule 57 was unconstitutionally vague in viola-
tion of the First Amendment.4 Local Rule 57 prohibits an attorney's
dissemination of information or opinion about a pending case when
there is a "reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere
with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of
justice."5
1. 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2394 (1999).
2. Local Rule 57 provides, in part:
(A) Potential or Imminent Criminal Litigation: In connection with pending or
imminent criminal litigation with which a lawyer or a law firm is associated, it is
the duty of that lawyer or firm not to release or authorize the release of informa-
tion or opinion (1) if a reasonable person would expect such information or
opinion to be further disseminated by any means of public communication, and
(2) if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination would interfere with a fair
trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
(C) Pending Criminal Proceedings-Specific Topics: From the time of arrest,
issuance of an arrest warrant, or the filing of a complaint, information, or indict-
ment in any criminal matter until the termination of trial or disposition without
trial, a lawyer or a law firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not
release or authorize the release of any extrajudicial statement which a reasonable
person would expect to be further disseminated by any means of public commu-
nication, if such statement concerns:
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the
lawyer or law firm may announce the identity of the victim if the announcement
is not otherwise prohibited by law;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the
case or the evidence in the case. D. E.D.Va. R. 57.
U.S. DIsT. CT. RuLEs E.D. VA., Local Criminal Rule 57 (emphasis added).
3. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 137-41.
4. Id. at 137-38; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment Freedom of
Speech Clause provides in part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech." Under the test established in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), a regula-
tion proscribing lawyer speech "must further an important or substantial government in-
terest ... [and] the limitation on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."
Id. at 413.
5. U.S. DIST. CT. RULES E.D. VA., Local Criminal Rule 57(A) (2); see also supra note 2.
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The court rejected the appellant's argument that recent Supreme
Court precedent permitted the restriction of an attorney's speech
only if there was a "substantial likelihood" of material prejudice, and
held, based on its own earlier precedent, that "the 'reasonable likeli-
hood' standard is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional
muster."
6
This Note examines the precedent and tests employed by courts
to balance free speech and Sixth Amendment rights, 7 in addition to
arguing that, for reasons of consistency and due respect for an attor-
ney's free speech rights, the "reasonable likelihood of prejudice" test
upheld in Morrissey should be overturned in favor of the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" test endorsed by the Supreme
Court.8
1. The Case.--On January 16, 1997, Joel W. Harris, a long-time
political operative and former mayoral aide, was indicted on state
drug distribution charges.9 The following day he hired appellant Jo-
seph D. Morrissey as his attorney.1" Due to Harris's political connec-
tions and the salacious details of the alleged crime, his indictment
drew substantial media coverage in the Richmond area." The state
prosecutors were hampered by accusations of partisanship on the part
of local officials investigating the case.' 2 Eventually, political pressure
overwhelmed the investigation, and the case was moved to federal
court.13
In preparation for the trial, Morrissey hired investigator James
"Bubba" Bates, who helped him determine the identity of various
6. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 139-40.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion states, in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense.
8. See infra notes 89-97 (discussing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030
(1991)).
9. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 136.
10. See id.
11. See id. (noting that "[t]he indictment alleged that Harris had exchanged drugs for
sexual favors"); Brief of the United States as Appellee at 4-5, In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134
(4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4168) (describing witness testimony before the grand jury in which
the alleged distribution of cocaine was said to have taken place in the context of group sex
and orgies at Harris's home).
12. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 136.
13. See id.
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grand jury witnesses including John Buerkley.'4 Bates set up an inter-
view between Morrissey and Buerkley.15 During the interview, which
Morrissey videotaped, Buerkley recanted much of his grand jury testi-
mony,1 6 as well as previous statements he had made to law enforce-
ment officers.17 Neither Morrissey nor Bates disputed the fact that
they were aware that Buerkley would be called as a government wit-
ness during trial.'"
Two days after this interview, Harris was indicted on federal drug
distribution charges. 9 The indictment included allegations that he
had traded drugs for sexual favors-licentious details that added to
the media frenzy in the Richmond area.2" On the same day, James B.
Comey, the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case, sent
Morrissey a copy of the indictment and enclosed a copy of Local Rule
57 regarding extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. 2' Because
Morrissey had a reputation for aggressive use of the media in high-
profile criminal cases, "Comey felt the need to remind [him] of the
applicability of Local Rule 57 because . . . comments similar to the
ones that Morrissey had previously made during the state proceedings
would be prohibited in federal court under this rule."2 2 For example,
Morrissey held a press conference shortly before Harris's federal in-
dictment where he (Morrissey) said that the witnesses in the case were
"a plate of cockroaches that the locals were trying to get Helen Fahey
[the U.S. Attorney] to take." 23
On February 11, 1997, attorneyJohn Honey, counsel for another
potential government witness against Harris, telephoned Morrissey to
warn him against approaching Honey's client for an interview. 24 Dur-
ing that conversation, Morrissey told Honey that he had scheduled a
press conference for that afternoon and had planned to show the




17. See Appellee's Brief at 5-6, Morrissey (No. 98-4168).
18. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 136.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Appellee's Brief at 6, Morrissey (No. 98-4168).
22. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 136.
23. Appellee's Brief at 7, Morrissey (No. 98-4168) (quoting testimony of Assistant U.S.
Attorney Comey).




Morrissey also told investigator Bates, and Buerkley's counsel Au-
gustus Hydrick, about the planned press conference.26 Both Hydrick
and Bates suggested to Morrissey that he not hold the press confer-
ence for fear it would jeopardize future attempts to interview other
witnesses.27 Hydrick later testified that Morrissey said he needed to
do it to send a message to the other witnesses 28 and to "rock their
world. '29 Comey also found out about the press conference and faxed
Morrissey a letter that again highlighted Local Rule 57, in particular,
subsections (C) (4) and (C) (6)." Comey's letter strongly recom-
mended that Morrissey cancel. 1 Morrissey went ahead with the press
conference anyway during which he played the videotape of Buer-
kley's recantation.12 The event received extensive television and print
media coverage throughout the Richmond area.33
After the press conference, Morrissey responded to Comey's let-
ter, claiming that he had discussed Local Rule 57 with three former
prosecutors and, based on their advice, decided to proceed with the
press conference 34-a contention that was later discredited during
the show cause hearingsY.3  Morrissey also attempted to justify his ac-
tions by insisting that his statements to the media only dealt with the
state case and the tainting of witnesses before the state grand jury.36
At that time, all state charges against Harris had been dismissed and
only federal charges remained.37 According to investigator Bates,
Morrissey called the press conference to shake up other witnesses.38
Morrissey, on the other hand, claimed that he meant only to induce
others to come forward.39 But as may have been anticipated, these
acts rattled several potential witnesses including one who threatened




29. Appellee's Brief at 9, Morrissey (No. 98-4168).
30. See id.; see also supra note 2 (quoting relevant portions of Local Rule 57).




35. See id. at 136; see also Appellee's Brief at 11 n.5, Morrissey (No. 98-4168) (discussing
Morrissey's claim that he had spoken to three former prosecutors and quoting testimony
from In re Morrissey, 996 F. Supp. 530, 534 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
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The day after the press conference, the district judge issued a
show cause order to Morrissey.41 It charged him with willfully violat-
ing Local Rule 57 by holding a press conference to discuss informa-
tion and the credibility of a prospective government witness in a
pending criminal proceeding. 42 At Morrissey's February 19th show
cause hearing, the district court judge reminded both sides about Lo-
cal Rule 57 and warned of harsh punishment for future violations.43
Two weeks before Harris's trial was to begin, in an interview with
a local newspaper reporter, Morrissey again made public statements
about the case.4 4 He stated that the charges against Harris were vin-
dictive and vicious and claimed that if these charges had been filed
when he was a prosecutor, they would have been laughed out of
court.45 Based on these comments, the court issued a second show
cause order to Morrissey and again charged him with willfully violat-
ing Local Rule 57 by making statements to a newspaper reporter re-
garding the merits of Harris's pending case.4 6
Morrissey moved to dismiss the show cause orders, arguing that
Local Rule 57 impermissibly infringed on his right to free speech.47
The district court denied the motion to dismiss and conducted a
bench trial on the charges.4" At trial, the district court found that
Morrissey knowingly and willfully violated Local Rule 57, in particular,
sections (C) (4) and (C) (6)." Those sections prohibit attorneys from
making public statements concerning the identity, testimony, or credi-
bility of prospective witnesses, and from giving any opinion as to the
merits of a pending case. 5' The court held that Morrissey's actions
were reasonably likely to adversely affect the jury pool, to make jury
selection more difficult, and to interfere with prospective witnesses.5'
Subsequently, the court found him guilty of two violations of Local





45. See id.; see also Appellee's Brief at 12-13, Morrissey (No. 98-4168) (quoting Morris-
sey's exact words).




50. See U.S. DisT. CT. RULES E.D. VA., Local Criminal Rule 57(C)(4), (C)(6).
51. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 137 (summarizing the holding in In re Morrissey, 996 F. Supp.
530 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
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years probation.5 2 In addition, Morrissey was suspended from practic-
ing law in the Eastern District of Virginia for two years. 53
Basing his argument on the Supreme Court decision in Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada,54 Morrissey appealed the district court's finding
that Local Rule 57 does not violate the First Amendment.55 More spe-
cifically, he claimed that the Gentile holding implied that the "reasona-
ble likelihood" standard was unconstitutional, arguing that it and the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard cannot both be
sufficiently narrowly tailored so as to withstand a constitutional
challenge. 6
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Supreme Court's Early Guidelines for Lawyer Speech.-As
early as 1887, lawyers were officially warned to "Avoid Newspaper Dis-
cussion of Legal Matters. '5 7 At least one state reasoned that
"[n] ewspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of pending
or anticipated litigation ... tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts,
and otherwise prejudice the due administration ofjustice." s In 1908,
the American Bar Association published its own code entitled "Canon
of Professional Ethics" that was thereafter adopted by many states.59
Canon 20 of that ABA code stated: "Newspaper publications by a law-
yer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair
trial in the Courts and may otherwise prejudice the due administra-
tion of justice. Generally they are to be condemned."6 °
In the mid-1900s, the Supreme Court heard several cases involv-
ing a court's right to suppress free speech and freedom of the press in
the interest of fair trials and due process. Bridges v. California,6 for
example, involved a contempt of court charge for the publisher and
managing editor of a California newspaper. The newspaper printed
an editorial that strongly advocated harsh sentences for two union en-
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
55. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 137.
56. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, 6-9, Morrissey (No. 98-4168).
57. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting AL.aBMtA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1887)).
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23, 356 (1953)).
59. See id.
60. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 20 (1908)).
61. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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forcers convicted of assaulting nonunion truck drivers6 2 and sent a
telegram to the Secretary of Labor while a motion for new trial was
pending in a case between the two unions.6"
A 5-4 Court overturned the contempt charges and found that
"the judgments below result in a curtailment of expression that can-
not be dismissed as insignificant."64 The majority explained that "[i]f
they can bejustified at all, it must be in terms of some serious substan-
tive evil which they are designed to avert. '65 Justice Black's majority
opinion acknowledged the high standards of previous cases that re-
quired a "clear and present danger" of bringing about the particular
evil in question" and stated that "the substantive evil must be ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished."67 As evidenced by this decision, a high
bar protecting First Amendment rights was being set.
In language that would seem to contradict the "reasonable likeli-
hood" standard of Local Rule 57, the Bridges's Court held that "[i]n
accordance with what we have said on the 'clear and present danger'
cases, neither 'inherent tendency' nor 'reasonable tendency' [of
speech to interfere with the orderly administration of justice] is
enough to justify a restriction of free expression."68 Justice Frank-
furter, on the other hand, offered a spirited dissent in Bridges, making
counter arguments that supported speech restrictions in exchange for
impartial justice.69 "Free speech," he said, "is not so absolute or irra-
tional a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective
protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights. ' 70 Justice
Frankfurter continued:
Freedom of expression can hardly carry implications that
nullify the guarantees of impartial trials. And since courts
are the ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights, a
state may surely authorize appropriate historic means to as-
sure that the process for such vindication be not wrenched
62. See id. at 271-76.
63. See id. at 275-76. The telegram warned of a strike that would tie up the port of Los
Angeles and involve the entire Pacific Coast. See id. at 276.
64. Id. at 270.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 260-64 (citing, among others, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(using "clear and present danger" language), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the "danger apprehended [must be]
imminent")).
67. Id. at 263.
68. Id at 272-73 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 279-305 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 282.
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from its rational tracks into the more primitive melee of pas-
sion and pressure. The need is great that courts be criticized
but just as great that they be allowed to do their duty.71
Finally, Frankfurter asked the majority not to "indulge in an idle play
on words" in adjudicating the constitutionality of speech that has a
"clear and present danger" of affecting impartial justice as opposed to
just a "reasonable tendency" to do the same. 72 The circumstances of
the particular case, he argued, would control the resolution of the
conflict. 73 As will be seen, the fractured decision in Gentile demon-
strates that both sides of the Bridges's argument have survived decades
of First Amendment jurisprudence.7 4
In 1966, the Supreme Court reeled in freedom of speech and
press a bit with its decision in Sheppard v. Maxwelf75 -the sensational
murder case that spawned a media frenzy, not to mention television
shows and movies.76 The appellant, Dr. Samuel Sheppard, claimed
that his due process rights were violated because the state trial judge
allowed prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences in the court-
room.7 7 The Supreme Court agreed and cited a litany of cases as sup-
port including Bridges78 and Pennekamp v. State of Florida.79  The
majority also cited Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and his adherence
to the "undeviating rule" that "[t]he theory of our system is that the
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence
71. Id. at 284.
72. Id. at 295-96.
73. Id. at 296.
74. See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
75. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
76. Both the television show and the movie based on this case were called The Fugitive.
They told the fictional story of a doctor who is falsely accused of murdering his wife, es-
capes from custody, and attempts to hunt down the real killer while avoiding recapture.
Harrison Ford and Tommy Lee Jones starred in the 1993 motion picture. THE FUGITIVE,
Warner Bros. (1993).
77. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 338-45, 349-58 (describing various aspects of carnival-like
pre-trial and trial media activity including "the erection of a press table for reporters inside
the bar [which was] unprecedented"). Id. at 355.
78. Id. at 350 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 271, for the proposition that "[l]egal trials
are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting hall, the radio and
newspaper").
79. Id. (quoting Pennekamp v. Rorida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946), for the proposition that
"[fireedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration ofjustice" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Pennekamp discussed the constitutionality of a contempt conviction. Appellants
were responsible for the publication of two editorials charged to be "unlawfully critical of
the administration of criminal justice in certain cases then pending before the [Dade
county circuit] Court." Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 333.
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and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print. 80
Perhaps Sheppards most far reaching lesson, which supports limits
on lawyer speech when it has a reasonable tendency to have prejudi-
cial effect, comes near the end of the opinion. There, the Court
warned that, "[c]ollaboration between counsel and the press as to in-
formation affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject
to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary mea-
sures."81 Consequently, the Sheppard Court advised that "the cure lies
in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception." 2
The 1974 case, Procunier v. Martinez,83 added yet another litmus
test to be applied when considering the constitutionality of free
speech restrictions.8 4 Specifically, Martinez employed a two-prong test
to gauge the constitutionality of a given restriction: a restriction (1)
must further one or more of the important and substantial govern-
mental interests involved, and (2) must be no greater than is neces-
sary to further the legitimate governmental interest involved. 5 The
governmental interest in securing fair trials and the impartial adminis-
tration of justice passes the first part of the test easily.8 6 After all, as
Justice Frankfurter stated, "l[t] he administration of justice by an im-
partial judiciary has been basic to our conception of freedom ever
since the Magna Carta."8 It is the second prong wherein lies the
rub-how do we determine if a restriction is "no greater than neces-
sary [or essential]" 8 to further the interest involved? Seventeen years
80. Id. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado ex rel.
Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
81. Id. at 363.
82. Id. The court noted that "[tihe courts must take such steps by rule and regulation
that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences." Id.
83. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
84. See id. at 413. Martinez involved a California prison's censorship of prisoner mail
and a ban against the use of law students to conduct attorney-client interviews with in-
mates. Id. at 398.
85. See id. at 411, 413 (referencing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968),
where the Court used a similar approach to determine whether a law prohibiting the burn-
ing of selective service registration certificates was a justified infringement on free
expression).
86. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1057 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("If as a regular matter speech by an attorney about pending
cases raised real dangers [of a kind that burdens the judicial process], then a substantial
governmental interest might support additional regulation of speech.").
87. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
88. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (outlining the two-prong test for constitu-
tionality in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)).
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after Martinez, the Supreme Court would try to answer that very ques-
tion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada-a case almost directly on point
with Morrissey.
In Gentile, a divided Court ruled that Nevada Supreme Court Rule
177 (Rule 177),89 as applied to the appellant Gentile, was void for
vagueness.9 ° Rule 177, a Nevada Court regulation very similar to Lo-
cal Rule 57, prohibited a lawyer from making extrajudicial statements
to the press that he "knows or reasonably should know ... will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding."91
Perhaps most important to the issue at hand, ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist concluded in his majority opinion (as to Parts I and II) that a
"clear and present danger" to fair and impartial adjudication need not
be present because the "'substantial likelihood of material prejudice'
standard applied by Nevada and most other States satisfies the First
Amendment." 2 The ChiefJustice also noted that, because lawyers are
officers of the court, their speech may be more heavily regulated than
89. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, App. B. Rule 177 provides, in
part:
1. A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
3. Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the investiga-
tion or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(a) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(b) the information contained in a public record;
(c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the general
scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and,
except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(d) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(e) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary
thereto;
(f) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when
there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial
harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(g) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to
aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and
the length of the investigation.
90. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-51 (Kennedy, J., Opinion of the Court, Parts III and VI).
91. Id. at 1060 (Appendix to Opinion of Kennedy, J.).
92. Id. at 1062-63 (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion of the Court, Parts I and II).
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that of the press.9' In fact, Rehnquist stated bluntly that the Court's
"opinions in In re Sawye 9 4 and Sheppard v. MaxwelF5 rather plainly in-
dicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases
may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that estab-
lished for regulation of the press."96 Gentile promotes the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard as sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to maintain a "constitutionally permissible balance between the
First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's
interest in fair trials."97
b. Dissension in the Ranks: No Uniform Rule Among the Circuit
Courts.-In Morrissey, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme
Court's ruling in Gentile, but chose to base its decision on its own
cases. Specifically, it looked to its 1974 en banc decision in Hirschkop
v. Snead."s
Hirschkop involved a Virginia attorney's challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a local rule identical to Disciplinary Rule 7-107(b) (DR 7-
107(b)) of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.9" The challenge was brought on grounds that the rule's
application of the "reasonable likelihood" standard impermissibly re-
stricted lawyers' speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 0 0
The en banc Hirschkop court upheld the constitutionality of the
"reasonable likelihood" test and found that the rule "furthered the
important governmental interest of protecting both the accused's and
the public's right to a fair trial." 01 In the 1984 case In re Russell,"°2 the
Fourth Circuit once again applied the "reasonable likelihood" test
93. Id. at 1065-76 (comparing Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), with In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) and
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)).
94. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
95. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
96. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion of the Court, Parts I and II)
(internal citations omitted).
97. Id. at 1075.
98. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 138-40 (finding that Hirschkop had not been overruled by
Gentile and relying on Hirschkop as proper authoritative precedent).
99. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(b) (1980).
100. See Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 362. As noted in Morrissey, Local Rule 57 is very similar to
DR 7-107 in that both rules list "six specific categories of extrajudicial statements that are
expressly prohibited during pending criminal trials if they are judged to be reasonably
likely to materially prejudice the due administration ofjustice." Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 138;
see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting Local Rule 57).
101. Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 363-64.
102. 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1984).
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and reaffirmed the Hirschkop reasoning. 10 3 More recently, in United
States v. Cutler,'0 4 the Second Circuit followed the Hirschkop reasoning
and upheld the constitutionality of a local rule identical to Local Rule
57. l 5 In Cutler, the defense attorney for an alleged organized crime
boss was convicted of misdemeanor criminal contempt for violating
orders and local rules prohibiting extrajudicial statements. The court
affirmed the conviction and held that Local Rule 7 of the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York and its "reasonable likelihood" standard adequately
and constitutionally protected the fair administration of justice.
As noted earlier, some federal circuits disagree with the proposi-
tion that the "reasonable likelihood" standard is constitutional. In
fact, the Morrissey court admitted that "the Seventh Circuit previously
found the 'reasonable likelihood' standard to be unconstitutional."'10 6
More recently, the Ninth Circuit explained the holding in Gentile by
stating that to satisfy the First Amendment, there must be facts show-
ing a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to an adjudicative
proceeding before a lawyer may be disciplined for extrajudicial
comments.
107
There is further confusion as to which rule is the constitutionally
acceptable model at the state level. As noted in Gentile, thirty-two
states have adopted the ABA's Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct10 8 that employs the "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" test.1 09 By contrast, eleven states have adopted the "less
103. Id. at 1010-11 (upholding the trial court's order that potential witnesses in a racially
charged criminal case refrain from making extrajudicial statements concerning the wit-
nesses' potential testimony).
104. 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995).
105. See id. at 835-36 (holding that E.D.N.Y. Crim. R. 7's reasonable likelihood standard
is constitutional and gives due consideration to the effect defense lawyers can have on
prospective jurors).
106. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 138 (referring to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago
Council of Lauyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1975), which involved an association
of Chicago lawyers and its challenge to a local criminal rule of the district court and a
disciplinary rule of the American Bar Association which sought to proscribe extrajudicial
comments by attorneys during both civil and criminal cases).
107. See United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.6 (Supp. 1986).
109. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1039, 1068 n.1 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
Opinion of the Court, Parts I and II). In addition to Nevada, the states that have adopted
the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test or a similar test are: Arizona, Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
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protective . . . 'reasonable likelihood of prejudice' standard."11 Still
five other states and the District of Columbia have chosen a clear and
present danger standard. 1 ' Ironically, the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia (as opposed to the Virginia federal district at issue in Morrissey) is
the only state of the latter five that has explicitly adopted the clear and
present danger language in its rule restricting lawyer speech.1 12
As might be expected, in Morrissey, the appellant viewed Gentile as
a clarifying decision that implicitly overruled Hirschkop and established
the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard as the least
restrictive test available to maintain the balance between an attorney's
free speech rights and the right to the impartial administration ofjus-
tice."' To date, Gentile has not had that simplifying effect. 1 4
3. The Court's Reasoning.-As encouraged by Gentile 5 and Bose
Colp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.," 6 the Fourth Circuit in
Morrissey reviewed the case de novo." 7 Bose stated that in First Amend-
ment cases "an appellate court has an obligation 'to make an indepen-
dent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the
judgement does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of
free expression.'"118
The Fourth Circuit explained that Morrissey's argument was that
the Supreme Court in Gentile implied that the less protective "reasona-
ble likelihood" standard of Local Rule 57 was unconstitutional be-
cause the Court had found the "substantial likelihood" test to be
narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional muster." 9 The Morris-
sey court then noted, however, that it had upheld the "reasonable like-
110. Id at 1068 n.2. The states that have adopted the "reasonable likelihood of
prejudice" test are the following: Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont. Id.
111. See id. at 1068 n.3. The states that have adopted a "clear and present danger" test
or a similar test are Illinois, Maine, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia. Id.
112. Virginia is technically a commonwealth but is referred to as a state in this Note to
differentiate it from the federal entities involved.
113. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 5, In reMorrissey, 168 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1999) (No.
98-4168).
114. See supra notes 109-112 (highlighting the different standards still employed by the
states to control extrajudicial statements of lawyers during pending criminal proceedings).
115. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1038 (Opinion of Kennedy, J.) (stating that because First
Amendment claims implicate the important right of freedom of expression, appellate
courts should independently examine the entire record).
116. 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (discussing the importance of a high degree of judicial
review when free speech rights are involved).
117. Morrissey, 168 F.2d at 137.
118. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285
(1964)).
119. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 137-38.
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lihood" standard in the pre-Gentile case of Hirschkop v. Snead.120 The
court treated the appellant's claim that Gentile overruled Hirschkop,
thereby rendering the "reasonable likelihood" standard unconstitu-
tional as the threshold matter in the case.'
2
'
After outlining the facts in Hirschkop, the court reasoned that Lo-
cal Rule 57 and the rule in Hirschkop are "very similar" in that they
both enumerate six specific categories of extrajudicial statements that
are expressly prohibited during pending litigation. 122 The court
again pointed to the six specific categories of the rule at issue in
Hirschkop as proof that it "was narrowly drawn and provided attorneys
with sufficient notice of what they could and could not publicize.' 21
The Morrissey court also recalled its explicit rejection of the Sev-
enth Circuit's dismissal of the "reasonable likelihood" standard as un-
constitutional and restated that "[ijn our opinion, 'the reasonable
likelihood test divides the innocuous from the culpable, adds clarity to
the rule and makes it more definite in application."'124 Finally, the
court noted that it had reaffirmed Hirschkop in In re Russell,125 a case in
which the "reasonable likelihood" test was applied to a court order in
considering its constitutionality.' 26
The Morrissey court then discussed the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Gentile and whether the Hirschkop decision was silently over-
ruled. The court first reiterated Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Gentile that "few, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fun-
damental than the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors, and an out-
come affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that
fundamental right." 12' The court also mentioned the Chief Justice's
assertion in Gentile that improper extrajudicial statements result in a
high cost to society including the need for new trials, changes in
venue, and other "expensive and time consuming measures."1 28




123. Id. (citing Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 367-68).
124. Id. at 138-39 (quoting Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 370).
125. 726 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (4th Cir. 1984).
126. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 139 (discussing further the court's past reliance on the
Hirschkop holding).
127. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991)).
128. Id. (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075 (Rehnquist, CJ., Opinion of the Court, Parts I
and II)) (noting that even these measures often do not repair the damage of extrajudicial
statements).
[VOL. 59:12751322
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
The Fourth Circuit then summarized Gentile's holding, but cau-
tioned that the Supreme Court did not hold that "substantial likeli-
hood" was the only permissible standard.1 29 The court also noted the
Gentile Court's recognition that there are "different standards, includ-
ing the existence of the 'reasonable likelihood' standard in place in
eleven states"1 3 and the Court's comment that the "'reasonable likeli-
hood' standard is 'less protective of lawyer speech."" 31 The Morrissey
court pointed out, however, that these comments came from Gentile
dicta and that the Court did not attempt to examine the constitution-
ality of other tests.13 2
The court then noted the Second Circuit's United States v. Cutler
decision, 133 a case in which the Second Circuit followed the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in Hirschkop and "upheld the constitutionality of a
local rule identical to Local Rule 57."134 The Morrissey court also ac-
knowledged that the Cutler court cited Gentile "throughout its decision
* . .[without] discuss[ing] the Supreme Court's mention of the 'rea-
sonable likelihood' standard as less protective of lawyer speech." 35
Ultimately, the court found itself in agreement with the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Cutler and held that "Gentile and Hirschkop are con-
sistent with one other."'3 6 The Morrissey court also refused to accept
the appellant's argument that Gentile overruled the holding in
Hirschkop and instead reasoned that "arguing ... a precedent has been
overruled through a court's silence is a disfavored enterprise within
this circuit."'
3 7
Next, the court stated that Local Rule 57's "reasonable likeli-
hood" standard "is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional
muster.' 3 8 It applied the two-prong test of Procunier v. Martinez,
namely, whether the content-based speech restriction (1) "further[s]
an important or substantial government interest" and (2) is "no
greater than necessary or essential to protect the governmental inter-
est involved."'3 9 The court noted that the "real question" is whether
the second prong is satisfied because courts have agreed that protect-
129. Id. (rejecting Morrissey's contention to the contrary).
130. Id. (referring to Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068).
131. Id. (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068).
132. Id.
133. 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995).
134. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 139.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 139-40.
138. Id. at 140.
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 413 (1974)); see also supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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ing the right to a fair criminal trial by an impartial jury is an important
state interest. 140 The court found that Local Rule 57 does satisfy the
second prong in that "it prohibits only the statements that are likely to
threaten the right to a fair trial and an impartial jury" and "explicitly
lists six limited categories of prohibited speech."' 41
Finally, the Morrissey court supported its holding that "Gentile and
Hirschkop are consistent with each other"'42 by showing that Local
Rule 57 satisfied Gentile's requirements for limitations on lawyer
speech. In doing so, the court first asserted that Local Rule 57's limi-
tations of lawyer speech, like the rule in Gentile, are "aimed at the two
evils that threaten the integrity of the judicial system . . . (1) com-
ments that will likely influence the outcome of the trial and (2) state-
ments that will prejudice the jury venire even if an untainted jury
panel can be found."'43
Next, the court reasoned that Local Rule 57 makes no distinc-
tions based on viewpoint and does not prohibit speech beyond the
length of the trial. 144 Consequently, the "reasonable likelihood" stan-
dard of the local rule was viewed to be sufficiently narrowly tailored, as
generally "satisf [ying] each of the elements required for constitution-
ally adequate protection, and [thereby] . . . not impermissibly infr-
ing[ing] on a lawyer's First Amendment rights."' 45  The Fourth
Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's ruling that Local Rule
57 was constitutionally valid on its face and as applied to Morrissey.146
4. Analysis. -
a. Mistake in Logic or Semantic Nonsense?-Perhaps the
threshold question of the Morrissey analysis is an obvious one: If the
Supreme Court held in Gentile that the "substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice" standard is narrowly tailored and no greater than neces-
sary to protect the governmental interest involved,' 47 how can the
"reasonable likelihood" standard, which the Court said is "less protec-
tive," also be constitutionally valid?
140. Morrissey, 168 F.2d at 140 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075
(1991); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d. 356,
363 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
141. Id. The court stated that these six categories "represent only the statements that
the Supreme Court established in Sheppard as most likely to cause prejudice in adjudicative
proceedings." Id. (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361-62).
142. Id. at 139.
143. Id. at 140 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 141.
147. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075-76.
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The logical answer is that if the two-prong, "no greater than nec-
essary" Martinez test148 is applied (as is done in both Gentile and Morris-
sey), it cannot. As plainly stated by the appellant Morrissey, if "the
'substantial likelihood of material prejudice' standard is narrowly tai-
lored and no broader than necessary, the less protective standard of 'rea-
sonable likelihood of prejudice' cannot also be narrowly tailored and
no broader than necessary." '149 Although Justice Frankfurter's admo-
nition about semantic gymnastics and "an idle play on words" is well
taken,150 "substantial" is legally more demanding than "reasonable"
while "material prejudice" is more exacting than "prejudice." '
The Supreme Court recently offered more evidence that lawyer
speech should be given considerable respect and protection when it
stated that "speech by attorneys on public issues and matters of legal
representation [is afforded] the strongest protection our Constitution
has to offer." 52 The counterargument would be that an attorney is
still free to say what she pleases, just not during the trial. This reason-
ing, however, does not give ample attention to the importance of tim-
ing. As Justice Black noted in Bridges v. State of California:
[A]s a practical result [of restricting an attorney's speech
during the pendency of a case] . . .anyone who might wish
to give public expression to his views on a pending case in-
volving no matter what problem of public interest, just at the
time his audience would be most receptive, would be as ef-
148. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing the Martinez test as requiring a
substantial governmental interest and a restriction on speech as least intrusive as possible
to attain the governmental interest).
149. Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Morrissey (No. 98-4168) (describing appellant's position
that the two standards at issue are logically inconsistent with each other).
150. Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 295 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating
a concern that the parsing of language occurring in the decision was leading to results not
in conformity with the history of similar decisions).
151. Of course, the word "material," defined as "relevant to the matter at hand," BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 976 (6th ed. 1990) is significant in many areas of law. For example, ele-
mentary contract law dictates that a transaction is voidable if the seller fails to disclose a
material fact that a reasonable person would weigh and consider before making the
purchase. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs 53-55 (4th ed. 1998). Non-
disclosure of just any fact will not suffice.
Using the same logic in the context of restrictions on lawyer speech, extrajudicial com-
ments that materially prejudice a person's right to a fair trial are actionable whereas com-
ments that would not affect the outcome of a trial need not be suppressed. In other words,
the word "material" properly narrows the standard and provides an attorney with more
substantive notice of speech that is not acceptable.
152. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995) (stating that such protec-
tion should be afforded to lawyers in appropriate circumstances).
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fectively discouraged as if a deliberate statutory scheme of
censorship had been adopted.
1 53
Although Bridges primarily concerned free speech of the press, a statu-
tory scheme of censorship that unduly chills lawyer speech during a
pending case is equally unacceptable, particularly when the attorney's
comments will not materially prejudice the trial, but, rather, may shed
light on public issues involved.
The Morrissey opinion itself has further shortcomings. Most nota-
bly, the court claimed that overruling a precedent through a court's
silence is "a disfavored enterprise within this circuit.' ' 1 5 4 Ironically,
the court lists not one case to support that contention. Furthermore,
the court acknowledged the Supreme Court's view that the "reasona-
ble likelihood" standard is "less protective of lawyer speech" but re-
fused to take the next step by applying that reasoning to the
constitutionality of Local Rule 57.155 It is as if the court knew that two
minus one equals one, but refused to say so until the Supreme Court
informed them that one, in fact, is the answer.
Finally, it is disconcerting that courts and states cannot agree on
an issue that concerns free speech rights for millions of attorneys in
the United States. As previously noted, the states (and federal circuits,
for that matter) are inconsistent, at best, as to their view on the proper
standard to control lawyer speech.' 56 By changing to the "substantial
likelihood" standard, the small minority of states that still have the
"reasonable likelihood" standard 157 could maintain a proper balance
between a lawyer's free speech rights and the right to impartial justice,
while bringing much needed clarity and uniformity to the rule. Ironi-
cally enough, the actions of Morrissey would also have been in viola-
tion of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard and
punished accordingly. 5  Perhaps a lawyer who is held in criminal
contempt for less egregious speech and activity would force the
Fourth Circuit to reconsider its position.
153. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 269 (discussing the importance of the press' ability to comment
on public issues in a timely manner).
154. Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 139-40 (preferring a clear intent stated by the court that a
particular standard be overruled).
155. Id. at 139.
156. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (referring to Gentile footnotes that
list the various standards restricting lawyer speech and the states that have adopted them).
157. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that there are eleven states
that have adopted such a standard).
158. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 140 (describing the ways in which Morrissey's comments
would have a significant effect on the outcome of the trial); see also Appellee's Brief at 15,
Morrissey (No. 98-4168) (referring to judge Payne's alternative holding that Morrissey's ac-
tions also satisfied the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test).
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b. The Bigger Picture: Avoiding Kangaroo Courts.--A broader
reason for overruling the "reasonable likelihood" standard in favor of
the less restrictive "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test is
the public's right to examine and criticize the government and its offi-
cials. Lawyers play an important role in guaranteeing that right be-
cause of their skill and knowledge of civic matters and because of the
legal processes involved.'59 Lawyers, advocates and counsel for their
clients are usually the only ones to speak on behalf of their clients
during pending litigation. Consequently, the voice of an attorney may
be the only voice the accused party has during the pending criminal
litigation.
The cases from which the Morrissey and Gentile convictions evolved
involved criminal indictments with political overtones. Morrissey's cli-
ent was a political operative and suspected homosexual charged with
drug distribution violations.16 ° Gentile's client was a storage vault
owner accused of stealing a customer's money, even though two local
police officers had unlimited access to the deposit boxes in ques-
tion.' 61 In each scenario, the accused's attorney had a legitimate right
to point out glaring and important facts of the case that went to the
motives of the prosecution. In other words, Morrissey attempted to
show that his client was being unfairly targeted because of his political
ties, while Gentile tried to demonstrate that his client was a scapegoat
for crooked cops.
As stated by justice Kennedy in Gentile, "[a]t issue here is the con-
stitutionality of a ban on political speech critical of the government
and its officials."' 62 Political speech "has traditionally been recog-
nized as lying at the core of the First Amendment.""16 Consequently,
a lesser standard that would allow for greater suppression of lawyer
speech at the exact time when limitations are most repugnant to the
Constitution, is simply unacceptable.
The danger that may follow from a lesser standard is a govern-
ment orjudiciary that wields subjectively interpreted powers to silence
lawyers who criticize what may be a potential railroading of their cli-
ents. As Justice Black warned: "[A] n enforced silence, however lim-
ited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would
159. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1056-57 (1991) (plurality opin-
ion) (Opinion of Kennedy, J.) (discussing the important function lawyers perform in in-
forming the general public of issues relevant to the judicial system).
160. See Appellant's Brief at 6, Morrissey (No. 98-4168).
161. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1039-41 (Opinion of Kennedy, J.).
162. Id. at 1034.
163. Id. at 1035 (quoting Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990)).
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probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect. 1 64 Fairness of trials is also of para-
mount concern. 16  A "liberty-loving society"'1 6 6 cannot permit such
mandated silence when its enforcement is based on uncertain rules
and arbitrary targets.
Although most would agree that "legal trials are not like elec-
tions, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and
the newspaper,"' 67 it is important in an information age for a society
to be informed as to how and why justice is being administered, espe-
cially in situations where there appears to be an overzealous prosecu-
tion. Sad would be the day when a person is wrongfully or maliciously
prosecuted on questionable charges and his counsel may not com-
ment due to fear of reprisal. This result would sway American confi-
dence in the justice system and promote charges of selective
"kangaroo courts."' 68  The "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" standard allows an attorney to speak more freely on behalf
of his client than the less protective "reasonable likelihood" standard,
thus giving citizens more confidence in the integrity of trials and in
the judicial system as a whole. Although the difference in the stan-
dards may seem slight to some, courts have always been leery of the
"slippery slope," especially when it pertains to First Amendment
rights.
5. Conclusion.-Although upheld in In re Morrissey, the "reasona-
ble likelihood of prejudice" standard is less protective of a lawyer's
First Amendments rights and increases the likelihood of contempt
charges for unwary attorneys. Only eleven states maintain this stan-
dard, and there is explicit disagreement among the federal courts as
to its constitutionality.
The Supreme Court's adoption of the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard as the only constitutionally viable rule
would mandate a unified standard nationwide while maintaining the
delicate balance between free speech rights and the right to fair trials.
Furthermore, attorneys would have better notice as to the type of
comments they are permitted, and not permitted, to make during
pending litigation.
164. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
166. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263.
167. Id. at 271.
168. Kangaroo courts are defined as "[s]purious legal proceedings; proceeding where a
person's rights and liberties are ignored and the result is a foregone conclusion." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 868 (6th ed. 1990).
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Morrissey probably would have been convicted under either stan-
dard. The Fourth Circuit, however, had the opportunity to reject the
"reasonable likelihood" standard. The Supreme Court's Gentile deci-
sion cleared the way for the Fourth Circuit to overrule its ruling in
Hirschkop-the twenty-five-year-old decision that upheld the constitu-
tionality of the "reasonable likelihood" standard. The Fourth Circuit
refused to do so.
As a result, a constitutional showdown between the two tests is
imminent. This battle of standards has created confusion for lawyers
as to what they can and cannot say. Until that showdown, a watchful
eye must be cast upon "reasonable likelihood" jurisdictions to ensure
that contempt punishments are not handed down arbitrarily or with
politically suspicious overtones.
JASON P. BEAULIEU
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL. 59:1275
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Concluding that At-Will Employment Suffices as a
Contractual Relationship
In Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass,' the Fourth Circuit considered
whether at-will employment relationships were "contracts" entitled to
the protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Section 1981 guarantees that all
people have equal rights to make and to enforce contracts.3 The
court held that although at-will employment relationships were termi-
nable at the will of either the employer or the employee, they are
nonetheless contracts within the meaning of § 1981.' In so doing, the
Fourth Circuit followed the decision of the only other circuit to con-
sider the issue squarely.5 The Fourth Circuit rejected notions that
such employment relations either did not give rise to contracts or that
the very fact that an employer could terminate the employee for no
reason meant that it could also do so for a racially discriminatory rea-
son.6 The solid legal analysis employed by the court in Spriggs helps to
further solidify the precedent of enforcing at-will contractual rights
under § 1981.
1. The Case.-James H. Spriggs, an African-American, began
working for Diamond Auto Glass (Diamond) in July 1993 as a cus-
tomer service representative. 7 No formal written employment con-
tract existed, and Diamond apparently never promised a specific
duration of employment.' His supervisor, Stickell, who was white, had
1. 165 F.3d 1015 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. See id. at 1016-17. Section 1981 provides, in full:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by non-
governmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
3. Id. § 1981(a).
4. See Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1018-19.
5. See id. at 1019 (citing Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 160 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir.
1998)).
6. Id. at 1019-20.
7. See id. at 1016.
8. See id. at 1017.
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repeatedly used racial slurs in Spriggs's presence and sometimes di-
rected these remarks at Spriggs.9 Spriggs quit in August 1995, but he
later returned to work in September 1996 after a manager promised
to do his best to control Stickell.1° Nevertheless, Stickell persisted in
his racist comments and actions, and Spriggs quit again on February
6, 1997.11 Spriggs returned to work for the last time on March 10,
1997, again at the request of a manager.12 Stickell immediately gave
him new duties that Spriggs considered to be "unreasonable and ra-
cially motivated.' 1 3 Shortly after his return, Spriggs left the company
permanently and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."4
In October 1997, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland determined that under Maryland law, Spriggs was an at-
will employee and reasoned that because "an at-will employment con-
tract confers no rights that are enforceable in an action ex contractu,
* . . [it] cannot serve as the predicate for a Section 1981 action."15
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Spriggs's § 1981 claim.16
Spriggs responded with a motion for reconsideration that was denied
by the district court. 17 He then appealed the dismissal of the action.
2. Legal Background.-
a. Section 1981 before the Civil Rights Act of 1991.-Congress
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to guarantee that all people in the United
States were granted the same rights as white citizens with respect "to
mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts," as well as guaranteeing other
rights.18 Originally, § 1981 consisted solely of the current subsection
(a), with no further explanations or qualifications attached. 19 At the
9. See id.; see also iL n.2 (giving examples of some of the offensive racial remarks made
in Spriggs's presence).





15. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, No. S 97-1449, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22476, at *2
(D. Md. Oct. 15, 1997) (granting the defendant's motion to dismiss).
16. Id.
17. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, No. S 97-1449, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22475, at *1
(D. Md. Oct. 27, 1997) (denying the motion for reconsideration). In his decision to deny
reconsideration, Judge Smalkin stated that "[w]hile an at-will employment contract may
support an action for wages earned but not paid, this is essentially a quasi-contractual rem-
edy in the nature of quantum meruit, not a contract remedy seeking to enforce any right
of continued employment." Id. at *1.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a); see also supra note 2 (quoting § 1981 (a) in its entirety).
19. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72




time, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1981's "make and enforce con-
tracts" provision narrowly.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,21 the Supreme Court held that
"racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not
actionable under § 1981 because that provision does not apply to con-
duct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does
not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obliga-
tions. '21 The Court was very clear in stating that § 1981 could not "be
construed as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all as-
pects of contract relations," reasoning that § 1981 expressly prohib-
ited discrimination only in the making and in the enforcement of
contracts. 22 Such a narrow interpretation would be short lived, as
Congress would soon enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically to
overturn Patterson.
23
The Seventh Circuit discussed the issue further, in dicta, in Mc-
Knight v. General Motors Corp.24 In McKnight, the court did not ex-
pressly decide whether at-will employment relationships meet the
contractual requirement of § 1981. The court, however, did provide a
relatively substantial analysis of contracts for at-will employment.25
The court stated that "[e] mployment at will is not a state of nature but
a continuing contractual relation."26 The court also noted that "[a]
contract for employment at will may end abruptly but it is a real and
continuing contract nonetheless, not a series of contracts each a
day-or a minute-long."27 These statements suggest that the Sev-
enth Circuit would support the conclusion that at-will employment re-
lationships are, in fact, contracts under § 1981.28
20. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
21. Id, at 171. McLean Credit Union hired Patterson as a teller in May 1972. See id. at
169. She was fired in July 1982. See id. Patterson sued under § 1981 alleging harassment
and racial discrimination. See id.
22. Id. at 176 (interpreting § 1981 as not protecting "problems that may arise later
from the conditions of continuing employment").
23. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 35 (1991) (noting that subsection (b) was in-
tended to overturn Patterson).
24. 908 F.2d 104, 108-12 (7th Cir. 1990). McKnight brought suit under § 1981 "claim-
ing that General Motors fired him both because he is black and also in retaliation for his
having filed claims of racial discrimination against the company." Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 109.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. It is significant to note that McKnight was decided in 1990, before the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Because the case was decided in the time of Patterson, and
prior to the 1991 Act, the Seventh Circuit has since questioned its validity. See Gonzalez v.
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Although dicta in Mc-
Knight suggests that an employment-at-will situation might support section 1981 claims, its
1332 [VOL. 59:1275
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b. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Broadening of the "Make
and Enforce Contracts" Provision.-In the House Report discussing the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the committee observed that
"[t]he impact of Patterson has been disastrous."29 In response, Con-
gress added two subsections to § 1981.30 Section 1981(b) defines the
"make and enforce contracts" phrase and was added as a direct re-
sponse to the limitations of Patterson, specifically the restrictions on
when § 1981 could be applied.3 1 In the House Report, Congress ex-
pressly stated that subsection (b) overrules Patterson.32 Subsection (c)
was added to ensure that § 1981 applied to private contracts, as well as
to public ones. 3 Therefore, after the Act's enactment in 1991, the
issue of forced termination due to discrimination could arise because
conduct, after the making of a contract, was suddenly subject to pro-
scription. There would seem to be little to no debate over the effect
of amending § 1981 since Congress expressed clearly its intention to
expand its scope of proscription, which had been strictly limited by
the Supreme Court in Patterson. After the 1991 Act, a large number of
district court cases began to address the issue of whether at-will em-
ployment relationships were contracts under § 1981."4 Until Spriggs in
1999, however, only one circuit court had addressed the issue head
on.
3 5
In 1998, the Fifth Circuit in Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Lubbock, Inc.36 became the first circuit to decide this issue. Fadeyi ar-
gued that her termination was actionable under § 1981, despite the
validity today is questionable given that case's reliance upon Patterson."). Various cases,
however, cite McKnight for the proposition that at-will relationships amount to contracts
under § 1981. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034-35 (questioning the validity of this pro-
position); Gandy v. Gateway Found., No. 97 C 2286, 1999 WIL 102777, at *17-18 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 22, 1999) (noting that according to McKnight, "at least under Illinois law, an at-will
relationship would be sufficient to support a section 1981 claim attacking a demotion and
reduction in pay"); Curtis v. Dimaio, 46 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing
the holding of McKnight).
29. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 36 (1991).
30. Id. at 37.
31. See id.; see also supra note 2. Specifically, the report states that subsection (b) bars
"all racial discrimination in contracts" including, but not limited to "claims of harassment,
discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retaliation, and hiring." Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 36.
33. Id. Subsection (c) was intended to codify the holding of the Supreme Court case of
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which, according to the report, "prohibited inten-
tional racial discrimination in private, as well as public, contracting." Id.
34. See infra notes 41-42.
35. See infta notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
36. 160 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1998).
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fact that she was an at-will employee.37 The court explained that "to
hold that at-will employees have no right of action under § 1981
would effectively eviscerate the very protection that Congress expressly
intended to install for minority employees."3 Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit had previously decided that an at-will employment relationship is
a contractual one, the decision was not in relation to a claim under
§ 1981." 9 The court noted that although over forty states recognized
that § 1981 claims could be brought for at-will employment relation-
ships, case law on the issue prior to that time had been "surprisingly
sparse."4 °
Since Fadeyi, many district court cases have addressed this issue.
The majority of those cases have reached the same conclusion as the
Fifth Circuit. These cases have all concluded that at-will employment
relationships satisfy the contractual requirement of § 1981 (b).41
Courts in at least five separate districts, however, have rejected the
argument that an at-will employment relationship meets the contrac-
tual requirement of § 1981(b).4 2
37. See id. at 1048. Fadeyi, a black female, was employed by Planned Parenthood. See
id. During her employment, she made various racial discrimination complaints. See id.
Planned Parenthood fired her "two working days after receiving notification that the
EEOC did not have jurisdiction to entertain her complaints." Id.
38. Id. at 1050.
39. See Paniagua v. City of Galveston, 995 F.2d 1310, 1313 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
(noting that "even assuming that Paniagua had only an at-will employment contract, he
nonetheless had a contract with the City of Galveston").
40. Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1049.
41. Many district courts have accepted that an at-will employment relationship is suffi-
cient to satisfy the contractual requirement of § 1981(b). Price v. Wisconsin Servs. Corp.,
55 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955-56 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Robinson v. SABIS Educ. Sys., No. 98 C 4251,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9065, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1999); Jones v. SABIS Educ. Sys., Inc.,
52 F. Supp. 2d 868, 875-76 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Lazaro v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 54 F. Supp.
2d 180, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 776
(D. Neb. 1999); O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 832, 837-38 (D.N.M. 1999);
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-1159-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *15-
16 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 1999); Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1202
(S.D. Ohio 1998); Lane v. Ogden Entertainment, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1272 (M.D.
Ala. 1998); Larmore v. RCP/JAS, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-5330, 1998 WL 372647, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. May 19, 1998); Baker v. American Juice, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Harris
v. New York Times, No. 90 CIV. 5235 (CSH), 1993 WL 42773, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
1993).
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Becker Group of O'Fallon Div., 38 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795-97 (E.D.
Mo. 1999); Payne v. Abbott Lab., No. 97 C 3882, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2443, at *6-7 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 2, 1999); Bascomb v. Smith Barney Inc., No. 96 CIV. 8747 (LAP), 1999 WL 20853,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999); Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553-54
(M.D.N.C. 1998); Simpson v. Vacco, No. 96 CIV. 3916 (JFK), 1998 WL 118155, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1998); Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 964 F. Supp. 665, 667,
675-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
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The reasoning of those district court' cases that have rejected
§ 1981 claims by at-will employees is contained within the analyses of
two or three of the leading cases. Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.4"
is perhaps most commonly cited as support for concluding that at-will
relationships are not contracts under § 1981(b)." 4 In Moorer, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
agreed with the defendant-employer's argument that the plaintiff-em-
ployee's at-will employment relationship was not a contract sufficient
to support a § 1981 claim.4 5 Also commonly cited is Moscowitz v.
Brown,4 6 in which a New York district court concluded that no under-
lying contractual relationship had been alleged, as the plaintiff was
merely an at-will employee.47 A slightly different analysis was used by
the court in Askew v. May Merchandising Corp.,4" which is also fre-
quently cited. The court in Askew concluded that the plaintiffs em-
ployment was not contractual in nature and was, therefore, fatal to his
§ 1981 claim.4 9 The court predicted that all of New York's courts
would interpret the plaintiffs employment as being at-will, not as a
contract of employment.5" Askew, Moorer, and Moscowitz are all perfect
examples of the basic argument made by these courts: no underlying
contract exists in an at-will employment relationship. This statement
has often been the basis of the analysis given by the courts, as no fur-
ther explanations are provided.
While the arguments regarding the issue have been scarce within
the district court cases, one Seventh Circuit case has discussed the is-
sue in greater detail. In Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co.,5 the
court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion, albeit dicta, to an
analysis of at-will contracts. 52 The court questioned the validity of
Judge Posner's earlier opinion in McKnight,53 in which Judge Posner
claimed that the at-will employment "contract" covered "[w] ages, ben-
efits, duties, [and] working conditions," but not the term of employ-
Askew v. May Merchandising Corp., No. 87 CIV. 7835 (JFK), 1991 WL 24390, at *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991).
43. 964 F. Supp. 665 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
44. See, e.g., Fadeyi, 160 F.2d at 1049 n.l1; Lane, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
45. Moorer, 964 F. Supp. at 667, 675-76.
46. 850 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
47. Id. at 1192.
48. No. 87 CIV. 7835 (JFK), 1991 WL 24390 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991).
49. Id. at *6.
50. Id. at *5.
51. 133 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 1998).
52. See id. at 1034-35.
53. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
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ment.54 Whereas McKnight had hinted that if it had decided the issue,
it would have allowed § 1981 claims to be brought by at-will employ-
ees, 55 Gonzalez could be interpreted as supporting the opposite posi-
tion in light of the court's statement that, as an at-will employee,
Gonzalez did not have any contractual rights to continued employ-
ment, and thus could not claim that she was discriminated against
with respect to being fired. 56 Thus, the court's dicta supported both
sides of the issue as is exemplified in McKnight prior to the Act of 1991
and then later by Gonzalez after the adoption of the Act of 1991.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Spriggs, the Fourth Circuit began its
analysis by examining the history of § 1981 claims and discussing the
changes made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 5' After observing that
§ 1981 (a) guarantees to all persons "the same right... to make and
enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," the court noted
that the Supreme Court had construed the statute narrowly before the
1991 amendments. 58 The court then discussed the broadening effects
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.5" The discussion was brief, as the court
quoted § 1981 (b) and mentioned its new, broad definition of make
and enforce contracts.6 °
The court then considered whether Spriggs's complaint alleged
facts that, if true, would show that he had a contract with Diamond.6
The court concluded that it did.62 The court reasoned that Diamond
offered to pay Spriggs for acting as a customer service representative,
which he then accepted by working for them. 3 The performance of
such duties was the consideration necessary to complete the contract
equation.6 4 Therefore, because all of the elements of a contract ex-
54. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035 (citing McKnight, 908 F.3d at 109).
55. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
56. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035.
57. 165 F.3d at 1017-18.
58. Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)).
59. Id. at 1018; see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's en-
actment of § 1981(b) and (c) to broaden the scope of proscription).
60. 165 F.3d at 1017-18 (noting Congress's response to Patterson by amending § 1981
"by adding, inter alia, a new, broad definition of 'make and enforce contracts'").
61. Id. at 1018.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. ("Spriggs's performance of the assigned job duties was consideration ex-
changed for Diamond's promise to pay. The parties' actions thus created a contractual
relationship." (citing Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1202 (S.D.
Ohio 1998))).
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isted, the court held that a contract had been formed between Spriggs
and Diamond.65
The court discussed Maryland law and commented that the lack
of an agreed upon duration in at-will employment relationships does
not mean that they are not contracts. 6 6 Under Maryland law, the ab-
sence of an agreed upon duration of employment allows either party
to terminate the contract at will. 67 Furthermore, the court noted that
Maryland courts have recognized that at-will employment relation-
ships are contracts. 68 The court then concluded that Spriggs's em-
ployment relationship with Diamond, though terminable at will, was
nonetheless contractual.69
The court then returned to the topic of § 1981 and the subse-
quent amendments in the 1991 Act, stating briefly that it had seen no
indication that Congress intended "the term 'contract' to have any
meaning other than its ordinary one" when it drafted the original
§ 1981 or when it amended the statute in 1991.70 Having concluded
that an at-will employment relationship was contractual, the court
found "that such relationships may therefore serve as predicate con-
tracts for § 1981 claims. 71
The court then discussed the only circuit court case to have
squarely addressed this issue, Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lub-
bock, Inc.7 2 The court stated that it agreed with the Fifth Circuit's con-
clusion in Fadeyi.7' The court then provided a brief overview of the
reasoning in Fadeyi, noting that the Fifth Circuit, after reviewing Patter-
son and § 1981's text and history, had concluded that "Congress could
not have meant to exclude at-will workers from the reach of § 1981
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. (citing Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467
(1981)).
68. Id. ("In Maryland, at-will employment is a contract of indefinite duration that can
be terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time." (quoting Hrehorovich v. Harbor
Hosp. Ctr., 93 Md. App. 772, 790, 614 A.2d 1021, 1030 (1992))).
69. Id. (citing McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1990)).
The court indicated, in a footnote, that the Seventh Circuit recently questioned McKnight
in dicta in Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998), but
concluded that the McKnight court's analysis of the basic at-will employment relationship
was persuasive whether or not the case was still good law. Id. at 1018 n.5.
70. Id. (citing Lane v. Ogden Entertainment, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1272 (M.N. Ala.
1998)).
71. Id. at 1018-19.
72. Id. at 1019 (discussing Fadeyi, 160 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also supra notes 36-
40 and accompanying text (discussing Fadeyi); infra notes 97-114 (discussing the decision
on Fadeyi more fully).
73. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019.
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In summing up its discussion of Fadeyi, the court stated that its
decision was consistent with the holding of the Fifth Circuit, the only
other federal circuit court to have decided the issue.75
After deciding the issue, the court clarified its previous decision
in Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.76 The court declared that
the district court had misapplied Conkwright in its rejection of
Spriggs's § 1981 claim.77 The court noted that in Conkwright, it had
found that, under Maryland law, the terms of an employee manual
had not become part of the plaintiffs employment contract. 7 Ac-
cordingly, the Conkwright plaintiff was "purely an at-will employee."79
The Spriggs court explained that the Fourth Circuit "did not hold [in
Conkwright] that contracts terminable at will do not create enforceable
contract rights," and that they did, in fact, create such rights."0
After distinguishing its precise holding in Conkwright, the court
turned its attention to Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,81 the other
case that the district court cited in making its determination that at-
will employment relationships are not adequate to bring a claim
under § 1981.82 The Fourth Circuit described Moorer as "one of a
handful of district court cases holding that at-will employment con-
tracts cannot serve as predicates for § 1981 claims."83 Additionally,
the court noted that the Seventh Circuit in Gonzalez, 4 in dicta, ques-
tioned whether a claim under § 1981 is adequately supported by at-
will employment status.8 5
The court divided these district court cases into two categories.8 6
The first group of cases "simply assume, without extensive analysis,
that at-will employment relationships are not 'contracts' within the
74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Fadeyi, 160
F.3d at 1052).
75. Id.
76. 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
77. Spriggs, 165 F.2d at 1019. The district court cited Conkwright as an example of the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that "[i]n Maryland, an at-will employment 'contract' is, be-
cause of its lack of substance, unenforceable in an action ex contractu." Spriggs v. Dia-
mond Auto Glass, No. S 97-1449, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22476, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 15,
1997).
78. Sprigs, 165 F.3d at 1019.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 964 F. Supp. 665 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
82. See Spriggs, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22476, at *2.
83. 165 F.3d at 1019; see also id. n.7 (citing other district court cases with the same
holding).
84. Gonzales v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 1998).
85. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019 (citing Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035).
86. Id. at 1019-20.
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meaning of § 1981," and therefore "hold [that] discrimination within
such relationships cannot give rise to § 1981 claims."87 Referring to its
earlier analysis, the court again rejected that notion.8' The second
group, the court explained, consisted of cases that "acknowledge that
the at-will employment relationship is a type of contract, but conclude
that, because at-will employees have no contractual rights to specific
terms of employment, they cannot challenge their contractually-per-
missible terminations under § 1981. '' "9 The court responded to this
idea by stating that "[p]roving breach of the underlying contract is
neither necessary to a successful § 1981 claim, nor, standing alone,
sufficient to make out such a claim."90
4. Analysis.-In Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, the Fourth Circuit
reached the same conclusion as a majority of federal district courts
that have decided the issue, as well as the only other federal circuit
court to squarely address the issue. The Spriggs court concluded that
Spriggs's at-will contract for employment was sufficient to bring a
§ 1981 claim. Not only did Spriggs follow the decision of the only
other circuit to decide the issue by adopting the substantial analysis of
the Fifth Circuit, but the Fourth Circuit also delved into a novel analy-
sis in its rejection of those cases that have reached the opposite con-
clusion. Overall, the court's analysis will withstand various criticisms,
as the court did not solely rely on any one facet in accepting at-will
employee claims under § 1981. The Fourth Circuit's decision in
Spriggs has begun to solidify the precedent within the federal appellate
87. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 964 F. Supp.
665, 675-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 162 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1998); Moskowitz v. Brown, 850
F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Askew v. May Merchandising Corp., No. 87 CIV. 7835
(JFK), 1991 WL 24390, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991)).
88. 165 F.3d at 1019 ("Our analysis above explains our disagreement with this group of
cases."). The court probably was referring to its interpretation of congressional intent in
that the definition of contract was to be an ordinary one. See supra note 70 and accompany-
ing text. The court was probably also referring to its conclusion that the amendments to
§ 1981 had broadened its scope. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
89. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019 (citing Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035; Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc.,
10 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553-54 (M.D.N.C. 1998)).
90. Id. at 1020. In a footnote, the court noted that the Supreme Court had reached
the same conclusion in Patterson through different reasoning. Id at 1020 n.8. In Patterson,
the Court rejected the view that "racial harassment in the conditions of employment is
actionable when, and only when, it amounts to a breach of contract under state law." Pat-
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 (1989). The court in Fadeyi made a
similar point, as the Spriggs court noted, when the Fifth Circuit stated that under Texas law,
"[e]ven though an at-will employee can be fired for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at
all, he or she cannot be fired for an illicit cause." Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1020 (citing Fadeyi,
160 F.3d at 1051-52).
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courts, as the court employed solid legal analysis, with well-founded
support, in reaching its ultimate holding.
The Spriggs court properly followed the reasoning and holding of
Fadeyi. The Spriggs court, however, could have solidified its holding
even more by providing the same depth in analysis that the Fadeyi de-
cision provided.9" In citing Fadeyi, the court discussed how the Fifth
Circuit reviewed Patterson, the 1991 Act, and the Act's legislative his-
tory.92 The court in Spriggs extracted only a small portion of the rea-
soning used in Fadeyi, the portion discussing how Congress could not
have meant to exclude at-will workers from the reach of § 1981." The
Fourth Circuit, while providing more detail in its analysis than most of
the district courts that have decided the issue, neglected to mention
the other substantial arguments94 made by the Fifth Circuit in Fadeyi,
and simply concluded that its decision is consistent with the holding
in Fadeyi.95 A discussion of the Fifth Circuit's entire analysis is neces-
sary to understand fully what the Fourth Circuit has endorsed in
agreeing with Fadeyi.
Fadeyi has served, and probably will continue to serve, as the back-
bone case regarding whether at-will employment relationships satisfy
the contractual requirement of § 1981 (b). The court in Spriggs relied
upon the precedent set forth in Fadeyi as support for its decision.96
91. 165 F.3d at 1019.
92. Id
93. Id. (citing Fadeyi, 160 F.3d 1048, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998)).
94. As is discussed infra, the Fourth Circuit in Spriggs neglected to recognize the discus-
sion devoted to Patterson in Fadeyi. In Fadeyi, the court concluded that the Supreme Court
in Patterson had condoned, implicitly, at-will employees bringing § 1981 claims. See infta
notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Additionally, Spriggs neglected to mention Fadey's
discussion of the analysis of the Southern District Court of New York in Harris v. New York
Times, No. 90 CIV. 5235 (CSH), 1993 WL 42773 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1993). In Hams, the
district court noted that a formal contract was absent in Patterson, yet the employment
relationship was deemed to be sufficiently contractual in nature to bring a § 1981 claim.
See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
95. Fadeyi has been used by various district courts in reaching the same conclusion
regarding at-will contracts satisfying the contractual requirement of § 1981. See, e.g., Price
v. Wisconsin Servs. Corp., No. 98-C-0721, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10913, at *7 (E.D. Wis.July
14, 1999); Robinson v. SABIS Educ. Sys., No. 98 C 4251, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9065, at *28
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 1999); Jones v. SABIS Educ. Sys., Inc., No. 98 C 4252, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9261, at *16 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1999); Lazaro v. Good Samaritan Hosp., No. 98 CIV.
5980 (BDP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6936, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1999); Curtis v. Dimaio, 46
F. Supp. 2d 206, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp.
2d 762, 775 (D. Neb. 1999); Gandy v. Gateway Found., No. 97 C 2286, 1999 WL 102777, at
*17 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1999); O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 832, 837
(N.M. 1999); Walker v. Thompson, No. 3:97-CV-2437-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219, at *29
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 1999); Byers v. The Dallas Morning News Inc., No. 3:97-CV-1159-R,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 1999).
96. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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Unlike Spriggs, the Fadeyi court devoted a sizeable portion of its opin-
ion to a discussion of Patterson.9 7 The most significant part of that
discussion was the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the following statement
made by the Supreme Court in Patterson:
[t]he question whether a promotion claim is actionable
under § 1981 depends upon whether the nature of the
change in position was such that it involved the opportunity
to enter into a new contract with the employer. If so, then
the employer's refusal to enter the new contract is actionable
under § 1981.98
The Fifth Circuit interpreted this statement as "leav[ing] no doubt
that the Supreme Court considered the employee's relationship with
her employer to be a contractual one: Obviously, there can be no
'new contract' unless there is first an old contract."99 From the above
statement, the Fadeyi court concluded that, in Patterson, the Supreme
Court "implicitly conceded that an at-will employee may maintain a
cause of action under § 1981. "10
In analyzing the Court's opinion in Patterson, the Fifth Circuit also
looked to Harris v. New York Times1"1 for the district court's interpreta-
tion. °2 As the Southern District Court of New York noted in Harris,
that particular statement in Patterson must be construed as the "Court
regard[ing] Patterson's relationship with her employer-the rendi-
tion of services in exchange for the payment of wages-as sufficiently
contractual in nature to satisfy § 1981. "1° Furthermore, the court
made an astute observation when it stated that nowhere in Patterson
was there a declaration of a formal contract between the parties." 4
Rather, the Supreme Court's opinion simply states that Patterson "was
employed by respondent ... as a teller and a file coordinator." 0 5 The
discussion of Patterson in Harris and in Fadeyi comprised a significant
portion of those courts' opinions." 6
97. Compare Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019, with Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1049-50 (discussing Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).




101. No. 90 CIV. 5235 (CSH), 1993 WL 42773 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1993).
102. See Fadeyi, 160 F.2d at 1050 n.15.
103. Harris, 1993 WL 42773, at *4; see also Fadeyi, 160 F.2d at 1050 n.15.
104. Id
105. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 169 (1989).
106. See Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1049-50 (discussing Patterson); Harris, 1993 WL 42773, at *3-4
(same). The analyses of Patterson are persuasive. Because the Court's decision came out
prior to the amendments to § 1981 contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the implicit
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The Fifth Circuit in Fadeyi also discussed Justice Stevens's ideas
concerning at-will employment relationships.1 1 7 In his separate opin-
ion, Justice Stevens stated that "[a] n at-will employee, such as Patter-
son, is not merely performing an existing contract; she is constantly
remaking that contract."' l 8 From there, the court in Fadeyi outlined
the legislative history, which it claimed, "reflects the intent of Con-
gress to protect minorities in their employment relationships. '1 9 The
court further noted that the House Judiciary Report stated that the
1991 Act "was designed to restore and strengthen civil rights laws that
ban discrimination in employment."' 10 The court subsequently con-
cluded that "[t]o hold that at-will employees have no right of action
under § 1981 would effectively eviscerate the very protection that Con-
gress expressly intended to install for minority employees, especially
those who, by virtue of working for small businesses, are not protected
by Title VII.""' Finally, the court applied Texas law" 2 and deter-
mined that "even though an at-will employee can be fired for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, he or she cannot be fired for an
illicit cause."" 3 Earlier in the opinion, when discussing the case his-
tory, the court stated that, while Texas law recognized that the em-
ployers can fire at-will for "good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all,
. . . does not necessarily follow, . . . that the employment-at-will rela-
tionship is not a contractual one for the purposes of § 1981."'l'
Although the court in Spriggs stated that it agreed with the Fifth
Circuit's decision, it did not provide a full discussion of the depth of
the analysis in Fadeyi. In endorsing Fadeyi, the Fourth Circuit was sub-
scribing to the Fifth Circuit's in-depth discussion of both Patterson and
the congressional intent in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The
Spriggs court also neglected to mention the extent of Fadey's reliance
on state law in reaching their final conclusion, which may prove signif-
approval of at-will contracts maintaining claims under § 1981 makes that conclusion all the
more persuasive for future cases.
107. 160 F.2d at 1050 (citing Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
108. Id. (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part)).
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2 (1991)).
111. Id.
112. The Fifth Circuit's discussion of Texas law becomes significant when district courts
analyze the analysis employed within Fadeyi. Various district courts have noted the reliance
on state law in both Fadeyi and Spriggs. See infra notes 152-171 and accompanying text
(discussing and interpreting the extent of reliance on state law in Fadeyi and Spriggs and its
impact on the precedential effect of their holdings).
113. Id. at 1051-52.
114. Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1049.
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icant when district courts look to both Fadeyi and Spriggs for their prec-
edential effect. While the Spriggs court briefly touched on the
important points in Fadeyi, the analysis it embraced was actually much
more extensive. The reliance on Fadeyi both aids in the understand-
ing of the decision in Spriggs, as well as buttresses the strength of its
holding.
In addition to its deference to Fadeyi, another notable aspect of
the Spriggs decision concerned the court's rejection of the arguments
against allowing at-will employees to bring claims under § 1981. The
Fourth Circuit's discussion contained a simple, yet novel, classification
of these various district court cases.1 15 The first group, the court
claimed, consisted of cases in which courts had decided that at-will
employment relationships were simply not contracts.1 1 6 The court ac-
curately stated that the analysis employed by the courts in these cases
was not extensive enough.1 1 7 In response to the reasoning in these
cases, the court merely declared that its previous discussion suffi-
ciently explained its disagreement."1 8 It is assumed that the court was
referring to its analysis of the existence of the elements of a contract,
as well as to Congress's intent in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991
as a direct response to Patterson, culminating in the creation of
§ 1981 (b).119 Moorer, Moscowitz, and Askew were all cited as falling
under this category, but were not, however, discussed by the court in
Spriggs.
12 0
The first of these New York cases to be decided was Askew. The
district court took a rather superficial look at the employment rela-
tionship between the plaintiff-employee and the defendant-employer.
First of all, the court stated that the plaintiffs original deposition, in
which the plaintiff denied having any type of contractual relationship
with his employer, was detrimental to his current § 1981 claim.' 2 1
115. Id. at 1019-20; see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
116. Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1019; see supra note 87.
117. Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1019. The court cited as examples the following: Moorer, 964 F.
Supp. at 675-76; Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Askew v.
May Merchandising Corp., No. 87 CIV. 7835 (JFK), 1991 WL 24390, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
20, 1991).
118. Id. Specifically, the court expressly stated that "[o]ur analysis above explains our
disagreement with this group of cases." Id.; see also supra note 88.
119. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning).
120. 165 F.3d at 1018 (citing, yet failing to discuss, Moorer, 964 F. Supp. at 675-76; Mosco-
witz, 850 F. Supp. at 1192; Askew, 1991 WL 24390, at *6).
121. Askew, 1991 WL 24390, at *4. Thus, plaintiff asserted that he did, in fact, have a
written employment agreement, although of indefinite duration. See id. The plaintiff fur-
ther contended that such a relationship was established when he "commenc[ed] work ...
in response to a written confirmation of an offer of employment from [the defendant]."
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The court then concluded that "the courts of New York would not
consider [the defendant's] letter to be evidence of an employment
contract, but simply an offer of employment at the will of the em-
ployer .... [which] is the regular rule in New York,' 22 without really
delving into any sort of analysis on the matter. The court boldly stated
that it was clear that "the absence of a contractual relationship is fatal
to this type of section 1981 claim."'123 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit
in Spriggs analyzed Spriggs's at-will employment relationship to deter-
mine if it contained the requirements of a contract. 124 Rather than
merely dismiss the employment relationship as at-will, and therefore
not a contract, the Fourth Circuit delved deeper to find out if the
essential elements of a contract existed nonetheless.
In Moscowitz, the same federal district court in New York relied on
Patterson because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had no retroactive ef-
fect 1 2 5 and because the cause of action had occurred in January
1991.126 Patterson, however, held that § 1981 merely proscribed dis-
criminatory conduct prior to the formation of a contract, and did not
specifically address the issue of the validity of claims brought by at-will
employees.' 27 Thus, while Patterson would prevent a successful § 1981
claim due to the timing of the discriminatory conduct, it would still
not deter the conclusion that an at-will contract is, in fact, a contract.
At least one court, however, has concluded that Patterson implied that
at-will employees could bring a claim under § 1981.128
Most recently, in Moorer, the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York cited the decisions in both Moscowitz and Askew but ne-
glected to provide any support beyond such citations to other courts'
decisions on the issue. 129 The Moorer court blindly adopted these pre-
vious decisions that required the existence of a contractual relation-
ship in bringing a § 1981 claim. Thus, the New York court never
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5. Additionally, the court cited Patterson as controlling. Id. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 took effect in November of 1991, thus the narrow interpretation of "make and
enforce" contracts was still powerful precedent.
124. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing the court's conclusion that
the Spriggs-Diamond employment relationship contained the contractual elements of of-
fer, acceptance and consideration).
125. 850 F. Supp. at 1192 (referring to the 1994 Supreme Court decision of Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994), which declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
has no retroactive effect).
126. Id. at 1189.
127. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
128. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (acknowledging the Fifth Circuit's
recognition of the district court's analysis in Harris v. New York Times, No. CIV. 5235
(CSH), 1993 WL 42773 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1993)).
129. 964 F. Supp. 665, 675-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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provided a valid reason for determining that an at-will employment
relationship does not constitute a contract.
Contained in the Spriggs court's earlier discussion, which the
court said fully explained its disagreement with the cases in the first
category, was a reference to the district court case of Lane v. Ogden
Entertainment Inc.13° Lane was cited as support for the conclusion that
the Fourth Circuit had seen "no indication that, when drafting the
original § 1981 or the amending 1991 Act, Congress intended the
term 'contract' to have any meaning other than its ordinary one.
" 131
Therefore, when the court referred to its earlier analysis as a reason
for disagreeing with the cases within the first category, it was citing the
district court's analysis regarding the context of the term "contract."
In Lane, the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama rec-
ognized that the defendant-employer was possibly "confus [ing] the is-
sue of whether the employee has a 'contract' in the sense used in
labor law-i.e., employment for an agreed duration, with certain ben-
efits and protections-with the issue of whether there is a contract
between an employer and an at-will employee at all."'1 2 The court in
Lane further concluded that " [e]ven at-will employees have some sort
of contract, in the broader legal sense of that term, with their em-
ployer."' 33 Spriggs' citation to the Alabama court's distinction between
the basic legal meaning of "contract" and a "specialized labor law
meaning "t 34 further strengthened the precedential effect of its hold-
ing, as well as simultaneously addressing the dearth of strong legal
analysis from cases under the first category delineated by the court.
The Fourth Circuit's endorsement of the analysis provided in Lane is
much more persuasive than that provided in Askew, Moscowitz, and
Moorer. While the Fourth Circuit supported its conclusion from vari-
ous angles, these district court cases failed to provide sound reasoning
to support their holdings.
The second category classified by the Fourth Circuit consisted of
those cases that recognized that at-will employment relationships are
contracts, but concluded that no claims could be brought under
130. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
131. 165 F.3d at 1018 (citing Lane, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1272).
132. 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. In Lane, the plaintiffs were black females who claimed that
they were discriminated against when they were not promoted within their company.
There was, however, much dispute regarding whether Lane was in fact offered the position
because the "requirements and process of application were ... somewhat disordered." Id.
at 1265. Additionally, after the person hired in that position left Ogden, Lane took on





§ 1981 due to a lack of contractual rights.135 The Fourth Circuit fur-
ther clarified the category; in addition to proving purposeful racial
discrimination, a § 1981 plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory
act violated a specific contract right. 36 The court only cited two cases
in this group, Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co.,1"7 and Hawkins
v. Pepsico Inc.13 8 The Fourth Circuit's response to the decisions of
courts falling into the second category was to declare that " [p] roving
breach of the underlying contract is neither necessary to a successful
§ 1981 claim, nor, standing alone, sufficient to make out such a
claim. ' 139 The court dismissed this second group of cases saying,
quite simply, that although an employer may be acting completely
within his contractual rights, a § 1981 action may still be brought if an
"action is racially discriminatory and affects one of the contractual as-
pects listed in § 1981(b)."14° The court subsequently referred to the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Fadeyi, in which it declared that while there
are instances in which an at-will employee could legitimately be fired,
an illicit cause did not qualify as one of those instances.'41
The court in Sprggs approached this argument from a vastly dif-
ferent perspective than those courts falling in the second category of
cases. The Fourth Circuit took a more practical, policy-based ap-
proach, while courts like Gonzalez and Hawkins took a literalist ap-
proach. In general, the reasoning employed in Spriggs, was more
realistic considering Congress's intent in amending § 1981.142
Both the district court in Hawkins, as well as the Seventh Circuit
in Gonzalez, focused on the fact that neither plaintiff had established a
duration of employment.143 While both courts are technically correct
in stating that there was no contract delineating a duration of employ-
135. 165 F.3d at 1019; see also supra notes 89-90.
136. See Lane, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-20 (providing a brief but profound analysis of
courts rejecting at-will employee claims due to the lack of an enforceable contractual
right).
137. 133 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 1998). In fact, the court did not actually decide the issue of
whether at-will employees could bring a claim under § 1981.
138. 10 F. Supp. 2d 548 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
139. Spiggs, 165 F.3d at 1020.
140. 1&
141. Id.; see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 29-32 (discussing the congressional intent).
143. See Hawkins, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (stating that the "[p ] laintiff had no contract with
respect to the continuation or duration of her employment. Thus, Plaintiffs discrimina-
tory and retaliatory discharge claims do not arise out [sic] a contractual relationship");
Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035 (concluding that "since [the plaintiff] ... was an employee at-
will, and did not have any contractual rights regarding the term of her employment, she
cannot claim that she was discriminated against with respect to [the defendant's] . . .
layoff").
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ment, it does not automatically negate the existence of an overall con-
tract for employment. It appeared that the courts overlooked the
premise on which § 1981 was amended, in concluding that, due to the
absence of an agreement regarding the duration of employment, an
at-will employee is precluded from bringing suit under § 1981.
In contrast, in determining that there is no § 1981 requirement
demanding that a violation of a specific contract right be proven,
44
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning was consistent with Congress's inten-
tions in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991.15 The House Report
discussing the purpose of amending § 1981 expressly states that the
statute is of "particular importance" because it is the "only federal law
banning race discrimination in all contracts. It has been a critically
important tool used to strike down racially discriminatory practices in
a broad variety of contexts. 146 Congress amended the statute specifi-
cally to reverse the effects of the narrow interpretations of the provi-
sions by the Supreme Court in Patterson.'47 Therefore, Congress has
broadened the scope of § 1981. It follows that Congress did not in-
tend to further limit the use of § 1981 by restricting at-will employees
from its protections. The entire premise of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was to curb discriminatory practices. 148 Hence, creating further
restrictions in the application of a statute that was enacted as a direct
response to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation, would not be
consistent with the purpose of amending § 1981.
The majority of courts deciding the issue have agreed with the
reasoning in both Fadeyi and Spriggs.'49 Spriggs briefly touched on all
of the important arguments made on behalf of allowing at-will em-
ployees to bring § 1981 claims, 50 thereby strengthening its preceden-
tial power since the holding cannot be summarily dismissed due to
substantial reliance on a single point of either fact or law.' 5 ' Two dis-
144. In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit recognized that, in Patterson, the Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1020 n.8. The court, however, did not
rely on the Supreme Court's decision due to the undermining effects of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Id,
145. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 93 and 109-111
and accompanying text (discussing the analysis contained within Fadeyi regarding the over-
all purpose of § 1981).
146. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 35 (1991).
147. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 110.
149. See supra notes 41-42 (listing, respectively, cases agreeing and disagreeing with re-
sult reached in Spriggs).
150. See Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1018-20.
151. The Fourth Circuit did not limit its discussion regarding at-will employees bringing
claims under § 1981 to a sole point. Instead, the court discussed a plethora of reasons
supporting its holding, as well as deftly rejecting the reasoning employed by courts reach-
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trict courts, however, have identified limitations on the applicability of
both Fadeyi and Spriggs.
In Curtis v. Dimaio,152 the court for the Eastern District of New
York noted that both circuit court cases were based, at least in part, on
a finding that at-will employment was contractual under the relevant
state law.15 ' The Fourth Circuit in Spriggs did confirm that "Maryland
courts recognize that at-will employment relationships are con-
tracts. ' 154 As support for its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit did refer
to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals's conclusion that "[iun Ma-
ryland, at-will employment is a contract of indefinite duration that can be
terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time."'155 While such
reliance on pertinent state law may be perceived as a liability in citing
Spriggs as persuasive precedent, the district court in Curtis made an
important distinction in recognizing that the Fourth's, as well as the
Fifth Circuit's, decisions were based only in part on the respective state
laws. 156 The Fourth Circuit did not rely solely on Maryland law in de-
termining that at-will employment contracts are actionable under
§ 1981.157 Although the Fifth Circuit devoted substantially more at-
tention to Texas law regarding at-will employment contracts than the
Fourth Circuit, 5 ' Fadeyi is still not in danger of losing its precedential
force since the Fifth Circuit also based its decision rather heavily on
the congressional response to Patterson.159
Upon close examination of the argument against Spriggs and
Fadeyi for their reliance on state law, it becomes apparent that a court
ing the opposite conclusion. The court's analysis consisted of discussions concerning: (1)
the legislative history of § 1981, which includes Patterson and the Civil Rights Act of 1991;
(2) the requirements of a contract-offer, acceptance, and consideration; (3) Maryland
law accepting at-will employment relationships as contracts; (4) congressional intent re-
garding the meaning of "contract"; (5) the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fadeyi; (6) the district
court's misapplication of a previously decided Fourth Circuit decision; and (7) the classifi-
cation of courts deciding the contrary and how the Fourth Circuit rejected their misguided
reasoning. See supra notes 57-90 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning).
Therefore, because the Spriggs court did not limit its discussion to any one aspect, the
holding may not be summarily dismissed due to disagreement with a single point of
analysis.
152. 46 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
153. Id. at 211-12.
154. Spr'ggs, 165 F.3d at 1018.
155. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App.
772, 790, 614 A.2d 1021, 1030 (1992)).
156. Curtis, 46 F.Supp. at 211-12.
157. See supra notes 57-90 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning).
158. See Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1050-51.
159. See id. at 1049-50 (analyzing the legislative history of § 1981); see also supra notes 97-
114 and accompanying text for further discussion of the overall analysis employed in
Fadeyi).
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is essentially stating that a specific contract right must be proven to
have been violated in order to bring a successful claim under § 1981.
Therefore, such cases fall under the second category of cases dis-
cussed in Spriggs, that rejected claims by at-will employees under
§ 1981.16° For instance, the court in Curtis noted that a Missouri dis-
trict court rejected Spriggs and Fadeyi because, in Missouri, the absence
of a durational agreement for employment results in an at-will em-
ployment relationship,161 and the "Missouri Supreme Court [had]
made it clear that a statement of duration is 'an essential element to
an employment contract.'1 62 In fact, the Missouri court was simply
narrowly interpreting § 1981 to exclude at-will employment relation-
ships. Claiming differences in state law disguises the underlying view
that a specific contract right must be shown to have been violated to
prevail under § 1981.
In contrast, in Robinson v. SABIS Educational Systems,' 63 the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois distinguished the
two circuit court cases by commenting that Fadeyi relied heavily on
state law, while Spriggs did not.'6 4 The Robinson court considered
Spriggs to be more persuasive than Fadeyi due to the alleged lack of
reliance on applicable state law overall.' 65 The Fourth Circuit, how-
ever, did rely on Maryland law in making its decision, although it did
not do so entirely. 66 Additionally, the court in Robinson noted the
degree of variance between Illinois and Texas law with respect to at-
will employees.' 67 While it is true that the Fifth Circuit devoted more
attention to Texas law than did the Fourth Circuit to Maryland law, 6 '
the reliance on Maryland law in Spriggs does not warrant an entire
dismissal of the holding.
While both Curtis and Robinson ultimately concluded that at-will
employment relationships did satisfy the contractual requirement in
bringing § 1981 claims,' 69 their observations concerning the reason-
160. See supra notes 135-141 and accompanying text.
161. Curtis, 46 F. Supp. at 212.
162. Id.; see also Jones v. Becker Group of O'Fallon Div., 38 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (E.D.
Mo. 1999) (citing Luethans v. Washington Univ., 894 S.W. 2d 169, 172 (Mo. 1995)).
163. No. 98 C 4251, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9065 (N.D. Il1. June 3, 1999).
164. Id. at *32 n.9.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 57-90 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning).
167. Robinson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9065, at *32 n.9. In a footnote, the court recog-
nized that "Texas state law (unlike Illinois) permits an at-will employee to maintain a tor-
tious interference with contract claim." Id.
168. Compare Fadeyi, 160 F.3d 1048, 1050-52 (5th Cir. 1998), with Spriggs, 165 F.3d 1015,
1018 (4th Cir. 1999).
169. Curtis, 46 F. Supp. at 212; Robinson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *32.
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ing contained in both Fadeyi and Spriggs are significant. It is quite pos-
sible that, when other circuits are confronted with the issue, they will
also take notice of the degree of reliance on state law in both Spriggs
and Fadeyi, just as the court in Robinson did. While many district court
cases have accepted § 1981 claims from at-will employees,17 ° some
courts may, although incorrectly, distinguish both the Fourth and
Fifth Circuit cases on the ground that at-will employment is not con-
tractual under the law of the forum state. The strongest rebuttal to
that argument with regard to Spriggs is that the court did not solely
rely on Maryland law in reaching its final holding.17 ' In fact, the
court's opinion in Spriggs most closely resembles a dim sum of argu-
ments regarding at-will employment relationships satisfying the con-
tractual requirement of § 1981 (b), rather than merely focusing on
one point to support its ultimate conclusion.
5. Conclusion.-The Fourth Circuit's decision in Spriggs has
been consistent with the view of most jurisdictions regarding the issue
as to whether at-will employment relationships satisfy the contractual
requirement under § 1981. In reaching its decision, the court agreed
with the reasoning of the only other circuit to have squarely decided
this precise issue. The acceptance of at-will contracts in bringing
claims under § 1981 is both logical and practical. The legislative in-
tent of Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the
courts' interpretations of the resulting amendments, were correctly
elucidated and applied in Spriggs. That intent encompassed the ex-
pansion of the "make and enforce contracts" phrase of § 1981(b) to
correct the disastrous effects of Patterson. In Spriggs, the Fourth Circuit
employed strong legal analysis, both in its arguments supporting at-
will employees bringing § 1981 claims, as well as in refuting the argu-
ments of courts holding the contrary. Furthermore, the Fourth Cir-
cuit smartly relied on numerous arguments in support of its ultimate
conclusion, which will prevent its holding from being succinctly dis-
missed by a court finding fault with a distinct point of analysis. The
court's analysis will inevitably prove to be a factor in future circuit
court decisions.
MINDY L. CAPLAN
170. See supra note 41.
171. See supra notes 57-90.
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B. The Varying Treatment and Scope of Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements and their Impact on Statutory Employment Rights
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether an arbitration agreement between Waffle House,
Inc. and a former employee was binding on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) when prosecuting a suit in its own
name.2 The Court of Appeals held that the EEOC cannot be com-
pelled, because of an arbitration agreement between the charging
party and their former employer, to arbitrate its claims against that
employer.3 When the EEOC, however, seeks specific monetary relief
for the individual subject to an arbitration agreement, it is precluded
from seeking that relief in a judicial forum.4 The Fourth Circuit, in
addition, decided that the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration
agreement and that the statutory scheme supporting the EEOC's en-
forcement powers did not require it to arbitrate any claim when it
affects its public mission of eradicating discrimination in the work-
place.5 The Court of Appeals's definitive language clarifies what the
EEOC is permitted to enforce and what remedies it is entitled to seek.
The decision substantially eliminates any specific individual relief
outside the arbitrational arena when the charging party's terms of em-
ployment are subject to such an agreement.6 Less clear, however, is
how this decision fits in with the surrounding case law and its impact
on employment relations.
1. The Case.--On June 23, 1994, Erin Baker entered a Waffle
House establishment located in Columbia, South Carolina and filled
out an application for employment.7 The application included an ar-
bitration clause.8 Mr. Baker, the charging party, declined the man-
ager's offer of employment and then subsequently called another
nearby Waffle House and eventually accepted their offer for a position
1. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. at 807 (noting that the employment application had a clause requiring the ap-
plicant to submit to binding arbitration "any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's em-
ployment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or
the terms, conditions or benefits of such employment" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
3. Id. at 806-07.
4. Id. at 807.
5. Id. at 809.
6. See id. at 806-07.
7. See id. at 807.
8. See id.; see also supra note 2 (describing the arbitration clause).
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as a grill cook.9 Two weeks later, at his home, Mr. Baker suffered a
seizure caused by a change in his medication intended to suppress a
seizure disorder stemming from a prior car accident." The following
day, while at work, Mr. Baker suffered another seizure.'" On Septem-
ber 5, 1994, Mr. Baker was terminated by Waffle House.
1 2
Mr. Baker proceeded to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that
his discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA). 1" On September 9, 1996, the EEOC filed an enforcement ac-
tion, in its own name, against Waffle House alleging "unlawful em-
ployment practices at its West Columbia, South Carolina, facility.'
4
The EEOC sought the following forms of relief: a permanent injunc-
tion barring Waffle House from engaging in employment practices
that discriminate based on disabilities; an order that Waffle House in-
stitute and implement anti-discrimination policies, practices, and pro-
grams to create opportunities and to eradicate the effects of past and
present discrimination based on disability; backpay and reinstatement
for Mr. Baker; compensation for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses
by Mr. Baker; and punitive damages.' 5
Waffle House responded by filing a petition under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)' 6 to compel arbitration and to stay the litiga-
tion or, alternatively, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be based.' 7 The motion was referred to a magistrate judge,
who determined that Mr. Baker had entered into a valid arbitration
agreement and that the EEOC was required to arbitrate with Waffle
House the claims that it had filed on behalf of Mr. Baker.'" The dis-
trict court disagreed with the magistrate judge's findings and subse-
9. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807. The court noted that Mr. Baker left blank the line
indicating which position he was seeking. See id. at 808.
10. See id. at 807 (indicating that this condition could have been caused by a change in
Mr. Baker's medication).
11. See id.
12. See id. (noting that in the separation notice Waffle House listed the reason for Mr.
Baker's dismissal-"[w]e decided that for [Baker's] benefit and safety and Waffle House it
would be best he not work any more").
13. See id.; see also Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
14. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that
the EEOC filed this action pursuant to section 107(a) of the ADA).
15. See id.
16. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1990)).
17. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
18. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
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quently denied each of Waffle House's motions.19 Waffle House then
filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of
its motions to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings.20 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was called upon
to resolve the issue of whether and to what extent an arbitration
agreement between private parties binds the EEOC when prosecuting
a suit in its own name.
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Arbitration.-
In enacting the ADA, the United States Congress expanded the en-
forcement powers vested in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2"
As originally enacted, those powers were limited to mere investigatory
and conciliatory functions. 22
Under the new amendments, Congress created a dual system of
enforcement encompassing both private and governmental rights and
remedies and access to dispute resolution forums.23 In fashioning
these remedies, Congress intended to provide for alternative, nonjudi-
cial forums to resolve statutory employment disputes. 24 As the Fourth
Circuit has recognized, however, Congress intended for the EEOC, as
opposed to private remedies, to have dominance in resolving disputes
19. See id, (discussing that the district court determined that the arbitration agreement
contained in Baker's employment application was not applicable because the Waffle House
location that ultimately hired Mr. Baker had not hired him pursuant to his earlier applica-
tion submitted to the Columbia Waffle House facility).
20. See id.
21. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809 (noting widespread noncompliance by employers
that required congressional amendment to Title VII authorizing the EEOC the right to file
suit in its own name in federal court).
22. Id.; see also EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 372 (4th Cir. 1976) (explain-
ing that "[p]rior to the Amendments, the EEOC lacked any 'coercive enforcement pow-
ers'" and that the EEOC's "role was simply that of 'the conferee, conciliator and
uncoercive persuader'" (citations omitted)).
23. See General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d at 373 (noting that "Congress intended by the [1972
Title VIII Amendments to place primary reliance upon the powers of enforcement to be
conferred upon the Commission").
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994) ("Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including . . . arbitration, is en-
couraged to resolve disputes arising under this [Act]."); see also Jan William Sturner, Arbi-
tration, Labor Contracts, and the ADA: The Benefits of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements and an
Update on the Conflict Between the Duty to Accommodate and Seniority Rights, 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE
RoCK L.J. 455, 458 (1999) (quoting United States Representative Dan Glickman (D-Kan.),
the author of section 12212 of the ADA, as stating that "[tihis provision should serve as a
reminder that rights and litigation are not one in the same" and that "[tihere are better
ways to achieve the goals of the ADA than litigation and we should encourage cooperation
in achieving those goals, not confrontation").
2000] 1353
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:1275
and achieving equal employment opportunity." While the legislation
reflects a preference for alternative forms of dispute resolution, Con-
gress did envision limits and restrictions on the use of alternative dis-
pute resolution procedures. An agreement to submit statutory claims
to binding arbitration, therefore, cannot absolutely preclude an in-
jured party from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of
the ADA.2 6 Nor does it prevent the EEOC from conducting its public
mission of eradicating workplace discrimination. 27
In bringing a discrimination suit, under the ADA, the EEOC and
a private party have distinct interests even though those separate inter-
ests may overlap. 28 In enforcing the federal anti-discrimination laws,
therefore, the EEOC does not act merely as a proxy for the charging
party, but rather seeks to advance societal interest in preventing and
remedying discrimination in the workplace. 29 Accordingly, with simi-
lar enforcement powers, under the ADA, as were vested in Title VII,
the EEOC has broad power to enforce the statute's ban on disability-
based discrimination.3 ° The EEOC, thus, sues to vindicate the public
interest, not to redress individual grievances. The validity of an indi-
vidual's claim, regardless of the presence of an arbitration agreement,
cannot preclude an EEOC action.31 This subservience of individual
claims to those of the EEOC is evidenced by the preemption power
the EEOC possesses. 2 In addition, when the EEOC determines to sue
25. See General Elec., 532 F.2d at 373 (detailing the Congressional intent evinced
through the 1972 Amendments).
26. See H.R. REp. No. 101-596, at 89 (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. RIc. H4582, 4606
(daily ed. July 12, 1990) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference)
("[Ulse of alternative dispute resolution procedures is completely voluntary. Under no
condition would an arbitration clause in a ... employment contract prevent an individual
from pursuing their rights under the ADA.").
27. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809 (illustrating the intent of Congress to make the
enforcement powers of the ADA superior to private remedies).
28. See id. at 811. The Fourth Circuit went onto document that the charging party and
the EEOC have "distinct, albeit overlapping, interests for which overlapping remedies are
available." Id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 809 (recognizing the enforcement powers the EEOC was ordained with in
order to accomplish its mission).
31. See EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that "the
standing of the EEOC to sue under Tide VII cannot be controlled or determined by the
standing of the charging party to sue"); see also EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286,
1291 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The EEOC has a right to sue independent of any private plaintiff's
rights."); EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496 (3d Cir. 1990) (observing
that private litigation to which the EEOC is not a party cannot preclude the EEOC from
bringing its own action because private litigants are not vested with authority to represent
the EEOC or its interests).
32. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 810-11 (noting that the aggrieved individual party can-
not preclude the EEOC from pursuing broad based relief for the public betterment); see
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in its own name, the Commission is not limited to the facts of the
particular case.3" Furthermore, once a claim is made with the EEOC,
an individual may not withdraw that claim unless the EEOC gives its
consent.
34
b. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.-The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) was originally enacted in 1925 and was recodified in its
present form in 1947."5 Congress ordained the FAA with the "pur-
pose . . . to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed ... and to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts." 6 Only in the last decade
has the Supreme Court expanded the role of arbitration in the resolu-
tion of legal disputes.37
In 1991, the Supreme Court made clear that the FAA declares a
policy favoring arbitration of disputes of all kinds, including those
stemming from the workplace." This application of the FAA to work-
place disputes seems to have escaped notice by most courts until re-
cently. 9  Those cases, however, involved collective bargaining
also EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496 (3d Cir. 1990) (observing that
"[p]rivate litigation in which the EEOC is not a party cannot preclude the EEOC from
maintaining its own action because private litigants are not vested with the authority to
represent the EEOC" (emphasis added)). The Fourth Circuit noted that the charging
party may intervene in an EEOC suit; however, they may not initiate their own suit, and
intervention is permitted only if the charging party does not feel that the EEOC can ade-
quately represent their needs as it pursues its public objectives. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at
810 (illustrating that this subservience is only applicable when the EEOC is seeking class
wide relief); see Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir.
1995) (concluding that the charging party may not proceed to federal district court until
the EEOC has determined the validity of the charging party's claim).
33. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 810 (observing that "[a]ny violations that [it] ascertains
in the course of a reasonable investigation of the charging party's complaint" are a legiti-
mate basis for an EEOC suit (citing General Tel., 446 U.S. at 331)); see also General Elec., 532
F.2d at 370.
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10.
35. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
36. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting this was a
dispute that arose under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)).
37. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1344 (giving a brief history and overview of prior reluctance to
arbitration and the current trend in modern case law towards a preference for arbitration).
38. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (noting that whether these workplace disputes are statu-
tory or not, arbitration is still an appropriate resolution).
39. See Edwin S. Hopson & Mitzi D. Wyrick, The Impact (Influence) of the Federal Arbitration
Act on Litigation Over Arbitration, 13 LAB. L.Aw. 359, 360 (citing the lack ofjudicial attention
to the FAA in the 1960 trilogy of cases-United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufac-
turing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S.
594 (1960)).
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agreements and the Supreme Court's indecisiveness on the applicabil-
ity of the FAA to those forms of collective agreements."0
Outside the context of collective bargaining agreements, courts
have been more unified in their approval of arbitration agreements.41
This unity is based on the narrow reading of the exclusionary clause of
the FAA which exempts certain classes of workers from arbitration
agreements. 42 In addition, most courts have taken this approach be-
cause "a narrow construction of the exclusionary clause is consistent
with the underlying purpose of the Act, which is to favor arbitration.
The history of the treatment of the Arbitration Act by the Supreme
Court of the United States reflects a clear disposition to liberalize and
expand its application."4
The Supreme Court has determined that statutory discrimination
claims can be referred to arbitration. 44 The Court stated that a judi-
cial forum is not the only proper venue nor is it indispensable to the
fair resolution of statutory discrimination claims.45 This was distin-
guished from the Court's earlier decision that an arbitration agree-
ment did not preclude an employee from vindicating their
discrimination claim in a court of law.4 6 The Court, however, stated
that the rights involved in a collective bargaining agreement are dis-
tinct from those of an individual employee protected by discrimina-
40. See id. at 361-63 (discussing the varying treatment and inconsistency among the
lower courts in resolving arbitration agreements concerning discrimination statutes in col-
lective bargaining agreements); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51
(1974) (noting, in dicta, that a union cannot waive an individual's statutory rights protect-
ing them against discrimination); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25 n.2 (declining to address the
issue of whether section 1 excludes all contracts of employment from coverage of the
FAA).
41. Hopson & Wyrick, supra note 39, at 363-64 n.32; but see Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811
(citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20, which held that an arbitration agreement by an individual
and her employer precluded her from filing suit in a traditional judicial forum).
42. See Asplundh Tree Experts v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that section 1 of the FAA [the exclusionary clause] should be construed narrowly so as not
to apply to employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees, and any other class of
workers involved in the movement of goods in interstate commerce); see also Kropfelder v.
Snap-on Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952, 956 (D. Md. 1994) (stating that courts have gener-
ally limited the section 1 exemption to employees closely related to the actual movement
of goods in interstate commerce (citing Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir.
1971))).
43. Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 601.
44. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (noting that the Court had recently held enforceable
claims under the Sherman Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Securities Act of 1933).
45. Id.
46. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51 (noting that this decision involved a collective bargain-
ing agreement).
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tion statutes. 47 Moreover, no agreement to arbitrate statutory claims
was present in Alexander and additionally, the Alexander decision was
made without guidance from the FAA.48
Furthermore, since the Gilmer decision, courts have not hesitated
in finding discrimination claims subject to arbitration.49 The zealous-
ness to find arbitration clauses applicable to statutory discrimination
claims was fueled by the language of those anti-discrimination stat-
utes.5" This ready acceptance of arbitration agreements has lead to
the development and popularity of mandatory arbitration agree-
ments, like the one present in Waffle House.5 1 In response, numerous
state legislatures have enacted provisions that would render these
forms of arbitration agreements unenforceable.5" The FAA, however,
has been permitted to preempt state law where the state legislatures
seek to limit or to disregard a valid clause in an otherwise enforceable
contract.
53
Thus, the recent fervor towards arbitration agreements, particu-
larly mandatory agreements in the employment context, appears to
47. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1998) (noting
the distinction between an individual waiver of one's statutory discrimination protections
with those rights waived by a collective bargaining agent such as a union); see also Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 34 (stating that this distinction is not eliminated merely because both the stat-
ute and the collective bargaining agreement were violated by the same "factual occur-
rence" (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 40-50)).
48. Cf Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the FAA's liberal pol-
icy favoring arbitration agreements).
49. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487
(10th Cir. 1994) (finding that Title VII claims are compulsory under the FAA); Willis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that enforcement
of an arbitration provision is not precluded by Title VII); Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F.
Supp. 100, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding Title VII claims arbitrable under the FAA); Cherry
v. Wertheim Schroder & Co., 888 F. Supp. 830, 834 (D.S.C. 1994) (same).
50. Hopson & Wyrick, supra note 39, at 366 (citing the statutory provision of both Title
VII and the ADA which provides, "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is en-
couraged to resolve disputes" (footnote omitted)).
51. See supra note 2.
52. See Hopson & Wyrick, supra note 39, at 367 (citing, as an example, a Kentucky
legislature's response to these agreements which provides, "no employer shall require as a
condition or precondition of employment that any employee or person seeking employ-
ment... arbitrate . .. any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or any federal law"
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
53. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987) (holding that a California law that
required certain claims to be adjudicated in a judicial forum was in direct conflict with
section 2 of the FAA which evinces the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and not-
ing under the Supremacy Clause the state law must give way); see also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that where contracting parties agree to arbitrate,
the national policy favoring arbitration trumps a state law to the contrary).
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find statutory support under the FAA. 54 The courts, therefore, have
been increasingly willing to adopt these agreements as long as the par-
ties enter into them knowingly and voluntarily.
c. Gilmer and Its Legacy in Mandatory Arbitration Controver-
sies.-In Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether an employee who entered into a mandatory arbitration, as
part of his employment contract with a major financial institution, was
bound to arbitrate his statutory discrimination claims.55 The Court
analogized the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) 56 with several other federal statutes and concluded that arbi-
tration was appropriate for claims under those acts and that this deci-
sion was in accord with the federal policy favoring arbitration.57 Thus,
the Court solidified the policy of arbitrating statutory claims as long as
there was no express congressional intent to the contrary. 5 This deci-
sion deviates from the aforementioned case law reflecting the Court's
disdain for arbitration clauses. 59 The Gilmer decision provides the cor-
nerstone for the arbitration of statutory claims and has been cited and
relied upon by numerous other courts to find arbitration agreements
binding.6 °
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed the same issue as in Waffle House, but within the context of
an ADEA claim. This dispute arose from the firing of seventeen se-
nior brokers, and the EEOC filed suit to stop this discriminatory pro-
54. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
55. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (explaining that the arbitration clause was part of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) registration requirement).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
57. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (concluding that the public policies behind the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 15 U.S.C. § 10(b), Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, and the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2), were equal to or greater than that of the ADEA).
58. Id. (noting that the burden is on the charging party to establish this intention and
that this process must be tempered with the strong policy favoring arbitration kept in
mind).
59. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51 (holding that an employee cannot waive prospectively
their statutory rights under Tide VII by means of mandatory arbitration clause); see also
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause in a
brokerage contract stating that the Securities Act of 1934 would lose effectiveness in the
hands of arbitrators who lacked the legal training to resolve disputes), overruled in part by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 482 (1989) (declaring
that the right to a judicial forum is a procedural one and is subject to modification by an
arbitration agreement).
60. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text (outlining the lower courts' accept-
ance and reliance upon the Gilmer decision).
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cess.6 1 The EEOC, however, only sought individual compensatory
relief for the aggrieved parties.6 2
As required in the securities industry, all of the former employees
had agreed to submit their claims to binding arbitration.63 Thus, Kid-
der, Peabody & Co., Inc. sought to enforce the agreement that the
parties had entered into, and this motion was granted by the district
court.6 4 The EEOC appealed this decision and the Second Circuit
affirmed the lower court's holding.65 The court in affirming the dis-
trict court noted that although the EEOC and the charging party are
separate and distinct entities, other courts have held consistently that
the EEOC is barred from seeking specific monetary relief when the
charging party has waived, settled, or previously litigated their claim.66
This decision, therefore, is in accord with the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Waffle House and both courts appear to be uniform in their
approach that the EEOC may not seek individual relief when that in-
dividual has bound themselves to arbitration.67
The only other circuit to have addressed this exact issue is the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., Adams, an
African-American woman, applied for a position as Executive Assistant
in the company's Detroit, Michigan Facility. 68 Prior to employment,
Adams was required to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement cover-
ing all claims associated with her employment relationship with
Frank's Nursery & Crafts. 69 Approximately two years later, there was a
change in management, and a new position was created that entailed
similar duties and responsibilities as those held by Adams in her then
61. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d at 300.
62. See id. (noting that Kidder had discontinued their investment banking operations,
thus injunctive relief would be a moot point).
63. See id. (observing that the New York Stock Exchange requires, as a condition of
being able to trade in their market, all licensed brokers sign a U-4 registration form that
includes a pre-dispute arbitration agreement).
64. See id. (stating that the district court relied primarily on Gilmer to reach its
conclusion).
65. Id at 300-01 (holding that to allow the EEOC to obtain individual relief would
frustrate the purpose of the FAA and thus contradict congressional intent).
66. Id. at 301 (citing New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. EEOC, 680 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1982)
(barring recovery based on res judicata grounds)).
67. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812-13; see also Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d at 301;
but see EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the EEOC can seek individual relief despite the submission of the claim to
arbitration).




current position.7 0 Adams, however, was not permitted to apply for
the position and then proceeded to file a complaint with the EEOC.71
In its complaint, the EEOC sought broad injunctive relief, in addition
to personal relief germane to Adams.7" Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.
sought an order compelling Adams to arbitrate her Title VII claims
pursuant to the terms of her employment contract. 73 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement did not bar the
EEOC from pursuing Title VII claims for individualized monetary re-
lief and, in addition, that the EEOC did not have to identify a class to
obtain broad based equitable relief."
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission v. Waffle House, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the arbitration agreement contained in the application
for employment governed the employment relationship between the
plaintiff employee, Mr. Baker, and Waffle House, Inc., and the clause
precluded the EEOC from seeking individual remedies in a judicial
forum.7 5 Nevertheless, in prosecuting a suit in its own name, the
court held that the EEOC cannot be compelled, by reason of an arbi-
tration agreement between the charging party and his former em-
ployer, to arbitrate the broad class based claims permitted under the
ADA.76
After concluding that arbitration is a matter of contract, Judge
Niemeyer, writing for the majority, addressed whether the arbitration
agreement in Mr. Baker's employment application governed his em-
ployment relationship with Waffle House.7 7 The court disagreed with
the district court's conclusion that the arbitration agreement did not
apply to Mr. Baker's employment with Waffle House because Mr.
Baker had completed the application at a different Waffle House
other than the one at which he was ultimately employed.7' The
Fourth Circuit explained that the arbitration agreement in the em-
70. See id. at 453 (explaining that the new vice president for human resources, who was




73. See id. at 453-54.
74. Id. at 454-55 (stating that the EEOC did not contend, on appeal, the issue of
whether the agreement was valid even though they have consistently stated that such
mandatory agreements violate federal law).
75. Waffle House, 193 F.2d at 813.
76. See id. at 812.
77. Id. at 808.
78. See id.
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ployment application did govern the employment relationship be-
cause the two Waffle House locations were not "legally distinct entities
in this context," and the application Mr. Baker completed was the
standard form application used by the Waffle House corporation, and
was not germane to any particular location.79
The court went on to address Waffle House's contention that the
EEOC, on behalf of Mr. Baker, was required to submit any employ-
ment related disputes to binding arbitration." The court rejected
this argument, stating that the EEOC does not merely act as a substi-
tute for the charging party, but rather seeks to enforce a legitimate
governmental interest in erasing employment discrimination.8 1 To
accomplish this public goal, the court noted that Congress chose to
give the EEOC the same enforcement powers under the ADA as it had
given it under Title VII.82 Furthermore, the court stated that by giving
the EEOC more power, Congress created a "dual system of private and
governmental enforcement" with primary reliance on the EEOC to
achieve equal employment opportunity.8 3 The court reasoned that
because of the enormity of the EEOC's public mission and Congress's
intention to deem them the primary vehicle to achieve equal employ-
ment, the EEOC cannot be viewed as merely an "institutional surro-
gate" for individual victim's claims.8 4
The court then asserted that the statutory structure of the ADA
"reflects the notion that the scope of the public interest exceeds that
of the individual's interest."8 5 The court pointed out that a charging
party may not proceed in federal court until the EEOC has permitted
them to do so.8 6 In addition, if the EEOC decides to bring a suit in its
own name, the charging party may not bring their own claim, and
their only redress is limited to intervening in the EEOC's suit.87 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that once the EEOC decides to sue in its
own name, it is not limited to the facts presented by the charging
79. Id. at 808-09.
80. Id. at 809 (noting Waffle House's contention that, under the FAA, it was of no
consequence that the EEOC was bringing the action as opposed to Baker).
81. Id.
82. Id. (noting that because of widespread noncompliance, Congress amended Title




85. Id. at 110.
86. Id.
87. Id. (adding that when a private litigant brings their own suit, the court may under
certain circumstances, permit the EEOC to intervene to protect the national interest).
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party.8" Finally, the court stated that the charging party may not with-
draw their claim absent the EEOC's acquiescence."'
The Waffle House majority also recognized that an EEOC action is
not the only avenue of relief for an injured party.9" The court noted
that private suits are still an appropriate remedy to individual griev-
ances.9" The court explained that the statutory framework of the ADA
allows an individual to intervene in the EEOC's suit if that individual
believes that the EEOC is incapable of adequately representing their
needs.92 Thus, as evidenced by the aforementioned statutory scheme,
the court concluded that Congress did not intend for the EEOC and
the charging party to be "interchangeable plaintiffs."9 3 Instead, each
party "has its own distinct, albeit overlapping interests." 4 Therefore,
according to the court, in determining whether the EEOC is bound by
an arbitration clause in an employee's contract, the correct approach
is "to examine the related, but independent, interests of both the
EEOC and the charging party to determine how an arbitration agree-
ment signed by the charging party affects the prosecution of a claim
by the EEOC." 5
In addressing this issue, the Waffle House court first noted that
neither the ADA nor Title VII requires the EEOC to arbitrate any
claim brought before it.96 The court also stated that neither of the
two other circuits that have addressed this issue found that the EEOC
is required to arbitrate. 7 The court went on to note that even the
Supreme Court has implicitly rejected the notion that the EEOC is
bound by a private arbitration agreement. 8 The Waffle House court
explained that although the Supreme Court held that a private arbi-
tration does bar an individual claimant from filing suit, the Court
stated that this does not prevent the aggrieved individual from filing a
charge with the EEOC.9 9 The Waffle House court, therefore, con-
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1999)).
90. Id. (noting that Congress preserved an individual's private remedies under Title
VII and therefore under the ADA).
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id. at 810-11.
94. Id. at 811.
95. Id.
96. Id. (explaining that Congress clearly intended for the EEOC to attempt concilia-
tion and then, if that failed, to pursue its claim in federal court).
97. See id. (citing EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 462 (6th Cir.
1999); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1998)).
98. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
99. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).
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cluded that because the EEOC can accomplish societal based goals
that individual claimants are incapable of realizing, and that to bind
the EEOC to a private arbitration agreement would violate the statu-
tory intent of the ADA and Title VII,100 the EEOC cannot be com-
pelled to arbitrate a claim because of a private agreement to do so
between an employee and employer.
The Waffle House majority next turned to the issue of whether the
EEOC could obtain reinstatement, compensatory, and punitive dam-
ages on behalf of Mr. Baker. 10 1 The court began by reiterating the
importance of the role that the EEOC plays in eradicating workplace
discrimination, but concluded that this role is not absolute. 10 2 The
court recognized that when an individual and an employer agree to
submit employment disputes to arbitration, it is the federal policy to
enforce that agreement.'0 3 Thus, according to the majority, to allow
the EEOC to prosecute Baker's individual claim, something that Mr.
Baker could not do himself, would emasculate the strong federal pol-
icy in favor of arbitration. 04 The court noted that only a "stronger,
competing policy could justify allowing the EEOC to do for Baker
what Baker could not have done for himself' and concluded that this
was not such an instance.' While the court recognized that the
EEOC does act in the public interest even when enforcing only the
charging party's claim, it noted that the public interest is significantly
less when the EEOC seeks relief "specific to a charging party" rather
than large scale injunctive relief.'0 6 Therefore, juxtaposing the com-
peting policies of arbitration and eradicating discrimination, the
court concluded that when seeking relief in its own name, the EEOC
is limited by an arbitration agreement only with regard to the type of
relief that it may seek.'0 7 When the EEOC is not a party to the arbitra-
tion agreement, however, their access to seek broad injunctive relief
or their ability to institute a proceeding in federal court is not ham-
pered or altered by a private arbitration agreement. 0 8
100. Id. at 811-12.
101. Id. at 812.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (noting that Mr. Baker's own suit would be barred, in federal court, by the
arbitration agreement contained in his contract for employment).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 812-13.




a. Introduction.--In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Waffle House, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the EEOC may not be compelled, by a private arbi-
tration agreement, to arbitrate the statutory claims of a charging
party, but the relief the EEOC seeks will be limited to broad injunctive
relief when the charging party has entered into a valid contractual
relationship with their employer to arbitrate disputes arising from
their employment relationship.1"9 This decision strikes a balance be-
tween the competing interests of the federal policy of promoting alter-
native dispute resolution and enforcing federal statutes aimed at
promoting the public good. This balance is consistent with the ex-
isting policy and, moreover, is beneficial to the area of employment
law.
b. The Transition Away from the Traditional Treatment of Arbitra-
tion Clauses.--Traditionally, arbitration has been met by the courts
with great disdain. 110 Accordingly, Congress enacted the FAA at the
behest of the American Bar Association (ABA)."' Even though the
FAA placed arbitration agreements on the same level as that of other
contracts, the Supreme Court still showed some distaste towards these
types of agreements.' 1 2 Nevertheless, at present, the concept of arbi-
tration has gained widespread judicial acceptance.' 13 Accordingly, ar-
bitration clauses have found their way into employment contracts
often as a condition of employment with a particular employer." 4
They are referred to as mandatory arbitration agreements or pre-dis-
109. Id. at 807.
110. SeeJeffrey Robert White, Mandatory Arbitration: A Growing Threat, TiuAL,Jul. 1, 1999,
at 32-36 (noting the common law hostility towards arbitration by citing examples of courts
refusing to offer specific performance of arbitration awards and allowing revocation of
arbitration agreements at any time prior to arbitrator's decision).
111. See id. at 32-33 (citing the reason for the ABA's lobbying was due to businesses
requesting an alternative to judicial resolution of claims because it was argued that the
courts were unfamiliar with and did not understand business practices and practicalities).
112. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting prior decisions refusing to en-
force arbitration agreements).
113. SeeWhite, supra note 110, at 33 (noting recent Supreme Court holdings that evince
a trend towards favoring arbitration); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985) (declaring that the federal policy in favor of arbi-
trating disputes should be emphatically followed).
114. See Estreicher, supra note 39, at 1345-55 (detailing the securities industries wide-
spread use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition to employment). Professor
Estreicher also stated that the NASD, the main regulatory body in the securities industry,
proposed eliminating the use of these clauses in their agreements. Id.; see also George
Gunset, Securities Group Yields on Suits, CHi. TRm., Aug. 8, 1997, § 3, at 1.
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pute agreements t 15 and these agreements are the farthest extension
of the federal policy favoring alternative dispute resolution."
16
The Fourth Circuit in Waffle House followed this strong federal
policy with one notable exception: The court favored the EEOC's
public mission of eradicating employment discrimination, through
broad injunctive relief, over the individual arbitration agreement en-
tered into by the charging party and his or her employer. 1 7 This ex-
ception suggests that arbitration has its limits, and while it can be
effective for remedying individual claims, arbitration is inadequate
when seeking broader, public interest goals." 8 It has been recog-
nized, however, that arbitration of statutory employment claims can
accomplish public good when addressing individual needs.119 A deci-
sion, however, that a private arbitration agreement precludes the
EEOC the right to vindicate the public interest would open the flood-
gates to widespread noncompliance and effectively render the EEOC
a nonentity.
1 20
The EEOC's separate role from that of the charging party has
been well established in the law. 121 Thus, the fact that the charging
party's avenue to redress is required to proceed through the arbitra-
tional gambit does not bind the EEOC to follow this route. 122 In addi-
tion, the EEOC may seek injunctive relief despite some private party's
115. See Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC's Policy Against Mandatory
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 151, 153 (1999) (defin-
ing mandatory arbitration agreements as requiring as a term or condition of employment,
that all disputes arising from employment or the termination of employment, including
statutory employment discrimination claims, be resolved through mandatory, binding
arbitration).
116. See Estreicher, supra note 39, at 1347 (noting the controversy surrounding the valid-
ity of "predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims").
117. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812 (noting that arbitration agreements to which the
EEOC are not a party cannot bind the EEOC in a suit brought in their own name).
118. See id, (explaining when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale injunctive relief, the pub-
lic interest outweighs the federal policy favoring arbitration).
119. Id. at 812-13.
120. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809 (noting widespread noncompliance prior to the
amendments to Title VII, at which time the EEOC did not have authority to prosecute
claims in its own name).
121. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. at 318, 331 (1980) (noting that the
EEOC is not a proxy for the charging party).
122. Cf Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(stating that the government is not barred from maintaining an independent action asking
a court to enforce a federal statute implicating both public and private interests merely
because independent private litigation has also been commenced or concluded); Donovan
v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1462 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing the principle that the
U.S. "will not be barred from independent litigation by the failure of the private plaintiff's
action" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. East Baton Rouge
Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1979))); EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d
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action that has impaired that party's own discrimination suit. 123 Fur-
thermore, courts have recognized that the EEOC may bring a suit, in
its own name, even when the injured party has settled their claim. 124
The EEOC may also bring a suit where the charging party's suit has
been adversely resolved by judicial action. 125 Thus, it is apparent that
the EEOC has ample authority to bring a suit to seek injunctive relief
regardless of the charging party's actions.
Barring the EEOC from seeking individual compensatory relief
on behalf of the charging party is also consistent with existing law.
This issue, however, has only been addressed by two other courts.126
With the two other circuit courts addressing this topic split on the
appropriate outcome, the discussion turns to equitable considerations
concerning the fragile employer/employee relationship.
The decision not to allow the EEOC to seek individual relief and
limiting it to injunctive relief appears to be in the best interests of the
employment world. As mentioned before, the EEOC has the daunt-
ing duty of eradicating workplace discrimination, 127 and it has been
held that this duty can be accomplished effectively through injunctive
relief.128 The fact that arbitration has been mistrusted and it has
taken so long to be accepted universally by the judiciary is an indicator
of how slowly the wheels of justice turn.
The basis for this longstanding judicial hostility stems from the
common law mistrust of arbitration and all of the mis-perceptions sur-
rounding the process. 12' These misplaced, but laudable reasons for
359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (observing that the EEOC's standing to sue cannot be determined
or controlled by the standing of the charging party).
123. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the EEOC's right to bring a suit cannot be compromised by an individual's action
impairing their own suit); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Goodyear Aero-
space, 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
124. See EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark, Inc., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (1975) (stressing that be-
cause the EEOC did not agree to the charging party's settlement, the EEOC was not privy
to or bound by that settlement).
125. See Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d at 1292 (holding that an EEOC claim under the
ADEA was not properly dismissed simply because the charging party's claim had been dis-
posed of through summary judgment).
126. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that an arbitration agreement did not bar the EEOC from seeking either individual or class
wide relief); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (conclud-
ing that the EEOC was limited to seeking class based equitable relief).
127. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809.
128. See id. at 812-13 (holding that the broad based relief sought by the EEOC was ap-
propriate for judicial determination and, in addition, finding that any individual relief
sought by the EEOC on behalf of Mr. Baker must be had in the arbitrational forum).
129. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text (describing the history and reason for
the FAA).
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the reluctance of the courts to enforce arbitration clauses were pre-
mised on two notions. The first is the idea of a general public policy
argument against these forms of contractual clauses. 13' The second
involves the actual physical process of arbitration and the historical
problems associated with it.
c. The Public Policy Argument Regarding Arbitration Clauses.-
This public policy argument against arbitration clauses first originated
in the early 1950s, in the context of a sale of securities, and quickly
gained widespread acceptance among the lower courts.1 3' The reason
for this quick acceptance was the idea that such a public issue should
be addressed in a public forum as opposed to the private arbitrational
arena.1 32 It was not long before this approach was applied to other
federal statutes.133 Eventually, the application of this public policy ex-
ception to the enforcement of arbitration clauses found its way onto
the newly enacted civil rights statutes and thus took on a new dimen-
sion. 34 Ultimately, pre-dispute arbitration agreements could not be
enforced to preclude any statutory civil rights claim.' 35
Nevertheless, support for this public policy exception has waned
in recent years, and the logic surrounding the exception has been
130. See Primm, supra note 115, at 154 (noting that "for nearly thirty years after the
enactment of the FAA, the court consistently applied a broad 'public policy exception' to
the statutory rule of presumptively enforcing arbitration agreements").
131. See id. (noting that the first application of the public policy argument for refusing
to enforce arbitration agreements occurred in the context of an arbitration clause in a
brokerage agreement, but that the argument "gained prompt and widespread acceptance
by [other] courts").
132. See id. (discussing the Second Circuit's decision in American Safety Equipment Corp. v.
JP. Maguire & Co., 371 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)).
133. See id. (noting that "the reasoning underlying [the line of cases applying the public
policy exception to arbitration clauses in securities and antitrust cases] was subsequently
applied to reject compelled arbitration under a number of other federal statutes").
134. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (holding that an
employee's right to a trial under Title VII is not foreclosed because of the prior submission
of his claim to arbitration); see also Primm, supra note 115, at 155 (noting that twenty years
after the first decision recognizing a public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses, "a separate line of civil rights cases emerged to rein in the national policy
favoring arbitration").
135. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49 (holding that "Title VII's purposes and procedures
strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first
pursues his grievance to final arbitration"). The Supreme Court, in addition, has held that
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act cannot "be abridged by contract or otherwise
waived because this would 'nullify the purposes' of the statute." Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981).
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refuted. 11 6 Even though this exception has been rejected by most
courts, the EEOC has recently reiterated their adamant stance against
mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context.3 7
The EEOC has taken the approach that mandatory arbitration of em-
ployment disputes is "contrary to the fundamental principles" of em-
ployment law.' Additionally, the EEOC believes that the federal
government, or more appropriately the EEOC, should be the sole or-
ganization to enforce employment laws.' 39 Unfortunately, this posi-
tion has created tremendous strain between the EEOC and the
judiciary with the ultimate harm coming to the employer and
employee.140
The courts that have addressed this issue have consistently held
that the public interest in obtaining individual relief is substantially
less than when the EEOC seeks injunctive relief.' Thus, if the public
interest is substantially less, and if refusing to enforce the arbitration
clause would frustrate another equal, if not superior, federal policy,
then it appears logical to allow the individual to seek their own redress
in their chosen forum. 1
42
d. Capability of Arbitrational Forum. -The arbitrational forum
is as equally qualified to deal with statutory employment disputes as
the courts are and in fact may be better equipped to do so.' 43 The
136. See Primm, supra note 115, at 155-56 (noting that as the legal profession became
increasingly comfortable with arbitration, courts began to reject the public policy excep-
tion to enforce arbitration clauses).
137. See EEOC NOTICE, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employ-
ment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (hereinafter Policy State-
ment) (visited Jan. 30, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.txt>.
138. Id at 1.
139. See id at 3 (explaining that if private organizations were permitted to resolve claims
it would lead to a lack of public accountability and ultimately harm the employee).
140. See Primm, supra note 115, at 160 (noting that the EEOC's position on arbitration
clauses in employment contracts is "in stark opposition to the judiciary" and "the rift be-
tween the courts and the EEOC is troublesome for employers and employees alike").
141. See Waffle House, Inc. v. EEOC, 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
legally entered-into arbitration agreement can preclude the EEOC from seeking individual
relief); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
that an arbitration agreement precluded any individual relief being received through an
action instituted by the EEOC); but see EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d
448, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement cannot pre-
clude the EEOC from seeking either individual or broad based relief).
142. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d at 300 (noting the strong policy favoring
arbitration and the inconsistency that would result if the EEOC were allowed to obtain
individual relief for a party who would not be otherwise able to).
143. See Sturner, supra note 24, at 465-68 (outlining the benefits of using arbitration to
settle ADA claims); see also Primm, supra note 115, at 161-76 (rejecting the common myths
and misnomers concerning arbitration as promulgated by the EEOC).
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hostility towards arbitration is based on antiquated notions of dispa-
rate bargaining powers, biased arbitrators, insufficient discovery, and
lack of written opinions to enable precedential value. 44 All of the
arguments against using arbitration can be sufficiently addressed in
the future by following certain guidelines. 45 These guidelines in-
clude placing no restriction on the right to file charges with the ap-
propriate administrative agency, 14 providing a reasonable forum for
arbitration, 47 having a competent arbitrator who knows the laws in
question, 4 ' ensuring a fair and simple method for exchange of infor-
mation, 49 providing a fair method of cost sharing to ensure afforda-
ble access to the system for all employees,15 ° having the right to
independent representation if requested by the employee,15 ' requir-
ing a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation,
ensuring a written award explaining the arbitrator's rationale for the
result, 152 and providing limited judicial review sufficient to ensure
that the result is consistent with applicable law.' 53 With these guide-
144. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29-33 (1991) (discussing
the past rationale for invalidating arbitration agreements).
145. Estreicher, supra note 39, at 1349-50 (arguing that "if properly designed, private arbi-
tration can complement public enforcement and, at the same time, satisfy the public inter-
est objective of various statutes governing the employment relationship" (emphasis
added)).
146. See id. at 1349 (including this as one of the "essential [arbitration] safeguards"); see
also EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that
an employee may not contract away his or her right to file a complaint because to do so
would violate public policy).
147. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT.
REV. 331, 388 (suggesting that employers should not be able, by means of an arbitration
clause to compel claimants to litigate in a distant, inconvenient forum).
148. See American Arbitration Association (AAA), National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes(Including Mediation and Arbitration Rules) (1997) <http://
www.adr.org/rules/employment.rules.html> (visited Jan. 30, 2000) [hereinafter AAA
Rules]. Rule Il(a)(i) of the AAA 1997 Rules requires that "[a]rbitrators serving under
these rules shall be experienced in the field of employment law." Id. at 8.
149. See Estreicher, supra note 39, at 1350 (realizing that unless provided for in the con-
tractual agreement there is no right to discovery, but also recognizing the ability of the
parties to provide for an expanded method of discovery in their contract negotiations).
150. See White, supra note 110, at 34 (noting that arbitration costs can be considerable,
including an initial filing fee of up to $5000 plus $350 per hour for the arbitrator, typically
for 15 to 40 hours of work all required to be paid in advance).
151. See Estreicher, supra note 39, at 1360.
152. See AAA Rules, supra note 148, at 13. Rule 4 of the AAA 1997 Rules provides that
"[t]he award shall be in writing and shall be signed by a majority of the arbitrators and
shall provide the written reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise." Id.
153. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) (stating
.although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is suffi-
cient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statutes at issue" (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987))).
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lines in place, the arbitration process can be an inexpensive, expedi-
ent, and private alternative to judicial intervention.
5. Conclusion.-In Waffle House, the Fourth Circuit has followed
the recent and foreseeable trend in statutory employment claims. 154
This trend demonstrates the use of and preference for mandatory ar-
bitration agreements to govern the respective rights of injured individ-
uals. In reaching this decision, however, the court has made it clear
that such arbitration agreements would not hinder the EEOC or any
other governmental agency or policy from accomplishing their respec-
tive tasks. 155 In doing so, the court is merely illustrating the prefer-
ence shown by the courts and legislatures for private adjudication of
contractual disputes. This decision, reflective of the recent trend, is
bound to refine existing case law. While it is true that the EEOC can-
not be bound by a private arbitration agreement, to which it is not a
party, the arbitrational forum is sufficiently capable of addressing the
individual needs of those employees who have been harmed by dis-
crimination in the workplace. Therefore, as long as an arbitration
agreement is entered into voluntarily and knowingly and complies
with other contractual principles, then the strong federal policy of al-
lowing the arbitration of employment claims should persist.15 6
DANA ALAN GAUSEPOHL
154. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (uphold-
ing the validity of an arbitration agreement found in an employment context); see also
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (enforcing the arbitration
agreement as it pertains to the EEOC seeking broad equitable relief).
155. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811-12 (holding that the EEOC could pursue a discrim-
ination claim under the ADA without being required to submit to arbitration, despite the
presence of an arbitration agreement between the employer and the charging party).
156. Id. at 808-09 (concluding that arbitration is a matter of contract and that all the
principles of contract law apply to the applicability and validity of arbitration agreements).
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